

A COMPREHENSIVE
HISTORY OF INDIA,
CIVIL, MILITARY, AND SOCIAL,

FROM

THE FIRST LANDING OF THE ENGLISH,
TO THE SUPPRESSION OF THE SEPOY REVOLT;

INCLUDING

AN OUTLINE OF THE EARLY HISTORY OF HINDOOSTAN.

By HENRY BEVERIDGE, Esq.,

ADVOCATE.

ILLUSTRATED BY ABOVE FIVE HUNDRED ENGRAVINGS.

DIVISION VI.



LONDON:
BLACKIE AND SON, WARWICK SQUARE, E. C.;
AND GLASGOW AND EDINBURGH.

MDCCCLX.

GLASGOW:
W. G. BLACKIE AND CO., PRINTERS,
VILLAFIELD.



Vellore was now in the crisis of its fate. Not one day's grain was in store, and the garrison had for some time been subsisting on grain purchased in distant villages, and brought in by stealth on dark nights. The approaching moonlight would deprive them of this resource, and the commandant had made Sir Eyre Coote aware that the only alternative which remained was either to throw in an immediate supply, or make a movement to cover the escape of the garrison. While in the north among the polygars, a small surplus of rice had been obtained and reserved for the relief of Vellore. Sir Eyre determined to make a last effort, and advanced by three marches from his encampment among the hills. Hyder on this occasion betrayed his fear of another general encounter by retiring to the other side of the Paliar; and Vellore was saved for the present by a supply of rice adequate to six weeks' consumption. After this most seasonable relief, Sir Eyre Coote was obliged for his own subsistence to return to the Pollams, a district of which Chittoor, situated twenty miles N.N.W. of Vellore, might be considered the capital. This place was reported to be the intermediate depôt of the provisions sent to the enemy through the Damaracherla Pass, and as its strength was not great Sir Eyre Coote laid siege to it, and took it in four days. Great, however, was his disappointment on finding that it contained no grain. As it would be impossible to subsist in this country during the monsoon, it was necessary to retire. The direction chosen was Tripassore, which it was necessary to relieve from a siege, and at which the army arrived on the 22d of November, 1781, after a forced march over an incipient inundation. The whole march from Chittoor was distressing. The food was so scanty that one-half of the army fasted alternately from day to day, and multitudes of camp followers died of starvation. Meanwhile the monsoon broke, the country became inundated, cattle and their stores were lost, an excellent corps of cavalry formed from the wreck of Mahomed Ali's horse were deprived of nearly half their numbers, and many of the followers not cut off by famine perished in the swollen streams. From Tripassore the army continued its march southwards, and finally entered into cantonments in the neighbourhood of Madras. The campaign, notwithstanding its dazzling triumphs, had yielded no solid advantages. The enemy was still in almost undisputed possession of the country, and the prospect of driving him from it was faint indeed.

A.D. 1781.

Critical state
of Vellore.Starvation
in the Bri-
tish army.

While Hyder was personally conducting the campaign in the north of the Carnatic, his troops were not inactive in the south. Shortly after his invasion he had made an incursion into the provinces of Trichinopoly and Tanjore, and subjected the greater part of both to his dominion. In Tanjore, in particular, with the exception of the capital, around which he had for the distance of about twelve miles drawn his usual circle of devastation, he was in undisturbed possession of the whole country, and drew the revenues as regularly as those of Mysore. On the commencement of British hostilities with the Dutch, he immediately concluded a defensive treaty with them, by which reciprocal co-

State of
affairs in
Trichino-
poly and
Tanjore.

A.D. 1781.

Affairs of
Trichino-
poly and
Tanjore.

operation was stipulated, and in return for the cession of Nagore and other possessions of the Company to the Dutch, and the promise of providing for the security of Negapatam, they undertook to assist him in maintaining his ground in Tanjore, and eventually in obtaining possession of its capital. Previous to this treaty the Company had made considerable exertions to collect a field-force in Tanjore, and given the command of it to Colonel Braithwaite, who as soon as he felt himself strong enough to leave the capital in which he had been shut up, attempted the capture of some of the nearest posts. In two of these attempts he failed, and having been wounded, was obliged to resign the command to Colonel Nixon, who, by means of reinforcements, was enabled to take the field at the head of 3500 men. By placing his officers and sergeants at the head of the forlorn hope he captured two forts, but sustained so heavy a loss that he hesitated to attempt a third. Meanwhile, Colonel Braithwaite had recovered, and having resumed the command, attacked a body of Hyder's troops double his own in number, and drove them in disorder and with great loss from a fortified position.

Siege and
capture of
Negapatam.

Sir Hector Monro, who had been acting as second in command to Sir Eyre Coote, and doing good service, had retired soon after the battle of Pollilore on the plea of ill health, and proceeded to Madras, with the view of sailing for England. It was believed that the ostensible cause of his retirement was not the real one, and that he had taken offence at a harsh answer given by Sir Eyre Coote to some advice which he tendered him. Being thus still fit for duty he had easily been persuaded by Lord Macartney to assume the direction of the siege of Negapatam. The requisite equipments for this purpose were embarked in the fleet under Sir Edward Hughes, and arrived at Nagore, a few miles northward, on the 20th of October, 1781. To assist in the siege, Colonel Braithwaite, after returning to his command in the city of Tanjore, gave his disposable troops to Colonel Nixon, who arrived on the 21st, and made a successful attack on the enemy's troops when evacuating Nagore. The siege of Negapatam was afterwards conducted with much skill and spirit. On the 3d of November the trenches were opened, and the place capitulated. What added to the honour of the capture was the disproportion between besiegers and besieged. The former never exceeded 4000; the latter, including a number of Hyder's troops who had joined according to treaty, were not less than 8000. Immediately after the surrender, the monsoon set in, and placed the fleet in imminent danger; but towards the close of the year the weather permitted the embarkation of marines and sailors, who had been landed to assist in the siege, and the fleet having on board a detachment of volunteer sepoys and artillerymen, sailed for Ceylon, when it effected the capture of Trincomalee.

The period to which Vellore had been provisioned having expired, Sir Eyre Coote, though he had previously intimated his intention to resign, and was still suffering from illness, determined to undertake its relief in person. On the 2d

of January, 1782, he joined the army, now encamped a little beyond Tripassore; on the morning of the 5th, when his servant entered, he found him senseless. He had been struck by apoplexy. The Madras government, anxious to save so valuable a life, urged his immediate conveyance to Madras, and were not a little astonished to learn that on the very next morning, the 6th, having so far recovered as to admit of his being carried by palanquin, he had started with the army for Vellore. On the 9th, Hyder made his appearance, but found all the arrangements so skilfully made, that his meditated attack was abandoned, and on the 11th, the very day which the commandant had declared to be the last on which he could hold out, Vellore was victualled anew for other three months. The army commenced its return on the 13th, and Hyder, by the boldness of his movements, seemed determined to risk a general action. It proved only a feint, and Tripassore was reached without incident.

A. D. 1781.

Provisions
thrown into
Vellore.

Malabar had also been the scene of military operations. In 1780, when the war was just commenced, Hyder detached a force for the reduction of Tellicherry, which was now the only possession of the Company on that coast. This place, though very imperfectly fortified and garrisoned, was enabled by timely aid from Bombay to make a protracted defence, and by the arrival of reinforcements under Major Abington, on the 18th of January, 1782, to raise the siege by a brilliant achievement—the capture of all the enemy's cannon, amounting to sixty pieces, all their baggage, equipments, and above 1200 prisoners, including the Mysorean general, Sirdar Khan.

Successful
defence of
Tellicherry.

This success of the Company on the Malabar coast was counterbalanced by a disaster in Tanjore. Here Colonel Braithwaite had succeeded in re-establishing the rajah's authority. Unfortunately, he gave credit to intelligence which had been given solely for the purpose of misleading, and remained encamped with 2000 men on a plain, till, unconscious even of the enemy's approach, he allowed himself to be entirely surrounded. He attempted to retreat, and was ably seconded by his officers and troops. All, however, proved unavailing, and he shared a fate very similar to that of Colonel Baillie. M. Lally, whose fortune it was to be present on both occasions, again exerted himself to arrest the carnage and give succour to the wounded.

Destruction
of a British
detachment
in Tanjore.

While gains and losses were thus counterbalancing each other on both sides, all the combatants were giving way to gloomy anticipations. The British were aware that a strong body of French troops might soon be expected, and reflecting on how little advantage they had yet gained in the struggle, knew not how they would be able to maintain it at all, when, in addition to Hyder's immense numerical superiority, they would be obliged to cope with some of the best-disciplined troops of Europe. Hyder, on the other hand, imputing their long-delayed arrival to mere evasion, had almost ceased to hope for it. At the same time he knew that the confederacy had already been broken up. Nizam Ali had been bought off by the restoration of Guntoor, and Moodajee Bhonsla by a large

Results of
the cam-
paign.

A. D. 1782.

Hyder's
opinion of
the British
resources.

sum of money; while Mahadajee Scindia had been induced to withdraw, partly by liberal promises, and partly by the dread of being obliged to carry on the war in the centre of his own territories, and at his own cost. The Mahrattas of Poonah, too, were on the eve of concluding peace with the Company. Hyder, while pondering over these events and his future prospects, is said to have thus expressed himself to his minister Poornea:—"Between me and the English there were perhaps mutual grounds of dissatisfaction, but no sufficient cause for war, and I might have made them my friends in spite of Mahomed Ali, the most treacherous of men. The defeat of many Baillies and Braithwaites will not destroy them. I can ruin their resources by land, but I cannot dry up the sea; and I must be first weary of a war in which I can gain nothing." The result of his reflections was a determination to abandon his scheme of conquest in the east, concentrate his force, and to devote his attention, first, to the expulsion of the British from the western coast, and afterwards to the preservation of his own dominions. In accordance with these views, he began, in the early part of 1782, to demolish his minor posts in Coromandel, mined the fortifications of Arcot preparatory to blowing them up, sent off all his heavy guns and stores, and forced the inhabitants of the Carnatic who were in his power to emigrate with their flocks and herds to Mysore.

Arrival of a
French force.

His determination to move to the west was probably precipitated by a general rebellion of the Nairs of Malabar, and of the Rajahs of Bullum and Coorg, whose territories lie along the summits of the Western Ghauts, overlooking that province. Before setting off in person, he despatched three strong detachments, one under Mukhdom Ali to Malabar, another under Woffadar to Coorg, and the third under Sheik Ayaz, generally named in English accounts Hyat Sahib, to Bullum. He was vigorously carrying out his scheme by a thorough spoliation of the Carnatic, and in a few days would have sprung the mines of Arcot and departed, leaving nothing but ruin behind him. Even then his absence would have been a great deliverance, but those who looked for it were not at this time to see it realized. On the 10th of March, 1782, a French force of 3000 men, including a regiment of Africans, landed at Porto Novo, and produced a complete revolution in Hyder's plans. Having satisfied himself by a personal interview with Admiral Suffrein, and M. Cossigny, who commanded the troops, that a still larger division, under the command of the celebrated Marquis of Bussy, might be expected, he concerted with them the operations that were to be prosecuted in the interval. The most important of these was the reduction of Cuddalore, which was to be used as a French depôt.

The French fleet, consisting of twelve ships of the line and eighteen other ships, chiefly transports, had made the coast considerably to the north of Pulicat, the same day that Sir Edward Hughes, on his return from the capture of Trincomalee, anchored with six ships in the roads of Madras. M. Suffrein, believing that these constituted the whole British fleet, set sail in the hope of being able to

surprise it in the open roads, and effect its destruction. Fortunately, three other ships of the line had arrived from England, and Sir Edward Hughes, though still numerically inferior, was not afraid to risk the encounter. M. Suffrein hesitated, and on standing away to the southward, was followed by the British fleet, which succeeded in capturing six transports, one of them the more valuable that it was laden with troops intended for M. Bussy. It was immediately subsequent to this action that the French admiral landed at Porto Novo the troops already mentioned. Afterwards he proceeded to Point de Galle, which had been fixed as the rendezvous of the scattered convoy; while the English admiral sought the opposite extremity of Ceylon, and anchored in the harbour of Trincomalee to repair the damages of his ships, most of them having suffered severely. This done, he returned to Madras early in March.

A. D. 1782.

Engagement
between the
British and
French
fleets.

About the same time with the French armament, another, having the same destination, sailed from England. Both armaments met with misfortunes, but those of the French greatly preponderated. A convoy, carrying the first division of the troops intended for M. Bussy, was captured by Admiral Kempenfelt, in December, 1781, and a second shared the same fate in April, 1782. Both armaments had the Cape of Good Hope for their first destination, the object of the French being to continue that settlement in the hands of the Dutch, their new allies, and that of the British to wrest it from them. Admiral Suffrein arrived first, and anchored in Simon's Bay, situated in the bottom of False Bay, to the eastward of the Cape. The British squadron, having captured a Dutch ship when nearing the Cape, obtained intelligence which enabled them to capture a number of Dutch Indiamen in Saldanha Bay. As the previous arrival of the French had frustrated the intended attack on Cape Town, Commodore Johnstone returned with the prizes and three frigates to England, and left the remainder of the squadron thus crippled, by being deprived of its frigates, to proceed for Bombay. In making this voyage, a fifty-gun ship, accidentally separated, was taken by the French. The other three ships already mentioned as having joined Sir Edward Hughes in Madras Roads previous to his action, belonged to this squadron. These ships had on board, under General Medows, part of the troops intended to reinforce the Madras army. The other part of the troops intended for the same purpose were employed on the western coast, in consequence of an open rupture between Sir Eyre Coote and Lord Macartney. To this unfortunate quarrel a brief reference must be made.

Proceedings
at the Cape
of Good
Hope.

Sir Eyre Coote's powers were not well defined. He was commander-in-chief of all the king's and Company's troops in India. He was also a member of the supreme council of Bengal, and at the same time, when acting within its territories, a member of the council of Madras. In the latter capacity he had only a single vote, and was bound by the decision of the majority, but in the other capacity, and more especially in that of commander-in-chief, he was

A.D. 1782.

Misunder-
standings
between
Sir Eyre
Coote and
Lord Ma-
cartney.

not disposed to admit that a subordinate presidency had any right to interfere with him. For a time Lord Macartney left him entirely to his own judgment, and matters went on smoothly; but at last some degree of interference could not be avoided, and a collision took place. When the arrangements for the Dutch captures were made, Sir Eyre Coote was in the field, and was not consulted. He complained of this as an invasion of his constitutional authority as commander-in-chief of all the presidencies. This was rather unreasonable. Another complaint was better founded. Mr. Sullivan, political resident at Tanjore, had a general superintendence of all the southern provinces, and thus became the medium of communication between the two coasts. He was authorized by Lord Macartney to open all his despatches, and send in duplicate only such parts of their contents as might seem to be required. The intervening country was wholly in the hands of the enemy, and the advantage of communicating in this manner was, that while the despatches themselves could not have been transmitted, their substance was copied out on thin paper, inserted in a quill, and forwarded by means of spies, or other secret messengers. Mr. Sullivan in his zeal gave too large an interpretation to Lord Macartney's permission, and opened despatches addressed to the naval and military commanders at Madras. This practice, however useful it might be, was unjustifiable without express authority; and the admiral, Sir Edward Hughes, joined Sir Eyre Coote in a letter which they addressed to Lord Macartney, complaining of Mr. Sullivan's conduct, as an illegal assumption of authority which they could not delegate to any man, and much less to a man who must necessarily be uninformed of their intentions and plans. These misunderstandings were embittered by Sir Eyre Coote's incessant complaint that no proper attention was paid to the wants of the army, and by Lord Macartney's replies, in which, amidst a superfluity of complimentary language, he threw out insinuations that the army as it was should be capable of much more than was accomplished by it. It is unnecessary to dwell further on this unhappy quarrel.

Another
engagement
between the
British and
French
fleets

The importance of preserving Trincomalee, and of covering a convoy of troops and stores from England, induced Sir Edward Hughes to sail in the end of March, 1782, for the northward of Ceylon. M. Suffrein, who also knew of the expected convoy, was equally on the alert, and set sail in the same direction. The hostile fleets came in sight of each other on the 8th of April, fifteen leagues from Trincomalee. The British force consisted of eleven ships, carrying 732 guns, and the French of twelve, carrying 770. After a variety of manœuvres, a sanguinary battle was fought on the 12th, but without any decisive result. Both fleets, too much crippled to renew the action, anchored in sight of each other till the 19th, when the French made sail to repair their damages at Baticolo, in Ceylon, and the British pursued their original destination to Trincomalee. While the hostile fleets were so equally matched, the armies, which depended on their co-operation, could not adopt decisive measures. Hyder was first in

motion, and during the absence of the fleets took Cuddalore, which, having only a garrison of 400 sepoys and five artillerymen, yielded without resistance. Though a weak place, its position made it important, and the possession of it gave the French what they had hitherto much wanted, a convenient *dépôt*.

A. D. 1782.

On the 11th of May, Hyder and the French having united their forces, appeared before Permacoil, and Sir Eyre Coote, while hastening to its relief, but retarded by a violent and destructive storm, had the mortification to learn that it had capitulated on the 16th, and that the enemy were advancing on Wandiwash. He hastened forward and offered them battle. Notwithstanding their great numerical superiority, they declined it, and moved off towards Pondicherry. He followed, and found them encamped in a strong position, which had been previously prepared, in the vicinity of Kilianur. Acting on instructions from M. Bussy, to avoid a general action before his arrival, they refused to quit their ground, and as it was impossible to force it, Sir Eyre Coote set off in the direction of Wandiwash. His destination was Arnee, situated twenty-three miles north-west of it. Hyder had made this place his principal *dépôt* for all that remained to him in the lower countries, and Sir Eyre Coote had determined to make a dash at it. It was too strong to be taken by a sudden assault, but Captain Flint, at Wandiwash, had for some time been bargaining for its surrender by treachery. Even should this fail, an advance threatening it seemed the most promising method of drawing the enemy from his strong position at Kilianur. Such, indeed, was the result. The very evening on which the British army departed, Hyder detached Tippoo to proceed by forced marches, for the purpose of throwing a strong reinforcement into Arnee, and followed himself the following morning with his allies, whose instructions did not allow them to accompany him.

Battle offered by Sir Eyre Coote, and declined by the French.

About eight o'clock on the 2d of June, when Sir Eyre Coote was preparing to encamp, after a short march, near Arnee, a cannonade, brisk but distant, was opened on both his front and rear. A series of skilful and admirably executed manœuvres, for the purpose of at once protecting the baggage and closing with the enemy, produced a desultory struggle rather than a battle, which terminated a little before sunset, with the capture from the enemy of one gun and eleven tumbrils and ammunition carts. With cavalry, a long train of retreating artillery would have been secured. As usual, the want of *dépôts* or any means of commanding food made it impossible to follow up the victory. The surrender of Arnee by treachery, and the capture of it by surprise or force, being now deemed hopeless, Sir Eyre Coote moved against the enemy on the 4th; but Hyder, having no wish for a new encounter, easily eluded it, and even succeeded by an ambuscade in cutting off 166 Europeans, and capturing fifty-four horses and two guns. This achievement so elated him after his recent defeats, that on his return to camp he ordered a salute, as a demonstration of victory. Climate and fatigue had produced so much sickness among

Encounter at Arnee.

A. D. 1782. the Europeans, that Sir Eyre Coote deemed it necessary again to retire. After halting four days at Wandiwash to refresh, he resumed his march, and on the 18th of June arrived in the vicinity of Madras.

Curious device for provisioning Vellore.

Vellore was again in extremity, and the commandant had intimated his inability to hold out beyond the 1st of July. Sir Eyre Coote having declared that no relief could be obtained from the army, Lord Macartney taxed his own ingenuity, and devised a scheme which owed its success to its extreme improbability. While Hyder's attention was occupied with the movements subsequent to the battle of Arnee, his lordship prepared a convoy of 500 bullocks, 24 carts, and 2000 coolies, loaded with provisions, and gave them an escort of 100 irregular sepoy, under the command of an ensign. They moved on the 6th of June to the skirts of the hills, and being there joined by a detachment of 1500 polygars, succeeded by forced marches in depositing the convoy safe in Vellore. Hyder, who had not even suspected the movement, took the only revenge in his power, by intercepting the escort and compelling it to surrender at discretion.

Encounter between the British and French fleets.

M. Suffrein had set his heart on the possession of Negapatam, as the best *dépôt* for the future operations of his countrymen, and took the first opportunity of bringing his squadron before it. Sir Edward Hughes immediately sailed from Madras to encounter him. The strength of the fleets was nearly equal, and the battle which took place proved indecisive. The French, however, so far acknowledged defeat that they abandoned their designs on Negapatam. They were never able to resume them, as the Madras government, by a very doubtful policy, without consulting Sir Eyre Coote, caused the place to be destroyed. After the action of Negapatam the British admiral made preparations for the revictualling of Trincomalee. Before he could reach it M. Suffrein had anticipated him. At an appointed rendezvous on the coast of Ceylon he had obtained a reinforcement of two ships of the line, a frigate, and eight transports full of troops, and hastened off to Trincomalee, where he landed 2400 men, and pushed the siege with so much vigour as to induce a speedy surrender. The captors were scarcely in possession when Sir Edward Hughes made his appearance; and had the mortification to see the French colours flying as well on shore as in the roads. The French fleet now mustered fifteen sail of the line; the British, with only twelve, did not hesitate to meet them, and another battle was fought without capture. The British fleet returned to Madras before proceeding to Bombay to refit; the French fleet to Cuddalore, where it landed the troops and military stores which had been received in transports. M. Suffrein afterwards sailed back to Trincomalee, but deemed its shelter so imperfect, that he took shelter during the monsoon at Acheen in Sumatra. On the 15th of October, the day on which he left Cuddalore, a hurricane drove the British fleet from Madras Roads, and destroyed a great number of country ships laden with grain, intended to avert an impending famine.

The subsequent operations of the campaign were of a desultory character. A.D. 1782.
Hyder's attention was chiefly directed to his detachments in Malabar. The
French, too feeble to act separately, obeyed their instructions by acting on the Desultory
defensive. Sir Eyre Coote, estimating their military prowess perhaps above its operations.



TRINCOMALEE.—From the M'Kenzie Drawings in East India House.

real worth, was more than usually cautious, and attempted nothing more important than the relief of Vellore, which he effected in August, by supplying it with provisions sufficient to last till the 1st of March, 1783. In the course of the campaign Hyder made some approaches to negotiation, through Colonel Braithwaite, who was a prisoner in his camp. He afterwards sent an envoy to the British camp, without giving him any definite proposals. Nothing can prove more strikingly the extent to which the quarrel between the civil and military authorities had been carried, than the fact that when Lord Macartney made official inquiries concerning the nature of Hyder's communications, Sir Eyre Coote declined to satisfy him. This was a state of matters which could not last; and accordingly, Sir Eyre Coote, on the plea of declining health—a plea for which, unfortunately, there was only too good foundation—resigned his command to Major-general Stuart, an officer who was next him in seniority, and had lost a leg at the battle of Pollilore.


On the Malabar coast, the relief of Tellicherry by Major Abington, and the destruction of the Mysorean army under Sirdar Khan, in January, 1782, had Proceedings
in Malabar.
been followed by the reduction of Calicut, and the arrival of 1000 men from Bombay under Colonel Humberstone, who, as senior officer, having assumed the command of the whole troops, including those under Major Abington, and been joined by a body of Nairs anxious to throw off Hyder's yoke, moved about twenty miles south of Calicut, and near Tricalore came in contact with the detachment under Mukhdom Ali. An action took place on a site which the Mysorean general had injudiciously chosen, and the result was that he lost his own life, and more than 1500 of his troops were killed, wounded, or taken prisoners. After an unavailing pursuit of the fleeing enemy, Colonel Humberstone turned

able thereafter to muster in all 800 Europeans, 1000 sepoy, and 1200 peons of Travancore. Tippoo, after his repulse, retired to some distance, to await the arrival of his heavy equipments, and resume the attack on Ponany. Suddenly, on the 12th December, the light troops, which had continued to watch the British position, became invisible, and subsequent reports made it certain that the whole Mysorean troops were moving eastward by forced marches. Hyder was dead. A. D. 1782.

This event, which had been preceded by a marked decline of health, was immediately caused by a disease of a rather singular nature. The first indication of it is a swelling behind the neck, or the upper portion of the back, and it is hence named by the Mahometans, *sertun* or *kercheng*, "the crab," from an imaginary resemblance of the swelling to the figure of that animal; while the Hindoos call it *raj-pora*, "the royal sore or boil," from its being supposed to be peculiar to persons of rank. Hindoo, Mahometan, and French physicians tried in vain to arrest its progress, and Hyder expired in the camp on the 7th of December, 1782. His two leading ministers, the Brahmins Poornea and Kishen Row, when his recovery became improbable, had agreed to conceal the death, as the only means

Death of
Hyder.

by which they could keep the army together, until the arrival of Tippoo. They accordingly placed the body in a large chest filled with *abeer*, a powder composed of various fragrant substances, and sent it off in the same way as valuable plunder was wont to be sent off to Seringapatam. The confidential servants who accompanied it, were ordered to deposit



HYDER ALI'S OWN FAMILY TOMB AT COLAR.—From Hunter's
Picturesque Scenery in Mysore.

it in the tomb of Hyder's father at Colar, where it remained till it was afterwards removed to a splendid mausoleum in the capital. Successive couriers having been despatched to intimate the event to Tippoo, all the business of the state and of the camp went on as usual in the name of Hyder. The principal officers of the army and the foreign envoys made their daily inquiries, and were assured that although extremely weak he was slowly recovering. The real fact, however, began to be whispered, and two ambitious chiefs conspired to give the nominal sovereignty to Abd-ul-Kerreem, Hyder's second son, who was of weak intellect, while they should retain the real power in their own hands; but this conspiracy was so quickly and effectually put down, that the deception was still kept up. Singular
mode of con-
cealing it.

A.D. 1783.

Death of
Hyder.

On the sixteenth day after Hyder's death, when the army began to march in the direction by which Tippoo was expected, the royal palanquin with the accustomed retinue issued at the usual hour, and due silence was maintained, not to disturb the illustrious patient supposed to be within. A few marches brought the army to Chucklamoor on the Pennar, which had been selected as the place of rendezvous, because it was nearly equidistant from Cuddalore and the Changama Pass, and was thus conveniently situated for communicating both with the east and the west.

Tippoo has-
tens off to
the camp.

Tippoo received his first despatches on the 11th, and was in full march the next morning. His arrival in the camp took place on the 2d of January, 1783. In the evening he gave audience to all the principal officers, receiving them seated on a plain carpet, because he wished it to be understood that grief would not yet allow him to ascend the musnud. This affectation deceived no one, and was soon laid aside. The Mysorean army at the time of Hyder's death, exclusive of garrisons and provincial troops, mustered about 90,000 men; the amount in the treasury at Seringapatam was three crores of rupees (£3,000,000 sterling) in cash, besides accumulated plunder in jewels and valuables, to such an extent as almost defied computation.

Plan of
future
operations.

Shortly after Tippoo's arrival, he was joined by a French force, consisting of 900 Europeans, 250 Caffres and Topasses, 2000 sepoy, and 22 pieces of artillery. The course of operations to be pursued was forthwith discussed. The French proposed that the capture of Madras should first be attempted, but Tippoo took advantage of the non-arrival of M. Bussy, in whose absence the French, as they had themselves repeatedly declared, were restricted to defensive operations. His plan, therefore, was to leave a respectable division of his army under Seyed Sahib, to co-operate with M. Bussy as soon as he should arrive, and be prepared to assume the offensive, and to set out with the remainder of his army to the west, where the diversion made by the British and their rapid successes demanded all his attention. Before following him on this expedition, and giving a narrative of the events which led to it, it will be necessary to return to the Coromandel coast, and attend to some extraordinary proceedings in which the civil and military authorities of the Madras presidency took opposite sides.

Strange con-
duct of
General
Stuart.

As soon as Hyder's death was rumoured, the Madras government urged General Stuart, their new commander-in-chief, to take advantage of the confusion which it might be expected to produce in the enemy's camp, more especially in the absence of the heir apparent, and march immediately to the scene of action, even though his preparations should not be complete. The answer he returned was that "he did not believe that Hyder was dead, and, if he were, the army would be ready for every action in proper time." A few days after, when the rumour was converted into certainty, and there was reason to believe that the anticipated confusion in the enemy's camp was in some measure realized, the government repeated their urgency, and were answered by an expression of

astonishment that "there could be so little reflection as to talk of undertakings against the enemy." These answers were neither courteous nor reasonable, as General Stuart had previously declared, that "upon any real emergency the army might and must move, and would be ready to do so." The truth is, that in being appointed commander-in-chief, he meant to imitate Sir Eyre Coote, and as unskilful imitators often do, stretched his claims to prerogative even farther than that distinguished general, with all the extraordinary powers conferred upon him, ventured to carry them. His idea was, that in the management of the army he was entitled to exercise his own judgment, and was not bound to listen to instructions from any quarter. He was a king's officer, the Company was only a trading corporation; and he made no secret of his opinion, that though they were his paymasters he was not at all accountable to them, at least in regard to the troops belonging to the crown. In opposition to these extravagant views, Lord Macartney lodged a minute, in which he justly observed—"His majesty has been graciously pleased to send out troops to the assistance of the Company; he has expressly declared them to be for their service, and they are actually in their pay. The king has formed regulations for their interior discipline, and has reserved to himself to fill up the vacancies which may happen in them; but how they are to be employed, and when and where their services are to be performed, must depend on those whom they are sent to serve. The authority to conduct all military operations lodged in the Company's representatives, cannot be separated from the authority over the troops which are to execute them." In another part of the same minute, he says, "The commander-in-chief of your forces, in addition to the power and influence which that station confers, asserts and maintains, in a separate capacity, an independent authority over the king's troops, which now constitute the principal strength of your army, and avows obedience to another authority, superior and preferable to that which he owes to your representatives. We conceive that there is but a slight transition from refusal to employ the king's troops upon a requisition from the civil government, to the employing them without a requisition; and we submit to you to what uses such an authority might be applied and where the consequence might end." The soundness of this argument is unquestionable. The practical application of it, however, is not without difficulty, and it may be questioned whether Lord Macartney did not push it to an extreme, when, in the exercise of his "authority to direct all military operations," he proffered military advice to Sir Eyre Coote, and directed some other operations of which an account remains to be given.

A. D. 1783.

Procedure of General Stuart.

Lord Macartney on military subordination.

General Stuart, who had rashly and thrasonically pledged himself, that "upon any real emergency the army might and must move, and would be ready to do so," was not able or did not choose to put it in motion till the 15th of January, 1783, exactly thirteen days after Tippoo had arrived in the camp, and been peaceably proclaimed. Even then he only moved with provisions to the inter-

A. D. 1783.

Wanton demolition of forts.

mediate depôt of Tripassore, and did not fairly start on the campaign till three weeks later, when of course all the advantages which might have been taken of Hyder's death had been thrown away. This campaign Lord Macartney undertook to direct, and, as might have been anticipated from his professional ignorance, did not direct wisely. He had already, contrary to the advice of Sir Eyre Coote, demolished Negapatam, and now proceeded, contrary to the same advice, but with the concurrence of his new commander-in-chief, to demolish the two forts of Carangoly and Wandiwash. This system of demolition was adopted on the ground that these places could not be successfully defended, and yet no sooner were they destroyed than the folly of the proceeding became apparent. On Tippoo's departure to the west they were in no danger from the enemy, and would on the contrary have furnished important bases for future operations, defensive and aggressive. The greater part of February, devoted to these demolitions, was thus spent in doing mischief. The only instance in which a better spirit was manifested was in the vicinity of Wandiwash, where General Stuart offered battle to the united forces of the French and the Mysoreans, and they declined it. The only operation of any consequence in March, was the re-victualing of Vellore. This was effected without interruption, as Tippoo had already ascended the western passes, after having destroyed the works of Arcot, and every other post of any consequence, except Arnee, which was left as a depôt for the division of troops left behind under Seyed Sahib.

Dreadful famine in the south of India.

During the absence of Sir Edward Hughes at Bombay, M. Suffrein had, on the 19th of January, 1783, made his appearance at the head of the Bay of Bengal, and captured a large number of vessels laden with rice for Madras, which was now suffering all the horrors of famine. Fortunately a still larger number of vessels had previously been despatched, but their supplies, though sufficient for the army, left little surplus for a crowded population, largely increased beyond its usual amount by fugitives driven in from the surrounding country by Hyder's devastations. It was therefore necessary to have recourse to the extreme measure of expelling the great mass of the natives, and sending them northwards, chiefly to Nellore, where the ravages of war had not been felt. The misery thus inflicted must have been great, but appears to have been far less than was endured by those whom they left behind. Burke's description, in continuance of the passage already quoted from his celebrated speech on the Nabob of Arcot's debts, is believed not to be overdrawn:—"The alms of the settlement, in this dreadful exigency, were certainly liberal, and all was done by charity that private charity could do; but it was a people in beggary—it was a nation which stretched out its hands for food. For months together these creatures of sufferance, whose very excess and luxury in their most plenteous days had fallen short of the allowance of our austere fasts, silent, patient, resigned, without sedition or disturbance, almost without complaint, perished by a hundred a day in the streets of Madras; every day seventy at least laid

their bodies in the streets, or on the glacis of Tanjore, and expired of famine in the granary of India." A.D. 1783.

Had M. Suffrein, in proceeding southwards, looked into Madras, matters would have been still worse, for he could not have failed to capture or destroy a great number of provision and other merchant ships; but partly from dread of Sir Edward Hughes, who might possibly be anchored there on his return from Bombay, and partly in the hope of finding M. Bussy at Trincomalee, the place of rendezvous, he hastened on for that port. Here he was joined by M. Bussy with the last reinforcements from the Isle of France, in the beginning of March, and immediately set sail for Cuddalore. Having landed the troops and their long-expected commander, he returned to Trincomalee to refit, and on the evening of the 10th of April, a few hours after entering its harbour, had the mortification to see Sir Edward Hughes with his fleet pursuing their course to Madras. M. Bussy must have been still more mortified when he found, that in consequence of the capture of convoys by the British, and the departure of one of his regiments, under M. Cossigny, for the west with Tippoo, how miserably short his whole force fell of his original calculations. The Madras government were of course proportionably elated, and immediately on the arrival of Sir Edward Hughes, determined to lose no time in carrying out their long-meditated attack on Cuddalore. All this time there was an immediate expectation of the arrival of Sir Eyre Coote. He had improved in health, obtained powers adequate to his wishes from the governor and council of Bengal, as the supreme government, and had announced his approaching return to resume the command. For this purpose he embarked with a large supply of money in the Company's armed ship *Resolution*, and towards the end of the voyage, was chased for two days by some French ships of the line. His agitation and anxiety, which kept him on deck night and day, were too much for a frame broken down both by age and disease, and he died on the 28th of April, two days after the vessel had safely reached Madras. Grief for the loss of so distinguished a soldier could not but be universal, and was fully manifested by all classes; but it has been said that the melancholy event was the means of preventing a collision which might have been attended with serious consequences. Lord Macartney, who, on Sir Eyre Coote's departure, had assumed the full exercise of what he conceived to be his legal powers, was not disposed to place them



ADMIRAL PIERRE ANDRE DE SUFFREIN DE SAINT TROPEZ. —
From a print by Cornet, after a picture by F. Gérard.

Arrival and
death of Sir
Eyre Coote.

A.D. 1788.

Death of Sir
Eyre Coote.

again in abeyance, and had resolved to contest the right of the supreme council to confer something like a military dictatorship on any individual, however eminent, within the limits of the Madras presidency. The death of Sir Eyre Coote rendered it unnecessary to decide this very important question, but the known determination of Lord Macartney to have raised it, probably increased the marked estrangement which had already taken place between his lordship and the governor-general, and of which some striking manifestations will yet be seen.

Operations
near Cud-
dalore.

On the 21st of April, five days before Sir Eyre Coote's arrival, General Stuart, who had returned with his army to the vicinity of Madras, commenced his march towards Cuddalore. From the state of feeling between him and the governor, little harmony was to be expected, and accordingly we find his lordship complaining that the army had occupied forty days, at the average of less than three miles a day, in performing the distance of twelve ordinary marches, and the general sneering at theory, and declaring that he had advanced as fast as was practically compatible with his means of transport. The fort of Cuddalore forms a quadrangle of unequal sides, inclosed by an indifferent rampart and ditch. Each angle has a bastion, but there are no outworks, except an advanced one at the north-east. Woody heights, called the Bandapollam Hills, embrace the western face and south-western angle at varying distances from two to four miles, the intervening space being occupied by rice fields. About a mile and a half to the north are the ruins of Fort St. David, situated on a peninsula formed by a small stream and the mouth of the Pennar. Along the eastern face runs an estuary, leaving a narrow strip of land between it and the sea. General Stuart, after arriving within a march of Cuddalore, made a circuit behind the Bandapollam Hills, and took up a position about two miles south, with his left resting on them, his centre fronting the north, and his right towards the estuary. M. Bussy took up an intermediate position between the British and Cuddalore, with his left on the estuary, and his right thrown a little back, so as to rest on a gentle eminence where the rice fields commenced.


Attack on
the enemy's
works.

The British, who had arrived on the 7th of June, were employed till the 13th in arranging the landing of stores and other preparations preliminary to more serious operations. M. Bussy was meanwhile active in strengthening his position by means of field-works. These becoming more and more formidable every day, it was determined in a council of war to attack them, and Colonel Kelly, at the head of a division, set out on the 13th, long before daylight, to turn the extreme right of some subsidiary works extending across the rice fields, now dry, to the Bandapollam Hills, and occupied by Mysoreans. These scarcely waited the attack, which was made between four and five o'clock, and fled leaving seven guns behind them. Subsequently, about half-past eight o'clock, a body of grenadiers under Colonel Cathcart, and the pickets under Colonel Stuart of the 78th, attempted, in combination with the troops under Colonel Kelly, to turn

the right of the main position, but were received with such a fire of grape and musketry, that Colonel Stuart, who commanded the attack, found it necessary after heavy loss to desist and place his men under cover. The greatest resistance from the enemy had been experienced at a salient work on the right of his main position, and a third attack to carry it and the trenches adjoining was made by two columns sent forward for that purpose under Colonel Bruce. The

A.D. 1763.

Attack on the enemy's works.



- A A A, The French lines, and position of their troops before the attack.
 B B B, Disposition of the British troops the night before the attack of the enemy's lines.
 C C C, Route of Colonel Kelly over the hills early in the morning of the 13th, and his attack of the French battery D upon a hill.
 E, Colonel Elliot's battery of six 18 pounders.
 F, Major Mackay's battery of four 12 pounders.
 G, Captain Montague's battery of six 18-pounders.
 H, The large French redoubt, to which the 101st and Hanoverians advanced.
 I, Position of Kelly's brigade after dispersing Tip-poo's troops.

- K, Route and first position of the grenadiers and 73d regiment.
 L, Advance of the centre division under Colonel Elphinstone.
 M, Rally of the centre division after they retreated.
 N, Track and advance of the grenadiers and Highlanders, supported by the sepoys and Kelly's brigade.
 O, First parallel of the British.
 P, Rally by the enemy on the 25th.
 Q, Choultry and tree to which the British and French officers resorted in the evenings for conversation after peace was concluded.

troops moved forward under a still heavier fire than that which the second attack had encountered, and one flank company of the 101st actually penetrated within the trenches. Unfortunately they were not supported as they ought to have been by the remainder of their regiment, and were driven back, with the whole column to which they belonged, amid frightful carnage, the French, besides plying them with grape and musketry, issuing forth from their trenches and charging them with fury. Colonel Stuart, who had been watching his opportunity, seized the moment when the enemy, in the eagerness of pursuit, had bared their works of defenders, and by a determined attack carried everything before him. He had driven the French right upon its centre, and gained possession of nearly a half of the line of works, when his progress was arrested

A.D. 1783.

Battle of
Cuddalore.

by fresh troops and superior numbers. He was able, however, to retire slowly to a position now strengthened by the works which he had carried, and his success was evinced, not more by the capture of thirteen guns and of the key of the contested position, than by the retirement of the French during the night within the walls of Cuddalore. The whole affair had been most sanguinary. Though only a comparatively small portion of both armies was engaged, the British computed their loss at 1016; that of the French was probably a third

A naval en-
gagement.

On the same day when this affair took place, M. Suffrein made his appearance in the offing, and Sir Edward Hughes, who was anchored near Porto Novo, eleven miles to the southward, advanced to prevent the communication of the enemy's fleet with the besieged. The British fleet was suffering dreadfully from scurvy. From the 2d of May to the 7th of June, 1120 men, and in the course of another fortnight, about 1700 more were rendered unfit for duty. In point of ships Sir Edward Hughes was superior, for he had seventeen ships carrying 1202 guns, whereas M. Suffrein had only twelve ships carrying 1018. Crippled as he was by the absence of so many effective men, Sir Edward Hughes was scarcely a match for his antagonist, but seems to have regarded it as a point of honour not to decline the challenge. On the 16th he weighed for the purpose of bringing the enemy to close action, but somehow or other, owing either to better fortune, or superior manœuvring, M. Suffrein was seen, as soon as the morning of the 17th dawned, riding at anchor off Cuddalore, while the British fleet, which on the previous day occupied the same anchorage, had entirely disappeared. The blockade of Cuddalore, on which the British army had calculated, was thus raised; but this advantage, great as it was, did not satisfy M. Bussy, who, calculating on the interval that must elapse before the besiegers, who had begun to make regular approaches, could threaten an assault, stripped his garrison of 1200 men and sent them on board the fleet, in the hope that M. Suffrein would thus have little difficulty in obtaining some advantage which would effectually cripple his antagonist. Deducting from the British fleet the men lost to it, at least temporarily, by scurvy, and adding to the French fleet Bussy's reinforcement, their relative strength, compared with what it was on the 2d of May, gave a balance against the former, and in favour of the latter, of not less than 3000 men. After a series of manœuvres the fleets met on the 20th, and an action took place. The British admiral wished to come to close quarters; the French admiral avoided it, and kept up a distant cannonade which served his purpose better, and cost his antagonist in the course of three hours, 532 men. Night separated the combatants. On the following morning Sir Edward Hughes would still have renewed the fight, but on finding that only another distant cannonade was intended, and that his fleet had already suffered so severely as to be completely crippled and in a most inefficient state, he was obliged to adopt the mortifying resolution of sailing away for the roads

The British
fleet retires.

of Madras, and leave at least the name of victory to his antagonist, who, on the 23d, resumed his anchorage off Cuddalore, and landed, not only the reinforcement lent him, but aid from the fleet to the amount of 2400 men. A. D. 1783.

M. Bussy now feeling his strength, made a vigorous sortie with his best troops. It took place on the morning of the 25th, while it was still quite dark, but was repulsed with the loss to the French of about 450 men, and scarcely any loss at all to the British. Among the wounded prisoners was a young French sergeant, whose interesting appearance attracted the attention of Colonel Wangenheim, in command of the Hanoverian troops, who ordered him to be taken to his own tents, where he was kindly treated till his recovery and release. Many years after, when the French army under Bernadotte, the future King of Sweden, entered Hanover, Colonel (now General) Wangenheim attended his levee. On being presented, Bernadotte thus accosted him, "You have served, I understand, in India?" "Yes." "At Cuddalore?" "Yes." "Do you recollect of taking a wounded sergeant under your protection?" The circumstance had escaped General Wangenheim's memory, but after a little he recollected it, and said, "He was a very fine young man, and I should like to hear of his welfare." "I was myself that young man," rejoined Bernadotte, "and will omit no means within my power of testifying my gratitude." Anecdote of Bernadotte.

The force under General Stuart had never been adequate to the siege of Cuddalore. After M. Bussy's reinforcement from the fleet, the besieged outnumbered the besiegers, who were gradually wasting away by casualties and sickness, while their labours were continually increasing. They had never been able to invest the place, and could not be said to possess an inch of ground beyond that on which they were encamped. General Stuart, shortly after setting out for Cuddalore, had sent orders to Colonel Fullarton, who was employed with a force south of the Coleroon, to cross that river for the purpose of joining him, should the course of the siege render it expedient. He had also repeatedly and urgently demanded succours from Madras, but obtaining no answer, and having learned that his order to Colonel Fullarton had been countermanded, he intimated his belief that the government had abandoned him to his fate, and his determination to abide the result. It could not have been long doubtful. Bussy was not the man to allow himself to be cooped up within walls by an inferior force, and had determined to attack the British in their camp. "The retreat of the English army, with the loss of its battering train and equipments, is," says Colonel Wilks, "the most favourable result that could possibly have been anticipated from a continuation of hostilities." Fortunately at this very crisis, hostilities ceased in consequence of the arrival of a frigate from Madras bearing a flag of truce, and having on board commissioners deputed by that government to intimate to M. Bussy that peace was concluded between Great Britain and France. Dangerous position of the British at Cuddalore.

On the Malabar coast and in several other districts of the west, various opera-

A.D. 1788.

Operations
on the Ma-
labar coast.

tions had taken place subsequent to Tippoo's sudden departure, on receiving intimation of his father's death. The Bombay government, on hearing of Colonel Humberstone's retreat to Ponany, and Tippoo's appearance before that place in full force, determined to despatch their commander-in-chief, Brigadier-general Matthews, to its relief, with as many troops as could be immediately embarked, and to reinforce him as speedily as possible with other troops. At Goa, General Matthews, having learned that Ponany was no longer in danger, resolved to make a descent at Rajahmundroog, situated at the mouth of the Mirjec, and about fifteen miles N.N.W. of Honawar or Onore, situated at the



FORT ONORE AFTER THE SIEGE, 1783.—From Forbes' Oriental Memoirs.

mouth of the Honawar. Could he succeed in capturing these two places, he would be able to command the whole of the fertile country between the two rivers; he would secure his rear and obtain supplies for his army during a meditated advance on Bednore, which, though originally Mahratta territory, was now incorporated with Hyder's other conquests. Rajahmundroog was easily carried by assault, and the ships were despatched to Ponany for the force there, now commanded by Colonel Macleod. Shortly after his arrival, Honawar was also taken, and along with it five ships of war of fifty to sixty-four guns, and many others of smaller dimensions, forming part of the fleet which it had been one great object of Hyder's ambition to construct.

Rapid con-
quests of
General
Matthews in
Bednore.

Intelligence of Hyder's death having meanwhile reached Bombay, that government sent positive orders to General Matthews, if the intelligence should prove true, to relinquish all other operations, and "make an immediate push to take possession of Bednore." At this very time he was pursuing a safe plan for making "a push" at Bednore. The fall of Honawar and Rajahmundroog had secured his rear, as well as a fertile district from which he could draw supplies; and he was preparing for the capture of Mirjee or Mirjan, which would have opened a way to Bednore by the passes of Bilguy. On receiving the *positive orders*, he resolved to obey them to the very letter, though disclaiming all

responsibility for consequences, and declaring that the force at his disposal was totally inadequate to the task assigned it. Precipitately abandoning his own plans, he embarked his troops, and sailing southward, landed at Cundapoor as the nearest point to Bednore. After capturing Cundapoor with some difficulty, in consequence of the resistance of a small field-force forming part of the detachments sent by Hyder from Coromandel, he started for the mountains, but with such imperfect means of conveyance, that the twenty-five miles of low country intervening between them and the coast, occupied three days. The ascent of the Ghauts, forming a rugged acclivity of seven miles, presented more serious difficulties. But they yielded one after another; and General Matthews found himself, on the 27th of January, 1783, in the possession of the fort of Hyderghur on the top of the Ghauts, though it mounted twenty-five pieces of cannon, was well constructed, and had outworks defended by 17,000 men. In taking this place, his loss in killed and wounded amounted only to about fifty. Bednore or Hydernuggur was still fourteen miles distant, but it yielded still more easily than the hill-forts. Sheik Ayaz, or Hyat Sahib, as he was usually called, after retiring into the citadel with only 1350 men, sent Captain Donald Campbell, who had been taken prisoner, to propose terms. These were, "to deliver the fort and country, and to remain under the English as he (Sheik Ayaz) was under the nabob (Hyder)." The terms were of course agreed to, and the conquest of Bednore was completed.

A.D. 1783.

Conquest of
General
Matthews in
Bednore.

General Matthews, unable to account for his astonishing success, breaks out, in his official despatch, dated 28th January, 1783, into the following exclamation:—"To what can it be owing, but to the divine will, that my army, without provisions or musket ammunition, should have our wants supplied as we advanced; for without the enemy's rice, and powder and ball, we must have stopped until the army could be furnished!" Having thus very properly attributed his success to its primary cause, he deems it necessary, notwithstanding, to consider how far it may have been produced by the instrumentality of secondary causes, and finds none worthy of mention, except "panic." It never seems to have occurred to him, that he was at least as much indebted to treachery. Sheik Ayaz stood high in the favour of Hyder, and for this reason was hated by Tippoo, who had no sooner secured his succession, than he sent a secret order to the officer next in authority to Ayaz, to put him to death and assume the government. Ayaz intercepted the order, and immediately made arrangements for surrendering to the British. This was the real cause of the success which seemed to General Matthews so mysterious. The surrender of Bednore was followed by that of most of its dependencies. Among these was Anantpoor, situated about twenty-five miles N.N.E. of the capital, and thirty miles north-west of Sheemoga. Its garrison and inhabitants had sent in their submission, and a British detachment was marching to take possession of it; when Lutf Ali Beg, one of Tippoo's officers at Sheemoga, learning how matters stood, despatched

His astonish-
ment at his
success.

A.D. 1783.

Successes of
General
Matthews.

300 peons under a trusty officer to supersede the commandant, and keep possession of the place. The British troops, on approaching the place, sent forward a flag of truce. It was fired at, and in retaliation the British having immediately assaulted the place, and taken it, put the garrison to the sword. Still worse atrocities were laid to their charge; but Colonel Wilks, after a diligent use of "the ample means of inquiry within his reach," pronounces the tragical tale of 400 beautiful women "all bleeding with the wounds of the bayonet, and either already dead or expiring in each other's arms," to be in all its parts "destitute of every foundation in truth."

A sudden
reverse.

On the 9th of March, Mangalore, situated on the coast about fifty-five miles S.S.W. of Bednore, surrendered. General Matthews, who had descended to direct the operations of the siege, and paid a visit to Bombay, where, instead of the former *positive orders*, only general instructions for his guidance were given him, returned to Bednore to defend his new conquests, which were seriously threatened. Large bodies of the enemy were constantly arriving from Coromandel, while the largest force which he could bring into the field amounted only to 400 Europeans and 1200 sepoys. Good reason, therefore, had he for urging the necessity of large reinforcements, and declaring that without them, "it would be a miracle if he could preserve his footing." Tippoo was advancing with his whole army, and Sheik Ayaz, foreseeing the result, disappeared, to seek an asylum at Bombay. On approaching Bednore, Tippoo divided his forces into two columns. The one, proceeding by the southern route of Couly Droog, took possession of Hyderghur, and thus cut off all communication with the coast; the other, taking the north-eastern route, proceeded directly to Bednore, and completely invested it. A general assault followed, and the British, after attempting a defence to which their force was inadequate, retired, after serious loss, to the citadel. Having defended it till it was a heap of ruins, General Matthews, in accordance with the opinion of a council of war, offered to surrender on certain terms, to which Tippoo agreed, induced, as he himself says, by the short interval which remained for the recovery of Mangalore before the rains. The terms included several articles, one of which guaranteed the safe conduct of the garrison to the coast, and another provided for the security of private and the surrender of public property. Unfortunately, a rapacity, of which too many examples had previously been given, prevailed over a sense of honour and even of self-preservation. In order to appropriate the sum in the treasury, which now belonged of right to Tippoo, the officers of the garrison were told to draw for what sums they pleased, to be afterwards accounted for at Bombay. In this way the treasury was fraudulently emptied. The garrison marched out, in terms of the capitulation, on the 3d of May, 1783. Tippoo, who only wanted a pretext for violating the capitulation, found too good a one in the example thus set him by the prisoners. On being searched, the missing money was found upon them, and instead of being fur-

Matthews
and all his
troops made
prisoners.

nished with safe conduct to the coast, they were marched off in irons to various places of imprisonment. Bednore and its dependencies were thus lost as easily as they had been won; and Tippoo, who had not before sat on the musnud, gave public audience upon it, and ordered a salute to be fired in honour of this his first victory. A.D. 1783.

Tippoo, without loss of time, proceeded to Mangalore. A considerable force, which he had previously sent forward under Lutf Ali Beg, had been defeated with the loss of its guns, and he therefore now advanced at the head of his whole army. The defence of Mangalore devolved on Major (afterwards Colonel) Campbell of the 42d. The enemy arrived before it on the 20th, and immediately invested it. The garrison endeavoured, notwithstanding, to keep possession of an outpost about a mile from the town, because it commanded the principal access to it. The two battalions necessary to occupy it were in consequence attacked, after their retreat had been almost cut off, and with the utmost difficulty and considerable loss made their escape. This first success, and the overpowering force which he commanded, made Tippoo confident of an early triumph. He soon found his mistake. His flag of truce, demanding an instant surrender, was dismissed without an answer, and he was obliged to have recourse to a regular siege. In this he was greatly assisted by the professional skill and experience of M. Cossigny, the commander of the French regiment which had been lent him. Three regular attacks embraced the faces of the fort accessible by land, and produced not so much breaches as continuous masses of ruin, while attempts at assault were repeated and repelled so often, as to become almost an affair of daily routine. Tippoo lays siege to Mangalore

On the 19th of July, after fifty-six days of open trenches, Colonel Campbell received a letter, signed "Peveron de Morlay, envoy from France to the nabob Tippoo Sultan," informing him that hostilities had ceased at Cuddalore, in consequence of the peace concluded between Britain and France, and that he was in possession of a letter which he was enjoined by Tippoo to deliver to him in person. This letter from the British commissioners, Messrs. Sadlier and Staunton, had been delivered to M. Bussy for transmission on the 2d of July, and must in all probability have arrived in the camp at Mangalore before the possession of it was thus acknowledged. During these ten days the besiegers had made the most vigorous efforts to make themselves masters of the place. That Peveron de Morlay was capable of this deceitful and dishonourable conduct was proved on subsequent occasions. Nothing could exceed Tippoo's astonishment and rage, when M. Cossigny intimated that he could give him no further aid, and also compelled the French officers, Lally and Boudenot, to follow his example. By the treaty of peace which Tippoo would now be under the necessity of concluding, a general restitution of conquests would take place, and consequently Mangalore would return to him without an effort. His dogged obstinacy, and his indignation at having been so long foiled, made him overlook this Armistice with Tippoo before Mangalore.

A. D. 1788.

Armistice
with Tippoo.

fact, or disregard it, and he determined to persist in the siege. Under cover of the arrangements for admitting M. Peveron to deliver his letter, a body of troops landed, and gained possession of a detached work which commanded the entrance of the harbour, and though an armistice with Tippoo was concluded on the 2d of August, he continued every operation short of actual assault with renewed vigour. By the third article of the armistice a bazaar was to be established, where the garrison might buy provisions to the extent of eight days' stock at a time, and articles not furnished by the bazaar might freely enter from other places, to the extent of a month's supply. This article was shamefully evaded, and the garrison, instead of being fully supplied, were reduced to the point of starvation.

Gross viola-
tion of the
armistice.

A fortnight after the armistice, Brigadier-general Macleod, holding the chief command of Malabar and Canara, and on the following day, a detachment of Hanoverians from Madras, destined to reinforce Mangalore, arrived in the offing. The general landed, and took up his residence in the town, but the detachment was ordered off to Tellicherry. Meanwhile, in consequence of the evasion of the articles of the armistice relating to provisions, the stock of the garrison had been so far diminished, that Tippoo, who had been amusing both General Macleod and Colonel Campbell with the announcement of his immediate departure for Seringapatam, thought he had secured the object at which he had all along been aiming, and threw off the mask. In open defiance of the armistice, he declared that the garrison should no longer be supplied with provisions, and immediately commenced repairing his old works, and erecting new batteries. The garrison, from having previously converted into fuel all the materials which might have been available for military purposes, could not retaliate. General Macleod, when he remonstrated, was only told that he was at liberty to depart. He gladly availed himself of the permission, and sailed for Tellicherry to collect means for relieving the garrison.

Disappoint-
ment and
distress of
the gar-
rison.

On the 22d of November, a fleet from the north and another from the south were descried standing for the roads. The garrison were overjoyed. Surely relief was now at hand. "The signal was made," says Colonel Campbell, "that the troops would land to the southward; they were discovered in the boats; every moment promised a speedy attack. Confidence and joy appeared in every countenance; even the poor, weak, emaciated convalescent, tottering under the weight of his firelock, boldly stood forth to offer what feeble aid his melancholy state admitted of." All this expectation was most grievously disappointed. General Macleod, instead of carrying out what seemed to be his original intentions, became entangled in a negotiation with Tippoo, and the result was, that after stipulating for a month's supply of provisions to the garrison, without taking care to see that it was properly furnished, he sailed away on the 2d of December, with the signal flying, of "speedy succour arriving." Sea-scurvy now began to make great havoc among the garrison, who, on the

20th of December, were again put on short allowance. On the 27th, a vessel bearing General Macleod's flag, with a snow and five boats, appeared, and on the 31st, a supply of provisions was landed in Tippoo's boats, but no intercourse was permitted between the vessels and the garrison. Only a small part of this supply proved fit for food. The scurvy of course continued to rage; two-thirds of the garrison were in hospital; a great number of the sepoy's doing duty had become blind, the consequence, it was supposed, of being obliged to eat rice alone, without salt or any other condiment. Ultimately, on the 26th of January, 1784, Colonel Campbell, after calling a council of war, which deemed it hopeless or useless to resist any longer, capitulated on honourable terms. The only explanation which has ever been given of the shameful desertion of this brave garrison, is, that the preliminary articles of peace stipulated a term of four months to be allowed to the native belligerent powers of India to accede; and that the hostilities necessary to give succour to Mangalore might have been, or seemed to be, an infringement of these articles. There could not be a lamer excuse. The preliminary articles never could have meant, that during the four months indulged to one belligerent for the purpose of making up his mind, he was to be at liberty to make war, while his European antagonist was not to be at liberty to resist him, or, that after concluding an armistice, the native power might violate its obligations, while the European power should be bound to observe them.

A.D. 1783.

Mangalore
surrendered
to Tippoo.

The capture of Mangalore had cost Tippoo dear. For nearly nine months it had locked up the services of his main army. It had thus prevented him from realizing his revenues, and had moreover led to the invasion of one of his richest provinces. The events connected with this invasion must be briefly detailed. A Brahmin of the name of Tremalrow, who gave himself out as "the son of the minister of that Rajah of Mysore who had been deposed by Hyder," having retired to Tanjore, ingratiated himself with the rajah, and was by him through Mr. Swartz introduced to Mr. Sullivan, the resident there. He possessed considerable talents and acquirements, and showed himself to be well acquainted with the government and resources of Mysore. When it was resolved to make a diversion in the south and west, it seemed to Mr. Sullivan that important use might be made of Tremalrow, who professed to be in the confidence of the imprisoned Ranees of Mysore, and that full employment might be given to Hyder, by setting up some member of the ancient family as a claimant of its throne. Colonel Lang, who commanded in the south, taking advantage of the departure of Tippoo on his father's death, marched, accompanied by Tremalrow, and on the 2d of April, 1783, obtained possession of the fort of Caroor, situated on the eastern frontiers of Coimbatore. The Hindoo colours of Mysore were immediately hoisted on the fort, and the management of the district was conferred on Tremalrow. Shortly after, Colonel Lang resigned the command to Colonel Fullarton, who was ordered to advance for the purpose of

Attempted
diversion in
Coimbatore.

A.D. 1783. relieving the pressure on General Matthews at Bednore. His progress in this direction was stopped by General Stuart, who on the 31st of May sent positive orders to him to cross the Cauvery, and march with the utmost expedition towards Cuddalore. After some delay, he succeeded in crossing in basket-boats at Trichinopoly, but had no sooner reached the opposite bank than he

Operations
of Colonel
Fullarton.



BASKET-BOAT AND CATTLE CROSSING THE RIVER TOOMBUDRA.¹—From original drawing in East India House.

received instructions so contradictory, as to place him in a dilemma. Those from General Stuart urged him to hasten on to Cuddalore; those from Lord Macartney ordered him to recross the river and proceed southward. Being a personal friend of Lord Macartney, and indebted to him for his command, his own feelings would have led him to comply with his lordship's wishes, but believing that his services were more required at Cuddalore, a sense of duty determined him to obey the general. He had accordingly arrived within three forced marches of the British camp, when he received intelligence of the cessation of hostilities.

His capture
of Palghaut-
cherry.

There was now nothing to prevent Colonel Fullarton from obeying Lord Macartney's orders, and he proceeded south, his numbers nearly doubled by a reinforcement from the army set free at Cuddalore. The armistice with Tippoo reduced him for some time to inaction, but on the 16th of October, having received intelligence from Tellicherry of the violation of the armistice at Mangalore, he determined to assist in the relief of this place, by uniting his forces to those of General Macleod, who was understood to be making preparations for that purpose. As the best means of effecting this junction, Colonel Fullarton set out in the direction of Palghautcherry, and after a difficult and tedious route through the centre of a teak forest, arrived before that fortress, which owed its construction to Hyder, and was as strong as he could make it. The siege, vigorously conducted, terminated in the cap-

¹ Basket-boats are "circular baskets from nine to fourteen feet in diameter, covered with buffalo leather." In these cotton, sandal-wood, saltpetre, and other wares, are brought down the river; and as the violence of the current precludes their up-

ward navigation, they are taken to pieces, the basket work abandoned, and the leather taken back on men's heads. The boat in our engraving represents one used on the river Toombudra, in Mysore.

ture of the place, on the 15th of November. After communicating with Telli-cherry, the proposed junction with General Macleod was deemed impracticable, or at least so difficult as to be inexpedient, and Colonel Fullarton determined to take the route to Seringapatam, by the pass of Gujelhutty. With this view he set out at the head of a force mustering 13,636 men, and arrived at Coimbatoor on the 26th of November. On the 28th, two days before his intended advance, he received a letter from Messrs. Staunton and Sadlier, informing him that they were on their route as duly authorized plenipotentiaries to negotiate with Tippoo, and directing him not only to suspend operations, but to abandon all his conquests and retire within the limits of the Company's possessions, as at the 26th of July preceding.

A.D. 1789.

Colonel Fullarton's victorious career arrested.

As early as February, 1783, before Tippoo's departure for the west, Lord Macartney and his council had employed a Brahmin of the name of Sambajee, who was the Rajah of Tanjore's agent at Madras, and was proceeding on his devotions to Conjeveram, to endeavour to sound Tippoo on the subject of peace. Sambajee, proud of appearing as the British envoy, readily undertook the office, and Tippoo, not unwilling to know on what terms he could command peace, directed a person named Sreenowasnow to accompany Sambajee on his return to Madras. Some conferences in consequence took place, but nothing was effected, and Tippoo, on the return of his envoy for instructions, treated the whole matter with contemptuous silence. On the cessation of hostilities between the British and French at Cuddalore, on the 2d of July, Lord Macartney, by agreement with M. Bussy, addressed a letter to Tippoo, inviting him to accede to peace on certain provisional conditions, and announcing a cessation of hostilities till his answer should be received. Tippoo returned a friendly answer, and sent it by a skilful diplomatist, Apajee Ram, whom he had appointed his envoy with the usual credentials. After much discussion, the principle of a mutual restitution of prisoners and conquests seemed to be established, but from time to time difficulties were started by Apajee Ram, and made by him a ground for suggesting, that the great delay occasioned by frequent references to Tippoo, might be saved by sending to his court two gentlemen, so thoroughly acquainted with the views of the Madras government as to render reference unnecessary. The suggestion was at once adopted; and Mr. Sadlier, the second member of council, and Mr. Staunton, Lord Macartney's private secretary, were appointed commissioners. They set out on the 9th of November, fully anticipating the success of their mission, as Tippoo had sent letters to the peishwa and Scindia declaring his accession to the treaty of Salbye.

Negotiations for peace with Tippoo

The commissioners arrived in the Mysorean camp near Arnee, on the 19th of November, and the very next day despatched the above order to Colonel Fullarton. When it reached him, he was in possession of information that the armistice had been violated, and consequently knew that the commissioners must have issued their order under a very great misconception. He therefore

A.D. 1784. adopted what seemed the only prudent course. He ceased from hostilities without giving up his conquests. Seyed Sahib, the commander of the Mysorean troops in the Carnatic, was found by the commissioners about twenty-five miles beyond Arnee, and a discussion ensued as to the manner in which restoration should be made. They insisted that the places eastward of the Ghauts should first be reciprocally restored, and all the English prisoners be set at liberty, and that then only a similar restitution of places west of the Ghauts should take place. Seyed Sahib and Apajee Ram, on the other hand, insisted that the evacuation of Mangalore should precede the release of the prisoners, and offered "to pledge their faith" that the evacuation should be immediately followed by the release. Here the commissioners differed. Mr. Sadlier was disposed to give up Mangalore and accept of "the pledge" as sufficient security, whereas Mr. Staunton was decidedly of opinion that, before giving up Mangalore and the other western conquests, they ought to be perfectly satisfied of the release of every prisoner. This difference made it necessary to refer to the government, who decided in favour of Mr. Staunton, and at the same time endeavoured to prevent future collision, by the appointment of Mr. Huddleston as a third plenipotentiary.

British commissioners sent to Tippoo's camp.

Fusillanimous conduct of the Madras government.

No sooner had the Madras government thus decided, than they began to deliberate anew, and on the 8th of December came to an opposite conclusion. Considering the distressed condition of their affairs—ruined finances, broken credit, and a supreme council not only withholding confidence, but supposed to be meditating suspension—they thought it not worth while to continue the war for the possession of Mangalore, and resolved that Colonel Fullarton should be required to make unqualified restitution, as previously ordered by the commissioners. Thus left without any alternative, he evacuated the whole of his conquests, at the very time that Tippoo's troops remained in force in Coromandel. While making his first march from Coimbatore, Colonel Fullarton was met by Mr. Swartz, who was proceeding by way of Gujelhutty to join the commissioners at Seringapatam, and act as their interpreter. In accordance with Tippoo's system of insult, the venerable missionary was stopped at the foot of the pass, and never allowed to proceed farther. His astonishment at finding Colonel Fullarton retiring is thus described by himself:—"Alas! said I, is the peace so certain that you quit all before the negotiation is ended. The possession of these two rich countries would have kept Tippoo in awe, and inclined him to reasonable terms. But you quit the reins, and how will you manage that beast!" The truth of these remarks was soon proved, for on the 26th of January, 1784, before Colonel Fullarton had completed the cantonment of his troops, he received a new despatch from Madras, ordering him "not only to retain possession of Palghaut, should that fort not have been delivered, but likewise to hold fast every inch of ground of which he was in possession, till he should have received accounts of the result of the negotiation."

A.D. 1784.

Tippoo's
insulting
treatment
of the
British
commis-
sioners.

The impunity with which Tippoo had hitherto bearded the Madras government naturally encouraged him to insult the commissioners. It had been distinctly agreed, that as the preliminaries of peace had been settled, and nothing remained but to adjust the details, they should, while proceeding through Mysore, have personal intercourse with the British prisoners, and an opportunity of giving them clothes and other requisites with which they had been provided for that purpose. So far from this, they had scarcely passed the frontiers when they found all communication cut off, and, partly for the purpose of contemptuous exhibition, were paraded on camels over routes impracticable to ordinary beasts of burden. On advancing farther, they were turned aside from Seringapatam by a letter from Tippoo, informing them that the prisoners, with a view to their liberation, had been forwarded to the frontiers, and inviting them to meet him in his camp. Their progress thither was not allowed to be more rapid than that of the starvation of the garrison, and when only twenty miles distant they received another letter from Tippoo informing them that, at the earnest request of Colonel Campbell, he had agreed to take charge of the fort of Mangalore. Their subsequent treatment was atrocious. Not only was every species of indignity heaped upon them, but three gibbets were erected, one opposite to the tent doors of each commissioner, and it seemed more than probable that the purpose insinuated by the erection would be actually executed. It was certain, at least, that Tippoo was already stained with crimes of as deep a dye, for it had been ascertained that General Matthews and several other officers had by his orders been poisoned in prison, or cut off by some more cruel death.

Shortly after the arrival of the commissioners at Mangalore, General Macleod anchored in the roads with two Company's ships from Bombay. Finding communication with them all but absolutely interdicted, he declared that he would consider them as imprisoned men, whose orders were of no force; and for the purpose of bringing this point to an issue, sent a messenger on shore with two letters, one addressed to Tippoo, and the other to the commissioners. His messenger was detained, and he sailed away without an answer. A letter sent on the 1st of March, by the commissioners to the commander of one of the ships, required him to send two boats, one of which "must endeavour to come to the beach on

The commis-
sioners
meditate
an escape.



TIPPOO SULTAN.—From a portrait engraved in Beaton's
View of the War with Tippoo Sultan.

A.D. 1784

The commis-
sioners at
Tippoo's
camp medi-
tate an
escape.

seeing a gentleman near it on horseback, holding as a signal a white handkerchief in his hand." General Macleod, in commenting on this mysterious passage on the 9th of March, says, "The adventure of the white handkerchief was an intended escape of the commissioners from Tippoo, leaving behind them their baggage, revenue," &c. This assertion, which charges the commissioners with a resolution to provide for their own safety, and leave the soldiers who acted as guard, and the other persons who accompanied them, to their fate, has been strenuously denied; but though the matter continues to be involved in mystery, the fair inference from the narrative given by Colonel Wilks, and "founded," he says, "on high and incontrovertible living authority," seems to be, that at least the two junior commissioners meditated something of the kind, and abandoned their design because the officer of their guard had come to the knowledge of it, and sent them the following intimation:—"If there be any embarkation, I hope to see the last private into the boats; but my sentinels have orders to give me precise information, and I have a party saddled in the lines ready to seize as a deserter any and every person who shall attempt a *clandestine* escape."

Treaty of
peace signed.

Negotiation, in which all was arrogance on the one hand and pusillanimous submission on the other, continued a little longer, and Tippoo, having gratified his pride to the utmost by the employment of every form of derision, humiliation, and contempt, thought it necessary at last to provide for his own safety. His feigned assent to the treaty of Salbye and practical rejection of it were about to bring upon him a combined attack of the Company and the Malhrottas, and he had sense enough to avert the danger by consenting at last, on the 7th of March, 1784, to sign the treaty of peace. The only thing of consequence that now remained was the restoration of prisoners. Two of the commissioners having returned to Madras by sea, and the third by land, the arrangements for the reception of the prisoners released was intrusted to the officer commanding the escort. This delicate and difficult task he performed with a spirit which strikingly contrasted with the dastardliness previously manifested by his superiors. Before leaving Mangalore he caused proclamation to be made, even within Tippoo's camp, that he was ready to give protection to all inhabitants of Coromandel who chose to accompany him. In this way he secured the return of about 2000, but it is said that at least 200,000 still remained in captivity. The number of prisoners released was 2680. Of these 180 were officers, 900 British soldiers, and 1600 sepoys. This number, too, ought to have been far larger, but many had sunk under harsh treatment, and not a few had been deliberately murdered. With the latter atrocity Hyder is not chargeable. He acted like a barbarian in keeping his prisoners in irons, chained in pairs, treating them, according to his own expression, as "unruly beasts," not to be kept quiet in any other way, but he never murdered them. This horrible barbarity was reserved for his fiendish son, who selected for his victims all those who were reputed to have distinguished themselves, and might hereafter prove dangerous

opponents. Colonel Baillie died during Hyder's reign, but Captain Rumley, who charged Tippoo's guns on the morning of Baillie's tragedy, and Lieutenant Fraser, one of his staff, were among the first sufferers by the diabolical policy of the new reign. Lieutenant Sampson, captured with Colonel Braithwaite, General Matthews, and most of the captains taken at Bednore, experienced the same fate; afterwards, at different periods, other prisoners were carried off to Cabal Droog to be poisoned, or taken out to the woods and hacked to pieces. It almost makes one's blood boil to think that these execrable deeds were done with impunity, and would have been prevented, had the monster who committed them been previously made aware that signal vengeance would certainly follow.

A.D. 1784

Tippoo's
horrid
treatment
of his
prisoners.

Mention has been made of the disputes between the civil and military authorities at Madras. After the departure of Sir Eyre Coote they increased in virulence, and the deputies sent from Madras to announce the peace between Britain and France, carried with them orders to General Stuart to repair to the presidency and give an account of his conduct. Having yielded a very reluctant and dilatory obedience, he no sooner made his appearance in the council than the old quarrels were renewed. At last Lord Macartney moved and carried a resolution that General Stuart should be dismissed from the Company's service. He, on the other hand, challenged this resolution, as not only unjust, but incompetent, and declared his determination still to retain the command of the king's troops. There was thus a collision, which, if one of the parties did not give way, must ere long have produced something like a civil war. General Stuart had formerly acted a prominent part in a similar collision, and tried to terminate it by arresting Lord Pigot, the governor. The fatal result of that proceeding had not taught him moderation, and it was therefore not impossible that he might be disposed again to try the same remedy. If this was his intention, Lord Macartney anticipated him by employing a party of sepoys to make him prisoner, and, a few days after, shipping him off for England. The kind of retributive justice apparent in this proceeding produced many epigrams. One of these, made by the second son of Mahomed Ali, in broken English, was as follows:—"*General Stuart catch one lord; one lord catch General Stuart.*"

Disputes
between the
civil and
military
authorities
at Madras.

The dissensions at Madras must have been fomented by the state of feeling known to exist between Mr. Hastings and Lord Macartney. His lordship, not long after his arrival at Madras, intimated his opinion that the government of Bengal had, in some instances, carried their interference with the internal affairs of Madras farther than law or good policy could justify. Mr. Hastings replied in moderate, and even complimentary terms, admitting that he had stretched his powers, because he had no confidence in the previous government, and much farther than he would have done had he known of Lord Macartney's appointment to the chair. One of the interferences complained of related to

Misunder-
standings
between
Mr. Hast-
ings and
Lord Ma-
cartney.

A.D. 1784.

Separate
agreement
of the
Bengal gov-
ernment
with the
Nabob of
Arcot.

the Nabob of Arcot. This ally of the Company had always been much more liberal in promise than performance, and when, in consequence of the invasion of Hyder, the treasury of Madras was completely emptied, it was deemed advisable, in order to replenish it, that some permanent arrangement should be made for the purpose of rendering the nabob's revenues more available than they had hitherto been. When strongly pressed on the subject the nabob made a number of excuses, and ended by declaring that his future contributions were defined by a treaty which he had just concluded with the government of Bengal. The Madras council having never heard of this treaty were naturally surprised, and on asking explanation discovered that the nabob's assertion of a treaty was not altogether unfounded. Probably from anticipating the demands which would be made upon him, he had sent deputies to Bengal and entered into a regular negotiation with its government. Ultimately he obtained the consent of the governor-general and council to a number of articles, the most important of which were—that he should be acknowledged independent sovereign of the Carnatic; that he should be entitled to appoint his successor; that he should be exempt from all pecuniary demands, except the expense of ten battalions of troops, to be employed, if necessary, in settling his country; and that certain districts possessed by Hyder should, in the event of their being wrested from him, be added to his dominions. On these conditions the nabob, retaining only as much of his revenues as might be necessary for the maintenance of his family and government, was willing to make over all the rest to the Company during the war, it being understood, however, that in making the collections his agents should act in conjunction with those appointed by the Madras government.

Partial
modifica-
tion of this
agreement.

There cannot be a doubt that, in entering into such an agreement, the Bengal government, or, as they were now generally termed, the supreme council, far exceeded their powers. The Madras government, however, without dwelling on the illegality, contented themselves with criticizing the terms of the so-called treaty, and pointing out some of the evils to which it would necessarily lead. This representation was so far successful, that the whole matter was finally left to their decision, and it was arranged by a deed, dated 2d December, 1781, that all the territorial revenues of the nabob should be transferred to the Company for a period of at least five years, without any interference on his part with the collections, but that a sixth of the whole should be paid over to him for his own expenditure, and that any surplus which might arise should be carried to his credit.

Wild pro-
posal of Mr.
Hastings
to cede the
Northern
Circars.

Another point in regard to which the supreme council and that of Madras took very different views related to the Northern Circars. Mr. Hastings, in his anxiety to obtain an adequate force to carry on the war with the Mahrattas, entered into a negotiation with Nizam Ali, for the purpose of obtaining from him a body of cavalry, and was willing in return for this aid, to make him a present of the Northern Circars. A treaty binding the Company to this costly

sacrifice was arranged, but not having been ratified when Lord Macartney arrived, it was deemed becoming to submit it to his approbation. In common with his colleagues he returned a very decided opinion, condemning the proposed treaty in all its parts. The revenue which Mr. Hastings, in supporting his views, represented as trifling, was shown to amount, exclusive of Guntoor, to about a quarter of a million sterling. The territory, from forming a long and comparative narrow tract along the coast, could be easily defended by a people holding the command of the sea; it moreover gave an almost continuous line of communication between Bengal and the Carnatic, an object to which great importance was justly attached; while the manufactures of the inhabitants furnished an important part of the Company's investments. In return for this valuable territory, nothing more was to be obtained than the friendship of Nizam Ali, on which no dependence could be placed, and a body of horse so ill-disciplined, that their expense would almost to a certainty exceed the value of their services. These arguments prevailed; but there is reason to suspect that Mr. Hastings, though he yielded, felt sore when he saw the soundness of his judgment questioned, and one of his favourite schemes frustrated.

A.D. 1784.

Proposal for
ceding the
Northern
Circars
abandoned.

In the misunderstandings with Sir Eyre Coote, the supreme council took a very decided part against the Madras government, and Mr. Hastings, at the very time when he was expressing an "anxious desire to co-operate with Lord Macartney firmly and liberally for the security of the Carnatic, for the support of his authority, and for the honour of his administration," did not hesitate to address a letter, in the name of his colleagues, to the Madras council, in which, while intimating that they might have issued a peremptory command, they contented themselves with most earnestly recommending that "Sir Eyre Coote's wishes in regard to power may be gratified to their fullest possible extent; and that he may be allowed an unparticipated command over all the forces acting under British authority in the Carnatic." Whether considered as a command or as a recommendation, the obvious meaning of this letter was to convert the commander-in-chief into a military dictator, and to deprive the council of all control over his proceedings, while it left them responsible for the results. Accordingly, while the council, though protesting against the unreasonableness of the injunction, endeavoured to act upon it, they found their hands so completely tied up, that on receiving a requisition to send a detachment to Bombay, they could only answer that it was impossible for them to comply, because they no longer possessed any authority over the troops. This occurrence so far opened the eyes of the supreme council, that they saw the necessity of modifying the dictatorial powers which their letter had conferred. This modification, in so far as it met the wishes of the council, was in contradiction to those of Sir Eyre Coote, who, partly in consequence of it, threw up his command and returned to Bengal. He appears to have succeeded in inducing the supreme council to make him once more dictator, and had arrived at Madras

Extraordin-
ary powers
conferred on
Sir Eyre
Coote by the
Bengal gov-
ernment.

A D. 1769.

Open rupture
between Mr.
Hastings
and Lord
Macartney.

to resume his absolute powers, when the collision with the council, which had to all appearance become inevitable, was prevented by his sudden death. From this time there was no cordiality, and scarcely even a semblance of civility, between Mr. Hastings and Lord Macartney. Accordingly, in answer to complaints of counteraction in the discharge of their functions, we find the supreme council addressing that of Madras in such terms as the following:—"Records of laborious altercation, invective, and mutual complaint, are no satisfaction to the public for a neglect that may cost millions." Again, "In reply to our desire of unambiguous explanation on a subject of such public concern (the imputed counteraction), you favour us with a collected mass of complaint and invective against this government, against the Nabob of Arcot and his ministers, against the commander-in-chief of all the forces in India, against the commander-in-chief of his majesty's fleet, against your own provincial commander-in-chief, and again, against this government. Had you been pleased in so general a charge of impeachment to take cognizance of the co-operative support which was till of late withheld from you by the presidency of Bombay, your description of the universal misconduct of the managers of the public affairs in India (the president and select committee of Fort St. George excepted) would have been complete." On reading such passages as these, there is no difficulty in believing that at the time when they were written, Mr. Hastings was meditating Lord Macartney's suspension.

Collision in
regard to
treaty with
Tippoo.

The only other instance of direct collision between the governor-general and the Madras president which it is necessary to notice, took place in regard to the treaty with Tippoo. When the treaty arrived in Bengal, Mr. Hastings was at Lucknow, and the supreme council having full authority to act, did not deem it necessary either to transmit it to him, or wait for his return. They therefore ratified it in due form, and sent it back to Lord Macartney, by whom it was at once transmitted to Tippoo. Some months after, a fresh copy of the treaty was sent from Bengal to Madras. Beside the former signatures, it had that of the governor-general. This of itself was nothing, but there was moreover a declaration appended, which was to all intents and purposes a new article. Its purport was that the nabob, Mahomed Ali, though his name did not appear in the treaty, was entitled to be a party to it. The omission of his name had not been owing to inadvertence. When the treaty was made with Hyder in 1769, the nabob declined to sign it, and had not afterwards fulfilled the promise he had given to ratify it. Acting on this as a precedent, and believing that some advantages might thereby be secured, the Madras government had purposely refrained from making him a party. Probably for this very reason, the nabob desired to be included, and made his complaint to Mr. Hastings, in whom he had on several other occasions found too willing a listener. The result was the second ratification of the treaty, which the Madras government were not only enjoined to transmit to Tippoo, but told in terms harsher

than the occasion justified, that if they refused it was "at their peril." Lord Macartney was now in no humour to comply with such peremptory messages, and on the ground that the treaty was already validly ratified, and that from the suspicious temper of Tippoo a second ratification might be productive of mischievous consequences, persuaded his colleagues to refuse to transmit it. At the same time he took the whole responsibility upon himself, and declared his readiness to brave the wrath of the supreme council, by incurring the penalty of suspension. This would doubtless have been his sentence, had not Mr. Hastings been at the time engaged in transactions which more immediately concerned himself, and required all his attention.

A.D. 1773.

Threatened
suspension
of Lord
Macartney.

CHAPTER IX.

Visit of Mr. Hastings to Benares—Proceedings against the rajah—Parliamentary reports on Indian affairs—Proceedings in Oude—Resignation of Mr. Hastings—Resignation of Lord Macartney—India bills of Mr. Dundas, Mr. Fox, and Mr. Pitt—Establishment of the Board of Control.



DURING the dismemberment of the Mogul empire, the province of Benares passed as a dependency to the Soubahdar of Oude, and was held as a zemindary by Bulwant Sing, who, in 1740, had succeeded his father, Mansa Ram, both in his possessions and in the title of rajah, conferred upon him by Mahomed Shah of Delhi. During the war between the Company and the Soubahdar of Oude, or Nabob Vizier as he was usually called, Bulwant Sing, throwing off his allegiance as zemindar, became a valuable ally of the Company; and accordingly, in 1765, when peace was made with the vizier, an article was inserted in the treaty, stipulating that Bulwant Sing, in again becoming the dependant of Oude, should hold his possessions unmolested, and be liable to no more tribute than before. On the death of Bulwant Sing, in 1770, the vizier showed an inclination to dispossess his son, Cheyte Sing, but the Company, in fulfilment of the guarantee which they had given in the treaty, interfered and secured the succession for him, on the same terms as before, with the exception of a small addition in the annual payment. In 1773, when Mr. Hastings paid his first visit to the vizier, he was earnestly solicited by the latter to allow him to dispossess the rajah of two forts, and exact from him ten lacs of rupees above the stipulated amount, but refused, obviously on the ground that he could not consent without violating the treaty. This, indeed, is not an inference, but a fact, confirmed by Mr. Hastings in his general report to his colleagues, where he thus expresses himself, "I am well convinced that the rajah's inheritance, and perhaps his life, are no longer safe than while he enjoys the Company's pro-

Relations
with the
Rajah of
Benares.

A D. 1775. tection; which is his due by the ties of justice, and the obligations of public faith, and which policy enjoins us to afford him ever most effectually; his country is a strong barrier to ours without subjecting us to any expense, and we may depend upon him as a sure ally whenever we may stand in need of his services." In accordance with these views it was formally decided that "no increase of revenue should ever thereafter be demanded."

Treaty of
Fyzabad.

On the death of the nabob vizier, in 1775, the Bengal government, then represented by the majority, Messrs. Clavering, Monson, and Francis, took advantage of the minority of his son and successor, Asoff-ul-Dowlah, to impose upon him the treaty of Fyzabad, by which, among other extortions, they obliged him to cede the province of Benares to the Company. The effect of this cession was obviously to place the Company in the very same position as that in which the vizier had previously stood. It was certainly never meant by it to injure the Rajah of Benares. On the contrary, while he remained liable to no greater payment than before, he was to have the advantage of exchanging his allegiance to a capricious despot into allegiance to the Company, whose protection he had already experienced, and in whose honour and justice he could perfectly confide. The majority of the Bengal council plumed themselves greatly on the treaty, and thought it necessary, in order to prevent their colleagues from sharing any part of the credit, to inform the directors, "The measure is strictly and exclusively ours; the original plan was opposed in every step by the governor-general and Mr. Barwell." But though Mr. Hastings objected to the treaty because it dishonourably exacted from Asoff-ul-Dowlah "concessions inconsistent with former treaties, to which the necessity of his situation alone obliged him, however unwilling, to submit," it appears that after the treaty was concluded, he strongly advocated the policy of improving rather than deteriorating the rajah's position, by rendering him as much as possible an independent though a tributary prince. On this subject, indeed, the council were unanimous, and it was therefore decreed that so long as he performed his engagements, "no more demands should be made upon him by the honourable Company of any kind; nor, on any pretence whatever, should any person be allowed to interfere with his authority." The more effectually to secure this, Mr. Hastings proposed that the rajah should pay his revenue at Patna, putting on record the following reason:—"If a resident was appointed to receive the money as it became due at Benares, such a resident would unavoidably acquire an influence over the rajah, and over his country, which would unavoidably make him master of both. The consequence might not, perhaps, be brought completely to pass without a struggle, and many appeals to the council, which, in a government constituted like this, cannot fail to terminate against the rajah, and by the construction to which his opposition to the agent would be liable, might eventually draw on him severe restrictions, and end in reducing him to the mean and depraved state of a mere zemindar." Though this passage does

The position
of the Rajah
of Benares
improved
by it.

not explain the nature of the higher state which Mr. Hastings believed the rajah already to possess, it proves to demonstration that, both in his own opinion and that of his colleagues, the rajah, by the transference of his allegiance to the Company, had lost none of his former rights, and was not to be subjected to additional demands of any kind, nor to any interference with his authority so long as he discharged his engagements. It has been necessary to set this matter in the clearest light, because it was afterwards argued that the *sunnud* or charter granted to the rajah in 1776, made all former *sunnuds* null and void, and that, as that *sunnud* did not contain any clause exempting him for ever from all further demands, there was in fact no limit to the demands which the Company, as his acknowledged sovereign, might make upon him. This argument is at best a legal quibble. If the *sunnud* did not exempt him from further demands, neither did it reserve any right to make and enforce such demands. The only obligations to which it bound the rajah were, to pay a certain amount of revenue, and maintain order within his territories; and the clear understanding of all parties was that the fulfilment of these obligations was all that the Company could legally or equitably require of him. To give any other interpretation to the *sunnud* is to place the rajah in a worse position than before, a result not only not contemplated, but disavowed in the strongest terms by Mr. Hastings and his colleagues at the time when the *sunnud* was granted.

A.D. 1778.

Mr. Hastings' declaration in regard to the rajah.

In the year 1778, when the Mahratta war was raging, Mr. Hastings proposed that during its continuance the rajah should be required to furnish three battalions of sepoys, the annual expense of which was estimated at five lacs (£50,000). Half of the council proposed to substitute *requested* for *required*, but Mr. Hastings carried his point on agreeing to reserve the question of right for the decision of the directors. The rajah endeavoured to stipulate that the exaction should be continued only for a single year, and was punished, for what was called his contumacy, by an order to pay the amount of a whole year forthwith, instead of by instalments, as would otherwise have been permitted. He pleaded poverty, and asked indulgence for six or seven months, but this was treated as a new offence, and instructions were sent to the resident at Benares to demand full payment within five days, with intimation that failure to comply would be construed and treated as an absolute refusal. Thus pressed, the rajah did not venture to carry resistance further, and the money was forthcoming. The feeling toward the rajah evinced by Mr. Hastings on this occasion, differs so much from that displayed in the passages above quoted, that one naturally inquires whether anything had occurred in the interval to produce the change. Mr. Hastings has himself made statements which his enemies believed to give the *real*, though more charitable judges consider them to amount only to an apparent explanation. Speaking of the period when he was supposed to have resigned he says, "It is a fact, that when the unhappy divisions of our

Altered views of Mr. Hastings.

A.D. 1780.

Mr. Hastings' statements regarding the rajah.

government had proceeded to an extremity bordering on civil violence, by the attempt to wrest from me my authority, in the month of June, 1777, he had deputed a man, named Sumboonaut, with an express commission to my opponent; and the man had proceeded as far as Moorshedabad, when hearing of the change of affairs he stopped, and the rajah recalled him." When the rajah pleaded for six or seven months' indulgence, Mr. Hastings made this other statement, "I will not conceal from the board that I have expected this evasive conduct in the rajah, having been for some time past well informed, that he had been advised in this manner to procrastinate the payment of the five lacs, to afford time for the arrival of despatches from England, which were to bring orders for a total change in this government; and this, he was given to expect, would produce a repeal of the demand made upon him by the present government." Mr. Hastings, for his own sake, ought either to have withheld these statements, or, having made them, to have abstained carefully from acting toward the rajah in a manner which might be much more readily ascribed to personal vindictiveness than to a sense of duty.

New demands on the rajah.

In 1779 the demand of the five lacs was repeated. The rajah again pretended poverty, complained of hardship, and even ventured to plead that, by the tenure of his territories, he was only under obligation to pay a stipulated sum—an obligation which he had regularly performed. He was again pronounced contumacious, and under threat of military execution, was compelled to pay the five lacs, and an additional sum of £2000, as the alleged expense of the troops employed to coerce him. In 1780, when the demand was made for the third time, the rajah sent a confidential agent to Calcutta, to deprecate the displeasure of the governor-general, and offer every reparation in his power except payment. As a substitute for it, he secretly offered a present of two lacs. Mr. Hastings at first refused it, telling the agent that the whole contribution must be paid, but he afterwards changed his mind and received it. He must have understood that the money was offered as a bribe, and would not have been paid, except under the impression that it was to relieve the rajah from the larger claim. The acceptance, therefore, while still determined to enforce that claim, looks very like a fraud. Mr. Hastings' own explanation is, that he was exerting himself at the time to send a detachment under Colonel Camac into Scindia's dominions, and being otherwise destitute of the necessary funds, regarded the proffered gift as a kind of god-send. There cannot be a doubt that the money was expended in the Company's service, and the allegation subsequently made that Mr. Hastings meant to have appropriated it to his own use may be dismissed as groundless. At the same time, it must be confessed that he made too much a mystery of it, and subjected himself very unnecessarily to misconstruction, by first talking of the money as if it had formed part of his private resources, and not informing the directors till five months after, "that the money, by whatever means it came into his possession, was not

Instalment accepted by Mr. Hastings.

his own; that he had himself no right to it, nor would or could have received it, but for the occasion which prompted him to avail himself of the accidental means which were at that instant afforded him, of accepting and converting it to the property and use of the Company." Ultimately the rajah found that he had only duped himself by his present. The five lacs were exacted as before, and a considerable fine is said to have been imposed for his previous attempts to evade payment.

A.D. 1780.

About the date of the last payment, the Bengal government resolved that the rajah, in addition to the tribute and the forced contribution, should be required to furnish them with as many of the cavalry in his service as could be spared. This was rather a vague demand, but it was made specific by Mr. Hastings, who instructed the resident at Benares to fix the number at 2000.

Both money
and troops
demanded
from the
rajah.



BENARES, THE CHURRUN PADOOKHA AND MUNIKURNIKA GHAT.—From Prinsep's Views in Benares.

The rajah averred that all his cavalry amounted only to 1300, and were absolutely necessary to keep the peace and collect the revenue. Mr. Hastings must have been satisfied that there was truth in this statement, as he reduced his demand successively to 1500 and 1000. Ultimately the rajah collected 500 horse, and 500 matchlock-men as a substitute for the remainder, and sent word to the governor-general that they were ready to receive his commands. No answer was returned, for coercion had already been resolved on. "I was resolved," says Mr. Hastings, "to draw from his guilt the means of relief to the Company's distresses. In a word, I had determined to make him pay largely for his pardon, or to exact a severe vengeance for his past delinquency." There is here no disguise. A demand is made upon a Hindoo rajah, who, believing on grounds which appear well founded, and are admitted on all hands to be at least plausible, that he is not liable, complies with the utmost reluctance, after pleading poverty and petitioning for delay. This reluctance is magnified into a heinous crime, not so much because it is so in reality, but because the fine or ruin inflicted on the

A.D. 1781. rajah under the form of punishment will have the effect of relieving the Company from severe pecuniary distress. When such motives are distinctly avowed, it is useless to inquire whether the proceedings that followed were in accordance with justice. They could not be so except by accident, as no justice was meant, and nothing but money was wanted.

Mr. Hastings' determination to exact severe vengeance.

Mr. Hastings, being about to make a tour to the north, for the purpose of visiting the Nabob of Oude, had an opportunity of personally exacting his "severe vengeance" at Benares. His intention in this respect had been confidentially communicated to Mr. Wheler, at that time the only other member of council; to all others it was a profound secret. It would seem, however, that his designs had been to some extent penetrated. The nabob, whose guest he was about to become, had actually offered to purchase the rajah's dominions at a very large price; and the rajah himself, now thoroughly intimidated, proved how groundless all his pleas of poverty had been, by tendering twenty lacs of rupees as a contribution to the public service. Mr. Hastings having the nabob's offer in his pocket, knew he could make a better bargain, and therefore refused to accept of less than fifty lacs, or £500,000 sterling. Meanwhile, he set out on his northern tour. Anxious, if possible, to avert the impending storm, the rajah met him at Buxar, on the frontiers of his province, and humbled himself in every way before the relentless governor-general. During a confidential interview, granted on his own solicitation, he assured me, says Mr. Hastings, "that his zemindary, and all that he possessed, were at my devotion; and he accompanied his words by an action either strongly expressive of the agitation of his mind, or his desire to impress on mine a conviction of his sincerity, by laying his turban on my lap." All would not do, and the rajah was dismissed without a hint of the fate which awaited him.

His proceedings at Benares.

Mr. Hastings arrived at Benares on the 14th of August, 1781. The rajah, who did not arrive till a few hours later, offered to wait upon him in the evening, but was told to forbear his visit. On the following morning, Mr. Markham, the resident, was sent to him with a paper of complaints and demands. He returned an answer in the course of the same day, partly explaining and partly excusing his conduct; but it was money, not explanation, that was wanted, and therefore, in the course of the same evening, he found himself a prisoner in his own palace, with two companies of sepoy placed over him. The disapprobation which it is impossible not to feel at the harshness of this arrest, is almost lost in amazement at its boldness. Benares, situated on the left or north bank of the Ganges, 420 miles north-west of Calcutta in a direct line, and a half more by water, was the acknowledged capital of Hindooism, and contained a population of 200,000, of which the Hindoos formed two-thirds. A large part of this population was casual and migratory, rather than fixed, consisting of pilgrims and mendicants, all of them of course deeply imbued with fanaticism, and many of them ferocious desperadoes provided with arms, which

they were ever ready to use in any affray. The rajah was popular on account of the mildness and equity of his administration, and the moment it became known that he had been subjected to the indignity of an arrest, and that his life was perhaps in danger, the whole city was in commotion, and a general rush was made for the palace. By some unaccountable oversight, the two companies of sepoy had not been provided with ammunition. As soon as the insurrection commenced, and the oversight was discovered, another company of sepoy was despatched to the assistance of their comrades, but the work of slaughter had already commenced. The sepoy in the palace, unable to defend themselves, were speedily cut to pieces, and the company sent to succour them found their passage disputed by multitudes of armed men, who had surrounded the palace and blockaded all the avenues. In the confusion the rajah escaped through a wicket, and descending the steep bank of the river, by means of turbans tied together, entered a boat, which conveyed him to the opposite side. Such were the first-fruits of Mr. Hastings' resolution to "exact severe vengeance."

A.D. 1781.

Serious insurrection at Benares, and flight of the rajah.

At a later period, Mr. Hastings, when called to account for his treatment of the rajah, endeavoured to improve his case by imputing to him treasonable designs. His own conduct refutes the charge. He moved into the heart of the rajah's capital, and arrested him in his own palace, under the very eyes of an attached and most excitable population, without providing himself with any stronger protection than a small escort. This, however much he might have been blinded by the desire of vengeance, he never would have done, if he had suspected treasonable designs. Still, though there seems not to have been any premeditated treason, the position into which he had now brought himself was full of alarm. His account of it is as follows:—"If Cheyte Sing's people, after they had effected his rescue, had proceeded to my quarters, instead of crowding after him in a tumultuous manner, as they did, in his passage over the river, it is probable that my blood, and that of about thirty English gentlemen of my party, would have been added to the recent carnage; for they were about 2000, furious and daring from the easy success of their last attempt; nor could I assemble more than fifty regular and armed sepoy for my defence." To these he was able almost immediately to add six companies of Major Popham's regiment, and a few recruits recently enlisted as a guard to the resident, the whole mustering about 450 men. This force, small as it was, might have sufficed to overawe the insurrectionists, had not new spirit and audacity been infused into them from another quarter.

Perilous position of Mr. Hastings.

The officer in command of the other four companies of Major Popham's regiment, lying at Mirzapore, together with a company of artillery and a company of the French rangers, was ordered to bring them down the river to Ramnugur, situated on the south bank, about four miles above Benares. It was a place of some strength, in the rajah's possession, and it was intended that no attempt should be made upon it till a larger force should be collected and placed under

A.D. 1781.

Progress of
insurrection
in Benares.

Major Popham's command. Unfortunately, the officer from Mirzapore, anxious to signalize himself, ventured on the attack with very inadequate means, and sustained a repulse, by which his force was nearly annihilated. The effect was to raise the whole country in the rajah's interest. Even beyond his territories, in parts of Oude and Behar, the excitement was felt, and multitudes flocked to arms. The rajah himself, meanwhile, professed an earnest desire for peace, protesting his innocence of all the blood that had been shed; but to his letters no answer was returned. Mr. Hastings must now have questioned, if not the propriety of his measures, the manner in which he had attempted to execute them, since instead of replenishing the treasury of the Company, they now threatened only to make a new drain upon it, by provoking an additional war. His quarters at Benares were regarded as no longer tenable, and he removed, with all the troops which had been collected, to the Company's strong fort of Chunar, or Chunarghur, situated sixteen miles to the south-west. The danger was thus removed, and little difficulty was afterwards felt in collecting a force which rendered further resistance hopeless. The rajah, who had mustered his forces after he found that no terms would be granted him, proved totally unable to cope with his antagonists, and fled to the fort of Bidjeyghur, situated about fifty miles south of his capital. Here he had deposited most of his treasures. Major Popham followed in pursuit, but the rajah, taking with him as much property as he could manage to carry, continued his flight. The ranee, his mother, still remaining within the fort, maintained the defence till an assault was threatened, and then surrendered on the condition of personal safety, and the assurance that neither she nor the females of her family and household should be subjected to the indignity of search. This article was shamefully violated, and, it appears, with the sanction of the officers; for the report of the proceedings of a committee of officers, put on record at the time, contains, *inter alia*, the following resolution:—"That ten gold mohurs¹ be given to each of the four female searchers." Mr. Hastings also admits the fact when he writes, "It gives me great concern that the licentiousness of any persons under your command should have given cause to complain of the infringement of the smallest article of the capitulation in favour of the mother of Cheyte Sing and her dependants." It is not unworthy of notice that what he here censures is only the infringement. To the thing itself, provided it could be done without infringement, he appears not to have had any serious objection, since he thus addressed Major Popham when consulted as to the terms of capitulation:—"I apprehend that she (the ranee) will contrive to defraud the captors of a considerable part of the booty, by being suffered to retire without examination. But this is your consideration and not mine. I should be very sorry that your officers and soldiers lost any part of the reward to which they are so well entitled; but I cannot make any objection, as you must be the best judge of the expediency of the promised indulgence to the ranee."

Shameful
treatment
of the
rajah's
mother.¹ The mohur was a gold coin worth about sixteen rupees.

This passage has been quoted, not so much for what it says about *examination*, as for its distinct admission that what should be found within the fort was to belong to the captors. Had it been taken by assault this would have been the rule, but as possession by capitulation only was now contemplated, the property found within the fort belonged of right to the Company. Accordingly, in the very face of the above passage, Mr. Hastings did lay claim to all the treasure of Bidjeyghur, but it was only to meet with a grievous disappointment. The troops seized upon everything found within the fort, or obtained by the dishonourable search of the females, as lawful booty. Mr. Hastings, after claiming it as a right, was so distressed for money that he petitioned for part of the money as a loan, and had the mortification of being refused. What his original expectations had been may be inferred from his belief of the report made to him that Cheyte Sing took away "as much treasure as his elephants and camels together could carry, which is reported to me to have consisted of one lac of mohurs and fifteen or sixteen of silver (in all about £320,000), besides jewels of an unknown amount." When disappointed in the expectation of treasure, the governor may have found some compensation in the exaction of "severe vengeance," which he accomplished by depriving Cheyte Sing of his territories, and bestowing them on his sister's son, a youth of only eighteen years of age. A better source of consolation was given him by the intelligence which he received while at Chunar that Mahadajee Scindia had agreed to terms of peace.

A.D. 1781.

Dispute as to
prize moneyDisappoint-
ment of Mr.
Hastings.

Mr. Hastings should now have continued his journey to Lucknow, but the eagerness of the nabob had rendered this unnecessary. On hearing of the insurrection at Benares, and the subsequent retirement to Chunar, he determined to lose no time in setting out for this fort. Shortly after his arrival, a new treaty, known by the name of the treaty of Chunar, was concluded between the nabob and the Company. The main object of it was to free him from burdens which he had declared his inability to bear, and permit him to resume a number of jaghires which the Company had guaranteed to their actual possessors. His payments to the Company for the troops maintained within his territories had fallen greatly into arrear; and as he declared that many of the troops might be dispensed with, and were even forced upon him contrary to his wish, there was little difficulty in arranging that as many as were deemed superfluous should be withdrawn. What, indeed, could the Company gain by sending troops into Oude, and receiving for their maintenance nothing better than promises from the nabob, while the real burden was thrown upon themselves? The articles providing for the resumption of jaghires raised questions of greater difficulty. The basis of agreement in regard to them was, that where the possessors were guaranteed by the Company, each should, on being ousted, receive a pension equivalent to the estimated annual value of the lands possessed. It must be perfectly obvious that such an exchange, when not

Treaty of
Chunar.

A.D. 1781.

left optional, but rendered compulsory, placed the holders of the jaghires in a far worse position than before, and therefore amounted to a gross breach of faith. So long as they continued in the possession of the lands, they were always sure of drawing a revenue from them; but what were they to expect when they were degraded to the condition of pensioners, and had no better security for their pensions than the promise of a despot, notoriously unable to pay, and notoriously still more unwilling than unable?

Treatment
of Fyzoola
Khan.

The most extensive of all the jaghires was that of Fyzoola Khan, the last of the Rohilla chiefs who had battled for the independence of his country. Up to the last, he remained so strongly entrenched at the head of a numerous and valiant army, that the late nabob, the father of the present, was glad to come to terms. Fyzoola Khan knew too well with whom he was dealing, to put any trust in his promises, and only agreed to enter into a treaty, on the Company undertaking to guarantee it. By this treaty he received a large and valuable jaghire, and engaged in return to retain in his service 5000 troops, with 2000 or 3000 of which he was to assist the nabob in time of war according to his ability. In 1778, when hostilities between Great Britain and France were declared, Mr. Hastings applied to him for aid, and receiving less than he expected, urged the nabob to make a demand upon him for 5000 horse. He replied that he had only 2000 horse in all, which were ready at the Company's service, and that the 3000 foot, the remainder of his troops, were necessary to keep the peace of the country and collect the revenues. When this answer was received, the governor-general and council, consisting at this time of only Mr. Hastings and Mr. Wheler, minuted the following resolution:—"That the nabob Fyzoola Khan had evaded the performance of his part of the treaty between the late nabob Sujah-u-Dowlah and him, to which the honourable Company were guarantees, and upon which he was lately summoned to furnish the stipulated number of troops, which he is obliged to furnish on the condition by which he holds the jaghire granted to him." This resolution looks as if it had been inserted to pave the way for a transaction which was already in contemplation, and was completed by the third article of the treaty of Chunar. This article is as follows:—"That as Fyzoola Khan has, by his breach of treaty, forfeited the

its injustice.

protection of the English government, and causes, by his continuance in his present independent state, great alarm and detriment to the nabob vizier, he be permitted, when time shall suit, to resume his lands and pay him in money, through the resident—after deducting the amount and charges of the troops he stands engaged to furnish by treaty—the amount stipulated by treaty, which amount shall be passed to the account of the Company during the continuance of the present war." When the question is asked, Wherein does the breach of treaty by Fyzoola Khan, previously asserted in the minute of the council, and now more solemnly reasserted in this third article, consist? Mr. Hastings himself answers that there was really no such breach. "In the hurry of

business," he says, "he and the other members of the board were deceived by this letter (a letter from a British officer in Rohilcund) into the belief that 5000 was the quota defined, and horse, though not expressed in the treaty, was undoubtedly understood." Again, after repeating the misstatement in the most solemn manner by inserting it in the treaty of Chunar, and employing it to excuse the Company for violating their guarantee, and leaving Fyzoola Khan at the nabob's mercy, he distinctly admits, that "the conduct of Fyzoola Khan in refusing the aid demanded," though "evasive and uncandid," was "not an absolute breach of treaty;" he was only guilty of a scrupulous "attention to literal expression, when a more liberal interpretation would have been highly useful and acceptable to us." This, he adds, "strongly marks his unfriendly disposition, though it may not impeach his fidelity, and leaves him little claim to any exertions from us for the continuance of his jaghires." These words occur in a kind of commentary, with which Mr. Hastings accompanied the treaty of Chunar, on transmitting it to his colleagues. Why Mr. Hastings, while acknowledging that Fyzoola had not broken the treaty, not only charged him with it, but made it a pretext for breaking faith with him, and depriving him of the protection which the Company had solemnly guaranteed, can only be explained by admitting, that on this as on various other occasions, he was too ready to sacrifice honour and justice to the purposes of the moment. In the present instance, he could not even say that the course he took was in accordance with sound policy. On the contrary, in the commentary above referred to, he makes the following extraordinary confession:—"I am of opinion, that neither the vizier's nor the Company's interests would be promoted by depriving Fyzoola Khan of his independency, and I have therefore reserved the execution of this agreement to an indefinite term; and our government may always interpose to prevent any ill effects from it." In other words, he had agreed, in consideration of a sum of money, to allow the nabob to rob Fyzoola Khan, but had purposely made the terms so ambiguous, that the nabob, after paying the money, might still be prevented from committing the robbery.

A.D. 1781.

Tortuous
policy of
Mr. Has-
tings.

The resumption of the jaghires led to other transactions of a still more disgraceful character. A large extent of land was held in jaghire by two Begums or Princesses of Oude, the one the grandmother and the other the mother of the nabob. In addition to the jaghires, they were understood to possess an enormous amount of treasure, the hoard accumulated by the late nabob Sujah-u-Dowlah, and estimated at £3,000,000. The proceedings at Benares, instead of yielding the money expected, had increased the financial difficulties of the Company, and Mr. Hastings, rendered almost desperate, determined as a last resource to replenish his treasury by the spoliation of the begums. With this view mainly, the second article of the treaty of Chunar, providing for the resumption of the jaghires, had been framed. Decency and

Spoliation
of the Be-
gums of
Oude.

A.D. 1781.

Shameful
project for
despoiling
the Begums
of Oude.

policy did not permit any express mention of the treasure, but the secret stipulation was, that the nabob should plunder his grandmother and mother, and pay over the proceeds to the governor-general for the behoof of the Company. There were difficulties in the way. Asoff-ul-Dowlah, though almost destitute of natural affection, stood somewhat in awe of the begums, and had no sooner consented to become their spoliator than he would fain have retracted. This difficulty, however, was easily surmounted. Another, involving the honour of the Company, was more serious. The nabob's mother had made a formal complaint against him to the governor-general and council. He had extorted from her twenty-six lacs of rupees, and was demanding an additional thirty lacs. The pretext was, that he required the money in order to meet his obligations to the Company. Assuming this to be the fact, she was willing to make the new advance, which, added to the former, constituted an entire debt of £560,000, and renounce all claim for repayment, provided her son would become solemnly bound, and the Company would undertake to guarantee, that he would make no further demand upon her; and that she should have the full enjoyment of her jaghires and effects wherever she might please to reside, whether within the limits of Oude, or elsewhere. The terms were accepted. Asoff-ul-Dowlah signed the obligation, and the Company gave the guarantee.

Claim of the
begums to
British pro-
tection.

In the beginning of 1778, the elder begum, who had not obtained any security for good treatment, resolved, in consequence of the extortion and insult to which she was daily subjected, to quit Oude and make a pilgrimage to Mecca. This did not suit the views of the nabob, who feared that her treasure would thus be entirely lost to him, and he refused to allow her to depart. She made her complaint to the resident, Mr. Middleton, who, after hearing both parties, reported that "the deportment of the nabob toward her, his family, and relations in general, was, he could not but admit, very exceptionable." The complaint from the elder was soon followed by another from the younger begum, who charged her son with repeated violations of his agreement, and called upon the Company to make good their guarantee. The Bengal council, in which Mr. Hastings had regained the ascendant, took up the subject on the 23d of March, and thus instructed the resident:—"We desire you will repeat your remonstrances to the vizier on these points, in the name of this government; representing to him the consequences of such an arbitrary proceeding; the reproach to which his honour and reputation, as well as ours from being connected with him, will be exposed by such acts of cruelty and injustice; and the right which we derive from the nature of our alliance with him, to expect that he will pay a deference to our remonstrances." With respect to the Bao Begum (the nabob's mother), they add, "Her grievances come before us on a very different footing. She is entitled to our protection by an act, not sought by us, but solicited by the nabob himself. We therefore empower and direct you, to afford your support and protection to her in the

due maintenance of all the rights she possesses, in virtue of the treaty executed between her and her son, under the guarantee of the treaty."

A. D. 1781.

Claim of the
begums
refused on
frivolous
grounds.

Such was the view taken by the governor-general and council in 1778, and we hear of nothing which had occurred to change it till 1781, when we are startled by an article in the treaty of Chunar, framed for the express purpose of sanctioning the spoliation of the begums. When asked, What had the begums done to deserve this cruel treatment, and place themselves beyond the pale of the Company's pledged protection? we can only answer, Mr. Hastings was in want of money and determined to have it. No doubt a proceeding carrying so much dishonour and iniquity on the very face of it, could not be carried out without some semblance of justification. Accordingly, it is said that the begums abetted Cheyte Sing, and countenanced, if they did not actually take part in his insurrection. Where is the proof of the fact? It was a rumour on which Mr. Hastings chose to act, before he had any means of ascertaining whether it was well founded, and he reiterated the charge, after he knew that if he could not make it good, his own conduct would be incapable of vindication. The means to which he resorted for proof only show the extremity to which he felt himself reduced. His old friend and schoolfellow, Sir Elijah Impey, in order, as he himself declares, that people in England might be satisfied that Mr. Hastings in his narrative had affirmed no more than the truth, volunteered to go to Lucknow, and take affidavits attesting the truth of the charges brought against the begums. Mr. Hastings accepted of this extraordinary offer, and Sir Elijah set out for the express purpose of taking these affidavits. Of course, he had no jurisdiction in Oude. Why then employ him? The only answer that can be given is, that being chief-justice of the supreme court of Calcutta and the known friend of the governor-general, abundance of affidavits of the kind required could hardly fail to be forthcoming. Personally, Sir Elijah Impey was destitute of every other qualification for the office. When afterwards interrogated on the subject, he admitted that he did not know what the affidavits contained, and he did not know whether the persons who swore them had ever read them, or whether they even understood them. They "brought their affidavits ready drawn," and he believed that the resident, Mr. Middleton, "in consequence of a letter Mr. Hastings wrote to him, had communicated the subject matter of what they were to depose to." It is needless to say, that affidavits so concocted and so sworn were worse than useless, and damaging only to those who had recourse to them.

Sir Elijah
Impey vol-
unteers to
procure
affidavits
for Mr.
Hastings
against the
begums.

The resumption of the jaghires proved more tedious than had been anticipated, not from any difficulty in the thing itself, but from the nabob's reluctance to carry out the extreme measures to which he had been induced to give his consent. Mr. Hastings, in consequence, lost patience, and instructed Mr. Middleton to take the matter into his own hands. This threatened supersession of the nabob's authority compelled him to proceed, and Mr. Middleton

A. D. 1781.

wrote Mr. Hastings, on 9th December, 1781, that, "rather than suffer it to appear that the point had been carried in opposition to his will, he at length yielded a nominal acquiescence, and has this day issued his own perwannahs to that effect: declaring however at the same time, both to me and his ministers, that it is an act of compulsion."

Mr. Hastings' attempts to justify the plunder of the begums.

The next part in the plan of spoliation was the seizure of the treasures. Mr. Hastings at one time alleged that this was not originally contemplated, and that it was inflicted as a punishment for the violent opposition which the servants and agents of the begums had made to the resumption of the jaghires. It is clear, however, that in this instance, his memory had proved treacherous. In one of his own letters, dated 23d January, 1782, but referring to the earlier date of the conferences at Chunar, he says, "that in addition to the resolution of resuming the begums' jaghires, the nabob had declared his resolution of reclaiming all the treasures of his family which were in their possession, and to which, by the Mahometan laws, he was entitled. This resolution I have strenuously encouraged and supported." Mr. Middleton also, in a letter dated the 6th of December, and consequently three days before the nabob had issued any orders for the resumption of the jaghires, wrote to Mr. Hastings, "Your pleasure respecting the begums I have learned from Sir Elijah; and the measure heretofore proposed will soon follow the resumption of the jaghires. From both, or indeed from the former alone, I have no doubt of the complete liquidation of the Company's balance." The measure from which this magnificent result was anticipated, could be nothing else than the seizure of the treasures. Mr. Hastings himself afterwards became satisfied, and candidly acknowledged, that in ascribing the seizure of the treasures to the opposition offered to the resumption of the jaghires, he had committed a blunder.


Abominable measures employed.

The begums were residing at Fyzabad, the former capital of Oude. Here the nabob, the resident, and a body of English troops arrived on the 8th of January, 1782. After three days spent in parleying, the troops took possession of the town, occupied the outer inclosure of the palace of the one begum, and blocked up the entrance to the other. Still negotiation proved unavailing. The begums remained within their secluded apartments, and no treasure was obtained. The next step was to operate on the feelings of the begums, through their favourite and confidential agents. These were two aged eunuchs, named Jewar Ali Khan and Behar Ali Khan, and the device fallen upon was to seize these persons, put them in irons, and by subjecting them to other severities, compel them to disclose any treasure of which they might have the custody, or to use their influence with the princesses, who, it was thought, might from mere compassion, on learning how their favourite servants were maltreated, be induced to give way. This diabolical expedient proved so far successful, that the elder begum paid to the English resident the amount of the bond granted by the nabob to the Company for the balance of 1779-80.

It does not appear what promise was made to induce her to make this payment, but the fact is that the eunuchs were not released. There was another balance due for 1780-81, but when it was demanded of her "she declared," says the resident, "with apparent truth, that she had delivered up the whole of the property in her hands." This might be so, argued the spoliators, and yet if not in her hands, it might be elsewhere. The torturing

A.D. 1781.

Inhuman
treatment
of the be-
gums' off-
icers.



GATE OF THE LOLL BANG AT FYZABAD—From Forbes' Oriental Memoirs.

process must therefore be continued. What its nature was, may be inferred from the following letter, dated 20th January, 1782, addressed by the resident to the British officer who guarded the eunuchs:—"Sir—When this note is delivered to you, I have to desire, that you order the two prisoners to be put in irons, keeping them from all food, &c., agreeable to my instructions of yesterday. (Signed) Nath. Middleton." Thus ironed, and starved, and subjected to all the privations and indignities which may be imagined to be included under the above "&c.," the eunuchs offered to pay the sum demanded in a month, from their own effects and credit. A bond for the amount was accordingly taken, but the imprisonment was continued, and the two begums remained under a guard. Before the 23d of February, 1782, upwards of £500,000 had been received by the resident. This consisted partly of payments made by the eunuchs on the bond which had been extorted from them. To raise the balance, they requested to be allowed to go abroad, and solicit the assistance of their friends. This was positively refused.

On the 18th of May, after the eunuchs had suffered a two months' imprisonment, the officer in charge of them wrote thus to the resident:—"The prisoners Behar Ali Khan and Jewar Ali Khan, who seem to be very sickly, have requested their irons might be taken off for a few days, that they might take medicine, and walk about the garden of the place where they are confined. Now, as I am sure that they will be equally secure without their irons as with

Their final
release.

A.D. 1782.

Release of
the begums
officers.

them, I think it my duty to inform you of this request. I desire to know your pleasure concerning it." The resident, acting under higher orders, had no alternative but to refuse. Indeed, new terrors and rigours were prepared for them. In Fyzabad, their ordinary residence, the fact of their being near the begums, and within reach of their possible intervention in their behalf, might afford some solace, but they were now sent off to Lucknow, perhaps to perish unheeded among strangers. What they here suffered must be conjectured from the following letter, addressed by the assistant-resident to the British officer on guard:—"Sir—The nabob having determined to inflict corporal punishment upon the prisoners under your guard, this is to desire, that his officers, when they shall come, may have free access to the prisoners, and be permitted to do with them as they shall see proper." All measures of severity proving unavailing, it began to be suspected that the work of spoliation was complete, or, that if anything remained to be given up, lenient measures were more likely to obtain it. The begums and their attendants, who had often been reduced to the point of starvation, were set free from restraint, and the eunuchs regained their freedom. The kind of treatment to which they had been subjected may be learned from the delight expressed at their deliverance. This is described rather hyperbolically by the officer who had the charge of them, in a letter to the resident:—"I wish you had been present at the enlargement of the prisoners. The quivering lips, with the tears of joy stealing down the poor men's cheeks, was a scene truly affecting. If the prayers of these poor men will avail, you will at the last trump be translated to the happiest regions in heaven."

Mr. Hastings accepts a present of £100,000 from the Nabob of Oude.

During his visit at Chunar, the nabob offered Mr. Hastings a present of ten lacs (£100,000), of course not in specie, for of this he had none, but in bills on some of the great soucars or bankers of the country. By the Regulating Act, all servants of the Company, civil and military, are expressly prohibited from accepting "from any of the Indian princes or powers, or their ministers or agents (or any of the natives of Asia), any present, gift, donation, gratuity, or reward, pecuniary or otherwise, on any account, or on any pretence whatsoever;" and by another regulation, all the ordinary nuzzurs or presents which it would be deemed an affront to the donor not to receive, are to be handed over to the Company. The only alternative remaining to Mr. Hastings, therefore, was to decline the present, or having accepted it, to pay over the amount into the Company's treasury. Once there, it must have appeared in the accounts, and could at any future time be traced. Mr. Hastings adopted a different course. He accepted the £100,000, as if for himself, expended it in the service of the Company, and then asked the directors to make his fortune by sanctioning his appropriation of it as a present. This request, contained in a letter dated 20th January, 1782, about four months after his acceptance of the gift, in September, 1781, was in the following terms:—"I accepted it without hesitation, and gladly,

being entirely destitute both of means and credit, whether for your service or the relief of my own necessities. It was made not in specie, but in bills. What I have received has been laid out in the public service; the rest shall be applied to the same account. The nominal sum is ten lacs Oude currency. As soon as the whole is completed, I shall send you a faithful account of it, resigning the disposal of it to the pleasure of your honourable court. If you shall adjudge the disposal to me, I shall consider it as the most honourable appointment and reward of my labours, and I wish to owe my fortune to your bounty. I am now in my fiftieth year; I have passed thirty-one years in your service. My conscience allows me boldly to claim the merit of zeal and integrity, nor has fortune been unpropitious to their exertions. To these qualities I bound my pretensions. I shall not repine, if you shall deem otherwise of my services; nor ought your decision, however it may disappoint my hope of a retreat adequate to the consequence and elevation of the office which I now possess, to lessen my gratitude for having been so long permitted to hold it, since it has at least permitted me to lay up a provision with which I can be contented in a more humble station."

A.D. 1782.

Mr. Hastings' explanation to the directors, and request to be permitted to keep the money as his own.

In making the above request, Mr. Hastings committed two important mistakes. He asked the directors for a gift which they could not bestow without flying in the face of an act of parliament; and he asked it under the impression that he stood high in favour with the directors, whereas his letter must have reached them about the very time when they were meditating his removal from office, in compliance with the following resolution adopted by the House of Commons, on the 30th of May, 1782:—"Resolved that Warren Hastings, Esq., governor-general, and William Hornby, Esq., president of the council at Bombay, having in sundry instances acted in a manner repugnant to the honour and policy of this nation, and thereby brought great calamities on India, and enormous expenses on the Company, it is the duty of the directors to pursue all legal and effectual means for the removal of the said governor-general and president from their respective offices, and to recall them to Great Britain." The parliamentary proceedings which issued in the adoption of the above resolution, and the course subsequently taken by the directors and the court of proprietors, must be briefly explained.

Serious blunders thus committed.

The exclusive privileges of the Company were to expire on three years' notice, given at any time after the 25th of March, 1780, and many communications passed between the ministry and the directors, with a view to a future arrangement. The points chiefly debated were the claim of the crown to all the territories which the Company had acquired, and the amount of payment which the Company ought to make to the public in return for their exclusive privileges. The precarious position of Lord North's ministry at the time, gave the directors advantages of which they did not fail to avail themselves, and the act which was passed left the more important of these questions still open. This

Renewal of the Company's charter.

A.D. 1762.

Parliamentary committees on Indian affairs.

act (21 Geo. III. c. 65) left the Company in possession of all their former privileges till three years' notice after the 1st of March, 1791; accepted of a sum of £400,000 as full payment of the arrears due to the public under former arrangement; and provided that in future, after payment of a dividend of eight per cent. out of the clear profits, the public should receive three-fourths of any surplus that might arise. The only part of the act seriously affecting the constitution of the Company was a section providing that, as the Company were already bound to communicate to government all despatches received from India, so they should in future be bound to communicate and submit for approval all despatches which they proposed to transmit to India. While the attention of parliament was thus directed to Indian affairs, two important committees were appointed—the one a select committee, restricted at first to the examination of the proceedings relative to the jurisdiction of the supreme court at Calcutta, but afterwards empowered to extend their inquiries generally to the administration of justice and government in Bengal; the other a secret committee, to inquire into the causes of the Carnatic war and the state of the Company's possessions on the coast. Mr. Burke took the lead in the one committee, Mr. Henry Dundas, afterwards Lord Melville, was chairman of the other. From the two, eighteen reports (twelve from the select and six from the secret committee) were received, containing a vast mass of important matter, and still affording the best materials for the history of India during the period to which they refer.

Political changes.

On the 9th of April, 1782, Mr. Dundas, in moving that the reports of the secret committee should be referred to, a committee of the whole house entered very fully into the merits of the transactions to which they referred, and concluded with a long series of resolutions, relating partly to the general system of government, and partly to the affairs of the Carnatic. A bill of pains and penalties, founded on those relating to the latter head, was immediately brought in against Sir Thomas Rumbold, the late governor, and Messrs Whitehill and Perring, late members of the council of Madras, for breaches of public trust and high crimes and misdemeanours. In March, 1782, Lord North's ministry had been succeeded by that of the Marquis of Rockingham, and this again, owing to his sudden death in the following July, by that of the Earl of Shelburne. The attention of parliament was so much engrossed by domestic politics, that Mr. Dundas's bill of pains and penalties had only passed a second reading when the session closed. In the spring of 1783 another ministerial change took place by the famous coalition between Lord North and Mr. Fox, and when parliament again met, the bill of pains and penalties continued to languish. In December the coalition ministry was dismissed, and Mr. Pitt became first lord of the treasury and chancellor of the exchequer. A few days afterwards the bill was finally dropped.

The resolution for the dismissal of Mr. Hastings, quoted above, was moved by

Mr. Dundas during the Rockingham ministry, and would in all probability have been carried into effect, had not this ministry been suddenly dissolved, since Mr. Burke, though only paymaster of the forces, was one of its most influential members, and had already expressed his decided condemnation of the governor-general's conduct. The directors accordingly seemed disposed to give immediate effect to the resolution, when they found their hands tied up by the proprietors, who, at a special general court, held on the 19th of June, 1782, adopted the following spirited resolution:—"That the removing of Warren Hastings, Esq., the governor-general of Bengal, or any servants of the Company, merely in compliance with a vote of the House of Commons, without being satisfied that the grounds of delinquency against the said Warren Hastings, or such other servants, are sufficient of themselves to vindicate the directors in coming to such resolution, would weaken the confidence which the servants of the Company ought to entertain of the justice of their employers, and will tend to destroy that independency which the proprietors of East India stock ought to enjoy in the management of their own affairs." Appended to this resolution was a recommendation to the directors not to give effect to any decision on the subject till it had received the approbation of a general court. The directors were so puzzled how to act, that they discussed the question at eleven meetings, held between the 20th of June and the 2d of October. Ultimately they adopted a series of resolutions, which, after declaring that their policy had always been "to abstain from schemes of conquest," and "to confine their views to a system of defence," but "that a contrary system of policy has been adopted and pursued by the Company's servants in India," in disobedience to the well-advised orders of their superiors, concluded that "a steady perseverance in the system of conduct, so frequently enjoined by the court of directors, cannot be expected from those whose ideas of extension of dominion, either by negotiation or conquest, have led them to depart from orders so often enforced, and therefore, that it is expedient to remove Warren Hastings, Esq., from the office of governor-general of Bengal." These resolutions were met by counter-resolutions on the part of the proprietors, who, at a special general court, held on the 21st of October, adopted a motion declaring "that the war in which we are now engaged with the Mahrattas was evidently founded on the sentiments of the court of directors, conveying demands on the Mahratta admin-

A.D. 1782.

Proposal to
dismiss Mr.
Hastings.

HENRY DUNDAS, Viscount Melville.
After Sir Thos. Lawrence.

Opposite
views of di-
rectors and
proprietors
on the
subject.

A.D. 1783.

Controversy
as to dismissal
of Mr.
Hastings.

istration greatly exceeding the conditions of the treaty of Poorundhur"—that "consequently it would be the height of injustice to lay the blame of that war, or the evils which have flowed from it, upon Mr. Hastings"—that "the government-general of Bengal were using every means in their power to effect a general pacification"—that this conduct "merits the warmest approbation of the court"—and "that therefore it would be evidently injurious to the interest of the Company and the nation to remove any of those principal servants of the Company, now discharging their duty with such uncommon exertions, ability, and unanimity."

Final decision by
ballot.

In accordance with these opinions, the general court "recommended to the court of directors to rescind their late resolution respecting the removal of Warren Hastings, Esq., governor-general of Bengal." This motion, when tested by a ballot, taken on the 31st of October, was carried by a large majority. The directors, in consequence, rescinded their resolution, and prepared a general letter to India announcing the result. Here, however, a serious difficulty occurred. By the recent act of 1781, it was necessary to submit the letter before transmitting it for the approval of government. This approval was distinctly refused. Mr. Secretary Townsend intimated that the resolution not to remove Mr. Hastings was so repugnant to the sense of the House of Commons, that he had received his majesty's commands to withhold all approbation and to prohibit the transmission of it; and Mr. Dundas, when moving that all proceedings relating to it should be laid before parliament, denounced it in still stronger terms.

Mr. Hastings
announces
his intention
to resign.

While the question of removing Mr. Hastings was thus discussed, he was himself preparing to supersede it by a voluntary resignation. He had received a letter from the directors, condemning his conduct at Benares, and declaring his treatment of the rajah unwarrantable and highly impolitic. The unqualified terms in which the condemnation was pronounced, seemed to him to justify the use of equally unqualified terms in answer, and he replied, in a letter to the court, dated 20th March, 1783:—"I understand that these resolutions regarding Cheyte Sing were either published or intended for publication; the authority from whence they proceed leads to the belief of the fact. Who are the readers? Not the proprietors alone, whose interest is immediately concerned in them, and whose approbation I am impelled by every motive of pride and gratitude to solicit, but the whole body of the people of England, whose passions have been excited on the general subject of the conduct of their servants in India; and before them I am arraigned and prejudged of a violation of the national faith in acts of such complicated aggravation, that if they were true, no punishment short of death could atone for the injury which the interest and credit of the public has sustained from them." After arguing the question, and remarking that "it is now eleven years since I first received the nominal charge of your affairs," and that "in the course of that time I have

had invariably to contend not only with ordinary difficulties, but with such as most naturally arose from the opposition of those very powers from whom I primarily derived my authority, and which were required for the support of it," he concludes thus:—"It therefore remains for me to perform the duty which I had assigned myself as the final purpose of this letter, to declare, as I now most formally do, that it is my desire that you will be pleased to obtain the early nomination of a person to succeed me in the government of Fort William; to declare that it is my intention to resign your service, so soon as I can do it without prejudice to your affairs, after the allowance of a competent time for your choice of a person to succeed me; and to declare that if, in the intermediate time, you shall proceed to order the restoration of Rajah Cheyte Sing to the zemindary from which he was dispossessed for crimes of the greatest enormity, and your council shall resolve to execute the order, I will instantly give up my station and the service." Even at this time, when expressing himself thus strongly, he was not without an expectation of still retaining his office, for he immediately says: "To these declarations suffer me to add this reservation, that if in the meantime the acts of which I complain shall, on a mature revision of them, be revoked, and I shall find myself possessed of such a degree of your confidence as shall enable me to discharge the duties of my station, I will continue it until the peace of all your possessions shall be restored, or it shall be your pleasure to allow me to resign it." In a subsequent letter, referring to the same subject, he says: "At whatever period your decision may arrive, may the government fall into the hands of a person invested with the powers of his office, not disgraced as I have been with an unsubstantial title without authority, and with a responsibility without the means of discharging it."

A. D. 1781.

Reasons assigned by Mr. Hastings for resigning.

In this state of suspense it is rather singular that he undertook a journey to Lucknow, though he must have foreseen that it would occupy the greater part of a year, and that not improbably during his absence his successor might arrive. His own explanation, as given in a pamphlet which he published,¹ is that his resolution to resign was not absolute but conditional, and that he considered himself pledged to execute it, only provided "no circumstance intervened which might lessen the weight of it as an engagement, or which, as a superior claim, might require it to be suspended. In effect," he continues, "such a contingency did actually come to pass within a very few months after the date of my letter. This originated in an appeal which was made by the nabob vizier and his ministers against the acts of Mr. Bristow, the Company's resident at his court, and impelled me by every tie of justice, honour, and public duty, to sacrifice every consideration that regarded myself alone, if necessary for his redress." Thus impelled, Mr. Hastings set out for Lucknow, on the 17th of February, 1784, and reached it on the 27th of March. During the journey he passed through Benares, and had ample opportunity of contemplating the

His visit to Lucknow.

¹ *Memoirs relative to the State of India*, p. 21.

A.D. 1784. results of the revolution effected in that province. Under Cheyte Sing, as well as under his father Bulwant Sing, it had enjoyed a high degree of prosperity. The striking contrast which it now presented he has himself candidly recorded. "From the confines of Buxar to Benares, I was followed and fatigued by the clamours of discontented inhabitants. The distresses which were produced by the long-continued drought unavoidably tended to heighten the general discontent; yet I have reason to fear that the cause existed principally in a defective, if not a corrupt and oppressive administration." He afterwards says, "I have seen nothing but traces of devastation in every village," and "I cannot help remarking that except the city of Benares, the province is in effect without a government. The administration of the province is misconducted and the people oppressed, trade discouraged, and the revenue in danger of a rapid decline, from the violent appropriation of its means." At Lucknow, Mr. Hastings made free use of the ample powers which his colleagues had conceded to him. He withdrew a detachment of the Company's troops stationed on the frontiers of Oude, because the nabob complained of it as eating up his revenues without yielding him any equivalent service in return; and removed the resident, not with the intention of appointing a successor, but avowedly for the purpose of enabling the nabob to exercise an uncontrolled sovereignty. To this course he had previously been opposed, because he maintained that the nabob was a mere cipher in the hands of his minister Hyder Beg Khan, "as he ever must be in the hands of some person." Now, however, from some sudden revolution in his views, he insisted that this cipher should have all the authority which his minister thought proper to ask for him, because, as he was now pleased to argue, "justice and good faith" cut off "every pretext for exercising any authority in the country, while the sovereign of it fulfils the engagement which he has contracted with the Company." While at Lucknow, Mr. Hastings was not indisposed to enter into some kind of treaty with the Mogul, then at Delhi, but the idea not receiving any countenance from his colleagues was dropped.

He finally
quits India.

Mr. Hastings left Lucknow on the 27th of August, and arrived in Calcutta on the 4th of November, after an absence of nine months. His letter to the directors on the subject of his resignation still remained unanswered. To what was this long delay to be ascribed? Had the directors been prevented by circumstances from arriving at any decision? or, having accepted of the resignation as if it had been a matter of course, had they deemed it unnecessary to take any further notice of it? The latter appears to have been the view taken by Mr. Hastings, and therefore within three weeks of his return he wrote them as follows: "If the next regular advices should contain, either the express acceptance of my resignation of the service, or your tacit acquiescence, I shall relinquish my office to the gentleman who stands next to me in the prescribed order of succession, and return to England as soon as the ship *Berrington* can be made ready to sail." As a reason for thus taking the decision into his own

hands he adds, "I do not believe this government will ever be invested with its proper powers till I am removed from it, nor can it much longer subsist without them. I am therefore a hurtful encumbrance on it, and my removal, whenever or however effected, will be a relief to it." After two months more had elapsed without an answer, he received accounts from England which satisfied him that all idea of continuing in office must be abandoned. His last communication to the directors on the subject, written on the 10th of January, 1785, contained the following passage:—"I conceive it now to be impossible for your commands to require my stay, on the terms in which I might have had the presumption to suppose within the line of possibility; were such to be your pleasure, it is scarcely possible for your commands, on any subject which could concern my stay, to arrive before the season required for my departure. I rather feel the wish to avoid the receipt of them than to await their coming, and I consider myself in this act as the fortunate instrument of dissolving the frame of an inefficient government pernicious to your interests, and disgraceful to the national character." Accordingly, on the 1st of February, he formally delivered the keys of Fort William and of the treasury to Mr. Macpherson, the senior councillor, and on the 8th finally quitted the shores of India.

A.D. 1783.

Mr. Hastings finally quits India.

The accounts from England, which seemed to Mr. Hastings to leave him no alternative, and to compel his immediate departure, are understood to have related to the various ministerial changes which had taken place, and the various parliamentary proceedings of which India was the subject. In the course of nine months three distinguished statesmen had aspired to the honour of being its legislators, and with that view brought forward bills which still possess historical importance. The first in order was the bill introduced by Mr. Dundas on the 14th of April, 1783. It proposed, as its leading provisions, to give the crown a power of recalling the principal servants of the Company, to define more accurately the extent of control which the governor-general and council of Bengal were entitled to exercise over the other presidencies, and to authorize the governor-general to act, whenever he should deem it expedient, on his own responsibility, should he happen to differ in opinion with the majority of his colleagues. This bill had been framed while the Shelburne ministry was in office, but as that ministry had fallen nine days before it was introduced, Mr. Dundas, seeing no prospect of carrying it, allowed it to drop.

Proposed legislation for India.

The second bill was introduced on the 18th of November, only a week after the meeting of a new parliament, by Mr. Fox, who had become a secretary of state, and ministerial leader of the House of Commons, in consequence of the coalition of his party with that of Lord North. It was entitled "A bill for vesting the affairs of the East India Company in the hands of certain commissioners for the benefit of the proprietors and the public." In accordance with this title, it proposed not so much to reform, as to revolutionize the existing constitution of the Company, and proceeded on the following preamble:—

A. D. 1783.

Mr. Fox's
Indian bill.Its leading
provisions.

"Whereas disorders of an alarming nature and magnitude have long prevailed and do still continue and increase, in the management of the territorial possessions, the revenues, and the commerce of this kingdom in the East Indies; by means whereof the prosperity of the natives hath been greatly diminished, and the valuable interests of this nation in the said territorial possessions, revenues, and commerce, have been materially impaired, and would probably fall into utter ruin if an immediate and fitting remedy were not provided." Assuming this preamble to be proved, there was no use in attempting half measures. The whole body was totally and incurably corrupt, and was only to be saved from destruction by being deprived of all means of hurting itself. The proposal therefore was to place it under trust for a period of four years. With this view, the court of directors and the general court of proprietors were both to be abolished, and all their powers, so far as not altered by the new act, were to be conferred on seven directors, and nine assistant-directors, the latter, however, being restricted to the management of the commerce only, and being even in this "under and subject to the orders and directions" of the former, who alone were to have "full power and authority" to govern, order, and manage the whole affairs of the Company, and in particular "to remove, displace, suspend, appoint, confirm, or restore all and every person or persons whatsoever, from or to any office, station, or capacity whatever, civil or military." Both the directors, of whom no special qualification was required, and the assistant-directors, who behaved to be proprietors possessing at least £2000 of stock, were named in the bill, but in the occurrence of vacancies they were to be supplied, in the case of directors, by the crown, and in the case of assistant-directors, by the proprietors, who, it was specially provided, were not to "vote by ballot, or in any other covert or concealed manner, but in an open court" specially summoned for the purpose. The assistant-directors might be removed for misconduct by a vote of five directors; and both directors and assistant-directors were removable by the crown on the address of either House of Parliament. Neither directors nor assistant-directors were to hold any office whatsoever in the service of the Company, nor any place of profit under the crown during pleasure. No mention was made of any payment to the directors, but each assistant-director was to have a salary of £500 a year. Other sections of the bill contained various provisions for enabling the directors to settle the differences which might arise between the supreme council and the subordinate presidencies, or between governors and their councils, to redress the grievances of native and protected princes, and prevent or punish other ascertained abuses. It is unnecessary, however, to enter further into detail, as the bill, instead of becoming law, proved the ruin of the ministry which had ventured to propose it. This was owing, not so much to its own demerits, though these were neither few nor small, as to adventitious causes, the most powerful of which was the avowed hostility of the king, who went so far as to intrust Earl Temple with a written

note, in which his majesty declared that "he should deem those who should vote for it (the bill) not only not his friends, but his enemies, and that if Lord Temple could put it in stronger words, he had full authority to do so." Before this note was written the bill had passed the commons by a majority of 208 to 102, and been read a first time in the lords. On the second reading the effect of the king's note was strikingly manifested. Several peers who had intrusted the minister with their proxies withdrew them only a few hours before the house met, others accustomed to be his supporters voted in opposition, and the bill was thrown out by a majority of eighty-seven to seventy-nine. The dismissal of the coalition ministry immediately followed, and Mr. Pitt became first lord of the treasury and chancellor of the exchequer.

A.D. 1784.

Mr. Fox's
bill rejected.

The state of political parties was now singular. Mr. Fox's bill, rejected by the lords, had been carried in the commons by a majority of more than two to one, and this majority, though gradually dwindling down, still continued so great that the new ministry sustained a succession of defeats. One of these took place on the introduction of a third East India bill, which, having been brought in by Mr. Pitt on the 16th of January, 1784, after leave obtained, and been read a second time on the 23d, was thrown out, on the motion for its being committed, by a majority of 222 to 214. Immediately on its rejection, as if India were now by mutual consent the battle-field on which the struggle between the two great political parties in the state was to be decided, Mr. Fox gave notice of his intention to bring in another bill "for the better regulation and management of the affairs of the East India Company." This intention he was not permitted to carry out. His majority in the commons had almost disappeared, that against him in the lords had rapidly increased; and the general dissatisfaction felt at the coalition, in which everything like principle seemed to have been sacrificed for the attainment of place, left no room to doubt that ministers might, by dissolving parliament, gain a large accession of strength. So conscious, indeed, were Mr. Fox and his party of this fact, that they had endeavoured to prevent the realization of it, by moving and carrying an address to his majesty against a dissolution. This extreme measure, by increasing the unpopularity of its supporters, only precipitated the appeal to the constituencies. The result was to give ministers a powerful majority.

Mr. Pitt's
bill.

Shortly after the new parliament met, Mr. Pitt again brought in an East India bill. Though differing little from the former, which the commons had rejected, it now passed with comparative ease through both houses, and having received the royal assent on the 13th of August, 1784, ranks in the statute book as 24 Geo. III. c. 25. It is entitled "An act for the better regulation and management of the affairs of the East India Company, and of the British possessions in India; and for establishing a court of judicature, for the more speedy and effectual trial of persons accused of offences committed in the East Indies." Its distinguishing feature is the establishment of a board of commissioners, since

A.D. 1784.

Leading provisions of Mr. Pitt's bill.

The board of control.

usually designated, though not in the act itself, the Board of Control, because designed to "superintend, direct, and control all acts, operations, and concerns which in any wise relate to the civil or military government, or revenues of the British possessions in the East Indies." The board, nominated by the crown, and at all times revocable by it, was to consist of not more than six individuals, privy councillors, of whom one was to be a principal secretary of state, and another the chancellor of the exchequer. The secretary of state, or, in his absence, the chancellor of the exchequer, or, in the absence of both, the senior member was to preside. As the former two could seldom if ever attend, the effect of this arrangement was to make the senior member the only actual president, and thus procure for him the usual designation of president of the board of control. The board was to have free access to all the papers of the Company, and the directors were not only to deliver to it all papers and despatches relating to civil and military government or revenue, but to obey whatever orders and instructions the board might be pleased to give respecting them. The only matters not submitted to the control of the board were the commercial; and as it was possible that the board and the directors might differ in opinion as to the subject-matter of a despatch, the one holding it to belong to one of the classes of subjects placed under control, and the other holding it to be strictly commercial, it was provided that in all such cases of difference, his majesty in council should decide without appeal.

Home management.

Nominally the court of directors and the general court of proprietors were to be constituted as before, and exercise all the rights of patronage, and other privileges which they previously possessed; in reality, however, they were essentially changed, not merely by the very establishment of the board, but by other special provisions in the act. Thus, by section 29, the proprietors were prohibited from interfering to alter any order once approved by the board; and by sections 15 and 16, the directors as a body were excluded not only from the management, but even from the knowledge of all transactions "concerning the levying of war or making of peace, or treating or negotiating with any of the native princes or states in India." This great constitutional change was effected by the establishment of a secret committee. This committee, consisting of not more than three of their number, the directors were enjoined to appoint, and through these three the board might transmit and give effect to all their orders relating to the above important transactions. Again, while by section 19 it was expressly declared that the board were not to have the "power of nominating or appointing any of the servants of the said United Company," it was enacted by section 22, that the power of removing or recalling any servant, high or low, civil or military, might be exercised not merely by the directors, but by the crown. The obvious tendency, and, as will afterwards be seen, the practical result of this absolute power of recall, was to enable the crown to monopolize as much India patronage as it might choose to claim, since every

nomination not made in accordance with its wishes it could at once nullify by recalling the nominee. A. D. 1784.

With regard to the management in India, few constitutional changes were made. The superiority of the governor-general to his colleagues was to remain restricted as before to a casting vote; but both in Bengal and the other presidencies, the number of councillors was to be reduced to three, of whom the commander-in-chief was always to be one, and to rank immediately after the governor. He was not, however, unless specially appointed, to succeed to the chair during a temporary vacancy, as the next senior councillor might. In order to define more accurately the relations of the supreme council and the other presidencies, it was enacted by section 31 that "the governor-general and council of Fort William aforesaid shall have power and authority to superintend, control, and direct the several presidencies and governments now or hereafter to be erected or established in the East Indies by the said united Company, in all such points as relate to any transactions with the country powers, or to war or peace, or to the application of the revenues or forces of such presidencies and settlements in time of war, or any other points as shall from time to time be specially referred by the court of directors of the said Company to their superintendence and control. Where doubts might arise as to whether the supreme council were not exceeding the above jurisdiction, the subordinate presidencies were still in the meantime to obey. In regard to foreign policy, the 34th section declares and enacts as follows:—"Whereas to pursue schemes of conquest and extension of dominion in India, are measures repugnant to the wish, the honour, and the policy of this nation," therefore "it shall not be lawful for the governor-general and council of Fort William aforesaid, without the express command and authority of the said court of directors, or the secret committee of the said court of directors, in any case (except where hostilities have actually been commenced, or preparations actually made for the commencement of hostilities, against the British nation in India, or against some of the princes or states dependent thereon, or whose territories the said united Company shall be at such time engaged by any subsisting treaty to defend or guarantee), either to declare war or commence hostilities, or enter into any treaty for making war against any of the country princes or states in India, or any treaty for guaranteeing the possessions of any country, provinces, or states; and that in such case, it shall not be lawful for the said governor-general and council to declare war or commence hostilities, or enter into any treaty for making war against any other prince or state, than such as shall be actually commencing hostilities, or making preparations as aforesaid; or to make such treaty for guaranteeing the possessions of any prince or state, but upon the consideration of such prince or state actually engaging to assist the Company against such hostile commencement, or preparations made as aforesaid."

Foreign
manage-
ment.

Policy to be
pursued.

A.D. 1784

Minor provisions of Pitt's Indian bill.

Among the various other provisions of the act, it may be sufficient simply to mention one series designed to prevent corrupt accumulation in India, by compelling the servants of the Company on their return to furnish inventories of their property on oath and under heavy penalties; another series erecting a new court in this country for the trial of offences committed in India by British subjects; and separate sections prohibiting presents, fixing the rule of appointment by seniority, enforcing economy, redressing the complaints of zemindars, and others arranging the Nabob of Arcot's debts, and settling disputes between him and the Rajah of Tanjore. The provisions for the disclosures of property proved so inquisitorial, that they were formally repealed after the lapse of only two years by 26 Geo. III. c. 16, which also supplied an important defect in the above act, by authorizing the governor-general, as proposed by Mr. Dundas's bill, to act in certain cases on his own responsibility, even in opposition to the majority of his council, and allowed the offices of governor-general and commander-in-chief to be united in one person. The new court, though not abolished, was so clumsily contrived, that no proceedings ever took place under it.




BLACK TOWN, CALCUTTA.—From Solvyms, Les Hindous.

BOOK VI.

FROM THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BOARD OF CONTROL TO THE COMPLETE EXTINCTION OF THE COMPANY'S TRADE.

CHAPTER I.

Mr. Macpherson governor-general—The Nabob of Arcot's debts—Lord Macartney, proposed as governor-general, declines—Lord Cornwallis appointed—His civil and military reforms—The cession of Guntoor—New agreement with Nizam Ali.



WHEN Mr. Hastings quitted Bengal without waiting for the arrival of a regularly appointed successor, temporary possession of the chair was taken by Mr. John Macpherson, to whom it of right belonged as the senior member of council. This was the gentleman who was formerly seen intriguing for the Nabob of Arcot with the British ministry, and was rewarded for his zealous exertions to injure the Company, by the appointment of a writership in the presidency of Madras. His possession of talent, and more especially of that kind of talent which gains patronage, and thereby secures advancement, was fully evinced by his subsequent career. Governor Dupré, shortly after his return from England, admitted him to his confidence, and employed him in writing his despatches. Thus patronized, he in 1774 obtained the lucrative appointment of paymaster to the army. In 1776, he sustained what seemed to be a serious reverse of fortune, though it ultimately paved the way for his higher promotion. A memorial, detailing the manner in which he had intrigued for the nabob, had somehow fallen into the hands of Lord Pigot. It is probable that in the disputes which then prevailed at Madras, Mr. Macpherson had strenuously espoused the cause of his ancient patron; and that his lordship, who had been specially sent out to oppose the claims of the nabob, and reinstate the Rajah of Tanjore in his territories, was not unwilling to use the memorial for the purpose of ridding himself of a formidable opponent. He therefore caused Mr. Macpherson to be summoned before the council, and interrogated whether he acknowledged the memorial as his production. Having given what was held to be an evasive answer, he was forthwith, without being called upon for his defence, dismissed from the Company's service. On his return to England, he appealed to the directors, a majority of whom seem to have been easily satisfied that he ought

A.D. 1785.

Mr. Macpherson,
governor-general.

A.D. 1765.

Mr. Macpherson,
governor-general.

to be restored, but were puzzled how to proceed. By the Regulating Act, a servant dismissed could not be restored without the concurrence of three-fourths of the directors and three-fourths of the proprietors. Was this requisite in the present instance, or would a mere majority suffice? The Company's standing counsel, while admitting that the dismissal was informal, held rather inconsistently that the concurrence of three-fourths was required, and volunteered advice on a subject on which it was not asked, by adding to his opinion the following postscript:—"It is worth considering, if Mr. Macpherson should be restored,



SIR JOHN MACPHERSON.
From a portrait engraved by S. W. Reynolds.

whether he is a proper person to be continued in the Company's service. He had in my opinion too much connection with the Nabob of Arcot; and when the Company's interest and the nabob's are affected, as they will often happen, they will greatly disturb a man of honour and integrity." The directors, not yet satisfied, consulted the solicitor-general, Mr. Wedderburn, afterwards Lord-chancellor Loughborough, who solved the difficulty in a more lawyer-like manner, by holding that an irregular dismissal was in fact no dismissal at all, and consequently that the only thing now necessary was to declare that Mr. Macpherson was still in the service.

Inconsistent
proceedings
of the direc-
tors respect-
ing him.

The directors, in acting upon this opinion, thought it necessary to soften the proceeding to the Madras council by adding, when they announced to them Mr. Macpherson's restoration, that, "as his behaviour was disrespectful to the board, and in other particulars very reprehensible, we direct that you give him a severe reprimand, and acquaint him that a like conduct will meet with a severer punishment." The directors could hardly have been serious in this part of the sentence, since they allowed him to remain in England till January, 1781, and then sent him out, not to Madras, but to Bengal, to supply the place rendered vacant in the supreme council by the resignation of Mr. Barwell. This brought him so near the chair that Mr. Hastings' departure placed him in it, and thus, by a train of circumstances, an individual, over whose head a sentence of censure for conduct "very reprehensible" hung suspended, became Governor-general of India.

It is doubtful if any amount of administrative skill would have enabled Mr. Macpherson to surmount the obstacles arising from his early antecedents, and prove himself worthy of the honour which had been unexpectedly thrust upon him, and it was fortunate, both for him and the Company, that the short period

during which he held the chair was one of comparative quiescence. He is far, however, from admitting that he had an easy task to perform. On the contrary, on the 4th of March, 1785, only a month after he had obtained his elevation, he declared in a letter to the directors—"The public distress was never so pressing as at this moment. The season of the heavy collections is over: the demands of Madras and Bombay are most pressing; and our arrears to the army are upwards of fifty lacs." At a later period, when made aware of the appointment of a successor, and naturally desirous to set his own conduct in the most favourable light, he reminded the directors that he had become their governor-general "at a season of peculiar difficulty, when the close of a ruinous war, and the relaxed habits of their service, had left all their armies in arrear and their presidencies in disorder." Some credit was given to Mr. Macpherson for financial ability, and for the exertions which he made to meet the pressure on the treasury, by enforcing economy and effecting reduction wherever it was practicable. Partly as a reward for this conduct, and partly also, it is presumed, for political services rendered at various times, he was created a baronet on the 10th of June, 1786. The directors also, when they appointed his successor, gave him an unanimous vote of thanks for his whole conduct as governor-general. It would seem, however, that in this vote they were somewhat premature, and that more careful inquiry would have thrown considerable doubts, both on the success and the purity of his administration. Promises of assistance, which he had unwarrantably made to the Mahrattas, placed his successor in a dilemma from which he found extreme difficulty in escaping, without serious offence either to them or to Tippoo, who, if such assistance had been given, would justly have complained of it as a gross violation of treaty; and Lord Cornwallis, writing confidentially to Mr. Dundas, does not hesitate to say, "I depend on your secrecy, and will not conceal from you that the late government (Sir John Macpherson's) had no authority, and the grossest frauds were daily committed before their faces; their whole conduct, and all their pretensions to economy, except in the reduction of salaries, was a scene of delusion."¹ At a later period, when Sir John Macpherson was proposing to return to India, not seriously, but in the hope that the proposal might induce government to grant him a pension, Lord Cornwallis again wrote Mr. Dundas as follows (vol. i. p. 371): "That the former (Sir J. Macpherson) does not return to India, is indeed a fortunate event: but his being officially permitted to return, and his having been within a few days of embarking, has had an effect not easily to be removed. What must the people of this country, either Europeans or natives, imagine? They have seen that our measures have been as widely different as, I trust, they believe our dispositions and characters to be." Again, he asks, "Why does Mr. Dundas let him return? Why does he not tell him, when he talks of griev-

A.D. 1785.

Doubtful
character
of Mac-
pherson's
administra-
tion.

Lord Corn-
wallis' opin-
ion of it.

¹ *Correspondence of Charles, first Marquis Cornwallis*; edited, with notes, by Charles Ross, Esq., vol. i. p. 373.

A. D. 1785. ances and pensions, that he may think himself well off that he is not impeached?—that he was guilty of a breach of an act of parliament in the offer which he made of aid to the Poonah government; and that he was guilty of basely degrading the national character by the quibbles and lies which he made use of to evade the performance of it;—that his government was a system of the dirtiest jobbing?" As Lord Cornwallis, at the time when he used this strong language, was personally offended at a rumour which Sir John Macpherson had

Sir John
Macpherson.



LORD MACARTNEY.

From a print by Behiaronetti, after a picture by H. Eiridge.

circulated respecting him, perhaps some deduction ought to be made from this bitter censure, but his lordship never would have written in such terms without having ample proof that his charges were well founded, and that Sir John Macpherson, whose large stature and soft plausible manner had given him the surname of "the gentle giant," was indeed what his antecedents lead us to expect—an unscrupulous intriguer and wholesale dealer in corruption.

During Sir John Macpherson's tenure of office, Lord Macartney paid a visit to Calcutta. He had been mainly instrumental in obtaining the assignment of the nabob's revenues, and was convinced that the only effectual method of

Lord
Macartney
governor of
Madras.

making these revenues available, both for the current expenses of government, and the liquidation of the debt due by the nabob to the Company, was to make that assignment permanent. This proposal was of course most obnoxious to the nabob, who insisted, with some show of reason, that, as the assignment had been originally made on the understanding that it was to exist only during the war, it was a breach of good faith to insist on continuing it, now that the war had ceased. In this view the nabob was strenuously supported by Paul Benfield and the other so-called creditors of the nabob, who left no means untried to prejudice both the supreme council and the court of directors against Lord Macartney's plan. With the supreme council they were completely successful, and Mr. Hastings, now at open war with his lordship, had peremptorily enjoined him to make the re-assignment to the nabob without delay. The court of directors at first took an opposite view, but ultimately were induced, or rather perhaps compelled to change it, as the Board of Control was now in full operation, and had espoused the cause of Benfield and his coadjutors. Lord Macartney had braved the indignation of the supreme council, and in effect defied Mr. Hastings to do his worst by refusing to obey his orders. The same

course could not be pursued with the directors, more especially as they were now understood only to express the sentiments of the government, and he therefore adopted the only alternative which could save his consistency by resigning. The resignation, however, was not a sudden thought. He had previously, on the ground of ill health, requested the appointment of a successor, and the same letter which ordered the restoration of the assignment, informed him that he was to be succeeded by Mr. Hollond, who, being already in the country, could enter on office at once. There was thus nothing to prevent Lord Macartney from carrying his resolution into immediate effect. Previous to the arrival of the final decision of the directors on the subject of the assignment, he had prepared for the worst. "Well apprised," he says, "of the nabob's extensive influence, and of the ability, industry, and vigilance of his agents, and observing a concurrence of many other circumstances, I was not without apprehensions, that before the government of Madras could have timely notice of the train, the assignment might be blown up at home, the sudden shock of which I knew must almost instantly overthrow the Company in the Carnatic. I therefore employed myself most assiduously in making preparations to mitigate the mischief; and by degrees collected and stored up all the money that it was possible to reserve with safety from other services and demands; so that, when the explosion burst upon us, I had provided an unexpected mass of little less than thirteen lacs of rupees (£130,000) to resist its first violence." Whatever relief this might give, the future was still to be provided for, and therefore Lord Macartney, now relieved from the toils of office, agreed, at the request of his late colleagues, instead of sailing direct for England, to pay a visit to Calcutta, and endeavour, by a full and strong representation of the pernicious consequences of reinstating the nabob, to obtain the sanction of the supreme council to a postponement. Success could scarcely have been anticipated, since at the very head of the council sat a man whose sympathies must have been wholly enlisted in favour of the nabob, and who, after exposing himself to obloquy by acting as his agent and sitting in parliament as his nominee, was not now likely to turn his back upon him. There was still another resource. Hopes had been held out that the revenues of Bengal were about to yield a surplus by which the deficiencies of the other presidencies would be supplied, but the prognosticated funds were not forthcoming, and the supreme council, when solicited on the subject, could only point to their own necessities, and declare their inability to "give any extraordinary and continued aid to Fort St. George."

A.D. 1785.

Lord
Macartney's
resignation.His visit to
Calcutta.

While detained in Calcutta by illness, Lord Macartney received a flattering testimony to the value of his previous services, in a despatch from the directors appointing him governor-general. His health and other considerations induced him to decline the appointment, and, leaving Sir John Macpherson still in possession of the chair, he set sail for England. He did not then think that he had closed his Indian career. From the account of his biographer he appears

A.D. 1786.

Lord
Macartney
declines the
appoint-
ment of
governor-
general.

not so much to have refused the appointment, as deferred acceptance of it till he should have had an opportunity of personally "submitting to his majesty's ministers certain regulations, which he considered indispensable for the salvation of this part of the empire, and of laying before them those conditions on which only he felt himself able to fulfil the purposes of his appointment, with advantage to the public and reputation to himself."¹ When he arrived in England on the 9th of January, 1786, the appointment was still open, and he had conferences both with the directors and with ministers, by whom, while ostensibly disclaiming Indian patronage, the vacancy was truly to be supplied. His suggestions for the improvement of the administration in India were favourably received, and everything preparatory to his acceptance of the office seemed about to be arranged, when he intimated his expectation, that, instead of continuing only an Irish, he would be made a British peer. Mr. Dundas, who, as president of the Board of Control, had urged Lord Macartney's appointment, and Mr. Pitt, who, on his suggestion, had concurred in it, in the face of considerable opposition from members of his administration and a strong party in the India House, felt hurt at this stipulation for honours, and without further communication with Lord Macartney, immediately conferred the office of governor-general on Lord Cornwallis.

The Nabob
of Arcot's
debts.

The re-assignment of the revenues to the nabob was not the part of his affairs which had at this time occupied the attention of the directors and the Board of Control. The enormous claims of debt which Paul Benfield and others had reared against him were threatening to absorb all his revenues, and it therefore became necessary to make some final arrangement respecting them. Accordingly each of the three India bills brought into parliament by Mr. Dundas, Mr. Fox, and Mr. Pitt, contained a special clause on the subject. Mr. Dundas's bill proposed to "take into consideration the present state of the affairs of the Nabob of Arcot, and inquire into and ascertain the origin, nature, and amount of his just debts." Mr. Fox, in addition to a similar inquiry, proposed to strike at the root of the evil by enacting that in future it should be "unlawful for any servant, civil or military, of the Company to be engaged in the borrowing or lending of any money, or in any money transactions whatsoever, with any protected or other native prince," and that the Nabob of Arcot, the Rajah of Tanjore, or any other protected native prince, should "not assign, mortgage, or pledge any land whatsoever, or the produce or revenue thereof, to any British subject whatsoever." The clause in Mr. Pitt's bill, the only one which became law, was as follows: "Whereas very large sums of money are claimed to be due to British subjects by the Nabob of Arcot, . . . be it enacted that the court of directors shall, as soon as may be, take into consideration the origin and justice of the said demands; and that they shall give such orders to their presidencies and servants abroad for completing the investigation thereof, as the nature of the case shall require;

¹ Barrow's *Life of Lord Macartney*, vol. i. p. 305.

and for establishing, in concert with the nabob, such fund for the discharge of those debts which shall appear to be justly due, as shall appear consistent with the rights of the Company, the security of the creditors, and the honour and dignity of the said nabob." A.D. 1766.

In accordance with this enactment, the directors proceeded to "take into consideration the origin and justice" of these claims on the nabob, and "for completing the investigation," prepared the draft of a despatch instructing the Madras government how to proceed. Having submitted this draft for approval to the Board of Control, they were astonished, on receiving it back, to find it so completely altered as to retain little of its original identity. In particular, the investigation contemplated by the legislature was entirely superseded, and it was declared in regard to two important classes of debts, described as "the loan of 1767 and the loan of 1777, commonly called the cavalry loan," that their "origin and justice" was "clear and indisputable, agreeable to the true sense and spirit of the late act of parliament." A third class of debts, described as the "consolidated debt of 1777," was admitted to stand "upon a less favourable footing." It had been contracted at a time when "an irreversible order of the directors" prohibiting their people "from having any dealings with the country governments in money matters" was "in full force and vigour;" it had been declared by the Madras council not to have been "in any respect whatever conducted under the auspices or protection of that government;" and in December, 1778, as soon as the consolidation of that debt became known to the directors, they had written as follows: "Your account of the nabob's private debts is very alarming; but from whatever cause or causes those debts have been contracted or increased, we hereby repeat our orders, that the sanction of the Company be on no account given to any kind of security for the payment or liquidation thereof (except by the express authority of the court of directors), on any account or pretence whatever." The consolidated debt, accordingly, had received "no sanction or authority," and the creditors moreover, when they made their alleged loans, were not only aware "how greatly the affairs of the nabob were at that time deranged," but had taken "the most effectual means to postpone" the payment of his debt to the Company, "by procuring an assignment of such specific revenues for the discharge of their own debts as alone could have enabled" him to meet it. This debt, thus accumulated in direct violation of a subsisting order of the directors, and to the direct injury of the Company, had certainly no claim to their countenance, and ought, at all events, to have been subjected to a most rigid examination. The Board of Control arrived at a different conclusion, and using the directors as their mouth-piece, gave their decision in the following terms:—

Enactment
in regard to
the Nabob
of Arrot's
debts.

Orders of the
directors.

"Under all these circumstances we should be warranted to refuse our aid or protection to the recovery of this loan; but when we consider the inexpediency of keeping the subject of the nabob's debts longer afloat than is absolutely

A.D. 1784. necessary; when we consider how much the final conclusion of this business will tend to promote tranquillity, credit, and circulation of property in the Carnatic; and when we consider that the debtor concurs with the creditor in establishing the justice of those debts consolidated in 1777 into gross sums, for which bonds were given, liable to be transferred to persons different from the original creditors, and having no share or knowledge of the transactions in which the debts originated, and of course how little ground there is to expect any substantial good to result from an unlimited investigation into them, we have resolved so far to recognize the justice of those debts as to extend to them that protection which, upon more forcible grounds, we have seen cause to allow to the other two classes of debts." The only distinction made between the debts was, that while the two former classes were to be admitted without question, complaints might be received against the third class "at the instance, either of the nabob himself, or of other creditors injured by their being so admitted, or by any other persons having a proper interest, or stating reasonable grounds of objection."

The Nabob
of Arcot's
debts.

Classifica-
tion of the
debts.

In carrying out the above views the Board of Control classified the debts in the following manner:—1. The debt of 1767 to be made up to the end of 1784, with the current interest at ten per cent. 2. The cavalry loan to be made up to the same period, with the current interest at twelve per cent. 3. The debt consolidated in 1777 to be made up to the same period, with the current interest at twelve per cent. to November, 1781, and from thence, with the current interest at six per cent. Twelve lacs of pagodas (about £480,000) were to be received annually from the nabob, and applied to the liquidation of his debt in the following order:—1. To the growing interest on the cavalry loan at twelve per cent. 2. To the growing interest on the debt of 1777 at six per cent. The remainder was to be equally divided—one half given to settling the Company's debt, and the other half to paying the growing interest at ten per cent. and towards the discharge of the principal of the debt of 1767. After the extinction of this debt a similar process was to be continued, the twelve lacs being applied, first, in paying the growing interest on the debt of 1777, and the remainder thereafter equally divided—one half to pay the current interest and principal of the cavalry loan, and the other half to discharge the Company's debt. On the extinction of the cavalry loan, seven lacs were to be employed in extinguishing the Company's debt, and five lacs in paying the growing interest and capital of 1777. On the extinction of the Company's debt, the whole twelve lacs were to be applied to the debt of 1777 till the whole was discharged.

This complicated arrangement seemed to the Board "founded on justice and the relative circumstances of the different debts." The directors thought differently, and proceeded to state objections to such of the amendments on their original draft as appeared to them "either insufficient, inexpedient, or unwarranted." In thus objecting, they appear not to have felt sure of their ground, and hence, besides expressing "extreme concern" at a difference of opinion with

the Board in this early exercise of their controlling power, employ the following apologetic terms: "In so novel an institution, it can scarce be thought extraordinary if the exact boundaries of our respective functions and duties should not at once, on either side, be precisely and familiarly understood, and we therefore confide in your justice and candour for believing that we have no wish to evade or frustrate the salutary purposes of your institution, as we on our part are thoroughly satisfied that you have no wish to encroach on the legal powers of the East India Company." The directors were evidently under the impression that they still possessed some degree of independent power. The result of their remonstrance on this occasion must have gone far to open their eyes, and convince them that whenever the Board of Control chose to be peremptory they had no alternative but to obey.

A.D. 1786.

Difference of
opinion be-
tween the
Board of
Control and
the direc-
tors.

In regard to the private debts of the nabob, and the application of the twelve lacs annually, the directors submitted "that at least the opportunity of questioning, within the limited time, the justice of any of the debts, ought to have been fully preserved," and doubted "how far the express direction of the act to examine the nature and origin of the debts has been by the amended paragraphs complied with." In respect to the mode of payment they use stronger language and say, "Our duty requires that we should state our strongest dissent. Our right to be paid the arrears of those expenses by which, almost to our ruin, we have preserved the country, and all the property connected with it, from falling a prey to a foreign conqueror, surely stands paramount to all claims for former debts upon the revenues of a country so preserved, even if the legislature had not expressly limited the assistance to be given to private creditors to be such as should be consistent with our own rights." They conclude with declaring, "until our debt shall be discharged we can by no means consent to give up any part of the seven lacs to the private creditors; and we humbly apprehend that in this declaration we do not exceed the limits of the authority and rights vested in us." The Board of Control condescended to return an answer, but in a style which evinced a full consciousness of the extent of their powers. After endeavouring to show that the debt of the nabob, if taken at three millions sterling, will, by the plan proposed, be discharged "in the course of the eleventh year," they continued thus: "We cannot, therefore, be of opinion that there is the smallest ground for objecting to this arrangement as injurious to the interests of the Company; even if the measure were to be considered on the mere ground of expediency, and with a view only to the wisdom of re-establishing credit and circulation in a commercial establishment, without any consideration of those motives of attention to the feelings and honour of the nabob, of humanity to individuals, and of justice to persons in your service and living under your protection, which have actuated the legislature, and which afford not only justifiable but commendable grounds for your conduct.

The directors
overborne
by the Board

A.D. 1786.

Discussion in
parliament
on the
Nabob of
Arcot's
debts.

Mr. Burke's
celebrated
speech.

The directors after this rebuff were unable to carry their interference any further, but there was still another ordeal through which the resolution of the Board of Control was destined to pass. On the 28th of February, 1785, Mr. Fox brought the subject before parliament, by a motion "for papers relative to the direction for charging the Nabob of Arcot's private debts to Europeans on the revenues of the Carnatic." This motion was resisted by ministers, in a manner which showed that there was something behind the curtain which they were anxious to conceal. Mr. Burke drew the curtain aside, and in the celebrated speech from which we have more than once quoted, made it palpable, almost to demonstration, that the recognition of the debt without even the form of examination, was a shameless concession made to Paul Benfield, for the purpose of securing his parliamentary influence. After a damaging exposure of ministerial corruption, Mr. Burke sums up in the following terms:—"I have thus laid before you, I think with sufficient clearness, the connection of the ministers with Mr. Atkinson at the general election; I have laid open to you the connection of Atkinson with Benfield; I have shown Benfield's employment of his wealth in creating a parliamentary interest to procure a ministerial protection; I have set before your eyes his large concern in the debt, his practices to hide that concern from the public eye, and the liberal protection which he has received from the minister. If this chain of circumstances do not lead you necessarily to conclude that the minister has paid to the avarice of Benfield the services done by Benfield's connection to his ambition, I do not know anything, short of the confession of the party, that can persuade you of his guilt. Clandestine and collusive practice can only be traced by combination and comparison of circumstances. To reject such combination and comparison is to reject the only means of detecting fraud; it is indeed to give it a patent and free license to cheat with impunity." It is rather singular that at the time of the debate, no reply to this speech was attempted. One reason assigned is, that from the little impression which it produced on the house, Mr. Pitt, after consulting with Mr. Grenville, considered a reply unnecessary. A more probable reason is, that a reply was deemed inexpedient. Ministers knew it was easier to find votes than arguments, and therefore hastened to close a discussion, which, the longer it was continued, only made the infamy of the transaction more apparent. How large the sums which fictitious creditors were enabled to extort under this corrupt arrangement with Benfield may be inferred from the fact that, under a commission which afterwards sat to adjudicate on other enormous debts alleged to have been contracted by the Nabob of Arcot, out of £30,400,000 claimed, only £2,687,000 was allowed.

Lord Cornwallis arrived at Calcutta in the beginning of September, 1786, and immediately assumed the two offices, conjoined for the first time in his person, of governor-general and commander-in-chief. Nearly four years before, when the Shelburne ministry was in power, the office of governor-general had

been offered to him, and declined on grounds similar to those which afterwards induced Lord Macartney to defer his acceptance; and it was partly with a view to remove the objections of Lord Cornwallis, that Mr. Dundas introduced into his East India bill the clause empowering the governor-general to act in certain emergencies on his own responsibility, even in opposition to the majority of his council. In introducing this bill, Mr. Dundas had not only urged the recall of Mr. Hastings, but advocated the appointment of Lord Cornwallis, on whom, by way of contrast, he pronounced an eulogy more remarkable for plainness of speech than elegance. "Here," he exclaimed, "there was no broken fortune to be mended! Here was no avarice to be gratified! Here was no beggarly mushroom kindred to be provided for—no crew of hungry followers gaping to be gorged!" An eulogy, in a much better spirit than this vulgar tirade, was pronounced by Mr. Fox, who, in bringing in his East India bill, referred to the above clause, and spoke of Lord Cornwallis in the following terms:—"A learned gentleman (Mr. Dundas) last year proposed to give the most extraordinary power to the governor-general of Bengal; he at the same time named the person

A.D. 1786.

Lord Cornwallis made governor-general.



LORD CORNWALLIS.—After J. Hoppner, R.A.

who was to fill the office. The person was Earl Cornwallis, a person whom I name now only for the purpose of paying homage to his great character. The name of such a man might make parliament consent to the vesting of such powers in a governor-general; but certain I am that nothing but the great character of that noble lord, could ever induce the legislature to commit such powers to an individual at the distance of half the globe." Mr. Pitt's East India bill did not contain Mr. Dundas's clause, and this may have been one reason why Mr. Dundas, when again in power, proposed that the appointment of governor-general should be offered, not to Lord Cornwallis, but to Lord Macartney. When, for reasons already explained, this appointment did not take effect, Lord Cornwallis was again applied to, and accepted, on being assured that the additional powers which he claimed, and the legal union of the offices of governor-general and commander-in-chief would be secured by a new application to parliament. Clauses to this effect were accordingly introduced into the bill, which was passed into act 26 Geo. III. c. 16, but had not received the royal assent when Lord Cornwallis sailed.

A.D. 1786. *

Appoint-
ment of
Lord Corn-
wallis gene-
rally ap-
proved.

The new government undoubtedly commenced under favourable circumstances. The character of Lord Cornwallis, notwithstanding the disaster which had befallen him in America, stood justly high with all parties; at the head of the Board of Control, in which all the leading powers of the directors now centered, was his able and zealous friend, Henry Dundas; the absolute right of recall vested in the crown would be exercised the moment he intimated a wish to be rid of any member of his council who might threaten to be troublesome, and in the meantime, before the actual recall was pronounced, he could set opposition at defiance by acting as he was empowered to do on his own responsibility. The government of Sir John Macpherson had been so feeble and defective, that there was no risk of suffering by any comparison which might be instituted, and all the presidencies, though exhausted by an expensive and unsuccessful war, were beginning to reap the fruits of the general peace which had succeeded it. Lord Cornwallis, it is true, was entering on a field which was entirely new to him, and being in consequence obliged for a time at least to rely on the judgments of those whose long service had given them experience, was liable to be led through bad advice into serious error. On the other hand, he had nothing to unlearn, no old opinions to renounce, no entanglements to escape, and no interests to serve but those of the public. Thus disencumbered of everything that could divert him from the path of duty, or thwart him in the discharge of it, he could hardly fail, in the exercise of the talents and virtues he was known to possess, to prove at once a popular and an efficient governor-general.

First impor-
tant act of
his adminis-
tration.

The first subject which engaged the attention of Lord Cornwallis, after he assumed the government, was the treaty which Sir John Macpherson had made with the Mahrattas, and by which he had bound the Company to furnish them with a body of troops. This treaty had been concluded in the very teeth of the act of parliament, and was a palpable violation of the treaty made with Tippoo, since he was at that time actually engaged in hostilities with the Mahrattas, and could not but consider a supply of troops to them as equivalent to a declaration of war against himself. Within a fortnight after his arrival at Calcutta, Lord Cornwallis thus expressed his opinion in a letter to Mr. Dundas:—"You will see that we are got into a very awkward, foolish scrape, by offering assistance to the Mahrattas; how we shall get out of it with honour, God knows, but out of it we must get somehow, and give no troops."¹ Accordingly, on the 27th September, he lodged a minute, in which, after exposing the illegality and injustice of the treaty, he adds, "It is unnecessary to examine the policy of a measure we are not at liberty to adopt; we cannot give the three battalions without going to war; we cannot go to war without offending the laws of our country. It is therefore high time to extricate ourselves from our present critical and dangerous situation, the continuance of which will not only

¹ *Correspondence of Marquis Cornwallis*, vol. i. p. 219.

give the most just grounds of offence to Tippoo, but will probably produce a quarrel with the Poonah ministers." The course adopted was to take the opportunity of the change in the government, to intimate to the Mahrattas that "a strict adherence to subsisting treaties" would not allow the troops to be supplied, and soften the intimation by referring to this decision, as a proof that the government was determined in their future conduct to be guided by "a spirit of justice." Nana Furnavese, and the other ministers at Poonah, on receiving the intimation, expressed much disappointment, and even made strong charges of duplicity, but the plain and honest course which had been taken proved also to be the most politic, and no open rupture was produced.

A.D. 1786.

A treaty with the Mahrattas cancelled.

The pecuniary position of the Company next engaged attention. The view which Lord Cornwallis took of it was almost desponding. In a letter addressed to the Duke of York, who was then, it seems, engaged "in the pursuit of military knowledge under the great authorities of Potsdam and Brunswick," he says, "The state of our finances is alarming, the difficulties are infinite; I feel that the whole may go to ruin in my hands, but I do not despair. I will not fail in my duty; I shall probably commit many errors, but I trust to the candid judgment of my king and country." To the directors he wrote, "While our unavoidable expensive establishments, the interest due upon our debts, and the demands from the other presidencies, absorb the produce of the revenues, a considerable investment can only be made by fresh issues of paper. By this mode the evil, though protracted, is increased. It exhibits a delusive appearance of wealth which cannot be supported, and, by a temporary accommodation, entails permanent distresses." His language would probably have been still more desponding, had he been at this time aware of the arrangement respecting the Nabob of Arcot's debts. In ignorance of that arrangement, he had proposed to leave the creditors to recover their debts as they could, and written in a letter to Mr. Dundas, "I trust you will have approved of discouraging Campbell's plan of taking that load on the shoulders of the Company, which I think are not able to bear this load of iniquity." How much must he have been disappointed and disgusted on learning that not only had this load of iniquity been laid on the shoulders of the Company, but that in the doing of it another load of disgrace had been laid on the shoulders of the British government.

Financial difficulties of the Company.

Shortly after the arrival of Lord Cornwallis, several of the native princes and other leading personages anxiously desired leave to visit Calcutta. The Nabob of Oude, whose difficulties had continued to increase, proposed to come in person, but was at last satisfied on being permitted to send his minister, Hyder Beg Khan. From the accounts which he had received, the governor-general seems to have had some fears of being overmatched by him. "This minister," he says in a letter to the directors, "is described to me as a man of uncommon abilities, and he no doubt exercises at present the whole power of the vizier's government." Alluding to the same subject, in a letter to Mr. Dundas, he says,

The Nabob of Oude.

A.D. 1787.

Affairs of the
Nabob of
Oude.Final
arrange-
ment with
him.

"I expect Hyder Beg in the course of next month, when I shall have a difficult game to play; but I think fairness, honesty, and firmness, will be a match for cunning, corruption, and timidity." The interviews which took place in February, 1787, when the visit was made, appear to have justified this opinion. The account which Lord Cornwallis gives of these interviews, in a letter to Mr. Dundas, is worth quoting. "I have had several interviews with Hyder Beg Khan, the vizier's minister. The total mismanagement of Oude, the confused manner of stating accounts between the vizier and the Company, and the constant practice on the one part of trumping-up charges, to extort every rupee that it was possible to get, and on the other, of making use of every art and evasion to defer payment, have rendered it very difficult to establish a fair open line between us." "One great difficulty was to persuade the nabob's minister that the promises made to him would be kept." "Hyder Beg," continues the letter, "constantly repeats a proverb of theirs—*Whoever has been stung by a snake is frightened when he sees a rope*. I have been greatly embarrassed to determine in my own mind what would be a fair bargain between the two governments, but it has been a much more arduous task to endeavour to make the minister believe what I said, or indeed understand the language I talked; I might almost as well have expected him to understand English." Lord Cornwallis proposed as the basis of agreement, "that we should disclaim all manner of interference in the revenues, collections, commerce, and internal management of the country, and that, on the other hand, we should have the entire direction of political matters; and as no dependence can be placed on their own contemptible rabble, that it should be clearly admitted that they looked to us solely for defence, and were to enjoy the blessings of peace under the protection of the most formidable power in Hindoostan." The ultimate arrangement was that the Company should keep two brigades in Oude, and that, instead of the seventy-four lacs with which the nabob was previously charged, he should in future pay only fifty lacs in full of all demands. The revenue of Oude at this time exceeded two millions sterling, and therefore fifty lacs, or a fourth of the whole, for complete protection was not a very unreasonable demand. The state of the country, however, must have made it doubtful if it would be paid, for at the very time when the arrangement was made, Lord Cornwallis drew the following picture of its government:—"From the best information I have been able to get concerning Oude, I hear that the vizier extorts every rupee he can from his ministers, to squander in debaucheries, cock-fighting, elephants, and horses; he is said to have a thousand of the latter in his stables, although he never uses them. The ministers, on their part, are fully as rapacious as their master; their object is to cheat him and plunder the country. They charge him seventy lacs for the maintenance of troops to enforce the collections, the greater part of which do not exist, and the money supposed to pay them goes into the pocket of Almas Ali Khan (a favourite eunuch) and Hyder Beg."

Another visit was offered to the governor-general at Calcutta, by a guest of A.D. 1788. far higher pretensions than either Hyder Beg, or the nabob vizier his master. This was Jewan Bukt Behaudar Shah, the heir-apparent of Shah Alum, and consequently designated as the Shazada, or son of the king. His father, Shah Alum, had never been his own master since he left the protection of the Company, but had passed from hand to hand as a mere tool, according as each succeeding revolution gave some new chief the ascendancy at Delhi. During one of these vicissitudes he fell into the power of Golan Kadir Khan (son of the Rohilla chief Zabita Khan, Nabob of Saharunpoor), who, having gained possession of Delhi in June, 1788, made Shah Alum prisoner, and barbarously with his own hand put out his eyes with the point of a dagger. With this exception, his person had been almost constantly in the possession of the Mahrattas, who endeavoured, by means of titles and grants which they compelled him to give, to extend their authority and dominion. Shortly after the death of Nujeef Khan, the Shazada quitted Delhi, and arrived at Lucknow in 1784, while Mr. Hastings was on his last visit there. He was favourably received by the nabob, who allowed him four lacs of rupees for his maintenance; and he appears to have succeeded in ingratiating himself with Mr. Hastings, who thus writes of him—"I saw him almost daily for six months, in which we were either participators of the same dues of hospitality, or he of mine. I found him gentle, lively, possessed of a high sense of honour, of a sound judgment, an uncommon quick penetration, and a well-cultivated understanding, with a spirit of resignation, and an equanimity of temper almost exceeding any within the reach of knowledge or recollection." Such was the individual who was now engaged in a hopeless endeavour to revive the fortunes of his family, and in furtherance of this object was desirous of an interview with the new governor-general.

Relations with Shah Alum and the Shazada.

What encouragement the schemes of the Shazada received from Mr. Hastings has not been satisfactorily explained; but the intimate terms on which he had lived with him seems to have encouraged him to try whether he might be able to ingratiate himself equally with Lord Cornwallis. In the letter announcing his intended visit, he says—"As the particulars of the allegiance, and sincerity, and fidelity of the noble English gentlemen used to come to my hearing, I turned the reins of my desire toward Lucknow, in reliance upon the attachment and service of the English gentlemen; and my heart's object was this, that, with the conjunction and advice of the noble English gentlemen, having provided for the settlement of the kingdom, and having planned the establishment of the throne of his majesty, I should obtain happiness from the title of heir-apparent which his majesty has bestowed upon me, and should, in return for this favour, perform some service which might be acceptable to his majesty, and might remain recorded in the annals of the world. Accordingly, after my arrival at Lucknow, discourses of designs and actions took place with Governor Hastings, but as his departure towards Europe was near, the event of

An offered visit from the latter declined.

A. D. 1788

An offered
visit from
the Shazada
declined by
Lord Cornwallis.

this business did not come to light. As all matters depend on their season, the event of these happy objects was kept until your arrival. God be praised that the object of all my prayers to God is come to pass! Truly, from hearing the happy news of the arrival of you, worthy of favour, fresh delights and innumerable joys came to me, and it became fixed in my penetrating mind, that, by the assistance of God, the settlement of the affairs of his majesty's throne will take place in the manner which I wish, through the wise plans of you, a peer gifted with sincerity." He had therefore determined to make himself happy by an interview, and would very speedily arrive at Calcutta by the river. It was impossible for the governor-general to give any countenance to the objects which the Shazada was contemplating. He had formerly told him so, and could therefore now only request that his highness would remain at Benares, where, in consequence of orders which had been given to the officials, the attention and respect due to his exalted dignity would be paid with all assiduity.

Notwithstanding this refusal to receive the visit, it seemed probable that the Shazada would insist on paying it, and Lord Cornwallis had therefore made up his mind as to the manner in which he was to act. "I shall certainly," he says, in a letter to the directors, "receive and treat him with much respect and the greatest kindness, but I have already prepared his mind not to expect many of the outward ceremonials usually paid in this country to the princes of the house of Timur, as they would not only be extremely irksome to me personally, but also in my opinion improper to be submitted to by the governor-general at the seat of your government. The whole political use that may be derived from this event is at present uncertain, but there may arise some future advantage if we can gain his affection and attachment; in the meantime you need not be afraid of my contracting any inconvenient engagements with him." The course thus chalked out was evidently dictated both by good feeling and sound policy, and preferable to that pursued by Mr. Hastings when, on parting with the prince at Benares, he left him his guard of honour, for the purpose of keeping up a show of state after the reality had vanished. The Shazada, however, appears to have thought differently, for after learning that he would not only receive no countenance to his schemes, but be denied the gratification of exhibiting himself in full pomp as the heir-apparent of the Mogul, he gave up the idea of visiting Calcutta, and fixed his residence at Benares, where he was suddenly cut off by fever, in May, 1788. A year before his death, the interview which he had sought was obtained, as Lord Cornwallis was passing through Benares on a tour to the north. The answer to his urgent applications for troops, or money to assist in the re-establishment of his father's throne, was a firm refusal, and at last all he asked was an asylum to himself and his family within the Company's territories, in the event of his being obliged to flee from his enemies. This request was granted, and to make it more formal and secure, it was reduced to writing, and signed by the governor-general and council.

Subsequent
interview at
Benares.

Among the instructions which Lord Cornwallis received from the directors A.D. 1787. before quitting England, one was to institute a strict inquiry into the mode in which the Company's investment was provided, and into the gross abuses and frauds which were supposed to be practised, through a corrupt understanding between members of the board of trade and the contractors. The chief localities where these corrupt practices prevailed were Benares and Lucknow, the great marts for silk, and the extent to which they were carried may be inferred from the fact, that as soon as the contractors were dismissed and open competition was invited, the prices fell thirty per cent. So satisfied were the directors of the existence of collusion, that they ordered the prosecution of seven of their servants, who appeared to be most deeply implicated. Lord Cornwallis having, as he himself expressed it, undertaken the government with a full determination to suffer no private considerations to interfere with the discharge of what he conceived to be his public duty, did not hesitate to take all the steps that seemed necessary, both for suppressing malpractices and punishing those who were guilty of them. At the same time he was not blind to the fact, that much of the corruption was fostered by the injudicious custom of allowing inadequately paid officials to eke out sufficient salaries by underhand practices. On this subject he makes the following very startling statement: "I am sorry to say that I have every reason to believe, that at present almost all the collectors are, under the name of some relation or friend, deeply engaged in commerce, and by their influence as collectors and judges of adawlut, become the most dangerous enemies to the Company's interest, and the greatest oppressors of the manufactures." His remedy was to improve the position of the collectors, and thus raise them above the temptation of committing fraud, or leave them, if they committed it, without excuse. With the former salaries he held it "impossible that an honest man could acquire the most moderate competency." He therefore made the necessary increase, and then announced his determination to make an example of every offender against the revenue regulations, and the prohibition to engage in trade. "I am clearly of opinion," he remarks, "that in such a country as this, where the servants who hold the principal offices are surrounded with temptations, it will ever be found, that the only mode that can be successful to prevent peculation and other abuses, will be by annexing liberal allowances to those offices, and give gentlemen a prospect of acquiring a moderate fortune from the savings of their salaries." This maxim, though sound, was not palatable to the directors, who disapproved of the additional salaries. Their conduct, in this respect, seemed to him as the result at once of false economy, and of a want of proper confidence in himself. Hence, in a letter to Mr. Dundas, dated August 26th, 1787, he animadverts upon it with some degree of indignation: "If the essence of the spirit of economy of the whole court of directors could be collected, I am sure it would fall very short of my earnest anxiety on that subject. But I never can or shall think that it is good

Abuses in
providing
the Com-
pany's in-
vestment.

Parsimoni-
ous spirit
of the
directors.

A.D. 1786. economy to put men into places of the greatest confidence, where they have it in their power to make their fortune in a few months, without giving them adequate salaries." And again, "I have saved, since I came, upon the salt, upon the various contracts, upon remittances, balances, and jobs of different kinds, ten times, I may say fifty times, the amount of the salaries that are retrenched. I am doing everything I can to reform the Company's servants, to teach them to be more economical in their mode of living, and to look forward to a moderate competency, and I flatter myself I have not hitherto laboured in vain. But if all chance of saving any money, and returning to England without acting dishonestly, is removed, there will be an end of my reformation."

State of the
Company's
army.

The civil was not the only branch of the public service in which reform was required. The army was also in a most defective state. In a letter to the Duke of York, Lord Cornwallis wrote, on the 10th November, 1786:—"The East India Company's artillery are very fine, but their European infantry, on whom the defence of their valuable possessions may one day depend, are in a most wretched state. The sepoy or native black troops are fine men, and would not in size disgrace the Prussian ranks; I have heard undeniable proofs of their courage and patience in bearing hunger and fatigue, but from the little I have hitherto seen of them, I have no favourable idea of their discipline." One great cause of the inferiority of the Company's European troops to those of the king's army was the very nature and condition of the service. In the case of the officers "the mainspring," continues his lordship, "has always been wanting; they have had no head to look up to; the promotion of rank has always gone by seniority; and the lucrative commands have been given to those who have had interest. Consequently there has been no spur to merit. The Company's officers have no regiments or governments to look forward to; few constitutions can stand this climate many years. If they cannot save some money, they must go home without rank or pay, condemned to disease and beggary. Under these circumstances, the most rigid general must relax a little, and suffer practices that are in some degree repugnant to the nice feelings of a soldier." Another main cause of inferiority in the Company's army was the kind of materials from which recruits were obtained. Writing on this subject to the directors, he says, "The abuses or neglects in recruiting your Europeans appear to be scandalous, and if not corrected, may endanger the safety of your possessions in this quarter of the globe; the best men being picked from the whole of the recruits for the artillery, that corps both here and at Madras is in a good and serviceable state, but the other European regiments are in very bad condition, incomplete in numbers, and many of those numbers consisting of foreigners, sailors, invalids, or men under the proper size for military services." Another singular class of recruits he refers to as "particularly embarrassing." They were, as he describes them, "gentlemen (among whom there are even some half-pay king's officers) who never meant to serve, and indeed are unfit for the duties of private soldiers, but

Existing
abuses.

who procured themselves to be enrolled as recruits, merely to get a passage on board the chartered ships to India." On their arrival they escaped from service by providing a substitute, usually a sailor who took the first opportunity of deserting, or some man who would probably have enlisted of his own accord, and then remaining for the most part without employment, were in a short time in great want and distress. To get rid of future importations of such fictitious recruits, Lord Cornwallis begged the directors to notify as publicly as possible, that "if any such young men do come out, either by passing themselves for persons of the proper class for recruits, or by the collusion of others," he would insist on their serving their time, or, in the event of discharge, on not only providing a substitute, but on giving security to return to Europe at their own expense by the first ships that sailed.

A. D. 1786.

Abuses in the Company's army.

A serious obstacle to the efficiency of the Indian army had arisen in an early period of the Company's history, from jealousies and disputes about precedence among the officers. Those of the king's service assumed a superiority which was not only galling to the feelings of the Company's officers, but detrimental to their interests, by interfering with and impeding the regular course of promotion. The remedy had been much discussed before Lord Cornwallis took his departure, and it had been all but determined to abolish all distinction between the two branches of the military service, and declare the whole European army in India to be *king's troops*. Shortly after his arrival in India, Lord Cornwallis, who had previously concurred in this project, began to entertain serious doubts of its practicability or expediency, and did not venture further than to propose that the Company should be furnished with better powers of recruiting, and that the Company's officers should rank with those of the king's troops, according to seniority of commission. Both points, though conceded at a later period, were disapproved at home, especially by Mr. Dundas, who had suggested the plan of declaring all king's troops, and continued strenuously to advocate it. In answer to Lord Cornwallis' proposals he wrote, "I confess the plan I have suggested is a favourite child, and do not be surprised if I am loath to give it up." "As to the first of these conditions" (better powers of recruiting), "I do not believe we could ever get the better of the grumbling of the army upon that idea, if it was proposed; and as to the second, I do not believe his majesty would ever be brought to yield up the notion of his commission having a pre-eminence over one flowing from a commercial body of his own subjects. I think my plan obviates all the difficulties." Mr. Dundas was on this occasion too sanguine. His plan, instead of obviating all difficulties, raised several which could not be surmounted, and was destined, even after the king had formally approved of it and directed the consideration of it in the cabinet, to be thrown aside. The discussion of it, it may here be observed, has, in consequence of recent changes, been revived and still continues, as the highest authorities both civil and military have ranged themselves on opposite sides.

Proposal to amalgamate the British and the Indian European troops.

Obstacles.

A.D. 1786.

Collision
between the
directors
and the
Board of
Control.

A declara-
tory act in
favour of
the latter.

Before the design of declaring the whole India-European army king's troops was abandoned, it had been resolved, preparatory to its completion, to send out four new regiments to India. When the resolution was first intimated to the directors they seemed rather pleased with it, because at the time a war with France was apprehended, and they did not see how they could otherwise provide effectually for the defence of their territories. The rumour of war having blown past, the directors changed their view, and not satisfied with objecting to the sending out of the regiments, declared their determination neither to receive them on board their ships nor allow their revenue to be employed in paying them. There was thus a direct collision between the directors and the Board of Control, and ministers, taking part of course with the Board, with which they are in fact identified, saw no better mode of explicating the matter than to bring in what they called a declaratory bill, for the purpose of explaining the powers vested in the Board by the act of 1784. This bill, which now ranks as 28 Geo. III. c. 8, was not passed without encountering an opposition which more than once threatened the existence of the ministry. It proceeds on the preamble that doubts had arisen whether the Board of Commissioners, under act 24 Geo. III. c. 25, were empowered to direct that the expense of troops deemed necessary for the security of the British territories in India shall be defrayed out of the revenues of these territories, "unless such troops are sent out at the express requisition of the East India Company," and removes the doubts by enacting and declaring that the Board "was, and is by the said act, fully authorized and empowered to order and direct that all the expenses incurred, or to be hereafter incurred, for raising, transporting, and maintaining such forces as shall be sent to India for the security of the said territories and possessions, shall be paid, defrayed, and borne out of the revenues arising from the said territories and possessions; and that nothing in the said act contained extended, or extends, or shall be construed to extend, to restrain, or to have restrained the said commissioners from giving such orders or directions as aforesaid with respect to the expense of raising, transporting, and maintaining any forces which may be sent to India for the security of the said possessions, in addition to the forces now there." So far the victory remained with the Board, but the directors could also boast of a victory, since the above power, instead of remaining absolute, is restricted by subsequent sections, which limit the number of king's troops that might be paid by the commissioners as above to 8045, and of Company's European troops to 12,200 men, and prohibits them from increasing salaries or bestowing gratuities beyond amounts proposed and specified in despatches from the directors. The account which Mr. Dundas gave Lord Cornwallis of the discussion on the above bill is amusing: "Although this contest at first began among the directors and proprietors of India stock, yet it was too tempting a bait not to be snatched at by higher powers. It became a complete opposition question, and brought

forth all the secret foes and lukewarm friends of government. The Lord Marquis of Lansdowne rode one of the first horses, and it would have amused you in the House of Lords, to have seen him sitting between Lord Stormont and Lord Loughborough, and they all hugging and complimenting each other. It proved, however, all in vain; the bill was carried with a high hand in both Houses of Parliament, and the court of proprietors of India stock have had several meetings called by factious proprietors, but in place of gaining their end or being able to keep up any flame, the proprietors have, three to one, negatived all their motions, and proved to the world in the most unequivocal manner that their confidence is firm and unshaken in the present system of Indian government."¹

A.D. 1788.
Mr. Dundas's account of the debate on the declaratory bill.

While thus engaged in correcting abuses, and suggesting reforms in both the civil and military services, the attention of the governor-general was particularly directed to Gunttoor, one of the Northern Circars. It was included in the original grant obtained by Clive from Shah Alum in 1765, but by the subsequent treaty made with Nizam Ali in 1768, it was agreed that the Company should defer taking actual possession during the lifetime of his brother Basalut Jung, to whom it had been granted in jaghire. Basalut Jung died in 1782, and the Company immediately claimed the reversion, but Nizam Ali, under various pretexts, eluded compliance. It was inconvenient at the time to use force, and the Company in the meantime so far compensated themselves by withholding payment of tribute for the other Circars. The value of Gunttoor to Nizam Ali was greatly enhanced, because through it alone he could obtain access to the sea-coast. He had thus been enabled, when meditating war against the Company, to obtain supplies of military stores and a considerable body of French troops. To the Company the possession of Gunttoor was desirable, both for the very reason which made Nizam Ali anxious to retain it, and because the want of it interrupted the communication between Madras and the other Circars. The directors had at length determined to gain possession of it at all hazards, and given Lord Cornwallis such specific instructions on the subject as scarcely left him an option. Shortly after his arrival, however, he became satisfied that the time was unseasonable. Nizam Ali was engaged in an unsuccessful war with Tippoo, and it would be thought ungenerous, under such circumstances, to subject him to any additional pressure. France, too, seemed to be preparing for war, and it could not be good policy to take a step which might throw him into their arms, and convert an ally into an inveterate and formidable foe. Lord Cornwallis therefore allowed the subject to remain in abeyance till June, 1788, when an European war being no longer apprehended, nor the interference of other native powers suspected, there was good ground to hope that the Nizam, however much he might be offended, would make a merit of necessity, by quietly yielding up a possession which he saw it would

The Company's claim to Gunttoor enforced.

¹ *Correspondence of Marquis Cornwallis*, vol. i. p. 355.

A D. 1788.

be impossible for him to retain. The result was as had been anticipated, and Captain (afterward Sir) John Kennaway, sent on a special mission to Hyderabad, found little difficulty in obtaining the peaceful and final cession of Guntoor.

Intrigues of
Nizam Ali.

Nizam Ali, in yielding Guntoor, was not without the hope of compensating himself in some other way. The claim to which he had been compelled to submit was founded on the treaty of 1768. That treaty must therefore, at least in the view of the Company, be still in force. If so, Was not he in like manner entitled to take shelter under it, and insist that its stipulations in his favour should also be fulfilled? No sooner had Nizam Ali started this idea, than he began to work it out in the manner which accorded best with his tortuous policy. He despatched two embassies, the one to Tippoo and the other to Lord Cornwallis. To Tippoo he pointed out that they two were now the only Mahometan princes of note in the Deccan, and that it therefore was at once their duty and their interest to combine against the infidels as common enemies. To give at once a religious character to the negotiation, and a sacred pledge of his earnest desire for permanent friendship and alliance, he sent the Sultan a splendid copy of the Koran. At the same time he endeavoured to arouse his suspicion and alarm his fears, by informing him of the apparent intention of the Company to enforce the stipulations of the treaty of 1768. He himself had already, under that treaty, been compelled to give up Guntoor, and Tippoo, a large portion of whose territories were to be given away under that treaty, might easily judge what he had to expect. These arguments, which accorded so well with the views Tippoo had long entertained, were not without effect, and he declared his readiness to return the sacred pledge, and enter into an offensive and defensive treaty, provided it were previously sanctioned by intermarriage between the families. To this condition Nizam Ali's envoy could only answer that he had no orders; and therefore Kuttub-u-din and Ali Reza were sent back with the envoy to Hyderabad to make a formal proposal of affinity. Ali Reza, on being admitted to an interview, made known the object of his embassy by saying, "We are desirous of partaking of the *sheker-bhat*," the dish of rice and sugar sent as the first preliminary ceremonial of marriage. Affinity with the family of Hyder Naick was more than the Nizam's pride could brook. He disdained to give an answer, and the negotiation ceased.

His separate
negotia-
tions with
Tippoo and
Lord Corn-
wallis.

The embassy to Lord Cornwallis was more successful. When the envoy Meer-Abd-ul-Kasim, better known as Meer Allum, referring to the recent cession of Guntoor, demanded the fulfilment of the other stipulations of the treaty of 1768, his lordship appears to have felt himself in a dilemma. He could not deny that the treaty was still in force, for he had just been acting upon it, and yet, how could he give effect to stipulations which stigmatized Hyder Ali as an usurper, and bound the Company to attempt the conquest of a large portion of the territories now belonging to Mysore. In 1769 a treaty

had been made with Hyder, formally recognizing his right to the territories of which the treaty of 1768 would have deprived him, and in 1784 a treaty to the very same effect had been made with Tippoo. How, then, could it be maintained with any semblance of truth, that a treaty, on which the Company could not act without violating two treaties made subsequently to it, and declaring war against a state with which they were at peace, was still binding? It must be confessed, that in disentangling this difficulty Lord Cornwallis failed to display his usual sagacity and straightforwardness, and was betrayed into a series of gross inconsistencies and wretched subterfuges. Having good ground to suspect that Tippoo was meditating war, he was anxious to secure the Nizam as an ally. But a stringent clause in Mr. Pitt's act of 1784, made it illegal to enter into any new treaty for this purpose, and therefore the singular device was fallen upon, of effecting the object by reviving an old treaty, and at the same time accompanying it with explanations and stipulations which entirely altered its character.

A.D. 1780.

Curious revival of an old treaty.

This device of reviving an old treaty so as to give it the effect of a new one, was carried out by means of a letter which Lord Cornwallis addressed to the Nizam, and which, while it purported to be explanatory of the treaty of 1768, was declared to be *equally binding as a treaty*. This letter, dated 1st July, 1780, after some preliminary explanations, declares it to be the intention of the governor-general, that the treaty of 1768 "be carried into full effect." By the sixth article of the treaty, the Company was to furnish the Nizam with two battalions of sepoys and six pieces of cannon, managed by European artillerymen, "whenever the Company's affairs would permit." The letter declares the meaning of these words just quoted to be, that "the force engaged for by this article shall be granted whenever the Nizam shall apply for it; making only one exception, that it is not to be employed against any powers in alliance with the Company." These powers are distinctly enumerated as the different "Mahratta chiefs, the Nabob of Arcot, the nabob vizier, the Rajahs of Tanjore and Travancore." As there is no mention made of Tippoo, the only inference that can be drawn is, either that he was not considered to be one of the "powers in alliance with the Company," or that, notwithstanding, the Nizam was at full liberty to employ the Company's troops in attacking him. This is absurd enough, but still not so absurd as what follows. The treaty of 1768 contemplated the conquest of the Carnatic Balaghaut, which was then possessed by Hyder, and which, by subsequent treaties, was solemnly recognized as belonging to Mysore. The dewannee of this territory was to be granted to the Company, who engaged, in return, to pay the Nizam seven lacs annually, as the reserved revenue, and moreover volunteered, without being asked, to pay the Mahrattas their chout. In regard to this projected conquest, the letter goes on to state that "circumstances have totally prevented the execution of those articles of the treaty of 1768 which relate to the dewannee of the Carnatic

Questionable policy of Lord Cornwallis

A.D. 1789.

Motives for
course
adopted by
Lord Corn-
wallis.

Balaghaut; but should it hereafter happen that the Company, with his highness' assistance, should obtain possession of the countries mentioned in those articles, they will strictly perform the stipulations in favour of his highness and the Mahrattas." Thus, in order to conform to the letter of an act of parliament, enjoining a system of neutrality, Lord Cornwallis violated its spirit, by not only entering into what was, to all intents and purposes, a new treaty, but undertaking engagements which contemplated the dismemberment of the territories of an ally, and thereby broke faith with him. A proceeding so unjustifiable in itself, and so inconsistent with the course of policy which Lord Cornwallis was anxious to pursue, can only be palliated by referring to the circumstances. Tippoo, though nominally an ally, was acting in a manner which made it almost impossible to doubt that he would seize the first favourable opportunity of commencing hostilities. It was therefore absolutely necessary to prepare for the worst, and this could not well be done without forming alliances with other native powers. Unfortunately, the legislature, in their zeal for neutrality, had, by a stringent clause in the act of 1784, made this illegal, and Lord Cornwallis, finding his hands injudiciously tied up, had allowed himself to be betrayed into the above circuitous and not very honourable course of procedure. While apparently unconscious of the evasion he had practised, he furnished the true key to the explanation of it, when he wrote as follows:—"Some considerable advantages have no doubt been experienced by the system of neutrality which the legislature required of the governments in this country, but it has at the same time been attended with the unavoidable inconvenience of our being constantly exposed to the necessity of commencing a war, without having previously secured the assistance of efficient allies." When this observation was made, Tippoo's conduct had already furnished what his lordship justly called "a case in point."

CHAPTER II.

Tippoo's tyranny and cruelty—His attack on the lines of Travancore—Confederacy against him—Progress of the war under General Medows—Lord Cornwallis assumes the command—Siege and capture of Bangalore—Operations in Coorg—Advance on Seringapatam—Siege of Seringapatam—Treaty of peace.



IN the conclusion of the war which he had been carrying on with the Nizam and the Mahrattas, Tippoo returned to his capital, where he spent some months in making innovations, dictated for the most part by no regular system of policy, but by mere bigotry, caprice, and tyranny. Cham Raj, in whose name the government had been nominally conducted, having died by small-pox, no suc-

cessor to him had been appointed. Though there was consequently no longer any pageant rajah, the ancient capital where the former dynasty resided, and which had given its name to the whole country, still remained. In this Tippoo saw a memorial which was continually reminding him of the usurpation of his family, and he therefore determined on its destruction. With this view he removed all the family of the late rajah, after stripping them even of their personal ornaments, to a miserable hovel, rifled the palace of its contents, laid the fort and town in ruins, and forcibly removed the inhabitants. After this work of destruction, he set out in the beginning of January, 1788, at the head of his army, for Malabar. Having arrived at Calicut, he gave orders for its destruction, as the most effectual means of annihilating the memory of the Zamorin, and continued making converts by thousands to Islamism, by the simple but barbarous infliction of its initiatory rite, till he perceived that in his absurd and excessive fanaticism he had forgotten the approaching monsoon. As soon as it began to break, he determined to hasten back to Coimbatore, and when warned of the difficulty, answered, that he would *order the clouds to cease discharging their waters until he should have passed*. He paid the penalty of this impious boast, by being compelled to make a tedious and most destructive march through swamps and floods, amid incessant torrents of rain.

A.D. 1788.

Tippoo's
forced con-
versions
in Malabar.

About this time he renewed his negotiations with the French, who had again, in expectation of a new war, turned their attention to India, and even attempted to gain possession of Trincomalee, by means of the Dutch faction opposed to the house of Orange. The possession of this harbour by the French seemed to the Madras presidency so dangerous, that Sir Archibald Campbell, who was then governor, on learning the design to capture it, determined on his own responsibility to retaliate by immediate preparations for the siege of Pondicherry. The French, finding Trincomalee well prepared for defence, desisted, and Sir Archibald Campbell having in consequence abandoned his preparations, peace was not disturbed. Tippoo's intercourse with the French under such circumstances, gave plain indication of his intentions to break with the Company. Another still stronger indication was shortly after given, by his ordering a minute inspection of the only two routes by which he could march an army into Travancore. This, he knew, could not be done without coming to an open rupture with the Company, since the Rajah of Travancore was specially mentioned as one of their allies in the treaty of Mangalore. Every indication of a design to attack him could only be construed into a design to violate that treaty. Tippoo returned to his capital in August, and was busily engaged in re-organizing his army, when intelligence arrived that all Coorg and Malabar had risen in rebellion. He lost no time in marching with his whole army, and descended, after traversing Coorg, into Malabar. The Nairs were completely overpowered, and submitted in great numbers to the rite of Islamism, as no choice was left them but conversion or death. Many, however,

His intrigues
with the
French.

A. D. 1789. made their escape to Tellicherry, from which they embarked for Travancore. Tippoo had long had designs on this province, and had even attempted the conquest of it indirectly in 1788, by engaging the Zamorin of Calicut to invade it in his own name. This scheme having failed, he endeavoured to turn the flight of the Nairs to advantage. Some countenance had been given to them by the Rajah of Cochin, his acknowledged tributary, and he resolved, in punishing him, to make it conducive if possible to the furtherance of his designs.

Tippoo
Sultan.

His designs
on Travancore.

Travancore is a long and comparatively narrow tract, forming the south-west corner of the Indian peninsula, and terminating a little to the east of Cape Comorin. On the east it is bounded by the lofty precipices of the Western Ghauts, and on the west and south is washed by the ocean. It is thus secure against a land attack on all sides except the north, where, though partially protected by the Ghauts, it lies open toward Cochin. To supply this want of a natural barrier, a series of artificial works, known by the name of the lines of Travancore, had been constructed. Though more formidable in appearance than in reality, a high opinion was entertained of their strength. Tippoo maintained that part of these lines was built on the territory of Cochin, and that the effect of them was to divide this territory into two parts, and debar him from access to one of them. This allegation seemed plausible, but careful inquiry on the part of the Company proved it to be unfounded, and it was therefore intimated to him, that any attempt to force the lines, as he had threatened to do, would be deemed equivalent to a declaration of war. Meanwhile, to meet Tippoo's complaint of the reception given to the Nairs in Travancore, Mr. Hollond, who had succeeded Sir Archibald Campbell as governor of Madras, desired the rajah to withdraw his protection from the unhappy fugitives, and then spent several months in fruitless negotiation, instead of obeying the orders which he had received from Bengal, to lose no time in preparing for the worst. Lord Cornwallis, while most reluctant to believe that Tippoo would break the peace, could not shut his eyes to the necessity of using every precaution against so faithless a despot, and had he not been restrained by the legislature, would probably have taken the initiative and compelled him to declare himself. As matters stood, he could do little more than wait in anxious suspense till Tippoo should complete his operations, and by some overt act of hostility free him from injudicious legislative trammels. It was not necessary to wait long.

Tippoo had established his camp about six miles northward of the principal gate of the Travancore lines. On the night of the 28th of December, 1789, he threw off all disguise by issuing orders for an attack on them. While the main body of the army manœuvred in front of the gate, with the view of occupying the attention of the defenders, he himself moved round, with a body of 14,000 infantry and 500 pioneers, by a route which a native had discovered to him. Nothing could be more propitious than this commencement. By daybreak of

the 30th, he had with little opposition forced his way within the lines, and gained possession of a considerable stretch of rampart on the right flank. His expectation was, that in the course of the day his whole army would be able to follow. With this view, he ordered the pioneers to throw part of the rampart into the ditch, which was about 16 feet wide and 20 feet deep, and thus fill it up so as to give free entrance. At the same time, the troops advanced along the rampart to force the principal gate, and admit the infantry and cavalry who had been manœuvring in front of it. The pioneers, worn out with previous exertion, did their work very sluggishly, and had made but little progress, when all the troops were seen rushing pell-mell towards the gap. In advancing towards the gate, a sudden onset by a mere handful of defenders, had caused a panic which speedily communicated itself to the whole detachment. As they crowded towards the gap they did the work of destruction more effectually than the enemy, by crushing and trampling one another to death. No less than 2000 men are said to have been killed. Tippoo himself, after attempting in vain to arrest the fugitives, was obliged to flee along with them; and in clearing the rampart, which he was only enabled to do by being raised on the shoulders of some faithful attendants, received contusions which gave him a certain degree of lameness for life. On arriving in the camp he swore, in a paroxysm of shame and rage, that he would not quit it till he had forced the lines; and there he was in fact destined to remain three months and a half, throwing away the only chance he had of striking a decisive blow, before effectual preparations could be made to oppose him in the field.

A.D. 1790.

Tippoo's
attack on
the Travancore lines.

4. The moment Lord Cornwallis heard of the attempt to force the lines of Travancore, he acted on his previously declared determination, to hold it equivalent to a declaration of war. The case, therefore, was completely altered, and the neutrality system of the legislature being no longer applicable, he was left untrammelled to follow his own course. Without loss of time he communicated both with the Nizam and the Mahrattas, and succeeded in forming a triple league against Tippoo. By the treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, concluded on this occasion with the peishwa on the 1st of June, and Nizam Ali on the 4th of July, 1790, it was agreed that immediate measures should be taken to punish Tippoo, and unfit him for again disturbing the public tranquillity—that the Mahrattas and the Nizam should each furnish a contingent of 10,000 horse to act with the British army, and be paid by the Company, and that a British detachment should in like manner act with each of their armies—and that at the conclusion of the war, the conquests should be equally divided. In regard to this last article, however, it was provided that the British should have exclusive possession of whatever forts and territories they might reduce before the other confederates took actual part in the war, and that, in like manner, the Mahrattas should obtain exclusive possession of the territories of certain specified zemindars and polygars formerly dependent upon

A triple
league
against him.

A.D. 1790.

Triple league
against Tip-
poo Sultan.

them, by whichever of the allies these might be reduced. In these exceptions to the equal division of conquest, the advantage was so greatly in favour of the Mahrattas, that it has been thought that Lord Cornwallis could not be aware of the vast extent of valuable country which he was thus surrendering without any equivalent. It would seem, however, that even if he had known the value, he would still have made the surrender, since, in a letter written on the 28th of February, 1790, to Mr. (afterwards Sir) Charles Malet, resident at Poonah, he says expressly, "I should think it incumbent upon me to agree to almost any conditions of that nature, which they (the Mahrattas) might appear determined to annex to their decision for making an immediate declaration in our favour." From the dates given above, it appears that Nizam Ali was more than a month later than the Mahrattas in executing the treaty. The cause of this delay is curious, and shows how feeble the tie was which bound the confederates. He was afraid that when he had set out with his army, the Mahrattas would take advantage of his absence and invade his dominions. At first he insisted that a specific guarantee of his dominions should be inserted in the treaty, but ultimately, on its being represented to him that the Mahrattas would justly take offence at such an article as implying an unworthy suspicion of them, he consented to accept of a declaration which was deemed equivalent to it.

Misconduct
of Governor
Holland of
Madras.

While Lord Cornwallis was thus exerting himself, he was not at all seconded at Madras. Governor Holland, instead of obeying the orders which he had received from Bengal, acted as if he thought himself possessed of a discretionary power to obey or refuse, just as suited his own particular views. The supreme council had directed him, that on receiving certain information of Tippoo having invaded any part of the dominions of the Nabob of Arcot or the Rajah of Travancore, he was to consider him as from that moment at war with the Company, and was in consequence to cease from providing any investment for Europe, in order that all the funds which would have been so employed, as well as the other pecuniary resources of the Carnatic, might be reserved for the exigencies of the war. He had been further instructed of the determination to defend the rajah, should it be ascertained on inquiry, as it eventually was, that he had a good title to the portion of territory which Tippoo claimed as belonging to Cochin. This determination he had never communicated either to Tippoo or to the rajah, or to the resident at his court, while on the contrary, he sent letters both to the rajah and the resident, "couched," as the supreme council express it, "in terms calculated to discourage a faithful ally in the defence of his own country against an enemy who was within a few miles of his frontiers, and with the insolence and violence of whose character" Governor Holland had long been fully acquainted. His conduct with regard to the investment was equally contumacious; and he had continued to advertise for articles which were to form part of it, after he was perfectly aware of Tippoo's attempt upon the lines. In the same spirit, though he had issued orders for a large body of

troops to be in readiness to take the field on the shortest notice, he had to a great extent neutralized the order, by delaying to order a sufficient number of draught and carriage bullocks. On all these points Governor Hollond and his council were put upon their defence. They had none; and could only answer, in regard to military preparations, that they had delayed them in order to save expense. The answer of Lord Cornwallis to this wretched subterfuge deserves quotation:—"So far am I from giving credit to the late government for economy in not making the necessary preparations for war according to the positive orders of the supreme government, after having received the most gross insults that could be offered to any nation, I think it very possible that every *cash* (the eighth part of a farthing) of that ill-judged saving may cost the Company a crore of rupees" (£1,000,000).

A D. 1790.

Misconduct
of Governor
Hollond.

It would never have done to leave the management of the war in the hands of such a council, and therefore Lord Cornwallis had determined, with the full concurrence of his colleagues, and "upon the ground of state necessity," to proceed to Madras, invested by the supreme council "with full powers to take a temporary charge of the civil and military affairs at the presidency of Fort St. George, by exercising the functions of governor as well as those of commander-in-chief." Before he could act on this resolution, he received intelligence which induced him to abandon it. General Medows, previously governor of Bombay, had been regularly invested by the directors with the offices of governor and commander-in-chief at Madras. As he was "a man of acknowledged ability and character," there was no occasion to interfere, and the governor-general therefore wisely resolved to remain at his post in Bengal. Here his first business was to make its resources available for carrying on the war, and he quickly despatched a large amount of specie, stores, and ammunition, and a battalion of artillery, chiefly gun-lascars, by sea. The prejudices of the high-caste Brahmins made them object to the same mode of conveyance, and therefore a large force, consisting of six battalions of sepoys, completed to ten companies each, marched by land under Colonel Cockerell. To make the resources of the Carnatic also available, application was made to the nabob for a large sum of arrears, and he was told that, during the continuance of the war, he must either appropriate the greater part of his revenue to defray its expenses, or allow the Company to collect it, allowing him a liberal sum for private and family expenses. The latter course was adopted, both in his case and that of the Rajah of Tanjore.

He is dis-
placed and
succeeded
by General
Medows.

Tippoo remained before the lines as he had sworn to do, waiting the tardy arrival of cannon and other equipments, as if, instead of attacking a miserable wall, he had been about to engage in a regular siege. While thus awaiting, he drew up a letter which he antedated fifteen days, and sent off to Madras. It purported to be an account of the encounter at the lines. His troops, he said, while searching for fugitives, had been fired upon by the rajah's people; they

A.D. 1790. retaliated and forced the lines, but he on hearing of the affair recalled them. False and hypocritical as this account was known to be, it was so satisfactory to Governor Hollond, that he actually proposed the appointment of commissioners to adjust the points in dispute. Tippoo haughtily replied, "that he had himself ascertained the points in dispute; after this, what was the use of commissioners? Nevertheless, if Mr. Hollond wished it, he might send commissioners to the presence." And doubtless, had Mr. Hollond been permitted to take his own way, he would have availed himself of this permission, and repeated the ignominious farce of sending commissioners to Tippoo's camp, to be paraded as before over the country, and perhaps put in bodily terror, as at Mangalore, by the erection of gibbets in front of their tents.

Tippoo's account of his attack on the Travancore lines.

While making hypocritical professions of peace, Tippoo had begun to make regular approaches towards the rampart, and meeting with little resistance, filled up the ditch, and made a practicable breach of nearly three-quarters of a mile in extent. All Travancore was now in his grasp, and the usual merciless devastation followed. The open country was converted into a desert, and the inhabitants, hunted down, were carried off in immense numbers to captivity and death. It was a disgrace to the Company to have left an old and faithfully exposed to such barbarity. When the rajah first intimated his fears, two battalions of sepoys were sent to his aid, and when Tippoo, after forcing the lines, was engaged in the siege of Cranganore, a small seaport which the rajah had purchased from the Dutch, Colonel Hartley arrived from Bombay with one European and two sepoy regiments. These were the whole troops furnished, and being totally unequal to offensive operations, remained cooped up in Ayacotta, situated on the north extremity of the island of Vipeen opposite to Cranganore. General Medows did not arrive at Madras till late in February. After forming a small encampment at Conjeveram, he set out on the 24th of May to take command of the main army, which had been assembled near Trichinopoly, and mustered about 15,000 men. Before leaving Madras, he had on the 5th of April announced to Tippoo his appointment and arrival in a

His barbarous proceedings and pacific professions.

Military preparations against him letter, written in the form usual on such occasions. Tippoo in his answer made the most pacific professions, and complained of "the representations, contrary to fact, of certain short-sighted persons, which had caused armies to be assembled on both sides, an event improper among those who are mutually at friendship." Formerly, he had with difficulty condescended to allow Mr. Hollond to send a commissioner "to the presence." His tone was now altered, and he begged General Medows to receive an envoy from him, in order "that the dust which had obscured his upright mind might be removed." The general's answer convinced him that it was now too late to continue the game of hypocrisy, and he hastened off with his army for Coimbatore. Before leaving Travancore, he gratified his pride and vainglory by converting the demolition of the lines into a kind of public ceremony. The whole army paraded without

arms, marched in divisions to the appointed stations; Tippoo, seated on an eminence, struck the first blow with a pickaxe, the chiefs and courtiers followed, and then the entire camp, not merely soldiers, but money-changers, shopkeepers, and followers of every description, put their hands to the work in earnest. In the course of six days the whole was razed to the ground. A.D. 1790.

The plan of campaign adopted by General Medows was as follows:—The main army, after reducing Palghaut and the forts in Coimbatore, was to ascend into Mysore by the pass of Gujelhutty, while a force under Colonel Kelly, to be composed chiefly of the troops expected from Bengal, was to penetrate from the centre of Coromandel into the Baramahal. So much time had been lost in making commissariat arrangements, that it was the 15th of June before General Medows reached the frontier posts of Caroor, only fifty miles beyond Trichinopoly, and the season of the year was so unfavourable, that upwards of 1200 men were sent back to the hospital of Caroor before a single shot was fired. It had been expected to overtake Tippoo at Coimbatore, but he was already above the Ghauts. On the 23d of July, Colonel Stuart was detached to reduce Palghaut. In this movement the nature of the climate had not been considered. Though Coimbatore, from its position, was receiving only a sprinkling of the south-west monsoon, Colonel Stuart, when only twenty miles to the west of it, encountered it in all its force, and became so entangled between two mountain torrents, that he was glad, after escaping with the utmost difficulty, to make the best of his way back to head-quarters. His destination was therefore changed, and he was sent in an opposite direction, above 100 miles south-west to Dindigul, while a detachment under Colonel Oldham was appointed for the capture of Erode, situated on the Cauvery, north-west of Caroor, and on the best route from it to the Gujelhutty Pass. Meanwhile, Colonel Floyd, who had advanced with the cavalry of the army and a light brigade of infantry, had come in contact with a large body of Mysore cavalry, whom Tippoo, on quitting Coimbatore, had left under the command of Seyed Sahib, with instruction to hang on the British army and disturb its communications. By a series of dexterous manœuvres, Seyed Sahib was driven northward across the Bhowani, a tributary of the Cauvery, flowing eastward from the Neilgherry Hills, and ultimately so close pressed that he ascended the Ghauts for safety. By this injudicious retreat, he left the whole country to the



GENERAL MEDOWS.

From a portrait engraved by H. R. Cook, after W. Haines.

First operations.

A. D. 1790.

Capture of
Dindigul.

south-east open, and Colonel Stuart was in consequence able to reach Dindigul without seeing an enemy. This place consisted of a town built on a gentle declivity, and a fort crowning a smooth granite rock, nearly perpendicular on three sides, and accessible only on the east by a flight of steps. The fort had within the last six years been strongly rebuilt on an improved plan, and now mounted fourteen good guns and one mortar. These improvements were not known to the British, and hence Colonel Stuart had not been provided with an adequate battering train, or a sufficient supply of ammunition. After silencing the enemy's fire and making a very indifferent breach, he found that he had shot for only two hours' firing. As a week would elapse before a new supply could arrive, he determined on risking an assault. The issue was very doubtful, but he was happily spared the trial, as the garrison on seeing the preparations for it, and not knowing the true cause, were frightened into a premature surrender. After returning to Coimbatore, Colonel Stuart was again despatched against Palghaut. On the 21st of September he opened upon it from two batteries. In less than two hours he had silenced its fire, and before night made a practicable breach. Happily, as at Dindigul, the assault was spared by a capitulation. By his kind treatment of the natives, Colonel Stuart so won upon them, that his bazaar assumed the appearance of a provincial granary, and he was able not only to leave the garrison provisioned for six months, but to carry back a month's grain for the whole army.

Other
captures.


During these operations by Colonel Stuart, Colonel Oldham had captured Erode, and Colonel Floyd Satimangalum. A line of posts had thus been established, leading directly from Caroor to the Guejelhutty Pass, which General Medows still hoped to be able to ascend in October. Still farther up the Bhowani than Satimangalum stood the fort of Dannayakkankottei, still in Tippoo's possession. Between these two places there was a ford at Poongur, and below Satimangalum another and a better ford, at Gopalchittypoliam. Early in September, Tippoo, leaving his stores and baggage on the summit of the Ghaut, began to descend by the Guejelhutty Pass. Colonel Floyd, having received early intelligence of this important movement, immediately communicated it to head-quarters, with a suggestion that, as the army was now dispersed, about a third of it being under the commander-in-chief at Coimbatore, another third with Colonel Stuart about thirty miles in the rear, and the remainder with Colonel Floyd himself, about sixty miles in advance, it might be prudent for him to fall back. The intelligence of Tippoo's descent was not, however, believed, and he was ordered to maintain his advanced position. The force under his command consisted of six troops of his majesty's 19th dragoons, sixteen troops of native cavalry, his majesty's 36th foot, four battalions of sepoys, and eleven guns, and was encamped exactly opposite to Satimangalum. On the morning of the 12th September Tippoo commenced the passage of the Bhowani, and encamped with a large portion of his army some miles south of the ford of

Poongur, while the remainder was ordered to proceed along the north bank, seize upon Satimangalum, and then cross either at the ford above or below it. Colonel Floyd's intelligence only led him to believe that Tippoo had nearly accomplished his descent, when he was in fact in his immediate neighbourhood, ready to pounce upon him. The nature of the country, intersected by impen-

A. D. 1790.

Encounter
between
Tippoo and
the British.

trable inclosures of prickly shrubs, in some measure explains without excusing such defective intelligence. On the morning of the 13th, three troops of the 19th were sent out to reconnoitre the ford of Poongur, and at daylight, about



TIPPOO SAHIB'S CAVALRY AND INFANTRY.—From Gold's Oriental Drawings. ONE OF HIS "GALLOPER" GUNS.—From a drawing in M'Kenzie Collection, East India House.

an hour and a half after, a regiment of native cavalry was ordered to follow and support them. There are two roads to the ford, one winding along the river, and the other more direct at some distance from it. The three troops after meeting and driving off some cavalry, returned by the former road; the native cavalry took the latter, and had only advanced a few miles upon it, when they were suddenly attacked by a strong force, and perceived large bodies of cavalry in every direction. The officer in command seized a favourable post to maintain himself, till he should send intelligence to Colonel Floyd and obtain relief. When it arrived about an hour after, he was surrounded and hard pressed in every direction. Ultimately, however, the enemy were completely repulsed, and the whole troops reached the camp in safety. Their struggle proved only the prelude to one of a more serious nature. A large body of the enemy began to descend the northern bank,¹ and at the same time Tippoo's columns were seen approaching rapidly from the west. Colonel Floyd had only time to change

¹ The group of figures in the middle ground of the illustration represents some of Tippoo's cavalry, one of them carrying the standard of Mahomet. The infantry in the distance are Tippoo's rocket corps and spearmen. These figures are from prints in Gold's *Oriental Drawings*. The gun in the foreground is copied from a drawing in the M'Kenzie Collection at the East India House, entitled, "One of Tippoo's

Gallopers, on its carriage, at Shikarpoor. January, 1806." The drawing shows the gun in plan and elevation, with measurements, showing that the gun, from muzzle to point at end of breech, was 2 feet 2 inches in length. The trail was of wood, mounted and shod with iron; the wheels of wood with iron tires. The carriage seems to have been of the rudest description, and was made of wood.

A. D. 1790.

Retreat of
the British
before
Tippoo.

front, and drew up the infantry in a position difficult to be outflanked, when Tippoo opened a distant but efficient cannonade from nineteen guns, and continued it throughout the day. The British casualties were serious, and it was determined in a council of war to retreat. For the first twelve miles, an open country enabled the infantry, cavalry, and baggage to move in separate lines, but afterwards, owing to inclosures, it was necessary for the whole to move in a single column, the cavalry leading. The retreat was commenced at eight in the morning, and Tippoo, who had drawn off for about six miles, was not made aware of it till an hour after. He immediately commenced pursuit, but was not able before two o'clock to bring any of his infantry into action, nor before five to bring his whole army so close as to make a combined attack. It was done with great spirit, but repulsed with great loss, many of the horsemen coming so near as to fall by the bayonet. Most of the British cannon and of the baggage had by this time been lost, but the cavalry had reached a village two miles in front, where it was hoped that a good encampment might be obtained. Suddenly a cry was raised that General Medows was at hand. A troop sent out to reconnoitre was mistaken for his personal guard. The effect upon both armies was almost as great as if he had actually arrived. The British giving three cheers rushed to the charge; and Tippoo, thinking that General Medows with his whole force was about to attack him, hastily drew off. The junction of the two divisions was effected without further opposition. Shortly afterwards, by the arrival of Colonel Stuart from Palghaut, the whole army was, in the end of September, reunited under its commander-in-chief at Coimbatoor.


A British
reinforce-
ment sent
overland
from Cal-
cutta.

The troops sent overland from Calcutta arrived at Conjeveram on the 1st of August, 1790, after a march of 1200 miles. By the addition of three regiments of European infantry, one of native cavalry, and a formidable artillery, it mustered 9500 men. The command, in consequence of the death of Colonel Kelly, on the 24th of September, devolved on Colonel Maxwell, who, in pursuance of the original plan of the campaign, entered Baramahal on the 24th of September. Tippoo, on hearing of this invasion, set off to encounter it with about three-fourths of his army, leaving the remainder under Kumma-u-din, to watch the movements of General Medows. Colonel Maxwell first approached the rocky fortress of Kistnagherry, of which he made a minute examination, as if with a view to a future siege, and then established his head-quarters near the central position of Caveripatam. On the 12th of November, Tippoo made his appearance in full force, and attempted, by a series of manœuvres, to attack with advantage, but being completely foiled in all his efforts, had resolved to depart on the 15th. Meanwhile, General Medows was advancing from the south, and on the very day fixed by Tippoo for his departure, encamped on the northern face of a range of hills overlooking Baramahal, and about twenty-five miles distant from the position of Colonel Maxwell at Caveripatam. When the advanced

guard arrived on the ground, they observed at the distance of six miles another camp gradually rising in the plain, and bodies of troops arriving to take up their ground. As no direct intelligence from Colonel Maxwell had been received for nearly three weeks, it was at once concluded that this must be his division, and three signal guns were fired to announce the happy meeting. In five

A.D. 1790.

Tippoo's
army mis-
taken for
Maxwell's
division.



CONJEVERAM, from the Royal Artillery Encampment. —From Hunter's Picturoque Scenery in Mysore.

minutes every tent was struck, and heavy columns were seen in full march westward. The mistake was now manifest; it was not Colonel Maxwell, but Tippoo. On the 17th of November, the junction with Colonel Maxwell was effected, and the united army encamped near Caveripatam, about twenty miles from the head, and twenty-six from the southern extremity of the pass of Tapoor. Tippoo, unwilling to be forced to ascend the Ghaut, had determined to double back through this very pass. On the 18th both armies were in motion, and, unconscious of each other's movements, were tending towards the same point. By proper management Tippoo might have been caught while completely entangled in the pass, but from some cause not explained, when the means were suggested to General Medows, he declined to act upon them, and allowed the enemy to escape with scarcely any loss. Tippoo, astonished at his good fortune, proceeded southward along the left bank of the Cauvery, and never halted till he made his appearance opposite to Trichinopoly. His demonstrations against it proved unavailing, but he was able, before the arrival of General Medows, who had been following on his track, to pillage and lay waste the island of Seringham.

The unsatisfactory results of the campaign of 1790 pointed out the necessity of some change in the mode of conducting it, and there is hence little difficulty in understanding why Lord Cornwallis should have resumed his intention of assuming the command. In a minute dated November 6th, 1790, he enters into a full explanation of his reasons, and says, "Under these circumstances it

Unsatisfac-
tory results
of campaign
of 1790.

A.D. 1791.

Lord Cornwallis resolves to command in person.

has appeared to me that, exclusive of every measure that may be adopted for promoting our own offensive operations against the Mysore country, it may be of great consequence to the public interest that some immediate steps should be taken, which may tend to animate and encourage our allies to persevere with firmness in the favourable disposition which they have lately shown to perform their engagements; and although I am not vain enough to suppose that the military operations would be conducted more ably or with more success by myself than by General Medows, yet from the station which I hold in this country, and from the friendly intercourse which I have hitherto had the good fortune to maintain both with the Nizam and the peishwa, I conceive it to be possible that my presence in the scene of action would be considered by our allies as a pledge of our sincerity, and of our confident hopes of success against the common enemy, and by that means operate as an encouragement to them to continue their exertions, and abide by their stipulations." While thus placing his assumption of the command chiefly on political grounds, he speaks out more plainly in a letter written on the 16th to his brother, the Bishop of Lichfield and Coventry. "Our war on the coast," he says, "has not succeeded hitherto so well as we had a right to expect. Our army, the finest and best appointed that ever took the field in India, is worn down with unprofitable fatigue, and much discontented with their leaders, and the conduct of both Medows and Musgrave (the previous commander) highly reprobated. In these circumstances I have no other part to take, but to go myself and take the command, and try whether I can do better; I shall therefore embark in little more than a fortnight for Madras, in the *Vestal* frigate, with the melancholy reflection that I had hoped about that time to have been bound for a happier port. I have in this war everything to lose, and nothing to gain. I shall derive no credit for beating Tippoo, and shall be for ever disgraced if he beats me."¹ Lord Cornwallis arrived at Madras on the 12th of December, 1790, with a considerable reinforcement. General Medows, with the greater part of the army, was still pursuing his march towards the encampment at Vellout, about eighteen miles west of Madras. The moment his arrival was announced, Lord Cornwallis set out, accompanied by his reinforcement, including a considerable number of horses and draught bullocks which he had caused to be transported from Bengal, and by a heavy military chest, and assumed the command on the 29th of January, 1791.

Proceedings of Tippoo.

Tippoo, on finding that nothing was to be effected at Trichinopoly, hastened northward into Coromandel, marking his progress as usual by plunder and conflagration, till he found that he could more effectually replenish his military chest by levying contributions. At Thiagur, where, from the number of inhabitants from the surrounding country who had crowded into it with their most valuable effects, he expected to find a rich booty, he met with a serious dis-

¹ *Correspondence of Marquis Cornwallis*, vol. ii. p. 52.

appointment, two successive attempts to carry the town, which was almost open, having been repulsed by the commandant Captain Flint, the gallant defender of Wandiwash. At Trinomalee, about thirty-five miles farther north, he was more successful, and treated the inhabitants, for having presumed to attempt defence, with horrible barbarity. From Trinomalee he turned south-east, and after taking Permacoil arrived in the vicinity of Pondicherry. Here he opened a communication with the governor, and by arrangement with him, despatched an envoy to the court of France to solicit the aid of 6000 French troops. Bertrand de Moleville, then minister of marine, would have granted it, but the king, the unfortunate Louis XVI., on whose head the storms of revolution were about to burst, peremptorily refused, exclaiming, "This resembles the affair of America, which I never think of without regret.

A.D. 1791.

Tippoo's embassy to the court of France.

Its failure.

My youth was taken advantage of at that time, and we suffer for it now; the lesson is too severe to be forgotten." The embassy thus proved a failure. In another quarter Tippoo's prospects were equally discouraging. He had left Hossein Ali in Malabar with a body of troops estimated at about 9000 men. The general disaffection of the natives made it dangerous to separate them, and though all the force which Colonel Hartley, the Company's officer, could muster to oppose him, consisted only of a regiment of Europeans, and two battalions of sepoys, Hossein Ali deemed it expedient to assume the defensive by taking up a strong position near Calicut. Notwithstanding his inferiority of numbers, Colonel Hartley did not hesitate to attack him on the 10th December,



NAIGUE OR CORPORAL OF THE BOMBAY GRENA-DIER BATTALION 1.—From Gold's *Oriental Drawings*, 1806.

1790, and gained a complete victory, losing only fifty-two men, while 1000 of the enemy were killed or wounded, and 900, including Hossein Ali himself, were taken prisoners. In the pursuit afterwards, 1500 more surrendered. Still greater successes followed. General (afterwards Sir Robert) Abercromby, then governor of Bombay, arrived at Tellicherry with a considerable force a few days after Colonel Hartley's victory, and followed up the recent success with so much spirit, as to capture every place in the possession of Tippoo and his dependants, and effect the entire conquest of the province of Malabar.

His losses in Malabar.

Lord Cornwallis commenced his march on the 5th of February, and on the 11th concentrated the army near Vellore. On hearing of this movement,


¹ Nalgue (corporal) of the Bombay grenadier battalion. Uniform: scarlet jacket and blue turban, with the addition of a gilt plate and feather on the

top, which gives the turban somewhat of a resemblance to a grenadier's cap.—Gold's *Oriental Drawings*, 1806.

A.D. 1781.

Lord Corn-
wallis opens
the cam-
paign.

Tippoo broke off the negotiations which he had protracted very uselessly and imprudently at Pondicherry, and hastened rapidly westward to defend the passes leading into Mysore. He expected that the ascent would be attempted by Amboor; and Lord Cornwallis, confirming him in this belief by sending a battalion, apparently his advanced guard, in that direction, suddenly made a dexterous movement with his army in two divisions to the north, and then turning west entered the easy pass of Mooglee, leading west from Chittoor to Moolwagle. By the 17th, before Tippoo could offer any effectual opposition, he had reached the summit and encamped on the table-land with a brigade. In four days more his battering-train and all his equipments, including sixty-seven elephants from Bengal and provisions for forty-five days, were within the encampment. Bangalore, the second town in Mysore, and the first object



NORTH FRONT OF TIPPOO SAHIB'S PALACE, BANGALORE.—From Hunter's Views in Mysore.

Disgraceful
depredations.

at which he was aiming, was only ninety miles distant. Though not a shot had been fired nor an enemy seen, the poor villagers had suffered all the horrors of war. Partly, perhaps, in retaliation of the devastations of the Mysorean army, not merely the camp-followers but the soldiers appear to have broken loose from all restraint, and pillaged and burned in every direction. The barbarity thus manifested at the very outset of the campaign required an immediate check, and Lord Cornwallis, besides executing nine of the ring-leaders, issued the following *general order*:—"Lord Cornwallis has too high an opinion of the zeal, honour, and public spirit of the officers of the army, to doubt for a moment, that every individual among them felt the same concern and indignation that he did himself, at the shocking and disgraceful outrages that were committed on the last march. His lordship now calls, in the most serious manner, for the active assistance of every officer in the army, and particularly those commanding flanking parties, advance and rear guards, to put a stop to these scenes of horror, which, if they should be suffered to continue, must defeat all our hopes of success, and blast the British name with infamy."

After the delay of a few days the army again moved, and took possession of Colar and Ooscotah, the garrisons of which, after threatening resistance, tamely surrendered. Bangalore was now only ten miles distant and no enemy had appeared. Where was Tippoo? The answer says little for his military tactics. He was looking after his harem, which had been lodged in Bangalore, and could not be left exposed to the impending danger. The removal might have been effected by an escort of 500 men, but Tippoo chose to superintend it personally at the head of his whole army, which was thus employed in empty ceremony when its utmost exertions in the field were demanded. On the 4th of March the cavalry appeared in some force, and ineffectually attempted to break through the columns in order to reach the baggage, increased beyond the ordinary amount by the immense mass of stores and grain provided for the siege. The following day the British army took up its ground before Bangalore with only five casualties, though not without a very daring attempt on the life of Lord Cornwallis himself. While, accompanied by General Medows and their respective staff, he was viewing Tippoo's movements from a gentle eminence, three Mysorean horsemen were seen approaching, but attracted little notice till they suddenly put their horses at full speed and made a dash at his person. Two of them were killed, and the third when seized seemed stupefied. The account afterwards given was, that the evening before, one of the horsemen having upbraided the other two with cowardice, they retorted that they would go next day where he durst not follow. They prepared themselves for the trial of courage by a dose of bang, and the above was the result. On the 6th a skirmish in which Colonel Floyd injudiciously engaged very nearly cost him his life, and occasioned a serious loss. While rashly following a body of horse, in the hope of intercepting large masses of baggage on elephants and camels, he fell as if shot by a cannon-ball, a musket-shot having entered his cheek and passed through both his jaws. Though at first left on the ground as dead, his orderly dragoons remounted him and carried him back to the camp. He ultimately recovered, but the rash attempt cost the lives of seventy-one men and the loss of 271 horses.

A. D. 1791.

Advance on
Bangalore.Narrow
escape of
Lord Corn-
wallis.

The fort of Bangalore, entirely rebuilt with strong masonry by Hyder and Tippoo, was nearly of an oval form, with round towers at intervals, and five powerful cavaliers. It was inclosed by a good ditch, and had a good covered way, but the glacis was imperfect. It was entered by two gates, the one called the Mysore and the other the Delhi gate. Opposite to the latter, which faced the north, lay the pettah or town, covering a large space, and surrounded by a rampart and ditch. The besiegers early gained possession of the town, but Tippoo, who had encamped at the distance of about six miles, was determined that they should not keep it, and made many determined efforts for its recovery. Ultimately he was driven out with a loss of upwards of 2000 men. The British loss was only 131, but among the killed was Colonel Moorhouse,

Description
of Ban-
galore.

A. D. 1791. an artillery officer of distinguished merit and the most amiable manners. Notwithstanding two wounds, he continued animating his men till struck dead by two musket-balls in the breast. Colonel Wilks thus describes him: "He had risen from the ranks, but nature herself had made him a gentleman; uneducated, he had made himself a man of science; a career of uninterrupted distinction had commanded general respect, and his amiable character universal

Siege of
Bangalore.



THE PETTAH OF BANGALORE—the Gate where Colonel Moorhouse fell.¹—From Home's *Select Views in Mysore*.

attachment; the regret of his general and the respect of his government were testified by a monument erected at the public expense in the church at Madras."

As the place was never invested, and the garrison consisting of 8000 men was regularly relieved by fresh troops, the siege was carried on under difficult and discouraging circumstances. Its commencement, too, was rather ominous, the engineers having stupidly erected their first battery without ascertaining the exact distance, and not discovered their mistake till they found the fire inefficient. Good progress, however, continued to be made. By the 20th of March an early assault was anticipated. Tippoo, on perceiving indications of this, on the morning of the 21st drew up his army on the heights to the south-west, to protect an advanced body with heavy guns, which they were about to place in an old embankment where they would have enfiladed, and might have destroyed the whole of the trenches and open sap, now advanced near to the crest of the glacis. These preparations seemed so alarming, that Lord Cornwallis resolved on assaulting that very night. According to ordinary practice, much still required to be accomplished, and success could scarcely be expected, unless the garrison could be taken in some measure by surprise. With this view Lord Cornwallis only communicated his intention confidentially to the

Counter-
movements
of Tippoo.

¹ "The first barrier was soon penetrated, and they rushed on to the second, but were opposed there by a well-directed and close fire of musketry from the walls, accompanied by showers of ground rockets,

which did considerable execution."—Home's *Select Views in Mysore*. It was at the second gate that Colonel Moorhouse was shot down while encouraging his men.

senior artillery officer, for the purpose of enabling him to take the necessary steps to perfect the breach, and concealed it from the rest of the army until the last moment. The assault was to be made at eleven o'clock at night in bright moonlight, at a breach to the left of the projecting works of the Delhi gate. The storming party on the appointed signal moved on in silence, and had nearly planted the ladders before the garrison took the alarm. Resistance, which had been protracted by the gallantry of the commandant, slackened the moment he fell, and at the end of an hour all opposition ceased. The secret of the assault had not been so well kept as to conceal it from Tippoo, who had not only warned the garrison, but appointed two heavy corps to fall upon both flanks of the assailants. This contingency had been foreseen and provided against, and they were repulsed with great slaughter by a reserve stationed for that special purpose. The capture was, in fact, effected in the presence of Tippoo's whole army, and the storming party barely amounted to one-fourth of the ordinary garrison. The advantages from success may be estimated from the disasters which must have attended a failure. Short as the duration of the siege had been, the forage and grain found in the pettah were all consumed; no supply could be obtained from the neighbouring villages, which had been completely destroyed, and the miserable resource of digging up the roots of grass had been used till not a fibre remained within the limits of the pickets. The draught and carriage cattle were daily dying by hundreds, and those intended for the shambles were so wasted and diseased as to be almost unfit for food. Every necessary, including ammunition, was at the lowest ebb, and a retreat after raising the siege must have been full of disaster. The knowledge of these circumstances was undoubtedly one main inducement to risk the assault, when the success of it was, to say the least, very problematical.

A D. 1791.

Bangalore
taken by
storm.

After repairing the breaches and making the place secure against a sudden onset, Lord Cornwallis set out on the 28th of March in a northern direction, taking the route to Deonhully. Tippoo had on the same day moved in the direction of Great Balipoor, and the two hostile armies were consequently pursuing routes which crossed diagonally. They were thus brought within sight of each other at the distance of only three miles, but Tippoo had no idea of risking an encounter, and was able by his superior equipments to escape with little loss, except of reputation, by allowing himself to be ignominiously chased. The main object of moving northward was to effect a junction with the corps of cavalry which Nizam Ali had agreed to furnish. This being accomplished on the 13th of April, the united force moved south-east to meet a convoy which was advancing by the passes near Amboor, under an escort of nearly 4000 men. On its arrival, the whole army returned to Bangalore. During this march, which occupied fifteen days, full means of estimating the value of the Nizam's cavalry was given. Nominally 15,000, they were actually 10,000 well mounted, and tolerably, though very dissimilarly armed, but totally

Tippoo re-
troats and
is pursued.

A.D. 1791.

Character of
the Nizam's
troops.

without order or discipline, scampering about in wild confusion, and utterly unfit to be employed in any combined movement. It was hoped, however, that they might relieve the regular cavalry by performing the duties of light troops. This hope soon proved fallacious. They were even unequal to the protection of their own foragers, and consumed far more forage and grain than they supplied. The only dexterity they displayed was in pillaging the villagers. At best the Nizam's troops were little better than a rabble, and the present sample was even worse than the average, owing to the total want of military talent in their commander Tejewunt Sing, a Hindoo, and to the venality, rapacity, and treachery of Assud Ali his second in command.

Lord Corn-
wallis re-
solves to
advance on
Seringa-
patam.

Lord Cornwallis was now anxious, for many reasons, to terminate the war with as little delay as possible. The French revolution had burst forth with unexampled fury, and all Europe was heaving with commotion. The drain of the war upon the Company's resources was enormous, and instead of an anticipated surplus from economical reforms, their debt was rapidly accumulating. Then what dependence could be placed on confederates who eyed each other with jealousy and suspicion, and were ready at any moment to change sides, on being convinced that their separate interests would thereby be promoted? Taking all these things into consideration, the only expedient course was to break off all delays, and at once push boldly on for Seringapatam. The great difficulty was, as in all former wars of the Company, to provide the means of transport, but extraordinary obstacles were overcome by equally extraordinary exertions, and the army, amply provided with everything except a sufficiency of draught and carriage cattle, commenced its march from Bangalore on the 3d of May. Tippoo on his part was not idle, but the measures which he adopted indicated only the terror and despair of a savage and brutal nature. Apparently under the impression that his capital was destined to fall, he began to remove every vestige of the evidence which would have revealed to the captors the full extent of his falsehood and cruelty. He had repeatedly affirmed on oath that all British prisoners had been released, and therefore, to avoid detection, all who still remained must be put out of the way. Among the victims were twenty English boys, the survivors of a much larger number, whom he had mutilated and brought up as singers and dancers. They were all handed over to Abyssinian slaves, and barbarously murdered, by the well understood practice of giving the head a sudden and violent twist so as to dislocate the vertebræ of the neck. Many of the prisoners of the preceding war were despatched by other modes of barbarity. In these horrible proceedings cruelty and fear went hand in hand, but other steps were taken, in which the latter passion alone was slavishly and even ludicrously manifested. The walls of the houses in the main streets had by his orders been covered with caricatures of the English. These are thus described by Colonel Wilks:—"In one it was a tiger seizing a trembling Englishman; in another it was a

Tippoo's
barbarity
to his pri-
soners.

horseman cutting off two English heads at a blow; in another it was the nabob Mahomed Ali, brought in with a rope round his waist, prostrating himself before an Englishman, seated on a chair, who placed one foot upon his neck; but the more favourite caricatures are necessarily excluded from decorous narrative." All these caricatures he caused to be obliterated by careful white-washing. Another step, which evinced as much fear but displayed more judgment, was the demolition of the bridge over the northern branch of the Cauvery.

A.D. 1791.

Tippoo's caricatures of the English.

While the British army was advancing on Seringapatam at a very slow pace, and suffering most severely from the nature of the ground, from storms of thunder and torrents of rain, and the increasing difficulty of transport at each successive march, Tippoo took up a strong position on the main road leading north-east through Cenapatam to Bangalore. Lord Cornwallis, aware how difficult it would be to force this position, or obtain any supplies in proceeding towards it, took the more circuitous road which passes through Cancauhully, and nearer to the Cauvery. During the first day's march after this route was chosen much benefit was experienced, but the very day after the work of desolation began, and almost every trace of human habitation disappeared, the whole of the inhabitants were carried off, and detachments, sent out on different occasions in search of information, failed to descry a single human being. It was the 13th of May before the army arrived at Arikera, situated on the Cauvery about nine miles east of the capital. The quantity of water in the river did not admit of crossing, and after an ineffectual attempt to break down a dam in the hope of lowering the water, the march was continued westward along the northern bank as far as Caniambaddy, which is as far above Seringapatam as Arikera is below it. The hope of finding a better ford was not the only reason for this movement. General Abercromby, after the subjugation of Malabar, had ascended through the friendly territory of the Rajah of Coorg, and was in possession of Periapatam, situated little more than thirty miles to the west.

Advance on Seringapatam.

This movement westward could not be made without passing immediately to the north of the island of Seringapatam, and Tippoo, though he had hitherto carefully avoided a general action, was determined not to allow so near an approach to his capital without disputing it. Accordingly, on proceeding to take up his encampment near Arikera, Lord Cornwallis perceived the enemy strongly posted about six miles in front, with their right on the river, and the left along a rugged and apparently inaccessible height. This position was strengthened by batteries above, and a swampy ravine below, while the British army in approaching was so hemmed in between the river and a ridge of hills, that the only space left them gradually diminished from a mile and a half to a mile. Lord Cornwallis having ascertained that it was possible by crossing the ridge to turn the enemy's left flank, and even get into his rear, determined

Preparations for a general engagement.

A.D. 1791.

Prepara-
tions for a
general en-
gagement.

on a night march for that purpose, and with the utmost secrecy ordered six regiments of European and twelve of native infantry to march at eleven o'clock. Nizam Ali's horse were to follow at daylight. The rest of the army remained to protect the camp. Unfortunately, before the appointed hour a dreadful storm of rain and thunder arose, and almost every corps became bewildered. Lord Cornwallis himself, having the best guides, had advanced four or five miles, accompanied by only one company and one gun, and the staff-officer who had been the first to make this discovery, on going back in search of the column narrowly escaped riding into the enemy's camp. As nothing could now be effected before dawn, the night attack had become impracticable, but Lord Cornwallis determined to force an action. Tippoo did not decline it, and displayed much skill in his arrangements, after being deprived of many of the advantages of his former position. In his rear was the hill of Carigat, abutting abruptly on the Cauvery, and crowned by a redoubt. This hill sent off two branches, one of them occupied by Tippoo's main force, and the other stretching two or three miles to his left in a strong rocky ridge. Opposite to the ridge, and separated from it by a ravine, was the hill on which the British army was posted.

Battle of
Carigat.

The battle commenced with a struggle for the possession of the rocky ridge. A considerable body of British cavalry and infantry, with eight guns, were marching rapidly to seize it, when a detachment sent by Tippoo anticipated it, and opened its first guns from the ridge, just as the British cleared the ravine. Fortunately the ground between the ravine and the ridge was so broken as to afford good cover and a support to subsequent formations. While Tippoo's detachment was occupied in seizing the ridge, his main body, which had changed front, was preparing to advance in line. To meet these movements, the British army was formed into two unequal fronts, united at right angles. While the front on the left was being formed, the enemy's select cavalry, which had been concealed by the ground, rushed out and made a spirited charge, many horsemen falling on the bayonets. When the formation was completed, the smaller of the two fronts, consisting of five battalions under Colonel Maxwell, attacked the position on the rocky ridge, and not only carried it, but overtook some guns on the opposite descent, and captured three of them. On this success, the remainder of the army advanced against the enemy's main body in two lines, and the action became general. The result seems never to have been doubtful. After the first onset, Tippoo, fearing the loss of his guns, began to draw them off, and leave the battle to be contested by the infantry. At this stage the Nizam's cavalry began to act, but only managed to throw themselves in an unwieldy mass in front of the left wing, where they could neither advance nor recede. The effect of this obstruction was to impede the advance of the British line, and thus prevent the inevitable capture or destruction of a large portion of the enemy's guns and infantry. There is reason to suspect, from proofs of

treachery afterwards discovered, that this obstruction was intentional, and not owing to mere awkwardness. After it was removed, the pursuit was continued till the works on the island of Seringapatam gave protection to the fugitives. The British loss was 500, that of the enemy above 2000. A.D. 1791.

Though this victory was most honourable to those who earned it, and but for the treachery or stupidity of the Nizam's cavalry, would have been decisive, Lord Cornwallis might have exclaimed, like Sir Eyre Coote on a similar occasion, "I would gladly exchange all these trophies, and the reputation of victory, for a few days' rice." The whole country was so effectually desolated that no supplies could be obtained, and so many of the draught cattle had perished, or become so enfeebled by want of food, that during the two subsequent marches, which brought the army to Caniambaddy, and were made almost under the eye of the enemy, the battering-train and nearly all the public carts of the army were dragged by the troops. The future thus presented a most gloomy prospect. Some dependence had been placed on General Abercromby; but, short as the distance was, it was so completely scoured by Tippoo's light troops, that communication with him was impossible. The decision could no longer be delayed, and Lord Cornwallis, now convinced that the original plan of the campaign must be abandoned, saw no alternative but to sacrifice his heavy guns and stores. On the 21st of May, he sent off a messenger with orders to General Abercromby to return to Malabar, and on the 22d the whole of the battering-train and the heavy equipments were destroyed. "The ground at Caniambaddy," says Major Dirom,¹ "where the army had encamped but six days, was covered, in a circuit of several miles, with the carcasses of cattle and horses; and the last of the gun-carriages, carts, and stores of the battering-train, left in flames, was a melancholy spectacle, which the troops passed as they quitted this deadly camp." General Abercromby duly received the orders sent him to return. They were entirely unexpected, and he immediately proceeded to execute them, though with extreme mortification. He had, with great difficulty, brought an army of about 8000 men, with a battering-train and a large supply of provisions and stores, over the rugged precipices and through the dense forests of the Ghauts. All this had proved labour in vain, and the soldiers, still suffering from disease and fatigue, were now to retrace their steps amid the storms and deluging rains of the monsoon. After leaving four eighteen-pounders imperfectly destroyed at Periapatam, and burying the rest of the battering-train at the summit of the pass, the Bombay army succeeded in reaching the coast, in a sickly state, with the loss of almost all the cattle. Want of supplies compels the British to retreat.

Serious losses.

On the 26th of May, the army, reduced to half rations, and pining away with disease, commenced its return to Bangalore, and had not completed its first short and tedious march of six miles, when a body of about 2000 horse made their appearance on the baggage flank. It was at once concluded to be

¹ *Narrative of the Campaign in India*, p. 3, 4.

A D. 1791

Seasonable
arrival of
the Mahrattas.

the enemy, and the necessary preparations were made to ward off an anticipated attack on the baggage and stores. One of the staff, while thus employed, was hailed by a horseman who announced himself as a Mahratta, and part of the advance of two Mahratta armies. It was really so. While Lord Cornwallis suspected that the Mahrattas had left him in the lurch, and had no idea that they were within 150 miles of him, the Poonah army, under Hurry Punt as commander-in-chief, and another more efficient army, under Purseram Bhow,



LAKE OF MOOTY TALLAW, near Bangalore.¹—From Colebrooke's *Twelve Views in Mysore*.

were on the eve of joining him. They had used all the customary means of sending him intelligence of every successive step in their approach, but so completely had Tippoo cut off all means of communication, that not a single messenger had arrived. The junction, even now, was a most fortunate event, but would have been far more fortunate had it happened a few days sooner. In that case the destruction of the battering-train and the other disastrous measures recently adopted would have been unnecessary, and the plan of campaign originally contemplated might have been carried out. All the wants of the British army could now be supplied, though at exorbitant prices, at the bazaar of the Mahratta camp. The description of this bazaar by Colonel Wilks is so curious as to deserve quotation:—

“The bazaar of a Mahratta camp presented an exhibition of no ordinary character; and to these famished visitors exhibited a picture of the spoils of the East and the industry of the West. From a web of English broadcloth to a Birmingham penknife—from the shawls of Cashmere to the second-hand

¹ This lake has been artificially formed by closing up an opening in a semicircular ridge of hills; the embankment which shuts in its waters is above sixty feet high. On the side towards the lake it is faced with regular stone steps, for the convenience of bathing and performing religious ablutions; these are continued to the bottom of the water, which is very

deep and remarkably clear. This place is ten miles north by west of the city of Seringapatam. A junction was formed here between the army under the command of Earl Cornwallis and the Mahratta forces under Purseram Bhow and Hurry Punt, on the 28th May, 1791.—Colebrooke's *Twelve Views in Mysore*, 1805.

garment of a Hindoo—from diamonds of the first water to the silver ear-ring of a poor plundered village maiden—from oxen, sheep, and poultry, to the dried salt fish of Concan—almost everything was seen that could be presented by the best bazaars of the richest towns; but above all, the tables of the money-changers, overspread with the coins of every country of the East, in the open air and public street of the camp, gave evidence of an extent of mercantile activity, utterly inconceivable in any camp, except that of systematic plunderers by wholesale and retail. Every variety of trade appeared to be exercised with a large competition and considerable diligence, and among them, one apparently the least adapted to a wandering life—the *trade of tanner*—was practised with eminent success. A circular hole dug in the earth, a raw hide adapted to it at the bottom and sides, and secured above with a series of skewers run through its edges into the earth, formed the tan-pit; on marching days, the tan-pit with its contents, in the shape of a bag, formed one side of a load for a horse or bullock, and the liquid preparation was either emptied or preserved, according to the length or expected repetition of the march: the best tanning material (catechu) is equally accessible and portable, and the English officers obtained from these ambulatory tan-pits what their own Indian capitals could not then produce, except as European imports—excellent sword-belts.”¹

A.D. 1791.

Description of a Mahratta camp-bazaar.

After the junction of the Mahrattas, the united armies proceeded slowly towards Bangalore. During the march, the intermediate plan of operation was arranged. The first preliminary was a loan of £144,000. This Lord Cornwallis was enabled to make on the part of the Company, by stopping, in its transit, the money intended for the China investment. Purseram Blow, with his own army and a detachment of Bombay troops, was to proceed by Sera, for the purpose of operating in the north-west. The Nizam's cavalry, long regarded only as an encumbrance, were to join the other forces of their own state, and operate with them in the north-east. Hurry Punt, Tejewunt, and Meer Alum were to remain with Lord Cornwallis, the first as representative of the Mahrattas, and the two last as respectively military and political representatives of the Nizam. Each of the representatives was attended by a select body of cavalry, designed to assist in the general operations of the British army.

Arrangements with the Mahrattas and the Nizam.

Various causes had produced the delay which had left Lord Cornwallis to contend with Tippoo single-handed, notwithstanding the promised aid of his allies. The army of Nizam Ali began to assemble in the vicinity of Hyderabad, as early as May, 1790, and was joined by the Company's stipulated detachment of two battalions of sepoys under Major Montgomery, and a company of sepoys. The cavalry were little if at all better than those which, under Aasud Ali, had encumbered Lord Cornwallis, but the infantry, commanded by M. Raymond, a Frenchman, were as good as he could be expected to make troops imperfectly armed and not under strict discipline. The whole army moved southward, and

Previous operations of the confederates.

¹ Wilk's *Historical Sketches*, vol. iii. p. 158, 159.

A.D. 1791.

Operations
of the allied
armies.Capture of
Darwar.

after long delays reached Rachore. Here they remained till they heard of Tippoo's descent to Coimbatore, in September, and then, having no fear of interruption, continued their march, and sat down on the 28th of October before Capool, situated about 100 miles to the south-west. The British artillery and M. Raymond's infantry did their part, but the obstinate ignorance of Nizam Ali's general protracted the siege, which was only terminated by capitulation on the 18th of April, 1791. Other minor places fell, and at last the only one of importance remaining in the enemy's possession was Goorumconda, about eighty miles north-east of Bangalore. The Mahrattas ostensibly took the field about the same time as the Nizam, and the army under Purseram Bhow was joined at Coompta by Captain Little, who, embarking at Bombay with two battalions of sepoy, one company of European and two of native artillery, landed at the mouth of the Jygurh, and ascended the Ghauts by the pass of Amba. Purseram Bhow's army, estimated at 20,000 horse and 10,000 infantry, did not march from Coompta till the 3d of August. The first object was to recover the provinces which Hyder had wrested from the Mahrattas during the civil war caused by Ragobah. Darwar, considered as the capital, had been made as strong as native art could make it, and was garrisoned by a force of about 10,000 men. Purseram Bhow arrived before it on the 18th of September. The siege made little progress, partly because the Mahrattas were not provided with the necessary battering-train, and when Captain Little reported this deficiency to the Bombay government, a considerable reinforcement was sent, but unfortunately not accompanied with what was most wanted—cannon and stores. The place was defended till the 4th of April, 1791, and then only surrendered on honourable terms, after the British had lost 500 and the Mahrattas about 3000 men. After this capture, every place north of the Toombudra easily yielded, and Purseram Bhow, crossing the river at Hurryhur, proceeded southward through Myconda, while Hurry Punt followed the parallel but more eastern route by Harponelly and Sera. In this way the junction with Lord Cornwallis had been effected.

Tippoo
professes a
desire to
negotiate.

During the previous operations, Tippoo had repeatedly professed a desire to negotiate. As early as the 13th of February, 1791, he sent a letter, which, as it was not received at Muglee on the 18th, was probably antedated two days. It proposed either to receive or send an ambassador for the adjustment of differences. Lord Cornwallis replied, that if Tippoo, who had violated the treaty, was willing to make reparation, a statement to that effect in writing must precede the appointment of ambassadors. Another similar overture made on the 27th of March received a similar answer. On the 17th of May, two days after Tippoo's defeat, he took advantage of an offer to release the wounded prisoners, to renew his proposal of negotiation. Lord Cornwallis being now attended by plenipotentiaries from the Mahrattas and the Nizam, and having also a foresight of the difficulties about to beset him, was rather

more conciliatory than before, and not only answered that, if Tippoo would submit his propositions in writing, commissioners might be appointed, but even intimated his consent, should Tippoo desire it, to a cessation of hostilities. In proportion as the allies seemed disposed to yield, Tippoo became more exacting, and ultimately, after Lord Cornwallis had even conceded the point of written propositions, and proposed a conference of deputies at Bangalore, declined the terms, unless his lordship would first remove his army to the frontier. Tippoo had meanwhile been trying the effect of similar overtures with the other confederates, and there can be little doubt that his real object was to stir up the jealousy of each, and thereby break up the confederacy.

A. D. 1791.

Insincerity
of Tippoo.

In the beginning of July, 1791, Lord Cornwallis moved from Bangalore in a south-east direction by Oosoor, which he found to be evacuated, and thence to the passes of Palicode and Rayacota. His object was to reduce the hill-forts commanding these passes above and below, and thus at once keep open his



NUNDIDROOG DURING THE SIEGE, 1791.—From the M'Kenzie Drawings, East India House.

communications with the Carnatic, and protect it from the inroads of the enemy's cavalry. By the end of the month, most of the forts had yielded; and he was making arrangements for the blockade of Kistnagherry, when he was suddenly recalled to the assistance of Purseram Bhow, who, by dispersing his forces too widely, had sustained a serious check. It was September before his lordship could resume his own objects. A number of places to the north-east of Bangalore still remained in possession of the enemy, and not only disturbed the communication with the Carnatic, but prevented the advance of the Nizam's army, still detained before Goorumconda. Major Gowdie, detached with a brigade and some battering cannon, found little difficulty in reducing all of them except Nundidroog, which, crowning a granite rock of tremendous height, had been so much strengthened with artificial works by Tippoo that he deemed it impregnable. The command of it had been intrusted to Lutf Ali Beg, an officer of tried merit and fidelity. Major Gowdie,

Subsequent
movements
of the con-
federates.

A. D. 1791. after forcing the pettah, sat down before the fort on the 27th of September. There was no choice of attack, as it was accessible only on the west. Notwithstanding the extreme difficulty of working up the face of a steep and rugged height, erecting batteries at breaching distance, and dragging up cannon to mount them, two breaches were effected in twenty-one days. When the assault was about to be made, Lord Cornwallis moved the army to the immediate vicinity, and sent in some additional companies to lead the assault. It was made on the 19th of October, with so much spirit and success, that though nothing more than a lodgment for further operations against the interior works was anticipated, the assailants followed the retiring defenders to the inner gate, and by forcing it before it could be completely barricaded, made a complete capture. An attempt made on Kistnagherry on the 7th of November, by a detachment under Colonel Maxwell, was less fortunate. After carrying the lower fort by escalade, the assailants attempted to gain the upper fort by entering it along with the fugitives. They were so near succeeding that they captured a standard on the gateway, but enormous masses of granite, thrown down by a garrison which far outnumbered them, obliged them to retire with considerable loss.

Capture of
Nandi-
droog.

Siege of
Savandroog.

After the return of Colonel Maxwell, Lord Cornwallis having secured access for supplies from Coromandel, turned his attention to several places of strength which the enemy still possessed, between Bangalore and Seringapatam, and without the reduction of which the siege of the latter could not be safely commenced. By far the most formidable of these places was Savandroog, situated about twenty-two miles W.S.W. of Bangalore, and fifty miles north-east of the capital. An enormous mass of granite covering a base of eight miles in circuit, rises in rugged precipices to the height of about 2500 feet. In its lower part, wherever deemed accessible, it was inclosed by walls and traversed by cross walls and barriers; towards its summit a deep chasm divided it into two peaks, each of which was crowned with strong works, and capable of separate defence. The reduction of this place seemed to the natives an utter impossibility. Besides the strength of its position and its works, it had another powerful defence in its deadly climate, and hence Tippoo, on hearing of the resolution to besiege it, is said "to have congratulated his army on the infatuation of the English, in having engaged in an enterprise that must terminate in their disgrace, as half the Europeans would die of sickness, and the other half be killed in the attack."¹


This important enterprise was intrusted to Colonel Stuart, who commanded the right wing of the army. The force employed consisted of the 52d and 72d regiments under Colonel Nesbitt, three battalions of sepoy, and a park of artillery, consisting of four eighteen-pounders, four twelve-pounders, and two howitzers, under Major Montague. On the 10th of December, Colonel Stuart pitched his camp within three miles of the north side of the rock, and Lord

¹ Dirom's *Narrative of the Campaign*, p. 69.

Cornwallis took up a position with the main body of the army, about five miles in his rear. The first operation of the siege was to cut a gun road from the camp, through a forest of bamboos, and transport the artillery by dragging it over rugged ground to the foot of the mountain. This was a work of incredible labour, as the guns, in order to be brought to the places marked out for batteries, required to be drawn or rather lifted over rocks of considerable height

A.D. 1791.

Siege of Savandroog.

PAGODAS AT MAUGREE.¹ From Colebrooke's Twelve Views in Mysore.

and almost perpendicular. Fortunately the garrison, over-confident in the strength of the place, scarcely interfered with these preliminary operations. On the 17th two batteries opened, one at 1000 and another at 700 yards. Owing to the distance and the thickness of the walls, the effect was less than expected, and on the 19th a third battery was opened, at only 250 yards. By it in the course of two days a practicable breach was effected, and the morning of the 21st was fixed for the assault. The storming party, commanded by Colonel Nesbitt, attacked at four different points—one party gaining the eastern hill on the left, another scouring the works of the western hill on the right, a third attacking the works or parties that might be discovered in the chasm between the hills, and the fourth making a feint by proceeding round the mountain, for the purpose of drawing off the attention of the garrison, and at the same time preventing their escape. A strenuous resistance was anticipated, as a large body of the enemy had been seen descending the hill to defend the breach, but the moment the storming party advanced, they were seized with an unaccountable panic and fled. The eastern hill above the breach was in consequence carried without an effort. In fleeing from the breach the main body of the garrison endeavoured to gain the western hill, but from the narrowness of the

It is taken by storm.

¹ At Maugree, on the 28th June, 1791, Earl Cornwallis pitched his camp whilst he reconnoitred the fortress of Savandroog; and on the 28th January,

1792, he was joined in this neighbourhood by the forces of the soubah or Nizam.—Home's *Select Views in Mysore*.

A D. 1791.

Tedious
siege of
Goorum-
conda by
the Nizam.

paths so impeded and confined each other that the assailants overtook them, entered the different barriers along with them, and completed the capture. Thus, as much by the pusillanimity of the garrison as by the skill and gallantry of the besiegers, a place deemed so impregnable that the very idea of attacking it was derided, fell in a single hour without costing the captors a single man. Ootradroog and Holioordroog, the only intermediate forts of any consequence still remaining, were taken with almost equal facility, and nothing now delayed the commencement of the siege of Seringapatam, but the detention of Nizam Ali's army before Goorumconda. The siege of this place had commenced early in September, but little progress had been made till the breaching artillery which was at Nundidroog arrived. Even then the detention of the army threatened to be indefinitely protracted, had not Captain Andrew Read, who commanded the British detachment, undertaken, on being allowed to manage in his own way, to capture the lower fort, by which alone access to the upper fort could be obtained. He succeeded, and by thus hemming in the garrison enabled the besiegers to convert the siege into a blockade. A strong detachment sufficing for this purpose, the main body of the Nizam's army was left free to join Lord Cornwallis. It accordingly set out for this purpose, but had not advanced far when intelligence arrived that the lower fort had been retaken by the enemy, in consequence of the rashness of Hafiz Jee, the officer left in com-



SAVANDROOG, East Side.—From the M'Kenzie Drawings, East India House.

mand, who had sallied out and been suddenly overwhelmed by an army of 12,000 horse and foot, led by Hyder Sahib, Tippoo's eldest son. On this disastrous news, the Nizam's army retraced their steps and were again detained till, by a second capture of the lower fort, the blockade was re-established.

The rains having ceased, and the men and horses recovered rapidly under the full supplies of grain and corn, which the Brinjarries were induced by liberal

treatment to bring into the camp, the three armies of the confederates united on the 25th of January, 1792, near Savandroog, and commenced their advance on the capital. Meanwhile, a fourth army was preparing to join from an opposite quarter. General Abercromby, whose duties as governor had required his presence at Bombay, returned to Tellicherry in the beginning of November, and having on the 23d assembled his army, consisting of 8400 men, at Cananore, proceeded five miles northward to Iliacore. The stream on which this place stands being swollen with rain, was crossed in boats, and a march of twenty-six miles was continued through a very rugged country, to the western head of the pass of Poodicherrim, on the frontiers of the Rajah of Coorg, on whose friendly aid the utmost dependence could be placed. The ground of this confidence must now be explained.

A. D. 1792.

New advances on Seringapatam.

In the time of Hyder, Coorg, which forms a mountainous tract, stretching along the very summit of the Western Ghauts, from the Tambercherry Pass, opposite to Calicut, in the south, to the confines of Bednore on the north, had been subjugated by treachery, and then treated with the utmost barbarity. The inhabitants were hunted down as if they had been wild beasts, and every effort which they made to throw off the yoke had only rivetted it more firmly. The reigning rajah with his family was carried off to the fort of Cuddoor, and died there in close confinement. His eldest son, the present rajah, had been subjected to the grossest indignity, and forced by the initiatory rite into an outward profession of Islamism. As he grew up he burned to avenge the wrongs of his countrymen. In 1783, when he was only fifteen years of age, he was removed by Tippoo with the other members of the family to Periapatam. This place, before Mercara supplanted it, was considered as the capital of Coorg, and containing many persons who were still strongly attached to the native dynasty, was the very last which Tippoo ought to have selected, if the security of the prisoners was his object. Fortunately this fact had escaped his notice, and the rajah was able to effect his escape in 1788. For some time he could only carry on a kind of guerilla warfare. In this he displayed remarkable ability, and while heard of everywhere was seen nowhere. Success rapidly increased the number of his adherents, and he began to show himself openly at the head of nearly 4000 faithful warriors. Post after post fell into his hands, and ultimately Mercara was the only place within the territory which Tippoo could call his own.

Relations with Coorg.

Excellent character of its rajah.

The rajah had for some time maintained the struggle single-handed, when a confidential servant, sent to make some purchases at Tellicherry, entered into communication with the Company's chief factor there. As the war with Tippoo had then commenced, the value of an ally whose frontier lay within forty miles of his capital was easily perceived, and the Bombay government gladly entered into a treaty for mutual co-operation and the invasion of Mysore. Contrary to the usual practice of native princes, the Rajah of Coorg not only faithfully

A. D. 1792. performed his engagements, but even went beyond them. The only case in which his conduct excited some degree of suspicion is deserving of notice. When General Abercromby, availing himself of the treaty, was preparing for the first time to pass through Coorg on his march to Periapatam, the rajah was engaged in the blockade of Mercara, which had been so long continued that the garrison was starving, and an early surrender seemed inevitable. It was known indeed that a large convoy for its relief was approaching, but the escort which accompanied it had been surrounded and could not possibly escape. How great, then, was the surprise of General Abercromby when the rajah himself arrived in his camp, and announced to him that he had allowed the convoy to enter and the escort to escape! His explanation was, that Kadir Khan, who commanded the escort, had laid him under obligations which made it impossible to treat him as an enemy. While the rajah was imprisoned at Periapatam, he had shown him great kindness, and not only so, but when two of the rajah's sisters were carried off to Tippoo's harem, he had been the means of saving the honour of a third sister, and of returning him to her unharmed. In return for these services, the rajah, after the convoy and escort were entirely in his power, caused information to be conveyed to Kadir Khan that he was desirous to save him. A conference thereupon took place, and on Kadir Khan representing that his acceptance of individual safety would be the ruin of his family, and his return with the service unexecuted would be fatal to himself, the rajah, with a generosity and gratitude to which it would be difficult to find a parallel, spared both the convoy and the escort. He was not ultimately a loser, as the garrison ere long consumed the provisions brought by the convoy, and being again reduced to extremity were glad to capitulate. With the aid of such an ally, General Abercromby had little difficulty in again reaching Periapatam.


Fidelity,
generosity,
and grati-
tude of the
Rajah of
Coorg.

Outer de-
fences of
Seringa-
patam.

The confederates, in advancing upon Seringapatam, passed through a country where every human dwelling was consumed or in flames, and on the 5th of February, 1792, after passing over a high ground which gave a full view of the city, and of Tippoo's army under its walls, encamped six miles to the northward. A bound hedge, formed by a wide belt of thorny plants, commenced on the north bank of the Cauvery, about a thousand yards above the island of Seringapatam, and after continuing due north for nearly two miles, swept round and pursued a south-easterly direction till it again met the river toward the eastern extremity of the island, and nearly opposite to the Carigat Hill. Within this inclosure, at its north-west extremity, was an eminence with a well-constructed redoubt, and at different parts also within the inclosure were seven other formidable redoubts, constructed so as to lend support to each other. A work commenced on the Carigat Hill was unfinished. The bound hedge thus formed the outer limit of a fortified camp, in which Tippoo's whole army now lay. Lord Cornwallis, who had feared that Tippoo would keep the field and operate on the communications of the besiegers, hoped to be able to

strike a decisive blow, and with that view determined on an immediate attack. Orders were accordingly issued at sunset, and the army prepared to move in three columns at eight o'clock with a clear moonlight. The right column, under General Medows, composed of 3300 men, was to leave the redoubt on the eminence at the north-west extremity untouched, and to enter the inclosure about 1500 yards to east of it, then turn to the left and attack everything in its

A.D. 1792.

A night
attack by
Lord Corn-
wallis.

NORTH-EAST VIEW OF SERINGAPATAM.—From Dirom's Narrative of the Campaign in India.

way till it met the centre column. This column, consisting of 3700 men, under the immediate direction of Lord Cornwallis himself, was subdivided into three parts. One of these, under Colonel Knox, was to lead, and endeavour, by mixing with the fugitives, to pass over into the island; the second, under Colonel Stuart, after penetrating deep into the camp, was to turn to the left, attack the enemy's right wing, and thereafter endeavour to force a passage into the island; the third, left as a reserve under Lord Cornwallis, was to wait for the junction of the column under General Medows. The third or left column, consisting of 1700 men under Colonel Maxwell, was first to attack the unfinished work on Carigat Hill, then descend, penetrate the inclosure, and unite with Colonel Stuart in forcing an entrance into the island.

Owing to some ambiguity in the order, the officer guiding the right column led it directly against the north-west redoubt, instead of avoiding it as had been intended. It was not carried till after a long and desperate struggle, in which the British lost ninety-one men, eleven of them officers, and the enemy 400. After this achievement, the right column, having secured its capture by a strong garrison, wheeled to the left, but on coming to another redoubt of great strength and magnitude, hesitated whether to attack it or to join the centre column, which it was conjectured might require to be strongly reinforced. The latter was the course adopted, and the consequence was, that the column, instead of advancing,

its results.

A.D. 1792.

Results of
night at-
tack by
Lord Corn-
wallis.

countermarched, recrossed the bound hedge, and did not find the centre column till the business of the night was over. The head of the centre column, under Colonel Knox, penetrated by the bayonet alone, but a battalion belonging to his corps was just entering the camp, when a galling fire on its flanks produced some degree of agitation, which ended in confusion. Colonel Stuart, who was immediately behind with the centre division of this column, rode up, but finding that much time would be lost in attempting to rally the men, ordered the 71st, which was the next corps of his own division, to advance. Meanwhile, Colonel Knox, in order to mix more effectually with the fugitives, had pushed on through a crowded mass of them by the main ford, close under the guns of the fort, and by the aid of a guide, penetrated with three companies to the pettah of Shaher Ganjaum, situated near the middle of the eastern part of the island. The other seven companies of the regiment, and three companies of sepoys following in compact order, missed the ford, but crossing a little below, gained possession of the palace of Deria Dowlat Baug. Captain Hunter, the officer in command, thinking his the first party that had crossed, took post to wait for further orders or intelligence, but as none arrived, and he perceived, as the day dawned, that his position immediately under the fire of the fort was not tenable, he recrossed the river and joined the reserve under Lord Cornwallis. Colonel Stuart, with the centre division of the centre column, had penetrated far into the camp, when he came upon a strong work called the Sultan's Redoubt. He immediately stormed it with far more ease than had been anticipated, and then leaving a party to defend it, turned to attack the enemy's right wing. After driving a large body of infantry before him, and thinking that they had crossed into the island, he was surprised to observe a line of troops drawn up with perfect regularity, as if to oppose him. He had just ordered a volley and a charge with the bayonet, when the opposing troops were discovered to be Colonel Maxwell's column. The mistake had been mutual, and might have been attended with serious consequences. Colonel Maxwell, after storming the work on Carigat Hill, had suffered severely in descending from it, from a body of the enemy who had availed themselves of the cover of a water-course at its foot. Ultimately, however, it had surmounted this and every other obstacle, and broken the enemy's right wing.


Other
operations.

Shortly after the junction of the two columns, a heavy fire was opened upon them from works on the island. After an ineffectual attempt to force them where the river was not fordable, Colonel Baird discovered a practicable ford, and effected a lodgment with a small party on the opposite bank. The head of the column following up this success was scarcely half-way across the stream, when the enemy's fire suddenly ceased. Colonel Knox, with his three companies, penetrating the cause of the heavy fire, had descended from Ganjaum, and taken the batteries in reverse. Lord Cornwallis, who had passed the bound hedge with the centre column, took post with the reserve within it, with the Sultan's

redoubt on his left. He had not as yet taken any active part in the battle, but he was destined to have his full share before it terminated. The unaccountable absence of General Medows had left him without the support on which he had calculated. The enemy, still unbroken on the left, and reinforced by the troops which had been obliged to retire from the centre, having become aware of his

A.D. 1792.

Lord Cornwallis wounded while heading a charge.



1. Bangalore gate.
2. Mysore gate.
3. Old bridge.
4. New bridge.
5. Place for breaching batteries.

6. Place intended for the enfilading battery.
7. Battery to defend the bridge.
8. Montresor's redoubt.
9. Hyder Ali's tomb.

comparatively defenceless state, rushed upon him with overwhelming numbers. A charge with bayonet led by himself with the utmost coolness, and executed with the greatest gallantry, drove back the assailants, but they repeatedly rallied, and did not finally desist till near daylight. During this struggle, his lordship was wounded in the hand, and the number of casualties was considerable. General Medows and his division were at last found at Carigat Hill, to which his lordship had repaired, in order to take up a position where his small corps could not be surrounded.

The attack took Tippoo by surprise. His tent was pitched as usual in the rear of the centre of the position, close to the road by which the head of the central column penetrated, and he had just left, after making his evening meal in the Sultan's redoubt. On the first alarm he mounted, and was first made aware by a mass of fugitives that his centre was penetrated, and that a column advancing to the main ford was about to cut off his retreat. He waited not a

Important results of the action.

A.D. 1792.

Disastrous
predica-
ment of
Tippoo.

moment longer, and was barely in time to pass the ford before the head of the column reached it. Having entered the fort, he repaired to a detached lozenge work at its north-east angle, and there sat until daylight issuing his orders. On counting his loss in the morning, it was ascertained that the killed, wounded, and missing amounted to 23,000. The missing, however, was by far the largest of these items, for no fewer than 10,000 Chelas (native Hindoos carried off and forced to become soldier slaves), taking advantage of the confusion, marched off with their arms to the forests of Coorg. As yet the only positions gained by the British were the unfinished work on Carigat Hill, the redoubt in the north-west corner of the bound hedge, the Sultan's redoubt, and the post held by Colonel Stuart near the east extremity of the island. Tippoo made several determined efforts to recover the two last positions, but was so signally repulsed that, as if in despair, he abandoned all the other redoubts within the inclosure, and thus allowed the preparatory operations for the siege to be immediately commenced.

His alarm.

On the 12th of January, 1792, Tippoo had again attempted to negotiate, but had only received for answer, that negotiation was useless with one who disregarded treaties and violated articles of capitulation. "Send hither the garrison of Coimbatore," said Lord Cornwallis, "and then we will listen to what you have to say." His lordship alluded to the capture of Coimbatore by Kummer-u-Deen. After a protracted defence, conducted by Lieutenant Chalmers with a mere handful of men under the most unfavourable circumstances, a capitulation was agreed to. One of the express conditions was, that the garrison should march to Palghaut. This condition, after the performance of it had been delayed under the pretext that the Sultan's ratification was necessary, was grossly violated, and the whole garrison were marched off as prisoners to Seringapatam. Lord Cornwallis by his answer had convinced Tippoo that his own faithlessness had made future negotiation impossible, and now therefore, when he could not but tremble for the fate of his capital, and see that without negotiation his doom was sealed, he took a step which at least showed the extent of his despair. Sending for Lieutenants Chalmers and Nash on the 8th of February, the day after all his efforts to drive the British from their positions had proved unavailing, he announced their release. He had supposed that the former, from having had the command at Coimbatore, was either a relative of Lord Cornwallis, or an officer of high rank. On being told the contrary, he asked him if he should not see his lordship on his return to the camp. To this question, Lieutenant Chalmers was able to answer in the affirmative, and Tippoo put into his hand a letter, telling him that it was on the subject of peace, and even begging him to assist in obtaining it. The letter attempted to justify the treatment of the garrison, by asserting, contrary to fact, that Kummer-u-Deen had not engaged to liberate them, but only promised to recommend their liberation. Lord Cornwallis, while he denied the truth of this statement, and upbraided Tippoo with the notorious

fact that the garrison were kept in irons, agreed, with the concurrence of the representatives of the Nizam and the Mahrattas, to receive the envoy. One cannot help wishing that, before this concession was made, the liberation not only of the garrison but of all the other prisoners unlawfully detained, had been insisted on as an essential preliminary. By the treaty of Mangalore, every European prisoner then in Mysore ought to have been delivered up, and yet it was perfectly well known that numbers of prisoners whose release was thus stipulated for were pining in its dungeons. Some indeed had been freed from misery by the atrocious assassinations already described, but others, including several whom Suffrein, the French admiral, had infamously consigned to the tender mercies of Hyder, were still alive. The fact was indisputable, for not only had some who had recently escaped from Chitteldroog revealed the horrors of the prison-house in which their companions were still detained, but in Shaher Ganjaum, on its capture only two days before, besides a considerable proportion of the garrison of Coimbatore, twenty-seven European captives, some of them Suffrein's victims, had been discovered and set at liberty. Antecedent therefore to the least concession to such a faithless barbarian as Tippoo, he ought to have been made to understand that nothing but the instant release of every prisoner unlawfully detained could avert or delay the ruin evidently impending over him.

A.D. 1792.

Tippoo's
barbarous
treatment
of his
prisoners.

Only a few hours before releasing Lieutenant Chalmers, Tippoo had entered upon a scheme which seemed to promise a termination of the war by a speedier process than negotiation. The head-quarters of Lord Cornwallis, known by its distinguishing flag, was placed a little to the left in the rear of Carigat Hill. The situation being somewhat exposed, it seemed possible to make a dash at it and slay his lordship. This project, which, from the circumstances in which it was undertaken, can only be considered as a meditated assassination, was to be carried out by the corps known as the stable horse or guards. On the morning of the 8th of February, the very day, it will be observed, on which Lieutenant Chalmers, doubtless to lull suspicion, was sent with his letter, Tippoo called the principal officers of the corps into his presence, and harangued them on the importance of the enterprise, and the glory they would acquire by terminating the war at a single stroke. All they had to do was to rid him of one individual. The officers pledged themselves not to return till they had done the deed, and retired after receiving the betel from Tippoo's own hand. Setting out with their detachment, they proceeded down the river and crossed at Arikera; on the 9th they waited to receive further reports from their spies; at dawn of the 10th, their selected advanced guard penetrated between the camp of the Nizam and the British, but attracted no notice, as they were supposed to be Nizam's troops. After lounging on, they approached the park of artillery, and inquired with seeming indifference at some gun-lascars for the tent of the *burra saheb*, or commander. Supposing Colonel Duff the commandant of artillery to be

Attempt on
life of Lord
Cornwallis.

A. D. 1792.

Attempt on
life of Lord
Cornwallis.

meant, the lascars pointed to his tent, and in an instant the horsemen with drawn swords were rushing at it in full gallop. The atrocity was so stupidly managed, that even before they reached the tent supposed to be that of the commander-in-chief, they were fired upon by a small body of sepoys, and obliged to save themselves by flight. Taking this attempt in connection with the one made during the previous campaign at Bangalore, Lord Cornwallis, who had hitherto used only two sentries, native troopers from his body guard, was prevailed on to allow a captain's guard to mount every night over his tent.

Prepara-
tions for
the siege
of Seringa-
patam.


While consenting to the proposed negotiation, it was determined to prosecute the siege, and with this view, General Abercromby, again at Periapatam with an effective force of 6000 men, was ordered to advance. He accordingly, on the 11th of February, crossed the Cauvery at Eratora, about thirty miles above Seringapatam, was met by Colonel Floyd with the cavalry on the 14th, at Caniambaddy, and joined the camp on the 16th. Meanwhile, materials for the siege, obtained chiefly by the destruction of the large and beautiful garden of Lall Baug at the eastern extremity of the island, were industriously provided. The point selected for the principal attack was the northern face near the western angle, a little above which General Abercromby crossed on the 19th, for the purpose of establishing the requisite enfilade. A vigorous attempt to impede his further progress failed, and the siege continued to advance. It is needless, however, to enter into details, as Tippoo's speedy acceptance of the terms offered him put an end to hostilities. His vakeels or deputies, Gholam Ali and Ali Reza, arrived in the British camp on the 14th of February, and were met by Sir John Kennaway on the part of the British, Meer Alum on the part of the Nizam, and an individual well acquainted with matters of revenue deputed by Hurry Punt on the part of the Mahrattas. There cannot be a doubt that Seringapatam was now at the mercy of the confederates, and that therefore the ultimatum which they offered on the 22d was not so rigorous as the circumstances would have justified. It consisted of the following five articles:—
 "I. One half of the dominions of which Tippoo Sultan was in possession before the war to be ceded to the allies from the countries adjacent according to their situation. II. Three crores and thirty lacs of rupees (£3,300,000) to be paid by Tippoo Sultan, either in gold mohurs, pagodas, or bullion—1st. One crore and sixty-five lacs to be paid immediately. 2d. One crore and sixty-five lacs to be paid in three payments, not exceeding four months each. III. All prisoners of the four powers from the time of Hyder Ali to be unequivocally restored. IV. Two of Tippoo Sultan's three eldest sons to be given as hostages for a due performance of the treaty. V. When they shall arrive in camp with the articles of this treaty under the seal of the Sultan, a counterpart shall be sent from the three powers. Hostilities shall cease, and terms of a treaty of alliance and perpetual friendship shall be adjusted."

On the 23d, Tippoo assembled the principal officers of his army in the great


A.D. 1792.

Cessation of
hostilities.

mosque, and after swearing them on the Koran to give him their undisguised advice, read to them the above ultimatum, and then asked, "Shall it be peace or war?" The answer was in substance, that the troops had become disheartened and unworthy of confidence. The preliminary articles sealed by Tippoo were sent in the course of the day to Lord Cornwallis, who did not insist on their delivery by the hostages, and while granting them a delay of two days, ordered hostilities to cease on the following morning. This order was received in the British camp with feelings bordering on indignation, and the soldiers in the trenches could scarcely be restrained from continuing their work. Lord Cornwallis endeavoured to soothe their feelings by his general orders, in which he spoke of the conditions as "highly honourable and advantageous," and "in consideration of the uncommon valour and firmness that has



SEAL OF TIPPPOO SULTAN.
From Drom's Narrative of the Campaign in India.



TIPPPOO SULTAN'S PALACE IN THE LALL BAUG, SERINGAPATAM ¹—FROM Gold's Oriental Drawings.

been manifested by the officers and soldiers of the king's and Company's troops during the whole course of the war," announced his "intention to take upon himself to order a handsome gratuity to be distributed to them in the same proportions as prize-money from the sum that Tippoo has bound himself by one of the articles to pay to the Company.'

There is said to have been a sad scene in the harem at parting with the boys who were to be sent out as hostages. Hyder Sahib, Tippoo's eldest son, was, or at least was alleged to be, absent with the troops, and the two fixed upon were

¹ "A magnificent palace—constructed on a similar principle, and nearly of the same dimensions, with that already described at Bangalore—stood towards the centre. It was built principally of wood, with

ornaments, which were lacquered and varnished as the former; but though the whole was finished in appearance from without, the decorations had not been completed"—*Sketch of the War with Tippoo Sultan.*

A. D. 1792. Abdul Kalick, about ten, and Mooza-u-Deen, about eight years of age. Lord Cornwallis had instructed the vakeels to say that he would wait upon the princes as soon as they came to their tents, but Tippoo, in a very polite answer, after assuring his lordship that he had "the most perfect confidence in his honour," begged that he would "allow them to be brought to his tent, and delivered into his own hands." On the 26th they left the fort under a salute, which was repeated by twenty-one guns from the British artillery. They were each seated in a silver howdah on a richly caparisoned elephant, and attended by the vakeels and several other persons of rank, also on elephants. The procession was led by several camel hircarras and seven standard-bearers, followed by 100 pikemen with spears inlaid with silver. A guard of 200 sepoy and a party of horse brought up the rear. Lord Cornwallis, attended by his staff and some of the principal officers of the army, met the princes at the door of his large tent, and after embracing them, led them in by the hand. When they were seated, one on each side of him, Gholaum Ali thus addressed him: "These children were this morning the sons of the Sultan, my master; their situation is now changed, and they must now look up to your lordship as their father." When his lordship declared that the greatest care would be taken of their persons, and every possible attention shown them, their faces brightened up, and told that their fears, if they had any, were already removed. They were dressed in long white muslin gowns and red turbans. Round their necks hung several rows of large pearls, and an ornament consisting of a large ruby and emerald surrounded by brilliants; in their turbans they wore a sprig of rich pearls. The elder boy had a dark complexion, thick lips, a small flattish nose, and a long countenance; the younger was remarkably fair, and had regular features, a small round face, large full eyes, and a countenance less thoughtful, but more animated than his brother's. His lordship presented each of them with a handsome gold watch, with which they seemed much pleased. The next day, the 27th, Lord Cornwallis visited them at their tents, attended by Sir John Kennaway and the vakeels of the Nizam and the Malhrattas.

Dispute as to the territories to be ceded.

The adjustment of the definite articles now occupied the attention of Sir John Kennaway and the other vakeels. The extent of the cessions depended on the whole amount of the Mysore revenue, and the value of the particular portions to be ceded. In settling these, some delay was caused by the discussion of conflicting statements, but no decided misunderstanding arose till Tippoo perceived that Coorg was inserted in the schedules as part of the Company's share. Becoming almost frantic with rage, he asked, "To which of the English possessions is Coorg adjacent? Why do they not ask for the key of Seringapatam? They knew that I would have died in the breach sooner than consent to such a cession, and durst not bring it forward until they had treacherously obtained possession of my children and my treasure (a crore of rupees, £1,000,000 sterling, had already been paid)." Nothing certainly could be more

Delivery of two of Tippoo's sons as hostages.

groundless than this charge of overreaching, but there is some reason to regret that the very possibility of making such a charge was not prevented by a distinct stipulation in favour of the Rajah of Coorg. The faithful and valuable services he had rendered entitled him to this honour, and his protection ought not to have been left to depend on the interpretation of a dubious article. At the same time, it is plain that Tippoo, however much he may have thirsted for vengeance on the rajah, never could have imagined that he would be left to his mercy. Strictly speaking, when the ultimatum was signed, Coorg was not adjacent to any of the Company's territories, but the moment Malabar, in accordance with Tippoo's own wish, was made part of the British share, Coorg did become adjacent, and therefore, in including it, neither the spirit nor the letter of the ultimatum was violated. A.D. 1792.

Whether Tippoo's surprise, when he learned that Coorg was to be taken from him, was real or affected, it is certain that he began immediately after to act as if he had determined to resume hostilities. Immense bodies of men were seen at work on a retrenchment on the face of the fort which had been attacked. When remonstrated with on this violation of the armistice, he had the hardihood to deny a fact which was perfectly visible to both armies. His vakeels also began to procrastinate, and managed to spin out the negotiation to the middle of March. By this time the position of Lord Cornwallis was greatly changed for the worse. The materials prepared for the siege, having been brought from the Lall Baug, were chiefly of the cypress tree, and from having been long made up, had become so dry, brittle, and inflammable as to be unfit for use. A new stock could only be obtained by a long and difficult transport. The camp, too, was sickly, and the season soon arriving at the worst would probably so fill the hospitals as scarcely to leave a sufficient number of effective men for the siege. These facts seem to have burst on Lord Cornwallis all at once, and he despatched fair copies of a treaty to Tippoo, leaving him only a few hours to decide on the alternative of signing or recommencing hostilities. Threatened
renewal of
hostilities. On an attempted evasion, the hostages were moved preparatory to their departure for Coromandel, and their military guard were made prisoners. The vakeels at first blustered, then entreated, and at last, on the 18th of March, returned with the treaty duly signed and sealed. On the following day, the forms of delivery and interchange were publicly concluded. Peace con-
cluded.

In arranging the division of the ceded territory among the confederates, the stipulations in the treaties of 1790, which gave exclusive right to the British of all they captured before the others took the field, and to the Mahrattas of all that Hyder had wrested from them, were disregarded, and the shares were allotted on the principle of perfect equality. The revenue of the whole territory ceded was estimated at 3,950,098 pagodas, or 11,850,294 rupees, equal to £1,185,029. Each share thus amounted to £395,009. The Mahratta acquisitions were situated to the north and west of the Toombudra, and adjoined

A.D. 1792.

Apportionment of the ceded territory.

their previous territories immediately south of the Kistna, making their frontier nearly the same as it had been in 1779. The Nizam's acquisitions bounded with those of the Mahrattas on the west, where a considerable tract on both sides of the Toombudra was received; another still larger tract lay farther to the east, extending along both banks of the Penaar, and north as far as the Kistna. The British acquisitions consisted of three distinct tracts, two of them on the east, and the third on the west. The most northerly of the eastern tracts commenced near Amboor, and stretched south to the vicinity of Caroor; on the west it was bounded partly by the Eastern Ghauts, which brought it to the table-land of Mysore, and partly by the Cauvery. Within this tract lay the Baramahal and some important fortresses, together with the chief passes through which the incursions into the Carnatic had hitherto been made. The lesser and more southerly of the eastern tracts included the fort of Dindigul, and the districts connected with it. The acquisitions of the west comprehended a large extent of the Malabar coast, including the ports of Cananore and Calicut, and the whole territory of the Rajah of Coorg, thus giving access to the table-land of Mysore on the west, in the same way as the other acquisitions gave access to it on the east.

Conditions of the treaty canvassed.

The terms of the treaty made with Tippoo have been much criticised on different and even opposite grounds, some maintaining that far too much, and others that far too little was exacted. The former, assuming the possibility of forcing European ideas into India politics, dream of a kind of a balance of power, by means of which Tippoo, the Nizam, and the Mahrattas were to check and counter-check each other, and prevent any one from becoming so great as to endanger the territories of the Company. In accordance with this view Tippoo's territories are represented as a kind of barrier, which the Company instead of weakening ought rather to have strengthened. Unquestionably, had Tippoo been a faithful and attached ally, and not the inveterate enemy of the Company, it might have been good policy to keep him strong. But in this instance the theory, so far from being based on facts, only contradicts them.

Dream of an Indian balance of power.

Under Hyder the Company had more than once been brought to the brink of ruin, and there cannot be a doubt that Tippoo, though fortunately not possessed of his father's talents, was bent on following, and did in fact take the first opportunity of following in his father's steps. So far, therefore, from being available as a barrier against the Mahrattas, he was far more to be feared than they, and nothing but the curtailment of his power could prevent him from employing it for the injury, and if possible for the ruin of the Company. Those, on the other hand, who think that the terms given to Tippoo were too favourable, allow themselves to be hurried away by a just detestation of his personal character, and overlook the fact that the dictation of more humiliating terms, if not inexpedient, might have proved impracticable. Seringapatam, though apparently destined to fall, was not yet taken, and besides the visible obstacles

which remained to be surmounted, many still unseen might have arisen and completely changed the aspect of affairs. Sickness was spreading in the camp, and the season was not yet at its worst. The allies, too, while determined to have a full share of the profits of victory, had as yet done scarcely anything to contribute to it. They were not only lukewarm, but suspected of being ready to change sides if a sufficient temptation were offered. In fact, it was afterwards ascertained that the representative of one of them was actually in treacherous correspondence with the enemy. Many other reasons made an early but honourable termination of the war extremely desirable. The directors were urging it in every letter from home; the legislature, not satisfied with a resolution denouncing conquest in India, had embodied the denunciation in an act of parliament, and in this had carried public opinion decidedly along with them; and the French revolution had brought Europe into such a state, that it was impossible to say how soon every soldier lent by the king to the Company might be absolutely required for other battle-fields. Lord Cornwallis had from the first declared, that he "would suffer no prospects, however brilliant, to postpone for an hour that most desirable event—a general peace," and that he would be satisfied with such concessions as "would put it out of the enemy's power to disturb the peace of India in future." The extent of the concessions necessary to curb such a ferocious and ambitious tyrant as Tippoo could not easily be estimated, and future events seem to show that his lordship had rather underrated them; but on a review of all the circumstances, impartial judges will readily concede that he fairly and modestly characterized the treaty, when, announcing it in a letter to Mr. Dundas, he said, "We have at length concluded our Indian war handsomely, and I think as advantageously as any reasonable person could expect. We have effectually crippled our enemy without making our friends too formidable."

A.D. 1792.

Views of
Lord Corn-
wallis as to
peace with
Tippoo.

In the beginning of April, Lord Cornwallis, accompanied by the two hostage princes, who were not to be delivered up till Tippoo's obligations under the treaty were performed, commenced his march homewards. Before he finally parted with Hurry Punt and Azim-ul-Omrah or Meer Alum, the respective representatives of the Mahrattas and the Nizam, they both endeavoured to sound him as to the kind and extent of interference which the Company would be disposed to exercise in the event of any misunderstanding between their governments. The Mahrattas, who had long wished to make the Nizam their prey, were anxious to know how far they might proceed in their ambitious projects, and were moreover desirous of possessing, like the Nizam, a subsidiary force of Company troops at their disposal. Hurry Punt, acting nominally for the peishwa, but really for Nana Furnavese, showed, without actually avowing it, that the object contemplated by such a force was to curb and overawe several of their own chiefs, and particularly Scindia, who had already acquired a kind of independence, and was suspected of a design to seat himself at Poonah. The

Opposite
views of the
Mahrattas
and the
Nizam.

A.D. 1792. Nizam, on the other hand, was trembling for his dominions, because he knew that if left to struggle unaided with the Mahrattas he would be completely overmatched. Lord Cornwallis thus consulted could only answer vaguely, that the Company would always be ready to interpose their good offices, and mediate between the parties with the view of obtaining an amicable settlement. Farther than this he could not go without entering into a new treaty, a proceeding from which, as peace had been re-established, he was precluded by act of parliament. There was, however, another case to which the legislative prohibition did not apply. By the 13th article of the confederacy of 1790, it was provided that, "if after the conclusion of the peace with Tippoo, he should molest or attack either of the contracting parties, the other shall join to punish him; the mode and conditions of effecting which shall be hereafter settled by the three contracting parties." This article was still in force, and Lord Cornwallis declared his readiness to convert the conditional stipulation contained in it into an explicit treaty of guarantee. This did not suit the policy of the Mahrattas, who preferred to leave everything open, so as that they might have full scope for taking advantage of contingencies, and hence, after some time wasted in negotiation, they positively refused to concur in the kind of guarantee which Lord Cornwallis had proposed. But the aversion of the Mahrattas to the guarantee was the very ground on which the Nizam desired to obtain it, and he argued with great appearance of justice, that the failure of one of three contracting parties to fulfil a common obligation could not render the obligation null, or justify the violation of it by the other two parties. Not only had he an express right under the treaty to a guarantee against Tippoo, but the letter which he had received from Lord Cornwallis before he consented to sign the treaty was equivalent to a guarantee against the Mahrattas also. It is difficult to answer this argument, and it must therefore be confessed, that when the Nizam obtained nothing more than a vague assurance that the English government would always be ready to act according to existing treaties, Lord Cornwallis rather evaded than fulfilled a subsisting obligation.

His lordship's views in regard to Indian governors.

Lord Cornwallis arrived at Madras in the end of May, 1792, and was not much satisfied with what he saw. In a confidential letter to Mr. Dundas he writes: "I must confess that I do not observe any material improvement that has been made, and that I see no flattering prospect. Sir Charles Oakley, though not a very capable man, is, I believe, the best of all the civil servants of this establishment that could have been selected to fill the station of governor, and yet you may rest assured that he will never possess sufficient authority, or make any radical reform." The great defect was, in his opinion, not so much in the men as in the system. Governors had hitherto been usually selected from the Company's service, and to this he objected in the most decided terms: "It is very difficult," he says, "for a man to divest himself of the prejudices which

A.D. 1792.

Views of
Lord Corn-
wallis in re-
gard to
Indian
governors.

the habits of twenty years have confirmed, and to govern people who have lived with him so long on a footing of equality. But the Company's servants have still greater obstacles to encounter when they become governors; for the wretched policy of the Company has, till the late alterations took place in Bengal, invariably driven all their servants to the alternative of starving, or of taking what was not their own; and although some have been infinitely less guilty in this respect than others, the world will not tamely submit to be reformed by those who have practised it in the smallest degree." In the course of the letter he returns to this subject and adds, "What I have said about governors is equally applicable to Bombay, and still more to the supreme government, which I hope never again to see in the hands of a Company's servant." It is not unworthy of notice, that at this very time, though he did not know it, the directors had



MADRAS, FORT ST. GEORGE, from the King's Barracks.—From Daniell, Views in Hindoostan.

appointed a Company's servant to succeed him as governor-general. The soundness of his opinion, however, in so far as relates to the supreme government, has since been practically recognized, though he overlooked a very important distinction when he applied it indiscriminately to all the presidencies. Admitting that long residence, and the local connections thereby formed, make it inexpedient to appoint a Company's servant governor of the presidency in which he has served, why should it disqualify him for holding that office in other presidencies? Surely, other things being equal, the experience of twenty years' faithful service in Bengal might be the best of all qualifications for the office of governor at Madras or Bombay.

Before quitting Madras, Lord Cornwallis availed himself of the opportunity of personal intercourse with Mahomed Ali, to make a new arrangement with him. The directors had called his attention specially to the subject, and the nabob himself was complaining that, in the arrangement made with Sir Archibald Campbell in 1787, he had promised more than he was able to

A.D. 1792.

Arrange-
ment of
Lord Corn-
wallis with
Mahomed
Ali.

perform. By this latter arrangement, four-fifths of the nabob's revenues were to be paid to the Company as his proportion in time of war; nine lacs as the expense of the civil and military establishments, together with twelve lacs to his creditors, were to be his payments in time of peace. It looked as if the nabob had entered into this arrangement merely to break it. Some securities for payment had been taken, but these proved unavailing, and the war with Tippoo had no sooner commenced than arrears began to accumulate so rapidly as to leave the Company no alternative but to take the management entirely into their own hands. The nabob as usual strenuously opposed, and even threw obstacles in the way of the Company's collectors. Of course, the moment the war ceased he claimed the right of resuming his own management, or rather of handing over the management to the numerous harpies who were constantly preying upon him. Such was the state of matters when Lord Cornwallis endeavoured to place them on a better footing. He was perfectly satisfied that the true plan would have been for the nabob to invest the entire management permanently, during peace as well as war, in the Company, reserving a liberal portion of the revenues for the maintenance of his family and dignity, and allotting the rest to the general defence and the liquidation of debt. This plan, however, the nabob at once rejected, and as the time had not yet arrived for forcing his assent, it only remained to provide the best possible substitute for it that could be obtained by persuasion. Accordingly an agreement, styled rather grandiloquently a treaty, was concluded on the 12th of July, 1792. It annulled all former agreements, gave the Company the sole management of the revenues in time of war, with the power of employing four-fifths of them in defraying its expenses, and reserved the management to the nabob in time of peace, but bound him to pay nine lacs of pagodas annually to the Company for the military establishment, and six lacs twenty-one thousand one hundred and five pagodas annually to creditors. The polygars were in future to pay their tribute directly to the Company, who were on this account to credit the nabob annually with a sum of rather more than two and a half lacs of pagodas; and in the event of failure of payment on the nabob's part, the Company were to enter into the possession of certain specified districts, and continue in it till all arrears were discharged. This agreement being only a compromise, could not be regarded as a perfect remedy, and the utmost that Lord Cornwallis ventured to say in favour of its provisions, was to express a hope that they would prove "well adapted to protect the Company against pecuniary losses and disappointments from the nabob in future, and to promote in an essential degree the quiet and general prosperity of the country." Referring to the same subject in a letter to Mr. Dundas he says, "I have at length settled everything with the nabob, and I believe in the best manner that it could have been done, unless we had kept possession of the country; but that point could only have been carried by force, without the least shadow of reason

or justice, and was therefore not to be attempted." On the 28th of July, 1792, Lord Cornwallis returned to Bengal. Before this time his successful termination of the war was known in England, and it was determined to bestow the first instalment of his reward by conferring upon him the title of Marquis. Immediately on his arrival he resumed a subject which had long occupied his thoughts, and with which he was busily engaged when the Mysore war commenced. This was the important subject of financial and judicial reform. A.D. 1792.

During the first five years of Mr. Hastings' administration, the revenues were collected and paid by farmers, who had for the most part obtained their leases as the highest bidders at public auction. Many of these farmers being mere adventurers, not only displaced the old collectors who, holding the office by hereditary right, had with their families been long connected with the lands, and were thus connected with them by many other ties than those of pecuniary interest, but practised all sorts of extortion on the ryots or cultivators. Under such a system it was impossible that the country could prosper. It was at the time only beginning to recover from a dreadful famine, and when this new instrument of oppression was added, threatened in many districts to return to a state of nature. Before the leases for five years expired, Mr. Hastings, though not willing to acknowledge the failure of a system which he plumed himself on having originated, could not shut his eyes to the misery which it had spread, and the enormous defalcations which had arisen under it; and he therefore proposed a new plan, of which the leading feature was that the lands, or rather the revenue exigible by government from the lands, should be "farmed out on leases for life, or for two joint lives, to such responsible persons as shall offer the most advantageous terms, allowing a preference to the zemindars, provided they have attained the age of eighteen years, if their offers are equal or nearly equal to those of others, or if they are equal to what the council shall judge to be the real value of the lands." As these leases were renewable to heirs on the same terms as before, or on a new valuation which was never to be less than the former valuation, and never more than ten per cent. above it, this was to all intents and purposes a permanent settlement. The zemindar in possession could not be ousted so long as he paid the fixed rent, and his heirs could immediately on his death enter into possession, either on the same terms or on payment of a fine of limited amount. Where the zemindar declined, or from legal incapacity was unable to accept the terms, he was to receive a pension equal to ten per cent. of the valuation, and when he failed in his payments, the zemindary, or such part of it as might be necessary to cover the deficiency, was to be publicly sold. The only part of the settlement which seems not to have been permanent was that which related to other farmers than zemindars. The minute is not very explicit on the subject, but several passages seem to intimate that, on the expiry of leases held by such farmers, the zemindar, or the heir of the zemindar, who had previously declined, might step in and claim to

Financial and judicial reforms introduced by Lord Cornwallis.

Land tenure.

A.D. 1776. be preferred on the new arrangement. Mr. Hastings, alluding to this part of his plan, says, "It might be resolved that no proposal should be received from any persons but the zemindars themselves," and then makes the following observation: "Leases to farmers on fixed terms for life would interest them in the improvement of the country equally with the zemindars, and in one respect would be more effectual; we mean, by being granted to substantial men who have money of their own to lay out in improvements. The principal argument in favour of the zemindars is, the security arising from the power of selling their lands, when landed property is put on such a footing as to become desirable." The last sentence in this quotation certainly implies that ~~mere~~ farmers and zemindars were considered as standing on a different footing, and that to the former nothing more than a life interest was to be given.

Plan of Mr. Hastings as to tenure of land.

Views of Mr. Francis.

At the time when the above plan was proposed Mr. Hastings was in a minority, and had the support of only Mr. Barwell, who expressed his approval of the plan by signing the above minute along with him. The other three members of council opposed it, and concurred in a very elaborate minute which Mr. Francis drew up, and at a later period published. As some account of this minute was formerly given, it is here necessary only to mention one or two of its leading features. Assuming zemindars to be proprietors in the European sense of the term, he proposed first to form "an estimate of the permanent services which government must indispensably provide for, under the great heads of civil and military establishments and investment, with an allowance of a reasonable reserve for contingencies," and then "proportion the whole demand upon the provinces, and fix it for ever." The quit-rent of each zemindary being fixed, "the zemindar must be informed that the due discharge of his rent is the tenure by which he holds his lands, with every possible assurance that no further demands will be made upon him. If he incurs a balance, a part of his zemindary should be invariably sold to make it good, and when the quit-rent is fixed, there can be no doubt of purchasers." Somewhat inconsistently, while complaining severely of the excessive amount of revenue previously exacted, Mr. Francis is inclined to think that the average of the three last years might be fairly assumed as the basis of a perpetual quit-rent.

Statistical office instituted by Mr. Hastings.

In 1776, Mr. Hastings having, by the death of Colonel Monson, obtained the casting vote in the council, resumed his financial plans, and, alleging that, in whatever manner the new settlement might be made, "it will be equally necessary to be previously furnished with accurate states of the real value of the lands, as the grounds on which it is to be constructed," proposed for this purpose the establishment of a temporary office, "under the conduct of one or two covenanted servants of the Company, assisted by a dewan and other officers." The control of this office was to be under "the immediate charge" of the governor-general, and the officers, besides the principal business of preparing for "the formation of an equal settlement," were to direct their

attention to points of inquiry that might be "useful to secure to the ryots the perpetual and undisturbed possession of their lands, and to guard them against arbitrary exactions." Mr. Francis objected to the proposed office, both because, if, according to his own plan, an average of the last three years were to be taken, knowledge of the actual value was superfluous, and might, by exciting suspicion, prove pernicious, and because, in his opinion, inquiry for the protection of the ryot was so far from being necessary that, "in the present state of the country, the ryot has, in fact, the advantage over the zemindar." Mr. Hastings was not moved by these objections, which, indeed, were more captious than forcible, and the new office, with a full staff of officials, was appointed. When the directors were consulted on the subject, they expressed great "surprise and concern," that, "after more than seven years' investigation, information is still so incomplete as to render another innovation (the establishment of the temporary office), still more extraordinary than any of the former, absolutely necessary in order to the formation of a new settlement, and while by no means disapproving" the attempt to obtain further information, if it be necessary, declared "that the conduct of the majority of the council on this occasion (in placing the office under the immediate charge of the governor-general) has been such as must have our utter disapprobation." The office, though thus denounced, was not abolished, and much valuable information was collected, but no attempt was made to use it for the purpose of forming a new system, and after the expiry of the leases for five years, the land revenue was collected by the most objectionable method of annual settlements.

A.D. 1789.

Statistical
office in-
stituted
by Mr.
Hastings.

Such was the state of matters when Lord Cornwallis was appointed governor-general. Before he sailed, the state of the land tenures in India had been the subject of conferences, which he held both with the ministry and the directors, and it was expected that he would be able, shortly after his arrival in India, to establish a permanent settlement. The subject, besides being difficult in itself, was entirely new to him, but he had the advantage on the outward voyage of being introduced to the knowledge of it by one of the ablest of Indian financiers. Mr. John Shore, who, after long service in India, had been appointed to a seat in the Bengal council, sailed in the same vessel with him, and must have had ample opportunity of imparting his stores of knowledge and experience to so apt and diligent a pupil. Hence, when his lordship reached Calcutta, he was rather an adept than a novice, and with the able assistance of his teacher, would not have been guilty of much presumption had he immediately begun to legislate. With characteristic modesty and caution, however, he determined not to commit himself till he could clearly see his way, and therefore, in the meantime, allowed the mode of settlement to continue as he found it. One year subsequent to his lordship's arrival thus passed away, and when the period for making the revenue arrangements for another year arrived, the governor-general in council thus addressed the directors:—"The

Views of
Lord Corn-
wallis as to
land tenure.

A.D. 1789.

Views of
Lord Corn-
wallis as to
land tenure.

acknowledged advantages which must result from concluding a settlement for a long term of years, together with your injunctions for carrying this measure into execution, impressed us with the greatest anxiety for completing it at the commencement of the current year, 1195 or 1788-9; but it was with real reluctance we found ourselves under the necessity of postponing the arrangement till the ensuing year, for the reasons which we have now the honour to submit to you." The reasons were the voluminous nature of the materials which had unavoidably retarded their completion, the short time which remained for inspection even had they been prepared, and "the serious obstacle to forming a settlement on a permanent plan," in consequence of "the storms and inundations which had so universally prevailed during the last season."

Proposed
settlement
for ten
years.

It will be observed that the above despatch, though it mentions a "permanent plan," does not appear to contemplate a settlement for perpetuity, but only one "for a long term of years." Indeed, in a subsequent part of the despatch, the plan deferred for the above reasons is distinctly spoken of as "the ten years' settlement in Bengal." This seems, accordingly, to have been the period originally contemplated. On the 7th of August, 1789, Lord Cornwallis intimated to the directors that he was now prepared to proceed. "The settlement," he says, "in conformity to your orders, will only be made for ten years certain, with a notification of its being your intention to declare it a perpetual and unalterable assessment of these provinces, if the amount and the principles upon which it has been made shall meet with your approbation." No doubt appears to have been entertained in any quarter as to the persons with whom the settlement ought to be made. The zemindars proper, and an inferior grade of zemindars called independent talookdars, were held to be the only proprietors of the soil, and it was never suspected that there were individuals, and even whole communities, who disputed, and, if they had had the opportunity, could have successfully contested their right. The term *zemindar* is not of Hindoo but of Persian origin, and must therefore, in all probability, have been unknown in India till the establishment of Mahometan ascendancy. It means landholder, but it does not follow that when it came to be applied to a particular class of persons in India it retained its original and literal signification. The Hindoo village system recognized two headmen—the one the headman of a single village, the other the headman of a district composed of several villages. The latter appears to be the official to whom the name of zemindar was subsequently given. At first he was probably elected by the villagers themselves, and held not only some portion of village land in his own right as a villager, but also a portion allotted to him by his fellow-villagers, under the name of *nan-kar* or subsistence land, in return for the services he was expected to perform. Subsequently, he was nominated by the government, which, in employing him to collect its revenues within the district, paid him by a percentage on the amount of his collections. He was at once a landholder, in respect of the land which he held

in his own name and by grant from his fellow-villagers, and a government official paid by a fee. In course of time, when the office had become hereditary, the distinction between the two kinds of land disappeared, and both the village and the subsistence land belonged to the zemindar as one common property. To this extent and no further he was a landholder, and the villagers, though their individual shares might be of less extent than his, were to all intents as much landholders as he. In his other character of government official, he was no landholder at all, and in paying over the revenue of the district he was merely the hand through which the money passed. The villagers who paid it were neither his tenants nor his vassals. What they paid was paid not to him, but to government through him. A very great blunder, as well as gross injustice, was committed when a settlement was made with zemindars alone, and rights of property, every whit as good as theirs, were completely ignored. The utmost that can be said in excuse is, that in Bengal the village system had been much broken down, and the number of those whose rights were thus wrested from them at one swoop was far less than it would have been if that system had still been in vigour.

A.D. 1792.

Rights of the
zemindars.

While all were agreed that the settlement was to be made with the zemindars, a serious difference of opinion arose as to its duration. Lord Cornwallis, convinced that the benefits anticipated never could be realized unless it was fixed and unalterable, proposed, while concluding only a decennial settlement, to issue a notification that the settlement, though fixed for a limited period, was intended to be perpetual, and would be made so if the directors, on being consulted, should give their sanction. Mr. Shore at first confined his objection to the notification, on the ground that the zemindars would regard it as a promise, and might therefore, should the directors refuse to sanction perpetuity, charge government with a breach of faith. Subsequently he carried his objections much further, and argued that, however desirable perpetuity might be in itself, the idea of it ought, at least for the present, to be abandoned. Notwithstanding the long period which had elapsed since the grant of the dewanee, the information necessary to justify a perpetual settlement had not been obtained, many important points still remained to be elucidated, and the experience of ten years would be required to show how the settlement actually worked. In that time many defects and errors would doubtless be discovered, and nothing therefore could be more rash and impolitic than voluntarily to deprive themselves of the power of correcting them. Lord Cornwallis was not to be diverted from his purpose by these or any similar arguments. He was convinced, as he himself expressed it, in an elaborate minute lodged in answer to Mr. Shore, that "by granting perpetual leases of the lands at a fixed assessment, we shall render our subjects the happiest people in India." Every delay therefore seemed to him repugnant to the dictates of humanity, and the perpetual settlement, after being conditionally promised in a notification, was finally and

A permanent
zemindary
settlement
adopted by
Lord Corn-
wallis.

A.D. 1793.

irrevocably established throughout the provinces of Bengal, Behar, and Orissa, as soon as the sanction of the home authorities arrived. The manner in which this sanction was obtained is graphically described by Mr. Dundas, in a letter dated 17th September, 1792, and received by Lord Cornwallis 2d March, 1793:—

Views of
Lord Corn-
wallis sanc-
tioned by
the British
ministry.

"In your letter," writes Mr. Dundas, "you allude to the important question of the perpetuity of the decennial settlement, and I have the very great satisfaction to inform you that the same conveyance which carries this, carries out an approbation and confirmation of your sentiments on this subject. It has been longer delayed than I expected, but the delay was unavoidable. Knowing that the directors would not be induced to take it up, so as to consider it with any degree of attention, and knowing that some of the most leading ones among them held an opinion different both from your lordship and me on the subject of perpetuity, and feeling that there was much respect due to the opinion and authority of Mr. Shore, I thought it indispensably necessary both that the measure must originate with the Board of Control, and likewise that I should induce Mr. Pitt to become my partner in the final consideration of so important and controverted a measure. He accordingly agreed to shut himself up with me for ten days at Wimbledon, and attend to that business only. Charles Grant stayed with us a great part of the time. After a most minute and attentive consideration of the whole subject, I had the satisfaction to find Mr. Pitt entirely of the same opinion with us. We therefore settled a despatch upon the ideas we had formed, and sent it down to the court of directors. What I expected happened; the subject was too large for the consideration of the directors in general, and the few who knew anything concerning it, understanding from me that Mr. Pitt and I were decided in our opinions, thought it best to acquiesce, so that they came to a resolution to adopt entirely the despatch as transmitted by me."

The sound-
ness and
equity of
this settle-
ment more
than ques-
tionable.

Such is the secret history of this celebrated settlement for perpetuity. Lord Cornwallis urged it, Mr. Dundas cordially seconded him, and after ten days' closeting, gained the assent of Mr. Pitt. The directors as a body were unwilling as well as unfit to deal with it, and remitted to a committee, who, knowing that the decision was already formed, deemed it unnecessary to go through the farce of deliberating, and simply acquiesced. On the merits of the settlement opinions continued to be divided, but future inquiry has undoubtedly tended to increase the regret that the caution recommended by Mr. Shore was not exercised, and that Lord Cornwallis, led away by the idea that he was restoring the principal landholders "to such circumstances as to enable them to support their families with decency, and to give a liberal education to their children, according to the customs of their respective castes and religions," and thereby supporting "a regular gradation of ranks," which "is nowhere more necessary than in this country, for preserving order in civil society," should have conferred the whole property of the country on a body of men so little

entitled to such a preference that Mr. Hastings had put on record the following description of them :—" It is a fact, which will with difficulty obtain credit in England, though the notoriety will justify me in asserting it here, that much the greatest part of the zemindars, both of Bengal and Behar, are incapable of judging or acting for themselves, being either minors, or men of weak understanding, or absolute idiots." A.D. 1793.

The judicial establishments next engaged the serious attention of Lord Cornwallis. Their numerous defects were well known, and the directors, in the instructions which they gave him on the subject, furnished a kind of plan, in the formation of which they stated that "they had been actuated by the necessity of accommodating their views and interests to the subsisting manners and usages of the people, rather than by any abstract theories drawn from other countries, or applicable to a different state of things." Before the passing of the Regulating Act, the councils of the different presidencies had not interfered much with the administration of justice among the natives. In Bengal, in particular, the collection of the revenue chiefly occupied their attention, and the administration of justice, when the revenue was not immediately concerned, was considered as lying beyond their province. The subject had, however, been gradually rising in importance, and when the Company had once determined to stand forth in their own names to manage the dewannee, it was soon perceived that the collection of the revenue was so intimately connected with the other departments of government, that it would be impossible to keep them separate. Accordingly, the Regulating Act, by its 36th section, gave power to "the governor-general and council of the said united Company's settlement at Fort William in Bengal, from time to time to make and issue such rules, ordinances, and regulations for the good order and civil government of the said Company's settlement at Fort William aforesaid, and other factories and places subordinate, or to be subordinate thereto, as shall be deemed just and reasonable (such rules, ordinances, and regulations not being repugnant to the laws of the realm), and to set, impose, inflict, and levy reasonable fines and forfeitures for the breach or non-observance of such rules, ordinances, and regulations." Judicial reforms of Lord Cornwallis.

Mr. Hastings devoted some attention to the subject, and, as has been already explained, established two courts in each collectorate—a civil, called the *dewannee adawlut*, and a criminal, called the *fougedary adawlut*—and also two superior or *sudder* courts, which sat at Calcutta; chiefly for the purpose of hearing appeals. In 1780 the constitution of these courts was abruptly changed by the corrupt bargain which placed Sir Elijah Impey at the head of the *sudder dewannee adawlut*, in order to induce him to withdraw the extravagant claims to jurisdiction which had been made by the supreme court at Calcutta, and threatened to goad the natives into rebellion. Some other changes were made, and various regulations framed, but nothing like a general and uniform system existed till Lord Cornwallis tried to introduce it. Changes introduced by Mr. Hastings.

A. D. 1793.

Changes
introduced
by the
authority of
the home
government.

The first judicial changes which took place after the arrival of Lord Cornwallis did not originate with him. They were contained in the instructions which he received, and made changes of a kind which could scarcely have commanded his approval, as he afterwards saw occasion to recall them. The directors ordered that the provincial civil courts, which had been withdrawn from the superintendence of the collectors, should be again placed under it, and that criminal justice should continue to be administered by Mahometan judges. As soon as his lordship's judicial reforms were matured, he entirely disconnected the collectors with judicial proceedings, and by abolishing the office of naib nazim, assumed for the Company the criminal,* as they had previously assumed the civil jurisdiction over the whole country. In depriving the collectors of all judicial powers, and "confining their duties and functions to the mere collection of the public dues," the governor-general and his council state that they had proceeded on a maxim, the soundness of which cannot be disputed, that "when the power to redress oppressions, and functions that must always have a tendency to promote or screen the commission of them, are united in the same person, a strict adherence to the principles of justice cannot be expected, and still less can it be hoped that the people will feel a confidence of obtaining justice." In future, therefore, revenue was to be placed in the same category as other causes, and decided in the ordinary courts. Of these courts, as now constituted, a very brief account must be given.

Judicial
system
finally
adopted.

Adopting the usual division of courts into civil and criminal, and commencing with the former, we find at the very base of the whole judicial system a species of small debt courts spread over the country, and fixed wherever the population seemed so numerous as to require them. These courts were limited to causes in which the pecuniary amount did not exceed fifty rupees, and were presided over by native commissioners, who received no salaries, but were paid by a fee of an ana per rupee, or a sixteenth of the sum claimed. Next in order were the *zillah* or district, and the city courts, possessed of jurisdiction within the limits of the respective districts and cities in which they were established, and entitled to take cognizance of all civil causes, of whatever nature and of whatever amount. A single judge, a covenanted servant of the Company, with a Mahometan and Hindoo assessor, presided in these courts; the only other principal official was a registrar, also a covenanted servant, who, in order to relieve the business of the court, had a primary jurisdiction in all causes not exceeding 200 rupees. All the officers of government were made amenable to these courts for acts done in their official capacities, and even government itself, in cases in which it might be a party with its subjects in matters of property. No British subject, except covenanted servants and king's officers, was to be permitted to reside within the jurisdiction of these courts, "without entering into a bond" to be amenable to them in all civil causes brought against him by natives; but the legality of this pro-

ceeding was more than questionable, as the legislature had previously provided that British subjects were to be amenable only to the supreme court at Calcutta. Above the zillah and city courts were four provincial courts, established in Patna, Dacca, Moorshedabad, and Calcutta. These courts had a primary jurisdiction within certain limits, but their chief business was to decide on appeal from the zillah and city courts. This decision, in all cases of real or personal property not exceeding a certain amount, was final, but in cases above that amount might be reviewed, as the minute of Lord Cornwallis expresses it, by "the supreme board as a court of appeal in the last resort, in their capacity of a court of *sudder dewannee adawlut*." Each provincial court consisted of three judges, all covenanted servants, a registrar, with one or more assistants, also covenanted, and three assessors—a *cazi*, a *muftie*, and a *pundit*. The decision of the *sudder dewannee adawlut* was final in all causes under 50,000 rupees, but in those exceeding this sum the Act 21 Geo. III. c. 70 gave an appeal to the king in council.

A.D. 1763.

Judicial
system
finally
adopted.

The criminal courts were practically composed of the same judges as those of the civil courts. Thus, the zillah and city judges were appointed to act as magistrates within their respective jurisdictions. In like manner, the judges of the provincial courts were to hold courts of circuits within their respective divisions, the senior judge going the circuit of one half of the stations, and the other two judges the circuit of the other half. By this means there were two annual jail-deliveries in the country; by another arrangement, a jail-delivery every month was secured in towns. In the land settlement, the zemindars were taken bound to keep the peace, and made responsible for robberies and thefts within their limits. This revival of ancient usage soon proved unavailing, and the police establishments of the zemindars were abolished, in order to make way for a system of police conducted under the direct authority of government. For this purpose, the zillah magistrates were instructed to divide their districts into police jurisdictions. Each of these, averaging about twenty miles square, was committed to a *darogah* or native superintendent, with a suitable staff of officers under him. In cities, the extent of the jurisdiction and the number of officers was determined of course by the population.

Criminal
courts.

While establishing courts for the administration of justice, Lord Cornwallis did not overlook the law according to which it was to be administered, but though aware how much both the Hindoo and Mahometan codes stood in need of reform, he saw the necessity of touching them with a sparing hand. The utmost which he ventured to do, was to order the admission of evidence in certain cases where the religion of the witness was the only ground for rejecting it; to prevent the escape of a murderer, merely because the heirs of the murdered person chose rather to compound with the criminal than to prosecute him; and to abolish the barbarous punishment of mutilation. There is still, however, another branch of judicial reform, in respect of which the adminis-

Complete
code of
regulations.

A. D. 1793.

Code of regulations.

Its merits strongly attested by Sir William Jones.

tration of Lord Cornwallis is entitled to special and honourable notice. We allude to the complete code of regulations, which not only explained every part of the new judicial system introduced, but was made patent to all who were interested in it, by being printed and published both in the original English, and in translations for the use of the natives. The code so printed and published, was declared to be the standard by which the courts of judicature should be guided, and an important check was thus provided against arbitrary and irresponsible proceedings. The best proof of the intrinsic merit of the code is, that it was used almost without change by several subsequent administrations, but it cannot be out of place to give the testimony of so competent a witness as Sir William Jones. He was then a judge in the supreme court at Calcutta, and Lord Cornwallis had sent the regulations to him with a letter, in which he said:—"I take the liberty of sending the fougedary propositions, according to your obliging permission, and earnestly request that you will use no ceremony with them, but scratch out and alter every part that you do not approve." Sir William returned the papers with this answer: "The adjournment of the court having given me a whole day of leisure, I have spent the morning in reading with great attention your lordship's minute on the administration of criminal justice in the provinces, and in perusing the papers which accompany it. I read them all with my pen in my hand, intending to write without reserve all objections that might occur to me; but I found nothing to which I could object, and did not meet with a single paragraph to which, if I were a member of the council, I would not heartily express my assent." After two short verbal criticisms, he adds: "These are trifling remarks, but I cannot start one serious objection, and think the whole minute unexceptionably just, wise, and benevolent." It is but fair to mention that, though Lord Cornwallis had the merit of adopting this minute, and probably also of suggesting much that it contains, it is understood to have been drawn up by Mr. (afterwards Sir) George Barlow.

Approaching expiry of the Company's charter.

As the Company's charter was about to expire in 1794, Lord Cornwallis was consulted by the ministry as to the future arrangements. Their original intention was, to make a complete separation between the commercial and the other departments, leaving the former entirely to the Company, and appropriating the latter entirely to the government. His lordship was decidedly opposed to this plan, because he was "perfectly convinced, that if the fostering aid and protection, and what is full as important, the check and control of the governments abroad were withdrawn from the commercial department, the Company would not long enjoy their new charter, but must very soon be reduced to a state of actual bankruptcy." He was not surprised that "the vexatious and interested contradictions" experienced from the court of directors, had made ministers "desirous of taking as much of the business as possible out of their hands;" but still he thought it would be wiser "to tie their hands from

A.D. 1793.

Scheme proposed by government in regard to the constitution of the Company.

doing material mischief, without meddling with their imperial dignity or their power of naming writers, and not to encounter the furious clamour that will be raised against annexing the patronage of India to the influence of the crown, except in cases of the most absolute necessity." A court of directors "under certain restrictions, and when better constituted, might," he thought, "prove an useful check on the ambitious or corrupt designs of some future minister;" but in order to enable them "to do this negative good, or to prevent their doing much positive evil, they should have a circumscribed management of the whole, and not a permission to ruin uncontrolled the commercial advantages which Britain should derive from her Asiatic territories." It might be said, "If the Company cannot carry on the trade, throw it open to all adventurers." "To that mode," says his lordship, "I should have still greater objections, as it would render it very difficult for government to prevent this unfortunate country from being overrun by desperate speculators from all parts of the British dominions." Notwithstanding this bugbear which frightened most of the statesmen of his time, he saw no objection to the entire opening of the export trade from Britain to India. The directors, he thought, might be advantageously reduced to twelve or nine, and "if handsome salaries could be attached to those situations," he "should be clear for adopting means for their being prohibited from having an interest directly or indirectly in contracts, or in any commercial transactions whatever, in which the Company may have the smallest concern." His reason for making these suggestions is well expressed in the following passage:—"The present court of directors is so numerous, and the responsibility for public conduct which falls to the share of each individual is so small, that it can have no great weight with any of them, and the participation in a profitable contract, or the means of serving friends or providing for relations, must always more than compensate to them for the loss that they may sustain by any fluctuation which may happen in the market price of the stock which constitutes their qualifications." In regard to the military arrangement, he was "clearly of opinion, that the European troops should all belong to the king, for experience has shown that the Company cannot keep up an efficient force in India; this," he adds, "is a fact so notorious, that no military man who has been in this country will venture to deny it, and I do not care how strongly I am quoted as an authority for it."

His lordship's views on the whole subject are thus summed up: "As the new system will only take place when the rights of the present Company cease, you cannot be charged with a violation of charters, and the attacks of the opposition in parliament will therefore be confined to an examination of its expediency and efficacy; I fancy I need hardly repeat to you that they would above all things avail themselves of any apparent attempt on your part to give an increase of patronage to the crown, which could not be justified on the soundest constitutional principles, or on the ground of evident necessity, and

Views of Lord Cornwallis.

A.D. 1793.

Views of
Lord Corn-
wallis in
regard to
renewal of
the Com-
pany's
charter.

would make use of it to misrepresent your intentions and principles, and to endeavour to inflame the minds of the nation against you. An addition of patronage to the crown, to a certain degree, will however, in my opinion, be not only a justifiable measure, but absolutely necessary for the future good government of this country. But, according to my judgment, a renewal of the Company's charter for the management of the territorial revenues and the commerce of India for a limited time (for instance, ten or fifteen years), and under such stipulations as it may be thought proper to annex as conditions, would be the wisest foundation for your plan, both for your own sakes as ministers, and as being best calculated for securing the greatest possible advantages to Britain from her Indian possessions, and least likely to injure the essential principles of our constitution." The above extracts are taken from a letter written to Mr. Dundas in 1790, and therefore it is right to mention that two years later, when offended at some obnoxious appointments and proceedings, he wrote to him as follows:—"If the court of directors cannot be controlled, I retract my opinion in favour of their continuance after the expiration of the charter. But I must confess that I cannot help believing that those orders, so degrading to our government, and some of them so slighting to myself, could not have found their way to India, if the Board of Control had not been too much occupied with other matters to have paid proper attention to them."

New charter
granted.

The above opinions concerning the renewal of the Company's charter are creditable to Lord Cornwallis as a statesman. In none of them was he behind, in some of them he was in advance of his age, and the length at which we have quoted them is justified by the fact, that they not only changed the views of ministers in regard to the mode of renewing the charter, but contained the germ of much future legislation. By an act passed 19th June, 1793, and now ranking as 33 Geo. III. c. 52, several previous statutes affecting the Company were consolidated, and the exclusive trade, as well as the management of the territorial revenues, was continued to them for twenty-four years, from the 1st of March, 1794, but "liable to be discontinued at or after the end of such period, upon three years' notice previously given by parliament for that purpose." Among the other new provisions, the most important were the power given to his majesty to pay the commissioners of the board such salaries as he should think fit, "provided always that the whole of the salaries to be paid to the members of the said board shall not exceed the sum of £5000 in one year, and the whole of the salaries, charges, and expenses of the said board, exclusive of the members of the said board, shall not exceed the sum of £11,000 in one year;" in other words, that the whole annual expense of the board should not exceed £16,000, payable by the Company—and the power given to the directors, with the approbation of the Board of Control, "to suspend all, or any of the powers hereby given to the governor-general of Fort William to act upon his own sole

authority, at and for such time or times as they may judge expedient or necessary." "For establishing a just principle of promotion" among the covenanted civil servants, all of them under the rank of members of council were "to be entitled to precedence in the service of the said Company at their respective stations, according to their seniority of appointment." No office or offices yielding more than £500 per annum were to be conferred on any one who had not been "actually resident in India as a covenanted servant" for three years at least in the whole antecedent to the vacancy; and none yielding more than £1500 till six years' similar residence, nor more than £3000 till nine, nor more than £4000 till twelve years' residence. The directors were not "to appoint or send out to India a greater number of persons in the capacity of cadets or writers, or in any other capacity, than will be necessary, in addition to those in India, to supply the proper complement of officers and servants," contained in a list of those establishments which they were required to furnish; and on the declaration that "it is expedient that the said Company shall be put under reasonable limitations in respect to the granting of pensions, or increasing the salaries of their officers and servants, or creating new establishments," it was enacted, that "no grant or resolution of the said Company, or their court of directors, to be made after the passing of this act, and during the continuance of their right in the said exclusive trade, whereby the said funds may become chargeable with any new salary or increase of salary, or any new or additional establishment of officers or servants, or any new pension or increase of pension, to any one person, exceeding £200 per annum, shall be available in law, unless such grant or resolution shall be approved and confirmed by the board of commissioners."

A.D. 1798.

Leading provisions of new charter granted to the Company.

This act, containing no fewer than 163 sections, is stated by Mr. Dundas to have "received the sanction of the legislature with an unanimity almost unexampled." This statement was contained in a letter dated October 23d, 1793, but before it reached its destination Marquis Cornwallis (such was now his title) had sailed for England. On the 11th of June, intelligence arrived that the French war, which was destined to envelope all the states of Europe in its flames, had broken out. Orders were immediately issued to take possession of Chandernagore, and several factories in the presidency of Bengal. This was easily accomplished, but greater difficulty was anticipated in Madras, because it was understood that Pondicherry had again been put into a state of defence, and that an attempt would be made to strengthen its garrison. Marquis Cornwallis determined immediately to repair to the scene of action, but before his arrival the work was already accomplished. Colonel Floyd arrived before Pondicherry on the 11th of July to blockade it on the land side, while Admiral Cornwallis, brother to the marquis, blockaded it by sea. The command of the land troops ultimately devolved on Colonel Braithwaite, who had only opened fire from the first batteries for a few hours when the licentiousness and insub-

War with France and capture of Pondicherry.

A.D. 1793. ordination of the garrison forced the governor to surrender. On finding that his presence was no longer required, he deemed it unnecessary to return to Bengal, where Mr. (now Sir John) Shore had been installed as general, and sailed directly for England from Madras in the beginning of October, 1793.

CHAPTER III.

The arrival of Marquis Cornwallis in England—Impeachment and trial of Warren Hastings—Indian administration of Sir John Shore.



ARQUIS CORNWALLIS arrived in England early in 1794.

His administration, though not so peaceful as had been anticipated, had been so successful as to unite in its favour the suffrages of all who did not think it necessary to make political capital out of his real or supposed deficiencies. As early

Arrival of
Marquis
Cornwallis
in England.

as January, 1793, the court of proprietors unanimously resolved, that his statue should be placed in the court-room at the India House, in order "that his great services might be ever had in remembrance;" and in June following, another unanimous resolution bestowed upon him an annuity of £5000, which was to commence from the date of his quitting India, and to be paid to his heirs, executors, administrators, or assigns for the term of twenty years. The honours and rewards conferred on Marquis Cornwallis present a striking contrast to the return which Mr. Hastings received for his services. On the 28th of June, 1785, shortly after his return to England, he attended the court and received the formal thanks of the directors, but eight days before Mr. Burke had risen in his place in parliament, and pledged himself "that if no other gentleman would undertake the business, he would at a future day make a motion respecting the conduct of a gentleman just returned from India." Mr. Burke, in making this announcement, is said to have allowed himself to be carried by his zeal farther than his party were inclined to follow him. The administration of Mr. Hastings could scarcely be made a party question. Among both the great political parties he had many zealous supporters, and there was therefore a danger that the opposition in attacking him might not only sustain a defeat, but by alienating some of their most powerful friends permanently weaken their strength. Mr. Burke was perhaps superior to such considerations. He had persuaded himself that Mr. Hastings was a great criminal, and he felt bound to leave no means untried to bring him to justice. His friends, however, either because they did not share his convictions, or because they deemed it quixotic to act upon them when no party advantage was likely to be gained, would have been satisfied with allowing the censure of Mr. Hastings, which

His reception contrasted with that of Mr. Hastings.

stood upon the journals of the House of Commons, to remain unrescinded, or with raising a discussion which might enable them to repeat the censure in some sterner form. It may have been owing to the comparative indifference of his party that Mr. Burke allowed the session to pass away without taking any steps to carry his announced intention into effect. A.D. 1786.

The subject having thus apparently dropped, would not, it is thought, have been revived, had not Mr. Hastings and his friends made so sure of victory, that they determined to carry the war into the enemy's camp. To allow the censure to remain on the journals unrecalled seemed to them equivalent to a confession of guilt, whereas Mr. Hastings, so far from confessing guilt, was boldly claiming honours and rewards. A peerage was talked of, and his agent Major Scott had, after several conferences with Mr. Pitt, carried away the impression that the peerage would be granted if the censure were deleted. Entertaining this conviction, and having no doubt of the support of the ministry, which was at this time equivalent to the support of large majorities in both Houses of Parliament, it is easy to



EDMUND BURKE.—After Sir Joshua Reynolds.

understand why Major Scott, at the very commencement of the new session in January, 1786, called upon Mr. Burke to produce his charges, and fix the earliest possible day for the discussion of them. This challenge could not with decency be refused, and Mr. Burke took his first step on the 18th of February, by moving for certain papers. He began his speech by asking that the 44th and 45th of a series of resolutions which Mr. Dundas had moved on 29th of May, 1782, should be read. These resolutions premising that it was contrary to the wish, honour, and policy of this nation to pursue schemes of conquest in India, and that parliament should give some mark of its displeasure against those who should appear to have wilfully adopted or countenanced such schemes, concluded with declaring that Warren Hastings, Esq., governor-general of Bengal, and William Hornby, Esq., president of the council of Bombay, had in several instances so acted, and that it was therefore the duty of the directors to pursue all legal and effectual means for their removal. After remarking that the task he had undertaken would have been more appropriate in the hands of the mover of these resolutions, Mr. Burke proceeded to explain the course which he wished to pursue. Three courses were open—a prosecution

Discussions
in parliament
respecting Mr.
Hastings.

A.D. 1786. by the attorney-general, a bill of pains and penalties, and impeachment. He preferred the last.

First steps in
impeach-
ment of Mr.
Hastings:

The debate which followed was remarkable only as indicating the feelings of the ministry. Mr. Dundas, while avowing the sentiments which induced him to move the resolutions, and still disapproving of many things in the conduct of Mr. Hastings, declared his inability to fasten any criminal intention upon him. Besides, Mr. Hastings, subsequently to the date of the resolutions, had rendered important services and merited the vote of thanks which had been given him. Mr. Pitt took similar ground. "It was absolutely necessary," he said, "in point of justice and right, to examine the whole of the public conduct of any servant of the people, to give him due credit for such parts as were meritorious, as well as to censure him for such as were culpable; and for his own part he should not hesitate one moment to declare that, however censurable some parts of Mr. Hastings' conduct might be made to appear, he must, notwithstanding, consider such as were praiseworthy as entitled to the warmest approbation—nay, as a sufficient ground for reward and thanks, could they be proved to predominate over what was exceptionable." All the papers moved for were granted. Another important debate took place on the 3d of April, when Mr. Burke moved that several persons who had been ordered to attend as witnesses should be called to the bar. There cannot be a doubt that such evidence, avowedly *ex parte*, would have given the accuser an undue advantage. Not having brought forward his charges, he was merely endeavouring to fish out matter of accusation. This was unfair, and at variance with ordinary legal procedure, and therefore the house unquestionably did right in insisting, as a preliminary, that the charges should be put on record. It would seem that Mr. Burke had anticipated this decision; for he brought forward nine articles of charge the very next day, and twelve more in the course of a week; the last article was not brought forward till the 22d of May.

Articles of
charge.

The twenty-two articles of charge, drawn up more in the form of a pamphlet than an indictment, did not omit a single act of Mr. Hastings' administration in which any semblance of delinquency could be discovered, but it is unnecessary to notice more than the 1st, 3d, 4th, 7th, and 8th—the 1st because it was rejected by the House of Commons, and the 3d, 4th, 7th, and 8th, because to them alone the trial was confined. The substance of the 1st charge was, that Warren Hastings, in contradiction of the positive orders of the court of directors, furnished the Nabob of Oude, for a stipulated sum of money to be paid to the East India Company, with a body of troops, for the declared purpose of thoroughly extirpating the nation of the Rohillas. There was good reason for placing this charge in the van. The facts on which it was founded could easily be proved, a complete justification of them seemed impossible, and Mr. Dundas had committed himself by moving a resolution in condemnation of the Rohilla war, and of the conduct of the president and select committee of Bengal in

regard to it. Taking these circumstances into consideration, it must have appeared, both to the assailants and to the supporters of Mr. Hastings, that this was the charge from which he had most to fear; and hence, when by the aid of Mr. Pitt, who was at full liberty to give any vote that policy or conscience dictated, and Mr. Dundas, who chose rather to be inconsistent than not to follow his leader, the charge was rejected by a majority of 119 to 67, it was considered by all parties that the question of impeachment was virtually decided, for how was it possible to doubt that all the other charges would be disposed of in a similar way? Hastings now saw his way clear to the peerage. He was to be Lord Daylesford, thus taking his title from the ancestral property by the purchase of which he had realized the aspiration of his boyhood, and to have a seat at the India board.

A.D. 1786.

Articles of
charge
against Mr.
Hastings.

So much were these arrangements believed to be settled, that the opposition was only expected to make an almost hopeless trial of strength on one or two other charges, and then drop all further proceedings.

The rejection of the Rohilla charge occurred on the 1st of June; on the 13th, passing over the 2d charge, which related to the treatment of Shah Alum, Mr. Fox moved the 3d or Benares charge. It was in substance as follows: That Warren Hastings, in violation of agreements, by which Cheyte Sing, the Rajah of Benares, was liable only in a fixed



CHARLES JAMES FOX.—After Reynolds.

annual contribution, and on the plea of a French war, extorted from the rajah repeated additional contributions, and, on his refusal or inability to pay them, dispossessed him of his territories and drove him into exile. It was not to be expected that those who had failed to discover impeachable matter in the treatment of the Rohillas, would see anything to startle them in the treatment of Cheyte Sing. Mr. Fox was followed by Mr. (now Sir) Philip Francis, who had obtained a seat in parliament, and was bent on using it as a means of gratifying his old enmities. When Mr. Pitt rose, Mr. Hastings' friends were in high spirits. They knew that he held Francis in detestation, and were therefore rejoicing in the belief that his speech would not only vindicate Mr. Hastings, but inflict due punishment on his inveterate and vindictive antagonist. Mr. Pitt, in the first part of his speech, confirmed their belief. He maintained that the government of India were entitled to call upon the zemindars of Benares for extraordinary contributions on public emergencies,

Strange con-
duct pursued
by Mr. Pitt.

A.D. 1787.

Strange pro-
cedure of
Mr. Pitt.

and to punish the contumacious refusal of them. He lauded Mr. Hastings for the ability and presence of mind which he had displayed during the insurrection, and inveighed against Francis in the bitterest terms. The whole tendency of his speech being thus to prove the innocence of Hastings, it only remained to hear him declare his determination to vote an acquittal. How great was the surprise when he suddenly turned round and declared his determination to vote with Mr. Fox! Why? Because though a fine was exigible, the amount which Mr. Hastings exacted, or rather intimated his intention to exact, was oppressive and unjust. His reported language was as follows:—"Upon the whole, the conduct of Mr. Hastings, in the transactions now before the house, had been so cruel, unjust, and oppressive, that it was impossible he, as a man of honour or honesty, or having any regard to faith or conscience, could any longer resist; and therefore he had fully satisfied his conscience, that Warren Hastings, in the case in question, had been guilty of such enormities and misdemeanours as constituted a crime sufficient to call upon the justice of the house to impeach him."

His probable
motives.

Mr. Pitt pleaded conscience, but many did not hesitate to attribute his conduct to very unworthy motives. The friends of Mr. Hastings openly accused him of treachery; others spoke only of jealousy. Mr. Hastings had been received with great favour by the king, and what was justly deemed still more remarkable, Mrs. Hastings, the quondam Baroness Imhoff, had overcome the strict morals of Queen Charlotte, and been welcomed at St. James's. It was difficult to say to what all this favour might lead. Hastings made a peer, seated at the India board, and leagued with his staunch friend Lord Thurlow, who had repeatedly set an example of ministerial insubordination, might yet prove a formidable rival in the cabinet. Such was the kind of surmises employed to account for Mr. Pitt's sudden conversion. There is not much plausibility in them. Pitt would have disdained to stoop to the shabbiness thus imputed to him, and was too conscious of his own powers to fear the rivalry of Mr. Hastings, who only a few weeks before, when permitted to defend himself at the bar of the House of Commons against the proposed impeachment, had shown how destitute he was of the talent most essential to a ministerial leader, by reading a pamphlet instead of delivering a vigorous and effective speech. The true account of the matter we believe to be, that Mr. Pitt was equally persuaded of the guilt of Mr. Hastings when he voted for him and when he voted against him. In both cases he acted merely as a politician, supporting the accused while he thought he was thereby strengthening his party, and abandoning him when he feared that he might ruin it by forfeiting his popularity. Mr. Dundas, who wheeled round with his leader, referred to the subject in his correspondence with Lord Cornwallis, and says, in a letter dated 21st March, 1787:—"The session (of parliament) has proceeded with uninterrupted triumph. The only unpleasant circumstance is the impeachment of Mr. Hastings. Mr. Pitt and I have got great credit from the undeviating fairness and candour

with which we have proceeded in it, but the proceeding is not pleasant to many of our friends, and of course, from that and many other circumstances, not pleasing to us; but the truth is, when we examined the various articles of charges against him, with his defences, they were so strong, and the defences so perfectly unsupported, it was impossible not to concur; and some of the charges will unquestionably go to the House of Lords."¹ Instead of giving Mr. Dundas credit for "the undeviating fairness and candour" which he here claims for himself and Mr. Pitt, the unbiassed opinion of most persons now is, that his own subsequent impeachment was a just retribution for his shuffling and hypocritical conduct. Be this as it may, whether the motives of the leaders were pure or paltry, the followers did their bidding as before, and the motion of Mr. Fox was carried by a majority of 119 to 79. As it was now certain that there would be an impeachment, the other articles of charge were carried without much opposition.

The session of parliament closed amid the discussion of these charges, and the ensuing session of 1787 having resumed the discussion, continued occupied with it till late in April. On the 2d of this month, when the articles

of charge were brought up, it was resolved, on the suggestion of Mr. Pitt, to appoint a committee to draw up articles of impeachment, before proceeding to vote whether the impeachment ought to be proceeded with. On the proposed committee stood the name of Sir Philip Francis, who, instead of recoiling at the idea of such an appointment, was quite prepared to gratify private malice, under the mask of performing a public duty. This was too much for the honourable feelings of the house, and he was ignominiously rejected, on the ground of private enmity to the accused, by a majority of ninety-six to forty-four. On this occasion, Mr. Dundas ventured to differ with Mr. Pitt, and give a new proof of his "undeviating fairness and candour" by voting in the minority. On the 9th of May, the impeachment was voted. Mr. Burke carried the impeachment to the House of Lords, and Mr. Hastings having been

A D. 1787.

Articles of charge against Mr. Hastings voted.



WILLIAM PITT.—From a portrait by J. Hoppner, R.A.

Preparations for the trial.

¹ *Correspondence of Marquis Cornwallis*, vol i. p. 281.

A.D. 1788

Preparations for trial of Mr. Hastings.

brought to its bar, in the custody of the sergeant-at-arms, was admitted to bail, and allowed till the second day of the ensuing session of parliament to prepare his defence. It is not unworthy of notice that in the same session of 1787, which impeached Mr. Hastings, Sir Gilbert Elliot announced his intention to bring Sir Elijah Impey in the same way to justice. The charges, among which the trial of Nuncomar stood in the foreground, were not brought forward till the following session, but the house had no desire to burden itself with a second impeachment, and Mr. Pitt throwing his shield over Sir Elijah allowed him to escape. After he had been heard in his own defence, a motion for impeachment was negatived by seventy-three to fifty-five.

Its commencement.

The trial commenced in Westminster Hall on the 13th day of February, 1788. The interest which it had excited among all classes was intense, and India and its government, which had hitherto been regarded as the most repulsive of all subjects, now fully engrossed the public mind. Much of the interest, doubtless, was factitious, being produced not so much by the importance of the questions at issue, as by the celebrity of the pleaders, the constitution of the court, and the dramatic effect of the scene about to be exhibited. The last has been repeatedly described, and still possesses sufficient historical importance to justify the following quotation from Lord Macaulay:—

Description of the scene by Lord Macaulay.

“There have been spectacles more dazzling to the eye, more gorgeous with jewellery and cloth of gold, more attractive to grown-up children, than that which was then exhibited at Westminster; but perhaps there never was a spectacle so well calculated to strike a highly cultivated, a reflecting, an imaginative mind. All the various kinds of interest which belong to the near and the distant, to the present and to the past, were collected on one spot, and in one hour. All the talents and all the accomplishments which are developed by liberty and civilization were now displayed, with every advantage that could be derived both from co-operation and from contrast. Every step in the proceedings carried the mind backward, through many troubled centuries, to the days when the foundations of our constitution were laid; or far away over boundless seas and deserts to dusky nations living under strange stars, worshipping strange gods, and writing strange characters from right to left (?). The high court of parliament was to sit, according to forms handed down from the days of the Plantagenets, on an Englishman accused of tyranny over the lord of the holy city of Benares, and over the ladies of the princely house of Oude.

“The place was worthy of such a trial. It was the great hall of William Rufus—the hall which had resounded with acclamations at the inauguration of thirty kings; the hall which had witnessed the just sentence of Bacon, and the just absolution of Somers; the hall where the eloquence of Strafford had for a moment awed and melted a victorious party inflamed with just resentment; the hall where Charles had confronted the high court of justice with the placid courage which has half redeemed his fame. Neither civil nor military pomp

was wanting. The avenues were lined with grenadiers. The streets were kept clear by cavalry. The peers, robed in gold and ermine, were marshalled by the heralds under garter king-at-arms. The judges, in their vestments of state, attended to give advice on points of law. Nearly 170 lords, three-fourths of the upper house, as the upper house then was, walked in solemn order from their usual place of assembling to the tribunal. . . . The gray old walls were hung with scarlet. The long galleries were crowded by an audience such as has rarely excited the fears or the emulation of an orator. There were gathered together from all parts of a great, free, enlightened, and prosperous empire, grace and female loveliness, wit and learning, the representatives of every science and of every art."

A.D. 1788.

Lord
Macaulay's
description
of Mr.
Hastings'
trial.

That the interest taken in this celebrated trial was far more dramatic than real, became apparent in the course of the proceeding. At first the attendance was crowded, and many who could not claim seats by right were glad to purchase them at enormous prices; but after Burke, and Fox, and Sheridan had displayed their matchless eloquence in the opening charges, the excitement rapidly diminished, and the trial, ever and anon interrupted by dry and knotty points of law, was left without much notice to drag out its weary length. When it commenced, there was no event of importance to divide with it the public attention; but in the second year of its existence, the king's illness, followed by the regency question and a probable change of ministry, were felt to be more engrossing topics, and before the questions which they raised were settled, the affairs of France had come to a crisis, and all Europe was in alarm. The trial, thus regarded as only a secondary object, made little progress. Even in 1788, when it had all the interest of novelty, the lords devoted only thirty-five days to it, and in 1789 only seventeen days. In 1790 a dissolution of parliament took place, and it became a question whether the impeachment had not in consequence fallen, and whether, if it were to be persisted in, it would not be necessary to commence it anew. When it was at length decided that the impeachment was still in force, so much time had been wasted, it was found absolutely necessary to prosecute only those charges on which it seemed most probable that a conviction could be obtained. Mr. Burke had made a general opening on all the charges. Mr. Fox had opened the Benares charge, of which an abstract has already been given; and Mr. (afterwards Baron) Adam the Begum charge, which was in substance as follows: That Warren Hastings, contrary to justice, equity, and good faith, authorized the Nabob of Oude, over whom he had an absolute control, to seize upon the landed estates of his mother and grandmother, his kindred, and principal nobility, as well as the personal property of the two princesses, who, together with their dependants, were, during the enforcing of these measures, treated with atrocious indignity and barbarity. It was now resolved to curtail the proceedings by opening only other two charges, the one relating to presents and the other to contracts.

Slow pro-
gress of the
trial.

A. D. 1795. After these were concluded, Mr. Hastings was still to be heard in reply on every separate charge, and to have an opportunity of rebutting the evidence of his accusers by counter-evidence. In this way seven years from the commencement of the trial were spun out, and the cause was not ripe for decision till the spring of 1795. On the 23d of April in this year, the lords met for the last time in Westminster Hall. One hundred and seventy walked in procession when the trial commenced; only twenty-nine now voted. On all the charges Mr. Hastings was pronounced not guilty by large majorities, never more than six, usually only three, and sometimes none at all voting him guilty.

Acquittal of Mr. Hastings.

This result generally approved.

This decision had been expected and was generally approved. The managers, particularly Mr. Burke, had stretched their charges to the very utmost, and inserted in them many things which they were unable to substantiate. Every such failure was a victory to Mr. Hastings, because it not only proved his innocence of the particular charge, but attached a degree of doubt to all the others. The language of Mr. Burke was often intemperate, and not only recoiled upon himself and the cause he advocated, but turned the tide of sympathy, and produced a strong reaction in Mr. Hastings' favour. There were other considerations which operated in the same way. The managers of the trial commanded the national purse, and might expend without limit, while not sustaining the loss of a single farthing; Mr. Hastings was incurring in necessary self-defence an expenditure, by which, even though innocent, he must inevitably be ruined. In some respects, too, the whole proceedings taken against him savoured of hypocrisy and injustice. What had become of the money which he was said to have extorted, and the territories which he was said to have usurped? Part of the money had passed into the British treasury, as the share which the legislature had exacted of an imaginary surplus of Indian revenue, and the remainder appropriated by the Company had helped to eke out their dividends. The territories were in like manner retained, and so far from thinking of restoring them, the Company and the government were quarrelling over them, the one claiming them as corporate, and the other as national property. They were thus at once hypocritically denouncing the alleged spoliation, and pocketing the proceeds of it. Such was the hypocrisy. The injustice was, if possible, still more glaring. Mr. Hastings was a public servant, and as such, bound to act according to the best of his judgment for the benefit of his employers. Mere blunders might prove him incapable, but they did not make him corrupt, and therefore could not form the ground of a penal accusation, except in so far as they implied criminal intention. From such intention the directors, even when they disapproved of his measures, entirely exculpated him, and hence, after they were perfectly aware of the worst things that could be laid to his charge, they more than once renewed his tenure of office. It is evident, therefore, that before the Company gave him a vote of thanks for his services on his return to England, they were barred by

Its accordance with equity.

their previous approbation of his conduct from afterwards challenging it. It may be said that the acts of the Company could not foreclose the legislature. As a general rule this is true, but in the present instance the legislature was as much foreclosed as the Company. In the Regulating Act, in which parliament took upon itself the appointment of the Bengal council, Mr. Hastings was made the first governor-general. This office he held for five years as the nominee and, by implication, with the approval of parliament, since the power of recall given by the act was not exercised. Nor was this all. When the five years of the Regulating Act expired, separate acts were passed, continuing him from year to year in his office. During this time all the measures charged as criminal in the impeachment were well known, and the fair conclusion therefore was, that the legislature did not condemn, or had condoned them. In either case, Mr. Hastings was entitled to a verdict of acquittal. From these and other considerations that might be urged, it is plain that the lords did right when they repelled all the charges, and found Mr. Hastings not guilty.

A.D. 1795.

Acquittal
of Mr.
Hastings.

The moment the decision of the lords was given, Mr. Hastings was entitled to stand up and say he was an injured man. He had been ruined in his fortunes by a false accusation. The reparation ought, according to the ordinary rule, to have been made by the party which inflicted the injury, and the House of Commons, had its dignity allowed it to confess a fault, would have done no more than equity required, by replacing every farthing which Mr. Hastings had been compelled to spend in his defence. As this, however, was scarcely to be expected, the court of proprietors very properly took the initiative, and passed two resolutions—the one to indemnify him for the expenses incurred in his defence, and the other to grant him and his representatives, during the Company's exclusive trade, an annuity of £5000 out of the territorial revenue, in consideration of his important services. These resolutions were unavailing without the consent of the Board of Control, and this there was some difficulty in obtaining. Mr. Dundas was at the head of it, and after the part which he had taken in the impeachment, was not generous enough to approve of a grant which virtually condemned it as unjust. After some higgling, it was arranged to grant Mr. Hastings an annuity of £4000 for twenty-eight years and a half, commencing from June 24th, 1785, and to relieve him from present embarrassments by a loan of £50,000, without interest, for eighteen years.

Reparation
made him.

Before parting finally with Mr. Hastings, it will not be out of place here to refer very briefly to his subsequent life. Though he was now only in his sixty-third year, and possessed a constitution so vigorous that he reached his eighty-sixth year in the full possession of his faculties, his public career had already closed. In 1813, when the renewal of the Company's charter was under discussion, he was one of the witnesses examined at the bar of the House of Commons. Twenty-seven years before he had stood at the same bar

Subsequent
events in
his life.

A.D. 1813. to defend himself against an accusation which charged him with heinous crimes. How different his position now! A chair was ordered to be set for him, and when he rose to retire, the whole house, with the exception of the one or two surviving managers of the impeachment, rose and uncovered. He was shortly after made a privy councillor. Something more substantial than honour still awaited him. In 1814 his annuity of £4000, and the period for which £50,000 had been lent him without interest, expired. The annuity was continued for life, and the loan under deduction of £16,000, which had been paid back, was remitted. In 1820, about eighteen months after his death, the court of proprietors resolved to place his statue in the general court-room of the India House, and about the same time his statue was placed in Calcutta by the inhabitants.

Honours
paid Mr.
Hastings.

Fulsome
eulogies of
his adminis-
tration.

The resolution of the court of proprietors was thus expressed:—"That as the last testimony of approbation of the long, zealous, and successful services of the late Right Honourable Warren Hastings, in maintaining, without diminution, the British possessions in India against the combined efforts of European, Mahometan, and Mahratta enemies, the statue of that distinguished servant of the East India Company be placed among the statesmen and heroes who have contributed in their several stations to the recovery, preservation, and security of the British power and authority in India." This resolution is a tolerably fair specimen of the kind of style in which it has become customary to bepraise the administration of Mr. Hastings. The injustice to which he was subjected is doubtless a main cause of the encomiums which are now lavished upon him, and it may therefore seem ungracious to object to them as unmeaning and extravagant. Still, when a writer so well informed as Colonel Wilks talks of Mr. Hastings as the *Saviour* of India, and another writer tries to improve upon the idea, by speaking of him as having come "in the fulness of time," one may be permitted to ask what the particular services are which fill them with such admiration that, in panting to give utterance to it, they are betrayed into profanity.

Its real
character
determined
by facts.

Though the House of Lords did right in finding that the criminal intention necessary to infer guilt was not proved, and that therefore Mr. Hastings was not guilty, it ought to be remembered that the facts on which the impeachment proceeded were either proved, or not proved, merely because they were confessed. It is true, then, that Mr. Hastings hired out British troops to the Nabob of Oude, for the express purpose of extirpating the Rohillas, and thereby placed one of the noblest races of Hindoostan at the mercy of a cruel despot, merely because that despot had promised to pay him liberally for his inhumanity and injustice. It is true that Mr. Hastings, when holding the provinces of Allahabad and Corah in trust, either for Shah Alum or the Company, sold them to the same despot for a large sum of money, and thus either cheated Shah Alum, or cheated the Company, by giving for money, provinces which, from their importance as a frontier, were to the Company above money's worth.

It is true that Mr. Hastings might by a word have saved the life of Nuncomar, and that by refusing to speak that word he became virtually responsible for the judicial murder of a person who was giving evidence against him, and charging him with the grossest corruption. It is true that Mr. Hastings goaded Cheyte Sing into rebellion by extortionate demands, and thereby, so far from replenishing the Company's treasury, as he had boasted he would do, burdened it with a new load of debt. Finally, it is true that Mr. Hastings, on shuffling pretexts, deprived the Begums of Oude of the protection which the Company were solemnly pledged to give them, and then employed the Nabob of Oude, the son of the one and grandson of the other, to confiscate their estates, and rob them of their personal property, subjecting them and the females of their household during the process to shameful indignities, and extorting money from two of their aged dependants by cruel imprisonment and, it is more than suspected, by actual torture. All these things are true, and the administration under which they were done ought to possess very extraordinary merits indeed to entitle it to any kind of eulogy. What, then, were these merits? The above resolution of the court of proprietors says, that they consisted in maintaining the British possessions in India "without diminution." This is at best but negative praise. After a vast expenditure of blood and treasure, he left matters no worse than he found them. But then, it is said, consider the formidable confederacy which he had to encounter. True; but what led to that confederacy? Mainly, we believe, the tortuous, vacillating, and short-sighted policy of Mr. Hastings. The Mahrattas were at peace with the Company, and had done nothing to provoke hostilities, when the Bombay council, merely because they coveted one of their possessions, attempted to seize it. War immediately ensued. Mr. Hastings, then in a minority in his council, very properly agreed with the majority in condemning the war; but no sooner had he obtained the majority, than he turned round and gave it his direct and hearty sanction. His only plea in justification was the change of circumstances. When he disapproved of the war, it threatened to be disastrous; it now promised to be successful, and therefore he approved of it. Thus, right and wrong had no weight in his political balance; nothing but success or the want of it was to be allowed to turn the beam. And what was the result? First the disgraceful convention of Worgaum, next the humiliating treaty of Poorundhur, and lastly the equally humiliating treaty of Salbye, by which the Bombay presidency was not only deprived of the only remnant of conquest which the treaty of Poorundhur had left, but stripped of almost all its older possessions, and nearly confined within its original island. The resolution of the proprietors asserts that Mr. Hastings maintained the territories "without diminution." Was there no diminution when Bombay was thus curtailed, and everything which it possessed in Gujerat handed over, along with a large sum of money, as a kind of peace-offering to Scindia?

A.D. 1795.

Mr. Hastings' administration reviewed.

Laxity of principle in Mr. Hastings.

A. D. 1795.

Military
administra-
tion of Mr.
Hastings.

If the other principal events in the administration of Mr. Hastings were reviewed, the results would be found to be not one whit more satisfactory. The resolution enumerates "European, Mahometan, and Mahratta enemies." How the Company fared in their war with the last has just been seen. If by the Mahometan enemy Hyder is to be understood, the allusion is unhappy, since the war with him was only terminated by imploring the intervention of the Mahrattas, to make him disgorge the territories which he had wrested from us, and which we had no hope of being able without this intervention to recover. It must be admitted that on this occasion, though there was no diminution of territory, it was only prevented by something like a stain on the national honour. By the European enemy must of course be meant the French. With them the early part of the struggle was chiefly naval, and so indecisive that neither of the combatants could boast much of their laurels. Latterly, when Sir Eyre Coote's great military talents were lost to the Company by his sudden death, the Madras army had been sent to Cuddalore, to an expedition which was so ill managed, that it owed its escape from destruction not to any measure of Mr. Hastings, but to the opportune cessation of hostilities on the announcement of an European peace.

His merits
tested both
by what he
did and
what he
wished to do.

It thus appears that all the wars of Mr. Hastings' administration were either blunders or misfortunes, and that, therefore, much praise cannot be due to the energy which was exerted merely in endeavours to redeem them. Some of the blunders were, as has been seen, committed by Mr. Hastings himself, and though it would be unfair to hold him responsible for the blunders of others, it cannot be forgotten that the measures by which he sought to repair them were as often wrong as right. It is often said that Mr. Hastings, having been refused the powers which were necessary to enable him to act efficiently, and been long thwarted by adverse majorities both in his own council and in the court of directors, is entitled to credit for the measures which he would have adopted, if he had been at liberty to follow his own judgment. Undoubtedly he is entitled both to the credit and to the discredit—credit where the measures would have been good, and discredit where they would have been pernicious. There are two sides to the account, and the only fair method of judging is to strike the balance. It is very doubtful if Mr. Hastings would gain by this process. Had he been left to take his own way, he would have involved the Company in a war with the Nizam, in order to conciliate the favour of the Mahratta Rajah of Berar; at a later period he would have conciliated the favour of the Nizam, by making him a present in perpetuity of the whole Northern Circars, in return for a body of worthless cavalry; and the Dutch had inveigled him into a bargain, by which he would have accepted of a body of auxiliary troops, as an equivalent for ceding to them the whole province of Tinnevely. Such are the mischiefs he would have done, and the enormous sacrifices he would have made; had not others prevented him; and it may well be

made a question, whether his reputation has not gained more than it has suffered by the obstacles thrown in his way. If from his foreign we turn to his internal policy, he will be found entitled to more praise. Except in the case of the Rohillas, when the want of money tempted him to commit a great iniquity, he showed an anxious desire to protect the natives from oppression, and in his financial arrangements never forgot the necessity of providing for the security and comforts of the ryots. He also brought the public offices for the first time into some kind of order, and in the face of much opposition, both from his colleagues and the court of directors, instituted a regular system of statistical inquiry, for the purpose of furnishing information without which several subsequent reforms could not have been attempted. His labours in this way are not, however, either so extensive or so valuable as to deserve further notice. One of his best claims to the gratitude of posterity, is the encouragement he gave to the cultivation of oriental literature, by the patronage both of learned societies and individual authors.

A.D. 1795.

Review of
Mr. Hastings' admin-
istration.

On the whole, though reprobating the harsh measure which was dealt out to Mr. Hastings by the impeachment, and admitting his claims in a few instances to the gratitude, and in many instances to the forbearance of his country, we are unable, in estimating his services, to concur in the high eulogy pronounced upon them, both by his admirers and by himself. In his published work, entitled *Memoirs relative to the State of India*, he speaks of "the invariable success with which all the measures which were known to be of my own formation were attended;" of "the apparent magnitude and temerity attributed to some of those which proved most fortunate in their termination;" of "the wonderful support and gradual elevation which my personal character had derived during a long and progressive series of contingencies," and then says, that "these and some other circumstances had altogether contributed to excite a degree of superstitious belief in the minds of almost all men who were situated within the sphere of my authority or influence, that the same success would crown all my future endeavours." Had these words, the language, obviously, of inordinate vanity and not of truth and soberness, fallen from Mr. Hastings when so far advanced in years that a second childhood might have been suspected, it would have been unfair to quote them; but as he tells us himself that he penned them on the homeward voyage to England, they furnish a genuine specimen of the self-conceit which is known to have been one of his greatest failings. In this respect, and in several others, he suffers by contrast with Marquis Cornwallis. This nobleman was modest, candid, and straightforward; Mr. Hastings was vain, disingenuous, and equivocating. The one always meant what he said, and kept every promise he made; the other too often acted as if he had believed, like Talleyrand, that speech had been given to man to enable him to conceal his thoughts. Not only on ordinary occasions was he too much given to keep the promise to the ear and break it to the

His extrava-
gant esti-
mate of
himself.

A.D. 1795.

Character
and admin-
istration of
Mr. Hast-
ings con-
trasted with
that of Mar-
quis Corn-
wallis.

sense, but even in making solemn treaties with native powers, we find him at one time instructing a resident to throw in a *vague* article, and at another, telling his colleagues that he had purposely made a stipulation *indefinite*. In thus preferring the crooked to the straight path, he sometimes brought the Company into a position where they could not remain with safety, nor recede with honour. Indeed, on comparing the two administrations, we have no hesitation in giving the preference to that of Marquis Cornwallis. His war, unlike the Mahratta war of Mr. Hastings, was engaged in, only because it could not be avoided, and, being just, terminated as it deserved, in curbing a faithless despot, and giving the Company, in addition to a large extent of territory, a much improved frontier. His reforms, though by no means free from faults, were carried on, not by fits and starts, like those of Mr. Hastings, but on a regular and comprehensive plan, embracing almost every department of the public service. Last, and best of all, Marquis Cornwallis was both in theory and practice the declared enemy of all corruption, and never made an appointment without preferring the candidate whom he believed best qualified to perform the duties; whereas, under Mr. Hastings, and still more perhaps under his immediate successor, Sir John Macpherson, every kind of jobbery prevailed, and influential support from directors and proprietors was secured, first, by conferring profitable contracts on their relatives and friends, and then winking at the imperfect or fraudulent manner in which the stipulations contained in them were performed. The banishment of this shameless trafficking in bullock contracts, salt contracts, silk contracts, and opium contracts, introduced a new era in Indian administration, and made it tenfold purer than it had ever been before. Mr. Hastings, unfortunately, could not afford to bestow his patronage on the most deserving, because it was the great instrument on which he depended for confirming the wavering fidelity, and increasing the number of his supporters; Sir John Macpherson, partly for the same reason, and partly also, it may be, because corruption was congenial to his nature and his habits, seems to have dealt with his patronage as every trader does in the article in which he traffics, employing it wherever it promised to yield the quickest and best return; Marquis Cornwallis regarded it as a sacred trust, and when solicited, even by the heir-apparent to the British crown, returned the unvarying answer, that qualification was his only test, and that where it was wanting, it was impossible for him to make any appointment. All honour to him for his firmness, disinterestedness, and sterling honesty!

CHAPTER IV.

Sir John Shore governor-general—Death of Mahadajee Scindia—War between the Nizam and the Mahrattas—Death of the Peishwa—Disputed succession in Oude—Death of Mahomed Ali—War with the Dutch.



DIFFICULTY was felt in appointing a successor to Marquis Cornwallis. Mr. Dundas, owing to this difficulty, had some thoughts of taking the office upon himself, and in a letter dated September 17, 1792, referring to the appointment of a successor, wrote him as follows: "I can assure your lordship you have never imposed any task upon me that I have found more difficult to accomplish. The truth is, I had almost despaired of it, and it is not a month since I had determined to write to you, entreating you to remain a few months more, and promising that if we did not find a successor in the winter to our mind, I would come out to India myself, the moment the charter of the East India Company should be settled, sooner than which time it was impossible for me to leave this country." When the office of Governor of India had thus gone a begging, the name of Mr. Shore was mentioned. To his appointment there was only one serious objection. The appointment of Marquis Cornwallis was the first in which a previous connection with the Company had not been deemed necessary, and the success of his administration had gone far to confirm the opinion that all future appointments should be made on the same principle. Indeed, Marquis Cornwallis, when not aware that there was any intention of appointing Mr. Shore, had written to Mr. Dundas, that he hoped never again to see the supreme government in the hands of a Company's servant, and inclosed in confirmation of this opinion, a letter, in which the writer, declared to be "one of the most able and honourable men in Bengal," had thus expressed himself: "The Company's servants are certainly the most fit persons for members of council, but from what I have seen since his lordship's departure (for the war against Tippoo), I am convinced that it could never answer to appoint any of them to the government. Such is the present temper of the British part of the community in India, that it appears to me that nobody but a person who has never been in the service, and who is entirely unconnected with the individuals who compose it, who is of a rank far surpassing his associates in the government, and has the full support of the ministry at home, can be competent to govern our possessions with that energy and vigour which is essential to our political safety and internal prosperity." The king himself appears to have been of the same opinion, for in a holograph letter to Mr. Dundas, dated

A.D. 1792.

Mr. Dundas
disposed to
become
governor-
general.

A.D. 1793. "Weymouth, September 5, 1792, 4 P.M.," he says, "Unless a very proper man of distinction could have been (found) to be governor-general at Bengal, no one could have been so properly thought of as Mr. Shore, who will more certainly follow the civil plan Lord Cornwallis has laid down than any other person."

Sir John
Shore ap-
pointed
governor-
general.

As the "very proper man of distinction" desired by his majesty was not forthcoming, Mr. Shore obtained the appointment, and along with it a baronetage. According to Mr. Dundas' account, he had not only the recom-



SIR JOHN SHORE, Lord Teignmouth.
After a portrait by H. F. Riggs, R.A.

mendation mentioned by the king of being certain to follow the civil plan of Lord Cornwallis, of which he was in fact the author, though he would have preferred a decennial to a perpetual settlement, but had moreover expressed his readiness to place himself entirely at the disposal of the ministry, being "willing either to remain for a few years at the head of the government, or to become second in the council, if we think it right, upon further inquiry, to send out any other person from this country, or to come home again, if that suits our arrangements best." In other words, Mr. Dundas intimates that Sir John

Shore was merely to keep the vacancy supplied till the king's "very proper man of distinction" could be found. In the above holograph letter, his majesty had added, after the passage already quoted, "I trust at the same time, a seat at the supreme council will be conferred on Major-general Abercrombie, and the commission of a commander-in-chief of the forces in the East Indies; and a fit person intrusted with the command of the forces in the Carnatic." In accordance with these wishes, which of course were received by Mr. Dundas as commands, Major-general Abercrombie obtained his appointments. About the same time, Lord Hobart was appointed to succeed Sir Charles Oakley as governor of Madras, and in the event of the death, resignation, or departure of Sir John Shore, was to become governor-general.

Tippoo's two
sons restored
to him.

Sir John Shore arrived in Calcutta some time before Marquis Cornwallis finally left it, but he did not enter formally on the duties of government till the 28th of October, 1793. An European war, sprung out of the French revolution, was then raging. As yet, however, its effects were little felt in the East, and the peace of India remained undisturbed. Tippoo, having performed his obligations under the treaty, claimed the restoration of his sons. Some objections by the Nizam, on the ground that Tippoo was making claims upon him

A.D. 1794.

Tippoo's
two sons
restored to
him.

inconsistent with the treaty, in respect to the district of Kurnool, were over-ruled, and the two princes, sent off from Madras under the charge of Captain Doveton, were formally restored to their father at Deonhully, on the 28th of March, 1794. Before their arrival, Tippoo had submitted to his counsellors in writing the important question, whether or not he should admit the Englishman to his presence. Their answer was, that as the refusal to receive him might excite suspicion, "he might be amused with professions of friendship, while whatever is in the heart may nevertheless remain there." Tippoo resolved to act on this advice, and left his capital for Deonhully. His tent was pitched on a plain in its vicinity. The two boys, on entering it with Captain Doveton, approached as if completely overawed, and when close to the musnud, placed their heads on their father's feet; he, apparently unmoved, and without saying a word, touched their necks with his hands; on this they arose, and he pointed to their seats: Captain Doveton, on making his obeisance, was pointed in like manner to a seat near theirs, and an animated conversation ensued, Tippoo talking with great ease and fluency on the wonders of the French revolution in making head against all Europe, on Lord Macartney's embassy to China, and various other leading topics of the day. During subsequent interviews, he declared to Captain Doveton that he deemed Lord Cornwallis his best friend, that he would be governed by his advice to forget the past, and would in future cultivate the friendship of the English nation as the primary object of his policy. The future showed that while he thus spoke, he was acting literally on the advice of his counsellors, expressing friendship, and at the same time concealing what was in the heart.

Relations
between the
Mahrattas
and the
Nizam.

The first subject of importance which engaged the attention of the new governor-general was the state of the relations between the Mahrattas and the Nizam. The mutual guarantee proposed by Marquis Cornwallis had, as we have seen, been rejected, simply because it would have bound the Mahrattas to a course of policy which they were determined not to follow. Fear of Tippoo, or a desire to share in the partition of his territories, had induced them to become parties to the confederacy against him, but this object accomplished, they were no longer willing to be the ally, because they were determined to be the absolute masters of the Nizam. Aware of this determination, the Nizam used every endeavour to obtain the guarantee, and was willing for that purpose to have made such concessions as would almost have brought him into a state of vassalage under the Company. Marquis Cornwallis, however, stretching the system of neutrality beyond its fair limits, refused to give more than a vague assurance that the British government would faithfully fulfil all its obligations under existing treaties. Sir John Shore, when applied to, nearly repeated the same answer, and left the Nizam no alternative but to seek security from some other quarter. Accordingly, he employed a Frenchman of the name of Raymond, who possessed good military talents, and had for some time been in

A D. 1794. his service, not only to organize native troops, but to form battalions of his own countrymen.

Unfriendly
feelings of
Scindia.

While the Nizam was endeavouring to enter into closer alliance with the British, the Mahrattas were pursuing an opposite course. In particular, Mahadajee Scindia, who was deeply offended because the extravagant terms on which he had at one time offered to furnish a contingent to the war against Tippoo were not accepted, had used all his influence to prevent the conclusion of any treaty of guarantee. The English, he said, were already too powerful,



MAHADAJEE SCINDIA.
From Daniel's Oriental Annual, 1831.

and instead of taking any step which would tend to increase their influence, a much wiser policy would be to employ Tippoo as a counterpoise to it. In accordance with these views, the Mahrattas actually entered into an alliance with Tippoo, the object of which was understood to be the destruction of the Nizam, and thereafter a combined effort against the Company. These measures were only in contemplation when Mahadajee Scindia was suddenly cut off by fever at Wunowlee, in the vicinity of Poonah, on the 12th of February, 1794. Though nominally the subject of the peishwa, he was evidently aspiring to be his master, and had risen to a degree of power which would doubtless have enabled him, if he had lived, to accom-

plish the object of his ambition. Some short account of him will therefore not be out of place.

Origin and
rise of Scin-
dia's family.

The family of Scindia are Sudras. Ranojee Scindia, the first of its members who acquired much distinction, had become by hereditary right the *potail* or headman of a village, when he was taken into the service of the peishwa, Balajee Row. His nominal office was to carry the peishwa's slippers. Though humble, it was deemed, like all court offices, honourable; and, what was of more consequence, gave Ranojee an opportunity of acquiring influence with his master. After the death of Balajee Row, his son Bajee Row continued him in his office, and treated him with still more favour. He had one day, on coming out from a long audience, found Ranojee asleep on his back, with the slippers clasped in his hands on his breast, and was so pleased with this simple proof of fidelity, that he immediately gave him a place in the *pagah*, or body-guard. It is said that Ranojee ever after "carried with him, carefully packed in a box, a pair of the peishwa's old slippers, which he never ceased to regard with almost

religious veneration as the source of his rise."¹ In his new station he distinguished himself as an active enterprising soldier, and at his death, though largely in debt to Mulhar Row Holkar, with whom he had formed an intimate connection, was in possession of a valuable jaghire. He left four sons, three legitimate, by Meenah Bae, a native of the Deccan, and one illegitimate, by a Rajpoot woman, a native of Malwah. The illegitimate son was Mahadajee Scindia. After his brothers as well as a nephew who had held the jaghire were dead, he succeeded in supplanting another nephew, and being put in possession of the jaghire, became the recognized head of the family. He was present at the fatal battle of Paniput, and during the flight was closely pursued by an Afghan. He rode a fine Deccany mare, which soon carried him far ahead, but whenever he halted a moment for rest, he saw the Afghan, who rode a strong ambling steed, following close upon his track. Ultimately, the mare completely exhausted fell into a ditch, and Mahadajee was taken. His enemy, after wounding him with a battle-axe, which deprived him for life of the use of his right leg, stripped him of some ornaments and left him to his fate. He was found by one of the fugitives, Rana Khan, a water-carrier, who placed him on his bullock, and took him towards the Deccan. Mahadajee Scindia told General Palmer, the resident at his court, that for a long time he never slept without seeing the Afghan and his clumsy charger pacing after him and his swift Deccany mare. Rana Khan was liberally rewarded for his humanity. He ever after went by the name of the Bhace, or brother of Mahadajee, rose to high commands, and was loaded with favours.

A.D. 1769.

History of
Scindia's
family.

The return of Ahmed Shah Abdalee and his Afghans to Cabool enabled the Mahrattas to repair the disasters of Paniput, and regain their possessions in Malwah and Hindoostan. Mahadajee Scindia, when Visajee Kishen as commander-in-chief crossed the Nerbudda in 1769, accompanied him at the head of 15,000 horse, and became the chief director of his councils; and it was chiefly at his instigation that the Mahrattas, in concert with Shah Alum's general, made the incursion into the territories of the Rohilla chief, Zabita Khan, thereby forcing the Rohillas into that treaty with the Nabob of Oude, the alleged violation of which was afterwards made a pretext for attempting to extirpate them. The Mahrattas during this campaign gained almost entire possession of the Doab, and established such a complete ascendancy at Delhi, that Shah Alum was truly their prisoner, and attempted in vain to throw off their yoke. In all these transactions Mahadajee took the lead, and extending his territories in every direction, made rapid strides towards independence. When Ragobah engaged in the struggle which ultimately involved the Company in the first Mahratta war, Mahadajee Scindia, as well as Tookajee Holkar, who usually followed in Scindia's wake, appear to have promised him their support. On this account, these two chiefs were believed not to be indis-

Dexterous
policy of
Scindia.

¹ Sir John Malcolm's *Central India*, vol. i. p. 117.

A.D. 1784.

Proceedings
of Scindia.

posed to a separate alliance with the Company. An attempt was accordingly made with that view, but it failed; and Mahadajee Scindia, having made common cause with Nana Furnavese, took an active part in the hostilities which led to the miserable convention of Wurgaom. With him specially was this convention concluded, and as the terms, though most humiliating, were not so rigorous as might have been exacted, his leniency was afterwards gratefully acknowledged and even liberally rewarded. His course had been dictated by sound policy. He was now the avowed rival without being the open enemy of Nana, and had secured the favour of the British, which might yet stand him in good stead. It was probably for this reason that at a later period, when he had obtained the custody of Ragobah's person, he allowed him to escape in the manner which has been related.

His motives
in making
peace.

After these apparent approaches to friendship with the Company, another turn of politics induced Mahadajee Scindia actually to take the field against General Goddard in Gujerat. Still, even at this time he professed the greatest friendship for the English, and, as a pledge of it, restored the two English gentlemen who had been left with him as hostages for the fulfilment of the Wurgaom convention. These professions of friendship, though they led to negotiation, ended in nothing, and hostilities having been renewed, Scindia sustained a defeat not so disastrous as disgraceful, because he had allowed himself to be surprised in his camp. Not long afterwards, the capture of Gwalior by Captain Popham and the invasion of Malwah by Colonel Camac, drove him northwards to defend his own territories. When thus forced to carry on the war at his own expense, he soon tired of it, and, contrary to expectation, entered into the negotiation which, as we have seen, terminated in a general Mahratta peace.

His gains by
the treaty
of Salbye.

By the above treaty of Salbye, Mahadajee Scindia, besides many other advantages, was left at full liberty to follow his own ambitious schemes. He wrested Gwalior from the hands of the Rana of Gohud, whom the British had left at his mercy, reduced several Rajpoot chiefs, who, after becoming Mahratta tributaries, had thrown off their allegiance, and sent a body of troops to attempt the conquest of Bundelcund. Still higher prospects opened before him when the two leading Mogul factions applied for his interference. At the head of the one was Mahomed Beg, of the other, Afrasiab Khan. As the invitation from the latter was ostensibly from the emperor, Mahadajee Scindia preferred it, and set out for Agra, towards which the imperial court was advancing. Immediately after a meeting had been held, Afrasiab Khan was assassinated. Scindia, from the advantage which he derived from the event, and the asylum he gave to the assassin, did not escape the suspicion of having been privy to the murder. Be this as it may, the result was to vest him with complete authority at Delhi. The office of *ameer-ul-omrah*, or vizier, was offered to him, but declined; in its stead he obtained for the peishwa the office of *vakeel-i-mootluc*, or supreme

deputy, and for himself, that of substitute to the peishwa in this new capacity. In this way he was really vested with the whole imperial authority, put in command of the army, and intrusted with the management of the provinces of Delhi and Agra. The position to which he had now attained is thus summed up by Sir John Malcolm:—"He was the nominal slave, but the rigid master of the unfortunate Shah Alum, Emperor of Delhi; the pretended friend, but the designing rival of the house of Holkar; the professed inferior in all matters of form, but the real superior and oppressor of the Rajpoot princes of Central India; and the proclaimed soldier, but the actual plunderer of the family of the peishwa." A.D. 1784.
Position
attained by
Scindia.

At this time, when Mahadajee Scindia was actual sovereign of Hindoostan from the Sutlej to Agra, possessed two-thirds of Malwah and some of the finest provinces of the Deccan, and had an army composed of sixteen battalions of regular infantry, disciplined by a Frenchman of the name of De Boigne, 100,000 horse, and 500 pieces of cannon, a curious scene of mock humility took place at Poonah. Having arrived here to pay his respects to Madhoo Row the peishwa, Mahadajee Scindia, too modest to enter the city in any kind of state, dismounted from his elephant at the gates, and took his place in the hall of audience below all the hereditary nobles. When the peishwa, on entering, requested them to take their seats, Scindia remained standing. For him to sit would be too much honour. Producing from a bundle which he carried under his arm a pair of slippers, he placed them before the peishwa. "This," he said, "is my occupation: it was my father's before me." There was policy in this grimace. The affected pride of his humble origin made him popular, and it became a common saying, "Mahadajee Scindia made himself a sovereign by calling himself a *potail*."

The new honours and conquests of Scindia greatly increased his expenditure, and he had soon to contend with the greatest of all dangers to an Indian potentate—an empty treasury. In his eagerness to replenish it, he did not employ the most judicious means. Under various pretexts, he confiscated the jaghires of many of the Mahometan chiefs, and thus not only provoked their enmity, but spread disaffection among all the others, who were afraid, not



MADHOO ROW.
From a picture in possession of the Royal Asiatic Society.

His affected
moderation.

A. D. 1792.

Scindia becomes involved in financial and other difficulties.

without cause, of similar treatment. Another step he took brought matters to a crisis. Using the name of the emperor, he claimed tribute from the Rajpoot chiefs, and by appearing with an army before the gates of Jeypoor, frightened the rajah into payment of a first instalment. More was promised, and had he appeared again with his army, more would have been paid. Instead of this, he sent an agent, and only received a contemptuous refusal. The Rajpoot chiefs had leagued with the disaffected Mahometan nobles and were ripe for revolt. Scindia was taken at a disadvantage. His funds were exhausted, his troops were in arrears, and when about to encounter a formidable insurrection at home, he was obliged to detach a considerable force to repel an incursion of the Sikhs. To complete his difficulties, Ismael Beg, one of his leading Mahometan chiefs, deserted him, on the eve of a great battle with the Rajpoots, and was shortly after followed by the whole of the emperor's regular infantry, with eighty pieces of cannon. Had the Rajpoots pressed their advantage, they might have freed Hindoostan from Mahratta domination, but, satisfied with driving the invader from their own territories, they left Ismael Beg to contend single-handed for the liberation of those belonging to the emperor. Even then, Scindia was encompassed with difficulties. Ismael Beg, joined by Gholam Kawdir, the son of Zabita Khan, defeated him in a pitched battle. Afterwards, when the tide of fortune had turned against them, they managed to obtain possession of Delhi, in June, 1788. Shah Alum, in endeavouring to maintain the citadel against them, became their prisoner, and was deprived of eyesight by the hands of the merciless Gholam Kawdir. This atrocity did not long remain unpunished. The perpetrator, after being driven from Delhi, was captured, and subjected to a dreadful mutilation which he did not survive, and the unhappy Shah Alum, now a blind old man, and once more in the hands of Scindia, was re-seated on his throne.

His visit to Poonah.

At the time when Lord Cornwallis concluded the treaty of alliance with the Nizam and the Mahrattas, Scindia offered to become a party to it, and march against Tippoo, provided the British would furnish him with two battalions similar to those granted to Nizam Ali, and engage moreover to protect his possessions in Hindoostan during his absence. The rejection of these proposals gave him deep offence, and he henceforward showed himself decidedly hostile to British interests. It was partly with the view of being able to damage them more effectually, that in 1792 he quitted Hindoostan to pay a visit to Poonah, but his ostensible object was different. Shah Alum had been made to grant new patents, not only confirming the offices of *vakeel-i-mooluc* to the peishwa, and of deputy to Scindia, but declaring both offices hereditary and perpetual, and Scindia, in setting out for Poonah, gave out that he was proceeding thither by the emperor's orders, with the sunnuds and insignia, for the purpose of seeing the peishwa regularly installed. Nana Furnavese made many objections to the proposed ceremony, and endeavoured to convince the

peishwa that he could not accept of the titles and insignia without violating the Mahratta constitution. His arguments were unavailing, and a day was fixed for the formal investiture. The following description of it is given by Duff:¹—

A.D. 1792.

“Scindia spared no pains to make it as imposing as possible. A grand suite of tents was pitched at a distance from his own camp. They proceeded towards them with the most pompous form. At the further end of these splendid apartments, a throne, meant to represent that of the Moguls, was erected, on which was displayed the imperial firman, the *khillut* or dresses of investiture, and all the principal insignia. The peishwa on approaching the throne made his obeisance thrice, placed 101 gold mohurs upon it, as a *nuzur* or offering, and took his seat on its left. Scindia's Persian secretary then read the imperial firmans, and amongst others the edict which prevented the slaughter of bullocks and cows. The peishwa then received the *khillut*, consisting of nine articles of dress, five superb ornaments of jewels and feathers, a sword and shield, a pencease, a seal and inkstand, and two royal *morechuls* or fans of peacocks' tails, accompanied by a *nalkee* (a sort of sedan-chair without a top), a *palkee* (a sort of short bedstead), a horse, and an elephant; besides six elephants bearing the imperial standard, two crescents, two stars, and the orders of the Fish and the Sun. The peishwa retired to an adjoining tent and returned clothed in the imperial *khillut*, when he resumed his seat; and Scindia, followed by Nana Furnavese and such of the peishwa's officers as were present, offered *nuzurs* of congratulation. When the peishwa arose to return to his palace, he was followed by Scindia and Hurry Punt, carrying the *morechuls* and fanning him. He entered Poonah seated on the *nalkee*; the concourse of people assembled to witness the procession was exceedingly great; the pomp and grandeur displayed was beyond anything that the inhabitants of Poonah had ever seen, whilst the clang of thousands of musical instruments, the shout of the populace, volleys of musketry, and salvos of cannon, seemed to give all the effect that the projector of this state ceremony could possibly desire.”

Curious ceremony at Poonah.



MORCHULS, Emblems of Sovereignty.²
1, From Moorsheadah; 2, from Madras—
Museum, East India House.

The investiture of Scindia as hereditary deputy took place on the arrival at the peishwa's palace. It was a very tame affair, both because his affected modesty would not allow it to be pompous, and because intimations were not wanting to show how much his ultimate designs were suspected and disrelished.

¹ Duff's *History of the Mahrattas*, vol. iii. p. 78-80.

² The *morechuls* whence our illustration is copied are very beautiful examples. That from Moorsheadabad has peacocks' feathers, and the tube holding

them is enriched with gold and green foil, disposed in a very pretty pattern; whilst that from Madras is ornamented with gold and red foil, the feathers in which are, however, not from the peacock.

A.D. 1792.

Scindia's
influence
with the
young
peishwa at
Poona.

He saw the necessity of acting with the utmost caution, and made it his first business to establish himself in the young peishwa's good graces. He had brought as presents to him many of the rare productions and curiosities of Hindoostan, and he soon rendered himself so agreeable to him by his frank unreserved manners, that he became his constant companion. He talked to him of hunting and hawking, carried him out on frequent excursions to these sports, and made parties of pleasure for his amusement. Madhoo Row was delighted with a behaviour so different from the grave decorum habitual to the Nana, and began gradually to give part of his confidence to Scindia. Business thus occasionally became the subject of conversation, and plans of policy were unfolded. If Holkar and any other Mahratta chiefs who interfered with his management were withdrawn, he would make all Hindoostan a secure possession to the peishwa. The English were the only enemies to be feared, and the accession of strength which they had gained in the late war by the aid of the Mahrattas was much to be lamented. The weakening of Tippoo was a political blunder, and it would therefore be advisable in future to form a closer connection with him. Such was the kind of policy which Scindia was understood to be inculcating, when all his schemes were suddenly cut short by a sudden death.

Scindia dies,
and is suc-
ceeded by
Dowlut
Row Scin-
dia, his
nephew.

Both from the suddenness of the event, and the state of parties at the time, it might have been expected that great changes would follow. Mahadajee Scindia left no male issue. He had a full brother, Tookajee Scindia, who fell at Paniput, and left three sons. The eldest of them had no sons; the other two had, and Scindia, without paying any regard to the legal order of succession, had repeatedly declared his intention to adopt Dowlut Row, the son of his youngest nephew. Though the adoption had not actually taken place, effect was given to the intention. Dowlut Row, then only a youth of fifteen years of age, was accordingly, after some slight opposition on the part of Mahadajee's widow, recognized as his heir, and entered into peaceable possession of his immense territories. The policy which he began to pursue was exactly that which his grand-uncle had advocated, and thus the question of interference on behalf of the Nizam, which Marquis Cornwallis had left open, Sir John Shore was compelled to answer. The case contemplated by the treaty between the confederates, but left for future arrangement, was about to be realized. Tippoo was believed to have collected an army for the express purpose of attacking the Nizam. Had this been all, there could not have been any room for discussion, as assistance could not have been refused without a violation both of the letter and the spirit of the treaty; but the peculiarity of the case was, that in the contemplated aggression, Tippoo could scarcely be considered as a principal. He was to be the auxiliary of another party, and that party was one of the confederates. Under these circumstances, Sir John Shore decided that no obligation would lie upon the British to interfere. In a long and able minute in support of this decision, he maintains, "That as the union of the three allies

was the basis of the treaty, the continuance of that union or friendship is essential to the performance of the obligations imposed by it, and a war between two of the parties totally changes the relative situation of all." As a necessary conclusion from these premises, he held that the British were under no obligation to interfere in any of the three following cases:—a war between the Nizam and the Mahrattas alone; a war between the Nizam and the Mahrattas assisted by Tippoo; and an unprovoked attack by Tippoo on the Nizam, while the Nizam and the Mahrattas were at war. The last of these three cases is the most ticklish of all, and it is very questionable whether Sir John Shore, in attempting to justify his decision respecting it, has not evaded a real obligation, by having recourse to a species of jesuitical casuistry. He argues thus:—"To support the Nizam against Tippoo, if he should seize the opportunity of actual hostility between his highness and the Mahrattas, to attack the territories of the former without provocation, must necessarily involve us in a war with the Mahrattas, a predicament which the obligations of the treaty never supposed. I state this as a necessary consequence, for the operations of the field would lead to it: even though the invasion were not originally concerted or intended between Tippoo and the peishwa, we cannot conceive it possible for us to fight against Tippoo alone, in defence of the Nizam, and with the co-operation of his forces, whilst he is engaged with the Mahrattas; and to prosecute the war with effect against Tippoo, we must commence hostilities at the same time with the Mahrattas. But if a contrary supposition were admissible, the whole burden of repelling and punishing the aggression of Tippoo would exclusively fall upon us, contrary to the spirit, meaning, and terms of the triple alliance." The argument is in substance simply this:—Both the British and the Mahrattas are bound to punish Tippoo should he attack or molest the Nizam; but should the Mahrattas choose to violate this obligation, the British will hold themselves entitled to violate it also, because to do otherwise would be very inconvenient, inasmuch as it might lead to a new Mahratta war, and even if it did not, would throw upon the British the whole, instead of only a share, of the burden of punishing Tippoo.

A.D. 1792.

Policy of Sir John Shore as governor-general.

Its justice questionable.

Having, very sophistically, we think, disencumbered himself of the *obligation* of giving assistance, Sir John Shore need scarcely have taken the trouble to discuss the *expediency*. If there was no obligation, then, however great the expediency might be, he was not at liberty to act upon it, since the legislature had tied up his hands, and made it illegal for him to enter into, what would have been to all intents in the case supposed, a new treaty. With the view to the future, however, the question of expediency was really important, and he therefore proceeds "seriously to weigh the probable consequences of neglecting the Nizam, or of supporting him against the joint invasion of the Mahrattas and Tippoo Sultan." He sets out with admitting that "the destruction of the Nizam's power, and the aggrandisement of that of his

Its inexpediency.

A. D. 1792.

Unexpedi-
ency of
Sir John
Shore's
policy.

enemies, must be the consequence of leaving him without support, and Tippoo and the Mahrattas will, of course, become proportionately dangerous." He also admits, that "our political consequence might lose something of its importance in the estimate of the native powers, by leaving the Nizam to his fate," and that the very opposite "conduct of the British government in resenting the attack upon their ally the Rajah of Travancore, during the war, and in the negotiations for the termination of it, not only gained us the confidence of our allies, but established the British reputation throughout India for good faith, firmness, and moderation." These, then, are the weights which the governor-general, after setting up his political balance, throws into the one scale. Into the other scale, he throws "the vices and imbecility of the Nizam's administration—the impossibility of directing his politics without usurping his government—and the dangers of perpetual war, the consequence of such interference—the difficulty of making any effectual impression in the Mahratta state by our forces—the comparative facility with which they might injure us—the magnitude of the resources and exertions, as well as the number of troops, both native and European, which would be required to oppose the united efforts of the Mahrattas and Tippoo—and the inevitable ruin of a long-protracted war;" together with "the situation of the affairs in Europe, which precludes the expectation of receiving any considerable reinforcement of troops during the continuance of the war, and impresses the necessity of preserving, by every effort, peace with all the powers in India." The scales thus standing—the one containing only prospective evils which might not be realized, and the loss of a reputation acquired by "good faith, firmness, and moderation," and the other containing the real danger of a long-protracted war, with a very doubtful issue—Sir John Shore held that the latter scale preponderated. This pusillanimous decision, as if it had not been more than enough even once to announce, he reiterates in various forms. "The inducement to support the Nizam, at the hazard of such impending consequences, ought to be much stronger than the apprehension of future evils from the subversion of his power." Again, after admitting that our conduct in the war with Tippoo had "not only gained us the confidence of our allies, but established the British reputation throughout India for good faith, firmness, and moderation," he adds, "but in weighing these motives, we must attend to self-preservation, including the permanency of the British possessions in India." In a previous part of the minute he had said, "Although I am fully sensible of the value of opinion in this country, it cannot be placed in competition with the greater evils attending a war with Tippoo and the Mahrattas."

When Sir John Shore arrived at this pitiable conclusion, and told the Mahrattas and Tippoo how very much he was afraid of them, and that they need be under no apprehension from him in working their will upon the Nizam, who was certainly as much our ally as the Rajah of Travancore was when his

A. D. 1792.

Fusillan-
im-
ity the chief
character-
istic of
Sir John
Shore's
policy.

lines were forced, he entertained the hope that he had merely been considering a question which he would "not be compelled to decide." The dissensions between the Mahrattas might yet, he thought, be terminated by negotiation, though he could not help seeing, that in whatever way terminated, whether by negotiation or by war, "there is too much reason to fear that the Nizam will fall under the subjection of the Mahrattas, and on this event his power, under their control and direction, will become an accumulation of their strength, already exorbitant." A confederacy between Tippoo and the Mahrattas, he says, "I deem improbable, unless the latter should be forced into it by our avowed support of the Nizam against them," and then adds significantly, "they are, I presume, satisfied on this head." But even should such a confederacy take place, and the power of the Nizam be in consequence annihilated, there was still this very encouraging consideration—"the probability is as great that they would attack each other as that they would unite to invade the territories of the Company." On the whole, then, his advice to the Company was to provide for their safety by taking part with the strongest. "The consolidation of our alliance with the latter is an object of the first importance to us." No doubt "the nature of the Mahratta government is well known to be avaricious, grasping, and ambitious—it never neglects any opportunity of extending its power or aggrandizing its wealth, with little solicitude as to the rectitude of the means employed in obtaining these objects." What then? It is the strongest; and therefore consolidate your alliance with it. Should any one object that this unprincipled, "avaricious, grasping, and ambitious" Mahratta government might perhaps take a liking to the territories of its humble, cowering, crouching British ally, Sir John Shore has this answer: "With respect to all the powers in India, our actual security is our strength; but with regard to the Mahrattas, the alarm of danger is lessened by a consideration that a wider and safer career is open to their ambition, in the absolute subjection of numerous petty states in Hindoostan, some of which are independent while others are partially under their control, than by attacking our possessions or those of our allies." Still, even at the very worst, existence, even by sufferance, was something; for "we are never to forget that a dominion exercised by foreigners must ever be viewed in a hostile light—that an union merely political is always precarious—and that if the whole power of the Mahratta state were directed against us, we should find ourselves very vulnerable in many parts, and in some, perhaps, at present unsuspected."

This celebrated minute has been dwelt on, because it unfolds the course of policy which the new governor-general had resolved to adopt, and into which he may have been betrayed by his wish "to adhere as literally as possible to the strictest possible interpretation of the restrictive clause in the act of parliament against entering into hostilities." Peace, at any price was its characteristic feature, and it was to be procured simply by practising "ignoble ease," and

Pernicious
conse-
quences

A. D. 1795.

Perilous
consequences
of
Sir John
Shore's
policy.

clinging to the strongest side merely because it was the strongest. In all parts of the world, but nowhere so much as in India, is timidity provocative of aggression; and Sir John Shore could not have taken a more effectual method of stimulating the Mahrattas, alone or in concert with Tippoo, to attack the Nizam, than by proclaiming that the British government had determined, from no higher motive than fear, to stand aloof, and see an ally annihilated without venturing to assist him. Tippoo's reappearance was as yet premature. Indeed, the Mahrattas, now assured that the British would not interfere, had no occasion for him, and knew their business too well to offer him a share of the spoils which they were able to appropriate without division. In less than three weeks from the date of the governor-general's minute, the Mahrattas were within the Nizam's territories. M. Raymond, ever since the policy of the British was suspected, had been diligently employed, in obedience to Nizam Ali's orders, in organizing corps of infantry, and been so successful that he did not hesitate to encounter the celebrated brigades of Scindia, trained by De Boigne. On the 11th of March, 1795, an action was fought near the frontier, and had every appearance of terminating to the Nizam's advantage, when Raymond was stunned by an order from him to retreat. Conformably to his usual practice, he was accompanied to the field by his harem. The favourite



THE NIZAM'S CAMP ON COMING INTO IT.—From the M'Kenzie Drawings, East India House.

The Nizam
obliged to
make large
concessions
to the
Mahrattas.

of the day took fright, and threatened to disgrace him by exposing herself to public view, if he did not instantly retire to the small fort of Kurdla. He complied, and was in consequence cooped up with his army, and reduced to such straits, that it only remained for the Mahrattas to dictate terms. Many of them were secret: those made public were, the cession of a territory yielding thirty-five lacs, and including Dowlatabad, the key of the Deccan, and the delivery of Azeem-ul-Omrah (Meer Allum) as an hostage. This unenviable distinction he owed not more to his talents, than to the constancy with which he had clung to a British alliance till all hope of it was extinguished.

A. D. 1796.

The British
complained of
the Nizam's
French
brigade.

Nizam Ali was now at the mercy of the Mahrattas, and the annihilation of his power, which Sir John Shore had contemplated with so much complacency, seemed inevitable. Two events saved him—the one, the rebellion of his son, Ali Jah, in June, the other, the death of the peishwa, in October, 1795. Previous to the treaty of Kurdla, Raymond's corps mustered twenty-three strong battalions. In the battle their value was fully tested, and it was therefore wisely resolved to increase and improve them. With this view the territorial revenues of the district of Kurpa or Cuddapah were assigned to him for the maintenance of his troops. This district, from its vicinity to the sea-coast, furnished him with facilities for recruiting his officers, and of uniting with an European corps which revolutionary France was understood to be preparing, with the view of regaining some of its former conquests. Sir John Shore, who had forced the Nizam to form French connections, by leaving him at the mercy of the Mahrattas, now complained, somewhat unreasonably, of the necessary result of his own policy, and threatened to send a body of troops in the direction of Kurpa if Raymond was not withdrawn from it. The discussions respecting Raymond were terminated by the rebellion and flight of Ali Jah. That officer was immediately despatched against him, and had just made him a prisoner when a British detachment, despatched for the same purpose at the Nizam's earnest request, arrived. The ready compliance with this request made the relations between the Nizam and the British more friendly.

Dissensions
at Poonah.

The dissensions at Poonah, originating in the choice of a new peishwa, produced still more important results. The legitimate heir, Bajee Row, son of the late Ragobah, was supported by Dowlut Row Scindia, while Nana Furnavese desired to give the office to a younger brother, Chinnajee, whom he expected to use as a pageant. The other Mahratta chiefs took different sides, and a period of distraction ensued. Nana endeavoured to strengthen his party by courting the Nizam, and with that view released Meer Allum. This officer, while detained as a hostage, managed to form a strong party among the Mahratta chiefs, and thus assist his old master. So much was the Nana pressed by his opponents that, in his anxiety to strengthen himself, he resigned all the cessions which had been wrested from the Nizam by the treaty of Kurdla. Meer Allum, in return for this obligation, procured the secret assembling of a large body of troops, which was intended to be placed at the Nana's disposal; but Scindia, penetrating this design, rendered it abortive, and Bajee Row was regularly installed as peishwa. On this event a new negotiation became necessary, and Meer Allum, who had still been detained at Poonah, was not allowed to quit it till an arrangement was made, by which the Nizam became bound to pay one-fourth of the amount stipulated at Kurdla. The influence of Meer Allum, when again in office at Hyderabad, was employed in strengthening the British connection.

The attention of the governor-general had about this time been called to the

A. D. 1797. north-west. Fyzoola Khan, the celebrated Rohilla chief, who held the jaghire of Rampoorah, under the Nabob of Oude, in virtue of an agreement which the Company had guaranteed, died in 1794. Mahomed Ali Khan, his eldest son, was of course entitled to the succession; but he had scarcely entered into the possession of it when his brother, Gholam Mahomed Khan, basely murdered him, and usurped his rights. The murderer immediately applied to the Nabob of Oude, and, by means of a large bribe, would probably have succeeded in obtaining his sanction to the usurpation, had not the British interfered. Sir Robert Abercromby, the commander-in-chief, marched against the usurper, and completely defeated him in a battle in which the Rohillas fought so well that they made a partial impression on the British line. Immediately after the victory, Sir Robert, on his own responsibility, obtained the consent of the vizier to the restoration of the jaghire to Ahmed Ali Khan, the infant son of the murdered Mahomed. It was fortunate that he had taken this step, as shortly afterwards instructions arrived from the governor-general and council suggesting, contrary to all equity, that the rights of the infant heir should be set aside, and that the jaghire should be resumed by the nabob. In consequence of the arrangement previously made, these instructions could not be carried into effect, and government was saved from committing great injustice.

A Rohilla
force
defeated.

State of
affairs in
Oude.

The proposal of the governor-general and council to confiscate Fyzoola Khan's jaghire is the more extraordinary from the fact that, at the very time when they would have placed it at the disposal of the nabob, they were loudly complaining that, ever since the death of Hyder Beg Khan, his administration had gone to wreck, and the whole power of the state had passed into the hands of a few favourites, who were of the most abandoned character, and known to be generally hostile to British interests. Sir John Shore, in particular, had given it as his decided opinion, that whilst the nabob's administration remained on its present footing, the British should derive no effective assistance from his troops, and must rather expect to find enemies than friends in his dominions. So much was he satisfied of the accuracy of this opinion, and alive to the evils which such a state of matters might engender, that, in March, 1797, he paid a visit to Lucknow, and, in addition to some other improvements, succeeded in obtaining the office of minister for Tuffuzel Hussein Khan, who was believed to be a man of talent and probity. Only a few months after this visit, the nabob, Azoff-u-Dowlah, died. Vizier Ali, whom he had acknowledged as his son, and who was in consequence recognized as his presumptive heir, was immediately placed on the musnud, with the concurrence of the British government. His right, however, was disputed by Sadat Ali, the late nabob's brother, who offered to prove that Vizier Ali was spurious, and produced so strong evidence of the fact that the governor-general, while he refused to displace Vizier Ali, found it impossible to divest himself of the belief of his spuriousness. This decision was neither just nor politic. The new nabob, though only seventeen

years of age, was already familiar with every species of profligacy, and in the hands of favourites as worthless as himself. Sir John Shore had never been satisfied with the decision he had given in his favour, and therefore during a second journey which he made to Lucknow, on seeing how miserably the government was conducted, was persuaded, though not without reluctance, again to open up the question. The conclusion at which he now arrived was—"1st, That Vizier Ali is undoubtedly the son of a *furraush* (the Persian name for a household menial servant), has no title to the musnud, and, from his character, is unworthy of it. This decision is supported by evidence as to his real birth, by the sanction of public opinion, by facts, and information. 2d, That to support him on the musnud would not only be an indelible disgrace to the reputation of the Company, but in all probability would prove the ruin of the country and the destruction of the British interests in Oude. 3d, That the justice and reputation of the Company, as well as their political interests, require the establishment of the rightful successor. 4th, That, as all the reputed sons of Azoff-u-Dowlah are undoubtedly spurious, the line of succession should be transferred to that of Sujah-u-Dowlah. 5th, That Vizier Ali ought to be deposed, and Sadat Ali be placed on the musnud." The above conclusions were immediately acted upon, and Vizier Ali was deposed.

A.D. 1798.

Contradictory decisions of the governor-general in regard to disputed succession to Oude.

Sadat Ali, when the resolution in his favour was taken, was residing at Benares, and received the first notification of his intended elevation in the form of a regular treaty of twenty-three articles, in which he was required immediately to declare his acquiescence, without qualification or reserve. He was not in a condition to object to any terms that might be dictated, and therefore readily expressed his determination to fulfil all the stipulations in the most faithful manner. On this he proceeded without delay to Cawnpore, where a large body of European troops waited his arrival. With them as his escort, he continued his journey to Lucknow, and was there without opposition proclaimed nabob vizier, on the 21st of January, 1798. The treaty ultimately concluded with him after his elevation to the musnud was, with a few modifications, the same as that to which he had assented at Benares. It vested the Company with the entire defence of Oude, and increased the annual subsidy payable by the nabob to seventy-six lacs. The number of Company's troops was rated at 10,000 men; but, in the event of their exceeding 13,000 or falling below 8000, the amount of the subsidy was to be proportionally increased or diminished. The native force maintained in Oude for internal police was not to exceed 35,000 men, and the nabob was not to hold communication with any foreign state, nor admit any Europeans to serve in his army or settle in his country without the Company's consent. The other payments stipulated in addition to the subsidy were, a sum of twelve lacs, payable to the Company as the expense of the nabob's elevation, a pension, of a lac and a half to Vizier Ali, who was to be removed to Benares, and suitable provisions for the other

Sadat Ali raised to the throne.

A. D. 1798. New treaty with Sadat Ali. reputed children of Azoff-u-Dowlah. The only cession made to the Company was the important fortress of Allahabad, which, after the nabob had parted with it for ever, was to be put in a state of repair at his expense. In order to meet the increased subsidy, and the other permanent charges on the revenue, all unnecessary expenditure was to cease, and a system of economy and reduction was to be carried out in concert with the Company.

Its terms extinguish the independence of Oude It is scarcely necessary to observe that by the above treaty, imposed, not in consequence of military successes, but merely by taking advantage of a disputed succession, Oude was deprived of its independence, and reduced to all intents to a state of vassalage. One main cause of the rigorous demands made by the governor-general on this occasion is stated to have been the apprehension of an invasion of Hindoostan from Cabool by Zemaun Shah, the grandson of the celebrated Ahmed Shah Abdallee. In 1796, he had actually advanced, with little opposition, to Lahore, and seemed about to advance on Delhi, when the rebellion of one of his brothers compelled him to return with all haste to his own dominions. His approach excited great hopes among the Mahometans of a restoration of the house of Timour, and equally great consternation among the Mahrattas, who, torn by their own intestine feuds, were totally unprepared for war, and solicited an alliance with the British against Zemaun Shah as a common enemy. The governor-general having been obliged, while the alarm prevailed, to take some precautions, had obtained fresh proof "of the imbecility of the vizier's government, and the insufficiency of his military establishment," the troops of which "would rather have proved an encumbrance than an assistance to the British forces." As a repetition of Zemaun Shah's invasion was expected, Sir John Shore had probably deemed it necessary to bring Oude into a state which would make its resources more fully and more readily available.

Sir John Shore, now Lord Teignmouth, resigns the government

Sir John Shore, whose services had been rewarded with an Irish peerage, under the title of Lord Teignmouth, resigned the government, and sailed for England in the beginning of March, 1798. The most important events of his administration have already been detailed, but some changes which took place at Madras still require a short notice. On the 13th of October, 1795, Mahomed Ali, Nabob of Arcot, ended a long and inglorious career. Contrary to his wish, which was to give the nabobship to his second son, he was succeeded by the eldest, Omdut-ul-Omrah. In 1792, Lord Cornwallis had attempted in vain to induce the late nabob to give up the management of his revenues in peace as well as in war, and, because unwilling to use compulsion, had concluded an agreement which, while diminishing some of the evils previously existing, left the root of them untouched. Mahomed Ali, though understood to be in the possession of considerable treasures, had early become the prey of usurers and sharpers. As the payments to the Company fell due, instead of emptying his own coffers, he met them by raising usurious loans, chiefly from the European

residents, on the security of the territorial revenues. In these loans the lenders usually stipulated for the appointment of their own managers, and thus the unhappy ryots were handed over to the tender mercies of men whose only interest in the soil was to wring from it the largest sum of money in the shortest possible time. The effects were, most grievous oppression of the people, general impoverishment, and consequent decay of revenue. A new succession seemed to Lord Hobart, the governor, to offer a fair opportunity of insisting on the change which had long been felt to be most desirable, and he proposed the entire cession to the Company of all the territories which were pledged in security of the *kists*, or regular pecuniary instalments. The new nabob refused to comply. The real cause of his refusal is thus described by Lord Hobart:—"The great houses of business, who are the principal money-lenders at the durbar, borrow from individuals who, though not absolutely engaged in the loan itself, are partakers of the speculation in a remote degree, and feel with no less sensibility than their principals the approach of danger. Similarity of interest makes a common cause; and the great body of interest which is condensed upon this principle is uniformly exerted to support his highness in an inflexible resistance against a melioration of system." Thus tutored, the nabob declared his determination to adhere to the treaty with Lord Cornwallis, alleging as his reason "the dying injunctions of his father," though he afterwards candidly confessed the real reason to be that "his native ministers and European advisers so perplexed, plagued, and intimidated him that he could not venture on this measure (the proposed change), notwithstanding his conviction that he ought to do so." The nabob was successful in his resistance, and the Madras presidency, though backed by the supreme council, were obliged to leave matters on their old footing.

A. D. 1792.

Death of
Mahomed
A. I.



ROBERT, LORD HOBART, Earl of Buckinghamshire.
After Sir T. Lawrence, R.A.

State of his
affairs.

During this abortive negotiation with the nabob, Lord Hobart was engaged in transactions of a different nature. The successes of the French in the revolutionary contest had been so great as to compel the Dutch to take part with them against Great Britain. The Dutch settlements in Ceylon, Malacca, Banda, and Amboyna were consequently attacked and reduced by armaments fitted from Madras. Another armament, intended for the reduction of Manilla, had sailed under the command of the Honourable Colonel Wellesley, afterwards Duke of Wellington, when the extraordinary victories of the French in Italy

Capture of
Dutch
settlements.

A.D. 1798. induced Lord Hobart to countermand it, under the belief that all the troops which could possibly be spared would be required to aid in defensive measures at home.

The system
of neutrality.

Its results.

Lord Teignmouth's administration may be considered as having tested the system of neutrality laid down by the legislature, and proved it to be, at least in the sense in which it was then generally understood, to be wanting. In its laudable desire to prevent wars of conquest, the legislature had laid down restrictions which, literally interpreted by the Indian government, precluded it from taking measures of prevention against dangers which it saw in progress, and thus deprived it of one of the most effectual means of maintaining general peace. This display of moderation being ascribed by the native powers to weakness or selfish policy, only shook the confidence of our allies and increased the presumption of hostile states. The consequence was, that at the end of six years' peace, while the British power remained nearly stationary, its enemies were increasing in strength and preparing for a struggle which it was foreseen could not be distant. The lesson taught by the neutral system, as Lord Teignmouth had exemplified it, is well stated by Sir John Malcolm.¹ "It was proved from the events of this administration, that no ground of political advantage could be abandoned without being instantly occupied by an enemy; and that to resign influence was not merely to resign power, but to allow that power to pass into hands hostile to the British government. The consequence of political inaction was equally obvious. No one measure of importance was taken, except the elevation of Sadat Ali to the musnud of Oude, which the governor-general states in express terms was forced upon his adoption. But this inactive system of policy, so far from attaining its object, which was to preserve affairs upon the footing on which it had found them, had only the effect of making the British government stationary while all around it advanced, and of exposing it to dangers arising from the revolutions of its neighbours, while it was even denied the power of adapting its policy to the change of circumstances."

¹ *Political History of India*, vol. i. p. 192.

CHAPTER V.

Earl of Mornington, afterwards Marquis Wellesley, appointed governor-general—State of India on his arrival—Treaty with the Nizam—Disbandment of the French corps—War with Tippoo—Siege and capture of Seringapatam—Settlement of Mysore.



WHEN Lord Hobart was appointed to the government of Madras, he was also nominated provisional successor to Sir John Shore. Some time, however, before the resignation of the latter, a new arrangement was contemplated. The new appointment occasioned some surprise; Marquis Cornwallis was to resume his office of governor-general. The main reason for this was the state of the Company's European army. A series of new regulations had been proposed, and received with so much dissatisfaction that a general mutiny of the officers was threatened. In consequence of their hostility to the plan of amalgamating all the European troops in India, they had appointed delegates and framed resolutions, which they urged with great intemperance. The delegates formed into an executive board, who were to treat with the government. They were bound to secrecy, and were 'guaranteed, in the name of the whole army, both from penal consequences and pecuniary loss. One of their determinations was, that if the new regulations expected from Europe did not speedily arrive, they would judge for themselves, and enforce their decision at any hazard. When the regulations did arrive they gave little satisfaction, and seem to have been as unpalatable to government as to the officers, since the governor-general (Sir John Shore), in a minute dated December 1, 1796, considered them not "founded on solid principles, or framed with any knowledge of the country." While matters were in this threatening position a brevet arrived from England. It would have promoted several king's officers over officers of the Company of longer standing, and as this was a grievance to which the executive board had declared their determination no longer to submit, the Bengal government, afraid of the consequences, protested against the issue of the brevet, and induced Sir Robert Abercromby to suppress it. In a letter subsequently written to the secret committee of directors, the governor-general intimated that he would be obliged, partially at least, to give way. The authorities at home, alarmed at the violence of the officers and the apparent want of firmness in the Indian government, immediately urged the re-appointment of Marquis Cornwallis.

A.D. 1796

Proposed re-
appoint-
ment of
Lord Corn-
wallis as
governor-
general.

In the correspondence on this subject, Mr. Dundas in opening it addressed the marquis as follows:—"Allow me to say to, your lordship, that if you could bring yourself to forego the comforts of home for one year more of your life,

A. D. 1791. and to spend three months at Bengal, and as much at Madras, you would do the greatest service to your country that ever any man had it in his power to do." In conclusion he says, "Take out your successors with you, teach them the road they should pursue, and having done that duty and settled all India by your presence and authority, you may return after six months in the same ship of war that would carry you out. And you will have the satisfaction of reflecting (and of transmitting the sentiment to your posterity) that you have twice been the instrument, in the hands of Providence, to save to the British empire in India that stake, in which no rational man can doubt that its permanent prosperity and stability do above all others truly rest." Mr. Dundas had again proposed to go himself, and hence Marquis Cornwallis answered—"I think on every account that you would succeed better than myself, especially as great pains have been taken from the moment of my leaving India, to impress on the minds of the Bengal officers that my sentiments were not favourable towards them, and that I was partial to the king's troops. If, however, you cannot go yourself, which I shall think very unfortunate for our Indian possessions, and if you and Mr. Pitt should be of opinion that, by once more doubling the Cape of Good Hope, I can render essential service to my country, I shall not depart from the line of conduct which I have invariably pursued through life, of sacrificing all private considerations of comfort and happiness to the service of the public."

Mr. Dundas suggested for the office of governor-general.

Earl Mornington appointed.

After giving this consent, Marquis Cornwallis began to make his preparations, but on learning that the mutiny of the sailors at Portsmouth had broken out a second time, and that the landing of a French army in Ireland was every day expected, he felt that this was not "a time to be occupied about speculative arrangements of the Indian army," and told Mr. Dundas, who was about to bring a bill into parliament for the purpose of giving legislative authority to the proposed regulations, that "there could be no hurry about the bill, as it was impossible that, under the present calamitous circumstances of this country, he could embark for India." He had already been sworn into office as governor-general, and believed that these events had only postponed his departure. Meanwhile, the Board of Control and the court of directors were discussing the regulations with a committee of Bengal officers sitting in London. This proceeding, which, but for the critical state of the times, could scarcely have been resorted to, appears to have been regarded by Marquis Cornwallis as unbecoming, and accordingly, when he found that concessions were made contrary to his opinion, he considered it unnecessary to proceed on the voyage, and resigned his appointment on the 2d of August, 1797. Ultimately, at the earnest request of Mr. Pitt, he accepted the united offices of Lord-lieutenant of Ireland and commander-in-chief. The office of governor-general was conferred in October, 1797, on the Earl of Mornington, afterwards Marquis Wellesley. His appointment may have been originally suggested by his intimacy with the family of

Marquis Cornwallis, whose uncle, afterwards Archbishop Cornwallis, had been his tutor at Eton, and by his possession of the qualification to which, as we have seen, his majesty attached great importance—that of being “a very proper man of distinction.” He had at the same time personal claims of a high order. His appearances in the House of Lords had given evidence of distinguished talents, and his office as a lord of the treasury had given him an opportunity of proving his aptitude for business. With this office, which he had held from 1786, was united in 1793 that of an unpaid commissioner of the Board of Control, and thus during the two years preceding his appointment as governor-general his attention must have been specially directed to Indian subjects.

A.D. 1798.

Lord Mornington governor-general.

The Earl of Mornington sailed from England on the 9th of November, 1797, and arrived at Madras in April, 1798. Here his administration may be said to have commenced in the settlement of a disputed succession in Tanjore, but as the final decision was not at this time announced, nor the arrangements consequent upon it, the details must in the meantime be deferred. On the 18th of May the governor-general arrived at Calcutta, and lost no time in entering upon his duties. In order to understand their nature, and form a judgment on the



RICHARD, LORD MORNINGTON, Marquis Wellesley.
After Sir T. Lawrence, R.A.

manner in which he discharged them, it will be necessary to take a brief survey of the state of affairs, both within the British territories and the principal adjoining states. The nominal limits of the Bengal presidency did not differ much from what they were after the grant of the dewannee obtained by Clive. The only extension of any consequence was in the north-west, where the zemindary of Benares, including also that of Ghazipoor, was acquired during the administration of Mr. Hastings, and the fortress of Allahabad during that of Lord Teignmouth. These acquisitions had previously belonged to Oude, which was now so entirely dependent on the British government, that the presidency might now be held virtually to include it within its limits. In the Bombay presidency, where Mr. Duncan had for some time been governor, the boundaries had fluctuated greatly within a recent period. It promised at one time to extend far to the north, and had appropriated a considerable tract of territory, or at least a large amount of territorial revenue in

State of affairs on his arrival.

A.D. 1798.

Extent of
the different
presidencies.

Gujerat, but the unfortunate Mahratta war had stripped it of all its conquests, and driven it back nearly to its ancient limits, leaving it little more than the two islands of Bombay and Salsette. The last war with Tippoo had, however, more than compensated it for all its losses, by obtaining for it a large territory stretching southward along the Malabar coast, and eastward to the table-land of Mysore. The presidency of Madras, now governed by Lord Clive, obtained a large accession of territory when his lordship's father, the true founder of our Indian empire, induced the Mogul to make a full cession to the Company of the Northern Circars. About the same time a considerable tract of territory had been procured from the Nabob of Arcot under the name of a jaghire. Neither the Circars nor the jaghire could be said to be held in absolute property, since, by a humiliating arrangement, tribute was paid for the one to the Nizam, and the very name of the other implied that it had been accepted as a grant from a superior. The case was different with the two important tracts of territory which had been added to the presidency by the curtailment of Mysore, and which had the double advantage of belonging to the Company absolutely and adding to the security of the Carnatic frontier. In addition to these territories the whole nabobship of Arcot and rajahship of Tanjore might be considered as included within the presidency, since, in time of war, the whole of their revenues were managed by the Company, and nothing remained in order to make their possession complete, but a similar power of management in time of peace.

Relations to
the other
powers.

The leading powers with which the Company were in immediate contact, without having established any decided ascendancy over them, were Tippoo, the Mahrattas, and the Nizam. It soon appeared that Marquis Cornwallis was too sanguine when he expressed the belief that, by depriving Tippoo of half his territories, and exacting a large sum as the expenses of the war, he had so effectually crippled his resources as to render him incapable of again disturbing the peace of India. Nothing but the anxious desire of recovering his sons, who were detained as hostages, had induced him to fulfil the conditions of the treaty, and he had repeatedly shown, even while fulfilling them, how determined he was again to measure swords with the British, and at once repair the loss and wipe off the disgrace which he had sustained at their hands. During the negotiations which preceded the treaty, he had tried to shake the fidelity of the two native confederates, and the moment it was concluded he endeavoured to conclude arrangements with the Mahrattas, with the view, first of destroying the Nizam, and then making a combined attack on the British settlements. So eagerly was he watching his opportunity, that in 1797, when Ali Jah, the Nizam's son, rebelled, he immediately assembled an army on the frontier for the purpose of assisting in the rebellion, and was only deterred when he learned that a British force was marching to counteract his designs. It afterwards appeared that on this occasion he had actually stipulated with

Ali Jah for the cession of all the Nizam's dominions south of the Toombudra and Kistna. His schemes for the expulsion of the British from India took a still more visible shape in 1796, when, after corresponding with the ministers of Zemaun Shah, through his agents at Delhi, he sent a secret embassy to him at Cabool, with a plan which he had sketched out for expelling all infidels and re-establishing Mahometan ascendancy in India. But the most decided evidence of Tippoo's determination to renew hostilities was furnished by his intercourse with the French.

A.D. 1798.

Tippoo
Sahib's
designs.

Tippoo had heard of the successes of the French in the revolutionary war, and by direct communication with the Isle of France, had been assured of direct assistance in any struggle into which he might enter with the British. While elated by these promises, he learned that a French privateer which had arrived at Mangalore, apparently in a disabled state, as if to obtain repairs, was commanded by a person of the name of Ripaud, who, in conversation with Gholaum Ali, the *meer-e-zem*, or lord of admiralty, represented that he was high in office in the Mauritius, and had by special instruction touched at Mangalore, for the purpose of ascertaining Tippoo's wishes regarding the co-operation of a force which was ready to sail and unite with him for the expulsion of the common enemy. Ripaud was accordingly sent forward to Seringapatam and admitted to several interviews. Tippoo appears to have suspected that the pretended envoy was an impostor, but thought it possible, notwithstanding, to turn his services to account, and therefore proposed, while retaining him in his assumed character, but ostensibly as a servant, to purchase his ship, lade it with merchandise for the Isle of France, and send confidential agents for the purpose of making arrangements respecting the desired armament. After forming this resolution, Tippoo as usual consulted his principal counsellors, who strongly endeavoured to dissuade him from it, "From first to last," they say, "the language of this man has been that of self-interest and falsehood; nothing has resulted from this business, and nothing can." They afterwards add, "The object of this state will be better effected than by relying on the agency of this compound of air and water." The advice was good, but Tippoo contenting himself with his usual remark, "Whatever is the will of God, that will be accomplished," took his own way. The vessel was purchased for 17,000 rupees, which were handed over to a Frenchman, called by the natives Pernore (apparently a corruption of Pernaud), who was to pay the amount at the Mauritius, agreeably to Ripaud's instructions. Ripaud himself was to remain at Tippoo's court as French ambassador. The other officers of the ship were to navigate her, and to be accompanied by four envoys in the assumed character of merchants. One of these was to return with the fleet and army expected; the other three, after seeing the conclusion of the negotiations at the Mauritius, were to proceed as ambassadors to the executive directory at Paris. The four envoys, and Pernore in possession of the money, set out in April, 1797,

His intrigues
with the
French.Mission to
the Mauri-
tius.

A. D. 1798.

Mission
from Tippoo
Mahib to the
Mauritius.

from Seringapatam, to embark for Mangalore. The night after they reached it Pernore and three others absconded in a boat with the 17,000 rupees and were never more heard of. The expedient now fallen upon was to restore the vessel to Ripaud, after making him give bond for the price which had been paid for her, and send him along with the envoys, who were reduced to two. The vessel, which, owing to the delay caused by these new arrangements, did not sail till October, had scarcely got to sea, when Ripaud, collecting his European part of the crew, came up to the envoys and insisted on seeing the letters addressed to the authorities at the Mauritius. On being refused, he took them by force. Their contents probably satisfied him that he had nothing to fear, as he continued the voyage and arrived at Port Louis on the 19th of January, 1798.

Proposed
secret treaty.

Though the mission was intended to be secret, and in a great measure depended on secrecy for its success, General Malartic, the governor of the Mauritius, immediately resolved to give the envoys a public reception. Accompanied by the admiral and all the constituted authorities, he received them under the customary salutes, and conducted them between a double line of troops to the government house. Here they formally delivered their despatches and then proceeded to the mansion appointed for their residence. The despatches contained the project of a treaty with the Mauritius government. Assuming that a large army, consisting of 5000 to 10,000 European French and 20,000 to 30,000 Africans, was actually prepared, they proposed that at a rendezvous to be fixed, it should be joined by 60,000 Mysoreans. Goa was first to be wrested from the Portuguese, and Bombay from the British, and given over to the French. From the west, the united armies were to be transported to the Coromandel coast, to raze Madras. This accomplished, they were to subdue the Mahrattas and the Nizam, and conclude with the conquest of Bengal. The day after their arrival, the envoys had the mortification to learn that all Ripaud's representations were false, that no armament for Indian service had arrived, or was expected. The only thing the governor proposed was, to despatch two frigates with Tippoo's letter in duplicate for the directory, requesting the desired succour, and in the meanwhile raise a corps of volunteers in the Mauritius and Bourbon. The envoys remonstrated against this last proposal, declaring that they could not return with a small force, as they had only been deputed to bring a large one. Disregarding the remonstrances of the envoys, and all injunctions to secrecy, Malartic ordered an advertisement to be published, and on the 30th of January, 1798, issued a formal proclamation to the effect that Tippoo Sultan had sent ambassadors to his government and the directory, with proposals to form an offensive and defensive alliance with the French, and only waited the arrival of French troops to declare war against the English. The envoys, after resisting this publicity, acquiesced in it, and not only allowed the published advertisement, which called upon the citizens to range under the banners of Tippoo, to be publicly distributed at their

Its terms
divulged.

residence, but encouraged volunteers to accompany them, under the promise that their pay would be regulated by the Sultan himself. A. D. 1798.

It is difficult to account for the absurd part which Governor Malartic played throughout these proceedings. Though aware that the mission from Tippoo had proceeded on false information, and that for this reason secrecy, even if it had not been enjoined him, was absolutely necessary, he took the measures above detailed to render secrecy impossible, and then, as if he had supposed that the British government could still be kept in ignorance, he informs Tippoo, in a letter, that he had laid an embargo on all the vessels in Port Louis until the departure of the ambassadors and recruits, "lest the English, our common enemy, should be apprised of the part which you seem determined to adopt with regard to them, and of the supply of men I have sent you." This supply of men, of which the British were to be kept in ignorance, amounted to exactly ninety-nine, civil and military officers included. They were embarked with the envoys in a French frigate, and landed at Mangalore on the 26th of April, 1798, about the very same time when Lord Mornington landed at Madras.

Absurd conduct of the French governor.

It was in Tippoo's power to have disavowed the proceedings of Malartic and the envoys, and thus furnished himself with plausible ground for postponing an open rupture with the British, at least till he was better prepared for it. So far from this, he only hastened to commit himself more deeply. The moment he heard of the arrival of the vessel, he was all impatience till his motley group of recruits reached Seringapatam. One of their first employments was to organize a Jacobin club under the sanction of *Citizen Tippoo*; the tree of liberty was planted; and at a grand ceremony, in which Citizen Tippoo performed the principal part, the national colours of the sister republic were consecrated under a salute from all the guns of the fort. "Of any comprehension of the purport or tendency of all these proceedings," says Colonel Wilks, "the Sultan was so entirely innocent that he fancied himself to be consolidating one of those associations devoted to his own aggrandisement, by which his imagination had lately been captivated in the history of the Arabian Wahabees." He understood better what he was doing when, a few weeks afterwards, he associated a French sea captain of the name of Dubuc, claiming to have come as commander of the naval forces, with two of his own envoys, and sent them on a joint embassy to the executive directory.

Citizen Tippoo.

Such being the relation in which Tippoo stood to the British government, it is obvious that when Lord Mornington entered on office war was already declared. It was so understood by his lordship, who accordingly held that an immediate attack upon Tippoo Sultan, for the purpose of frustrating the execution of his unprovoked and unwarrantable projects of ambition and revenge, was demanded by the soundest maxims of justice and policy. In a minute, lodged on the 12th of August, 1798, within three months from the commencement of his administration, after giving a full detail of all the above proceedings,

The governor-general resolves on hostilities with Tippoo.

A.D. 1798.

The govern-
ment general
resolves on
hostilities
with Tippoo

he arrived at the following conclusion:—"Having thus entered into offensive and defensive engagements with the enemy,—having proceeded to collect, in conjunction with the enemy, a force openly destined to act against the possessions of the Company—having avowed through his public ambassadors, that he has completed his preparations of war for the express purpose of attempting the entire subversion of the British empire in India—and having declared that he only waits to prosecute offensive operations, Tippoo Sultan has violated the treaties of peace and friendship subsisting between him and the Company, and has committed an act of direct hostility against the British government in India." In this conclusion he had been to some extent anticipated by the authorities at home, who, in a letter written in June, 1798, had thus acquainted him with their views:—"Our empire in the East has ever been an object of jealousy to the French; we have no doubt that the present government of France would even adopt measures of a most enterprising and uncommon nature for the chance of reducing the British power and consequence in India. We recommend energy, promptness, and decision. Do not wait for actual hostilities on the part of Tippoo, should he have entered into a league with the French." He would not have waited for this sanction to the commencement of hostilities, but there were circumstances which obliged him most reluctantly to postpone them till the ensuing season.

His plans
and pre-
parations.

Lord Mornington's determination was "to attack Tippoo with every degree of practicable despatch," and the objects at which he proposed to aim are thus enumerated by himself in the above minute:—"1. To seize the whole maritime territory remaining in his possession below the Ghauts, on the coast of Malabar, in order to preclude him from all future communications by sea with his French allies. 2. By marching the army from the coast directly upon his capital, to compel him to purchase peace by a formal cession of the territory seized on the coast of Malabar. 3. To compel him to defray our whole expense in the war, and thus to secure the double advantage of indemnifying us for the expense occasioned by his aggression, and of reducing his resources with a view to our future security. 4. To compel him to admit permanent residents at his court from us and from our allies: a measure which would enable us at all times to check his operations and his treachery. 5. That the expulsion of all the natives of France now in his service, and the perpetual exclusion of all Frenchmen, both from his army and dominions, should be made conditions of any treaty of peace with him." In order to carry these views into effect, he directed that the army upon the coasts of Coromandel and Malabar, and at Bombay, should be immediately assembled, expecting that a single campaign would bring the war to a successful termination. On inquiry, however, the military authorities gave their decided opinion that though the ultimate success of the plan proposed could scarcely be doubted, it could not be effected, in all probability, without a tedious, expensive, and protracted war. Radical defects

existed in the military establishments on the coast of Coromandel. In the opinion of Colonel Close, the adjutant-general, the Madras army was not capable of defending the Company's territories, much less of carrying on offensive operations in a country like Mysore; even for the purpose of defence it could not move before the spring of 1799. This opinion was concurred in by General Harris, the commander-in-chief. The Madras council gave a still more unfavourable opinion, and even deprecated the ordinary precautions of defence "lest they should draw down the resentment of the Sultan upon our unprotected possessions."

A.D. 1798.

Plans for
conducting
war with
Tippoo.

In consequence of these opinions, "the question," says Lord Mornington in the minute already quoted, "was now entirely changed; the plan which I originally had in contemplation was nothing more than a military expedition of short duration, of no heavy expense, and of certain success; with the additional advantage that success would certainly exonerate our finances, and throw the whole expense of the undertaking upon the enemy who had provoked it. But it now appeared that I could not hope to effect any of my proposed objects without encountering the expense and inconvenience of a long war." A short military expedition might have been undertaken by the British troops single-handed, but a long war could not be contemplated without securing the aid of the leading native states, whose troops, if not available as regulars, might greatly assist in facilitating supplies of provision. The first step therefore which now seemed necessary, was to attempt to revise the old, or to form a new alliance with the Nizam and the Mahrattas. To this important task the governor-general forthwith devoted all his energies. As a preliminary measure, which promised to facilitate the negotiations on which he was about to enter, he instructed the Madras council to provide a force of 4000 men, with the view of offering them as a subsidy to the Nizam. The fears of the council were again aroused, and instead of at once obeying the instructions thus given, they proceeded to argue against them, and even to obstruct the execution of them. In a letter, dated 10th July, 1798, they returned to their old allegation, that Tippoo's "resources are more prompt than our own, and that a great part of his army is supposed to have long been in a state of field equipment." On this ground they counselled "ignoble ease," because, as they argued, Tippoo, the moment he saw signs of preparations, would anticipate them and overrun the



GENERAL LORD HARRIS.—From a portrait by Devin.

Difficulties
to be en-
countered.

A.D. 1798.

Objections of
the Madras
council to
plans of
Lord Morn-
ington.


Carnatic. In other words, because Tippoo possessed the ready means of attack, the British must not even venture to resort to means of defence. The disposal of their fate was in his hands, and they must be contented to exist by his sufferance. The pusillanimous spirit thus displayed, filled the governor-general with indignation, and when it manifested itself, in the shape of direct opposition to his instructions, he had no toleration for it. "This opposition," he says, "I am resolved to crush; I have sufficient powers to do so, and I will exert those powers to the extreme point of their extent, rather than suffer the smallest particle of my plans for the public service to be frustrated by such unworthy means." These words occur in a letter to General Harris, complimenting him on his "honourable firmness" in refusing to yield to this opposition. In a public letter to the Madras council, the supreme government, adverting to the same subject, wrote as follows:—"If we thought proper to enter with you into any discussion of the policy of our late orders, we might refer you to the records of your own government, which furnish more than one example of the fatal consequences of neglecting to keep pace with the forwardness of the enemy's equipments, and of resting the defence of the Carnatic, in such a crisis as the present, upon any other security than a state of early and active preparation for war." This firmness at once suppressed all idea of resistance, and the orders of the governor-general, understood to be peremptory, were henceforth implicitly obeyed.

Negotiations
with the
Nizam.

The position of the Nizam about this period has been already adverted to. By the refusal to give him the guarantee to which he considered himself entitled under the treaty of 1790, and leaving him to his fate when about to be overwhelmed by the Mahrattas, his relations with the British became so unfriendly that he requested the withdrawal of the detachment with which they had furnished him, and endeavoured to provide for his security by organizing a large body of infantry, under the command of M. Raymond and other French officers. The Bengal government, when too late, began to see the result of the pusillanimous policy which they had pursued, and endeavoured to retrace their steps by hastening to send back the detachment when earnestly requested by the Nizam, in consequence of the rebellion of his son, Ali Jah. The relations between the two courts thus began once more to wear a friendly aspect, but the Nizam, who had already been brought to the brink of destruction by the Mahrattas, and compelled to submit to the humiliating treaty of Kurdla, naturally clung to the force which he had found most available in his time of need, and continued to strengthen himself by additional levies of French troops. There had thus grown up in the very heart of the Nizam's dominions a new power, known to be decidedly hostile to British interests, and prepared to assist in any enterprise by which revolutionary France might secure a footing in India. It was hence obvious that no dependence could be placed on any alliance with the Nizam until his French connections were dissolved. Consider-

ing this, therefore, as an essential preliminary, Lord Mornington proposed to increase the British subsidy to such an amount as would enable the Nizam entirely to dispense with Raymond's corps. Fortunately there were several circumstances which secured for this proposal a more favourable reception than could otherwise have been anticipated. Raymond had recently died, and been succeeded in his command by one Perron, who very imperfectly supplied his

A.D. 1798.

Negotiations
with the
Nizam.

FLAGS OF THE FRENCH BRIGADES IN THE SERVICE OF THE NIZAM.¹—From the M'Kenzie Drawings, East India House.

place. Some of his proceedings had given umbrage to the Nizam, and made him apprehensive that, instead of continuing to be his servants, they were aspiring to be his masters. These feelings in the Nizam were kept alive by his minister, Azeem-ul-Omrah, who, on his release by the Mahrattas, to whom he had been delivered as an hostage, had regained all his former influence, and was employing it in favour of a British alliance which he had always zealously advocated.

Availing himself of these favourable circumstances, Lord Mornington succeeded, after some demur on the part of the Nizam, in obtaining his consent to a negotiation for the dismissal of the French corps, and an increase of the British subsidiary force, together with a guarantee against any future aggression on the part of the Mahrattas. A regular treaty to this effect was accordingly concluded on the 1st of September, 1798, increasing the British subsidiary force to six battalions, to be paid for at the rate of 201,425 rupees per month, or £241,710 per annum, pledging the Nizam to the disbanding of the French corps, and guaranteeing him against any unjust or unreasonable demands of the Mahrattas. As soon as this treaty was signed, no time was lost in acting upon it. Four British battalions which had been assembled on the Nizam's frontier immediately marched to Hyderabad, and uniting with the two battalions already there, completed the stipulated number. The disbanding of the French corps was immediately demanded by Major Kirkpatrick, the resident. The Nizam, and even Azeem-ul-Omrah, demurred and begged delay. Their only motive was fear. The French were 14,000 strong, and the issue of a contest with them, should they offer resistance, might be doubtful. The resident, acting under the peremptory orders of the governor-general, declared that at that

New treaty
with him.

¹ These flags are of the class represented in the engraving of the Nizam's Camp on page 668. They were placed in front of the tents, their staves being driven into the ground and kept in position by cords.

The colours of the flags are shown in the engraving by tint lines, as adopted in heraldic illustrations—horizontal lines indicating a blue colour, and perpendicular lines a red.

A.D. 1798. advanced stage of matters he had no alternative but to insist on the complete execution of the stipulations of the treaty. The interests of the British government, he said, might be seriously compromised by any delay, however short, after the resolution to disband had been announced, and therefore, should the Nizam continue wavering, he would himself authorize an attack on the French camp, and hold him responsible for the consequences. Captain (afterwards Sir) John Malcolm, then assistant to the resident at Hyderabad, had an important share in the management of this business, in which firmness and tact were equally required, and gave proof of the ability which ultimately made him so distinguished an ornament of the Indian service.

New treaty
with the
Nizam.

On the 9th of October, 1798, the detachment of four battalions, under Colonel Roberts, arrived in the vicinity of Hyderabad, and on the same day the French corps joined their cantonments. Both forces were on the right bank of the Moosy, and Azeem-ul-Omrah, afraid of a collision, begged Colonel Roberts to cross over to the left bank, where the two battalions were already stationed. He refused, and the Nizam, listening only to his fears, hastened off to his fortress



FORTS AND TOMBS AT GOLCONDA. — From original drawing, Library of East India House.

of Golconda. Meanwhile the French put on a bold front, and the *pagah*, or household horse, whose commander was in their interest, was ordered to the capital. On the 19th, the resident having learned, at an interview with the minister, that the disinclination to disband the French corps was stronger than ever, made instant arrangements for the attack. Colonel Hyndman, in command of the two battalions on the left bank, was moved to a position from which he could open a destructive fire on their rear, and set fire with hot shot to their storehouses and magazines, and Colonel Roberts was about to occupy some heights, favourably situated for attacking their centre. The Nizam had now no alternative

but to fulfil the treaty, or make common cause with the French. The former was preferred, not so much from good faith as because it was seen to be the safer course. Orders were given to dismiss the French officers, and deliver them up to the British government as prisoners of war, and the troops under them were informed that if they ventured to support them, they would be considered and punished as traitors. Perron, as soon as he received the order for dismissal, intimated to the resident that he and his officers were desirous to throw themselves on his protection, and begged that an officer might be sent to the French lines to take charge of articles of public and private property. Captain Malcolm, who proceeded on this errand, made a narrow escape. Before he arrived, a mutiny had broken out, and he fell into the hands of the mutineers. Fortunately, some men, who, four years before, had belonged to his company in the 29th battalion of native infantry, but had since joined the French corps, which was composed in a great measure of deserters, interfered in his behalf, and, as he believed, saved his life "by their active and spirited exertions." During the whole of the 21st, the French lines were a scene of disorder and tumult. The officers made their escape by night, and at daylight of the 22d the men of their corps were surrounded. Before evening the whole were disarmed, without the loss of a single life.

A.D. 1798.

The Nizam's
French
troops d'a-
banded.

Negotiations with the Mahrattas were carried on at the same time as with the Nizam. This formed, indeed, an essential part of Lord Mornington's plan, which was to revive the tripartite treaty of 1790, accompanying it with such provisions and guarantees as its previous premature dissolution had shown to be necessary. Owing to the distracted state of Maharashtra, the negotiation did not succeed. A number of chiefs, nominally subject to the peishwa, but really independent, or aspiring to independence, could not be brought to act with any degree of unity, and the proposal of a treaty, which would have authorized British interference in any disputes arising between the Mahrattas and the Nizam, was distinctly declined. It was well known that the peishwa himself, who was subjected to a species of thralldom from which he was anxious to be emancipated, would have given a different decision, but the influence of Dowlut Row Scindia, who, following out the latest policy of his immediate predecessor, was inimical to British interests, had prevailed. It was not likely, however, that when so many jarring interests were to be reconciled, the Mahratta chiefs would unite in support of Tippoo, and it was therefore determined vigorously to prosecute the war against him.

Negotiations
with the
Mahrattas.

While engaged in these negotiations, the governor-general had never intermitted his military operations. He was, however, by no means averse to an amicable arrangement, and could he have obtained such concessions as would disengage Tippoo from his French connections, and guarantee the abandonment of all his aggressive schemes, he would very gladly have dispensed with the necessity of war. In accordance with this feeling, when Tippoo wrote

A.D. 1798. complaining of an infringement of his rights by the occupation of some villages by the Rajah of Coorg, his lordship immediately ordered those to which Tippoo's right seemed established to be restored. At a later period he informed him of the great naval victory gained by Lord Nelson, off the coast of Egypt; and in answer to a letter from Tippoo, who thought the time for professing friendship was not yet past, he answered him in a similar spirit, telling him of the sincere satisfaction he felt on learning that Tippoo had appointed two persons of honour to confer with the deputies appointed by his orders to investigate the question concerning some disputed talooks, and assuring him that possession of them will not be withheld from him for an instant, if the justice of his claim should be established. This letter was written on the 8th of November, 1798, and shows that, even at this period, though he held that Tippoo had taken steps equivalent to a declaration of war, he was still desirous that peace should be maintained. Accordingly, in the same letter, he thus addresses him:—"It is impossible that you should suppose me ignorant of the intercourse, which subsists between you and the French, whom you know to be the inveterate enemies of the Company, and to be now engaged in an unjust war with the British nation. You cannot imagine me to be indifferent to the transactions which have passed between you and the enemies of my country; nor does it appear proper or necessary that I should any longer conceal from you the surprise and concern with which I have perceived you disposed to involve yourself in all the ruinous consequences of a connection which threatens not only to subvert the foundations of friendship between you and the Company, but to introduce into the heart of your kingdom the principles of anarchy and confusion, to shake your own authority, to weaken the obedience of your subjects, and to destroy the religion which you revere." In this letter, after stating, perhaps from a desire to make it more impressive, but certainly not with strict accuracy, that the peishwa and the Nizam concurred in the observations contained in it, Lord Mornington professed to communicate "on behalf of the Company and their allies, a plan calculated to promote the mutual security and welfare of all parties," and to depute to him for this purpose Major Doveton, the officer, it will be remembered, from whose hands Tippoo received his sons who had been detained as hostages. The letter concluded thus:—"You will, I doubt not, let me know at what time and place it will be convenient for you to receive Major Doveton, and as soon as your friendly letter shall reach me, I will direct him to proceed to your presence. I shall expect your answer to this letter, with an earnest hope that it may correspond with the pacific views and wishes of the allies, and that you may be convinced that you cannot, in any manner, better consult your true interests than by meeting with cordiality the present friendly and moderate advance to a satisfactory and amicable settlement of all points on which any doubts or anxiety may have arisen in the minds either of yourself or of the allies."

Attempt to
arrange
amicably
with Tippoo.

The gover-
nor-gene-
ral's letter
to him.

A.D. 1798.

Tippoo's
answer to
Lord Mor-
nington's
letters.

No answer having been received from Tippoo, Lord Mornington wrote him, referring to his letter of the 8th November, as containing a variety of important points to which his highness would no doubt perceive the propriety and necessity of giving his earliest and most serious consideration, and informing him that he was on the point of setting out from Calcutta for Madras, where he hoped to arrive about the same time that this letter reached him. His lordship concluded thus:—"Should any circumstances hitherto have prevented your answering my last letter of the 8th November, I assure myself that you will, immediately on receipt of this, despatch a satisfactory reply to it, addressed to me at Madras." On the 15th December, a letter dated 20th November was received from Tippoo. Being apparently written before Lord Mornington's letter of the 8th November had reached him, it commenced abruptly, thus:—"It has lately come to my ears from report, that in consequence of the talk of interested persons, military preparations are on foot. Report is equally subject to the likelihood of being true or false. I have the fullest confidence that the present is without foundation." After more to the same purpose, he concludes with declaring that his "friendly heart is to the last degree bent on endeavours to confirm and strengthen the foundations of harmony and union." This brief letter was followed by a very long one, which was received only ten days later, and not only referred to Lord Mornington's letter of the 8th November, but made large quotations from it, and discussed some of the points which it raised. His explanation of the expedition to Mauritius is a good specimen of the enormous lying to which he had recourse whenever a purpose was to be served by it. "In this *sircar* (the gift of God) there is a mercantile tribe who employ themselves in trading by sea and land; their agents purchased a two-masted vessel, and having loaded her with rice, departed with a view to traffic. It happened that she went to the Mauritius, from whence forty persons, French, and of a dark colour, of whom ten or twelve were artificers, and the rest servants, paying the hire of the ship, came here in search of employment; such as chose to take service were entertained, and the remainder departed beyond the confines of this *sircar* (the gift of God), and the French, who are full of vice and deceit, have perhaps taken advantage of the departure of the ship to put about reports, with a view to ruffle the minds of both *sircars*." In another part of the letter, he says that as he is "resident at home, at times taking the air, and at others amusing myself with hunting, at a spot which is used as a pleasure-ground," his lordship's allusion to "war," and his declaration that "prudence required that both the Company and their allies should adopt certain measures of precaution and self-defence," had given him the greatest surprise. Since "it has been understood, by the blessing of the Almighty, at the conclusion of the peace, the treaties and engagements entered into among the four *sircars* were so firmly established and confirmed as ever to remain fixed and durable, and be an example to the rulers of the age," he

A D. 1799. cannot even imagine how there can be any occasion to send Major Doveton to him. He concludes thus:—"I have the strongest hope that the minds of the wise and intelligent, but particularly of the four states, will not be sullied by doubts and jealousies, but will consider me from my heart desirous of harmony and friendship."

Lord Mornington's rejoinder to Tippoo.

The above letter from Tippoo was answered by Lord Mornington on the 9th of January, 1799. It was dated from Madras, where his lordship had arrived on the 31st of December, and entered into a full detail of all the proceedings by which the Company and their allies were alarmed and aggrieved. From the facts detailed, seven distinct conclusions were drawn, of which the two last were as follows:—"7. That your highness was prepared to make an unprovoked attack upon the Company's possessions, if you had obtained from the French the effectual succour which you had solicited through your ambassadors. 8. That your highness, by these several acts, has violated the treaties of peace and friendship subsisting between your highness and the allies." Still, notwithstanding all these provocations, the Company and their allies were "ready to renew and confirm the bonds of amity, on such conditions as shall preclude the continuance of those jealousies which must subsist, so long as a final and satisfactory adjustment of all causes of suspicion shall be delayed." The letter concluded thus:—"Had your highness received Major Doveton, that gentleman would have explained to your highness how this advantageous arrangement is to be obtained. The allies being always anxious to enter into this friendly explanation with your highness, I once more call upon your highness, in the most serious and solemn manner, to assent to the admission of Major Doveton, as a measure which I am confident would be productive of the most lasting advantages to all parties. I trust that your highness will favour me with a friendly letter in reply to this; and I most earnestly request that your reply may not be deferred for more than one day after this letter. Dangerous consequences result from the delay of arduous affairs." To this letter, Lord Mornington appended a Persian translation of the manifesto issued by the Ottoman Porte against the French for their invasion of Egypt.

Close of the correspondence.

On the 16th of January, Lord Mornington again wrote Tippoo, and transmitted a letter addressed to him by the Turkish sultan, for the purpose of dissuading him from his French connections. His answer to the governor-general was as follows:—"I have been much gratified by the receipt of your lordship's two friendly letters, the first brought by a camel-man, and the latter by hircarrahs, and understood their contents. The letter of the prince in station like Jumshied with angels as his guards, with troops numerous as the stars, the sun illuminating the world, the heaven of empire and dominion, the luminary giving splendour to the universe, the firmament of glory and power; the sultan of the sea and the land, the King of Roum, (be his empire and his power perpetual!) addressed to me which reached you through the British envoy,

and which you transmitted, has arrived. Being frequently disposed to make excursions and hunt, I am accordingly proceeding on a hunting excursion. You will be pleased to despatch Major Doveton (about whose coming your friendly pen has repeatedly written) slightly attended." This letter, received on the 13th of February, closed the correspondence on Tippoo's part, and was briefly answered on the 22d, the governor-general simply intimating regret that his friendly warnings had not been attended to. The season for action had now arrived, the army had been ordered to advance, and Major Doveton's mission would now be useless; but General Harris, the commander of the British troops, had been authorized to receive any embassy that might be sent to him, and to form a new treaty of friendship "founded on such conditions as appear to the allies to be indispensably necessary to the establishment of a secure and permanent peace" On the same day when this letter was written, a manifesto was issued, entitled, "Declaration of the Right Honourable the Governor-general in council for all the Forces and Affairs of the British nation in India, on behalf of the Honourable the East India Company, and the Allies of the said Company, the Nizam and the Peishwa." Composed in the grandiloquent style to which the governor-general was rather too much addicted, it enumerated all Tippoo's delinquencies and evasions, boasted that "the providence of God and the victorious arms of the British nation frustrated his vain hopes, and checked the presumptuous career of the French in Egypt, at the moment when he anxiously expected their arrival on the coast of Malabar," spoke of "the happy intelligence of the glorious success of the British fleet at the mouth of the Nile," and declared that the allies, while "equally prepared to repel his violence and counteract his artifices and delays," still retained "an anxious desire to effect an adjustment with Tippoo Sultan."

A.D. 1799.

Termination
of corres-
pondence
with Tippoo.

1, CAMEL HIRCARRAH. 2, FOOT HIRCARRAH.¹
From original drawing, East India House; and Solyns, Les Hindous.

The gover-
nor-gene-
ral's mani-
festo.

It is not out of place to mention that Tippoo, though he failed to obtain direct assistance from the French, was not forgotten by them, and that at the very time when he was corresponding with the governor-general, the following singular letter was addressed to him:—

¹ *Hircarra*, or *hircarrah*—a guide, a spy, a messenger.

A.D. 1799.

"FRENCH REPUBLIC."

*"Liberty."**Equality.*

Letter to
Tippoo
from Bona-
parte.

"Bonaparte, Member of the National Convention, General-in-chief, to the most magnificent Sultan, our greatest Friend, Tippoo Sahib.

"Head-quarters at Cairo, 7th Pluviso, 7th year of the Republic, One and Indivisible.

"You have already been informed of my arrival on the borders of the Red Sea, with an innumerable and invincible army, full of the desire of delivering you from the iron yoke of England. I eagerly embrace this opportunity of testifying to you the desire I have of being informed by you, by the way of Muscat and Mocha, as to your political situation. I would even wish you could send me some intelligent person to Suez or Cairo, possessing your confidence, with whom I may confer. May the Almighty increase your power, and destroy your enemies.

(Signed) BONAPARTE."


Tippoo's
infatuated
course.

The above letter having been intercepted did not reach its destination, but other letters written in a similar spirit were undoubtedly received, and furnish the most plausible explanation of the comparative indifference which Tippoo continued to manifest to all the warnings which were given him by the governor-general. He seems to have expected that powerful foreign armaments were about to arrive, which would so completely overmatch his enemies as to leave him little more to do than to look on and witness their destruction. Very possibly, too, he was misled by the very style which the governor-general adopted in all his letters. He spoke of himself and his allies as if they were all acting in concert, and he had agreed not to take a single step without their concurrence. Were this the case, Tippoo might well calculate that a long period must elapse before he was actually attacked, because he was at this very time in close communication with the Mahrattas, and knew that so far from joining the governor-general, they were more likely to take the field against him. The only other hypothesis which might be adopted to explain Tippoo's apparent indifference, would be to assume that he was unconscious of having given any just cause of offence, and therefore could not believe that he was in any immediate danger. This hypothesis however, though it has found supporters, is totally at variance with fact. Tippoo knew well how deeply he had offended, but as he had offended as deeply on other occasions without being called to account, he perhaps inferred that he would again escape with impunity. He did not know, or at least did not attach sufficient importance to the fact, that British India was no longer administered by a governor-general who endeavoured to avert danger by winking at it, but by one who disdained this timid policy, and ever followed the wiser course of anticipating danger, instead of allowing it to overtake him.

All hopes of an amicable settlement being now extinguished, the campaign immediately commenced. The main army under General Harris had assembled

in January, 1799, at Vellore, and made its first march towards Mysore, on the 11th of February. It consisted in all of 36,979 men. Of these 20,802 formed the Madras army, in which the cavalry amounted to 2635, and the infantry to 15,076; the remainder were artillerymen and pioneers. Of the cavalry 884, of the infantry 4381, and of the artillerymen 608 were Europeans. The Nizam's army, nominally commanded by Meer Alum, but really by the Honourable Colonel Wellesley (Duke of Wellington), who had joined it with his own regiment, consisted of the subsidiary detachment of 6536 men under Colonel Dalrymple, 3621 infantry, formerly French, under Captain Malcolm, and about

A.D. 1799.

Commence-
ment of
campaign
against
Tippoo.

SEPOYS OF THE MADRAS ARMY. — From Gold's Oriental Drawings.
1, 2, 3, Officers and private, Gun Lascar Corps; 4, 5, 6, Subahdar, grenadier, recruit.

6000 regular and irregular horse. The united army proceeded south-west to Carimungulum, which was reached on the 28th. About the same time, the Bombay army of 6420 men, which had assembled under the command of General Stuart, began to ascend the Western Ghauts. On the 25th of February it reached the head of the Poodicherrum Pass, and on the 2d of March took post at Sedaseer, only forty-five miles west of Seringapatam. The main army proceeding up the pass of Palicode, arrived on the 4th of March at Ryacottah on Tippoo's frontier, and crossing it without opposition, encamped on the 9th at Kelamungulum, about eighty miles east of his capital. In addition to the main and the Bombay armies, two adequate detachments were stationed for the purpose of collecting and forwarding supplies; the one in the district of Coimbatore, under Colonel Brown, and the other in Baramahal, under Colonel Read. A British squadron under Admiral Ramier scoured the western coast, for the purpose of intercepting any armament that might have been fitted out by the French.

March of
the British
army.

As the nearest route to Seringapatam led through a pass which had not been examined, General Harris proceeded northwards past Anicul. Parties of

A. D. 1799.


Diversion
attempted
by Tippoo.

the enemy's horse were now seen in all directions, burning the forage and destroying the villages. On the 14th, the main army encamped at the village of Cullagerapettah, about ten miles south, and within sight of Bangalore. It was expected that, before this time, Tippoo would have appeared in force, and opposed farther progress. He was elsewhere employed. On the 6th of March, when only the right brigade of the Bombay army, composed of three native battalions under Colonel Montresor, had reached Sedaseer, the remainder being stationed in two divisions in the rear, at the distances of eight and twelve miles, Tippoo, having crossed into the territories of the Rajah of Coorg, suddenly made his appearance, in the hope of surprising the brigade, and destroying it by overwhelming numbers. He very nearly succeeded. Penetrating with secrecy and expedition through the jungles, he commenced an attack on front and rear almost at the same instant. The brigade was in fact completely surrounded, and was only saved by its own distinguished gallantry in maintaining the unequal struggle until it could be reinforced. Ultimately Tippoo was driven off, with an estimated loss of 1500 men, while that of the British amounted only to twenty-nine killed, ninety-eight wounded, and sixteen missing. The disgrace must have been felt by him still more severely than the loss, for 11,800 of his best troops had been repulsed by little more than 2000. Two native accounts of this battle are extant, the one by the celebrated Rajah of Coorg, the other by Tippoo himself. They are both sufficiently characteristic, though, as might be expected, they differ widely. The rajah, writing to the governor-general, says, "A severe action then ensued, in which I was present. To describe the battle which General Stuart fought with these two regiments of Europeans, the discipline, valour, strength, and magnanimity of the troops, the courageous attack upon the army of Tippoo surpasses all example in this world. In our Shasters and Paranas, the battles fought by Allered and Maharat have been much celebrated, but they are unequal to this battle. It exceeds my ability to describe this action at length to your lordship. In this manner Tippoo's army was beaten. The action with the two regiments lasted about three hours and a half. A sirdar of high rank with Tippoo, the Benky Nabob, fell in this action; the first and second bukshees of a body of 6000 men, being wounded with musket-balls, were taken prisoners; I have also heard that five or six officers of rank with the enemy have fallen; many of the enemy were slain, and many wounded; the remainder having thrown away their muskets and swords, and their turbans, and thinking it sufficient to save their lives, fled in the greatest confusion. Tippoo, having collected the remains of his troops, returned to Periapatam." Tippoo's account, contained in a memorandum in his own handwriting, is as follows:—"On Wednesday, the 30th, or last day of the month Razy, of the Shadeb, 1226 from the birth of Mahomed, corresponding with the 29th of Ramzan (when the moon is not visible), the victorious army having left their baggage at Periapatam, and formed them-

Two native
accounts of
the result.

selves into three divisions or detachments, entered the woods of Coorg by three different roads, where the army of the Christians had taken post, and advancing, gave battle, fighting with firelocks and spears, and the whole army of the infidels was routed, some of the Christians taking to flight. In that battle, Mahomed Reza and Mahomed Meeran devoted themselves, and drank the cup of martyrdom; Mirzah Bakir Bukshy, and Mahomed Ichangeer, Bukshee Asiff of Cucherry, became martyrs; and Moazim Khan Bukshy was wounded and taken prisoner by the Christians, and Golam Mohee-u-deen devoted himself a martyr." A.D. 1799.

Tippoo, quitting Periapatam, arrived at Seringapatam on the 14th of March,



SERINGAPATAM, from the East.—From Colebrooke's Twelve Views in Mysore, 1805.

and immediately moved to encounter General Harris, who, continuing to advance, encamped on the 26th, five miles east of Malavilly, and not more than thirty miles east of the capital. The spies reported that Tippoo had announced his intention to attack the English "so soon as they ventured out of the jungles." This information seemed to be correct, for his advanced parties, among which were some elephants, appeared on a distant ridge, and fourteen or fifteen guns were distinctly seen in motion. On the 27th five regiments of cavalry, forming the advance under General Floyd, on approaching within a mile of the village of Malavilly, discovered a numerous body of the enemy's cavalry on the right flank, and their infantry on the heights beyond. It was evidently Tippoo's army, but as it kept at too great a distance to be brought to action, General Harris ordered the quartermaster-general to mark out a new encampment. This was scarcely finished when twelve or fourteen guns opened from the enemy's line, at the distance of about 2000 yards. This cannonade was answered by such of the field-pieces as could be brought up, and the action soon became general along the whole front. The enemy displayed much cour-

Tippoo
hazards a
battle and
is defeated

A.D. 1799. age. After several repulses, a column of about 2000 men moved forward in excellent order towards his majesty's 33d. The regiment reserving its fire, received that of the enemy at the distance of sixty yards, and then advancing threw the column into disorder. At this, General Floyd with his cavalry charged and completed the rout with great slaughter. The whole of the British line now moved forward and drove the enemy's first line back upon his second, but his movements were too rapid to give any hope of overtaking him, and the pursuit was abandoned. The enemy's loss amounted to 1000 killed and wounded; ours was trifling.

Tippoo
defeated.

Prepara-
tions for
the siege
of Seringa-
patani.

The British army on the 28th moved south-west towards Sosilay, where there is an easy ford over the Cauvery. This route not having been suspected by the enemy had not been devastated, and hence all the villages and even open fields furnished large supplies of forage. Sosilay, in particular, where the inhabitants of the neighbouring villages had taken refuge, was found to contain large quantities of grain and twelve to fifteen thousand head of cattle, besides a great number of sheep and goats. The right wing of the army, the cavalry, and Colonel Wellesley's division still remained encamped on the north bank, but the rest of the army crossed at Sosilay into a country which had all its stores untouched, as Tippoo had reserved them for the consumption of his own army. This able movement had other advantages. It facilitated the junction with the Bombay army, and rendered nugatory all the intermediate defensive operations which the enemy had employed, under the impression that the attack would be made, as in 1792, from the north side of the river. On the 30th, the portion of the army which had remained on the north side also crossed, and the march westward was continued without further interruption. At length, on the 5th of April, the army took up its ground opposite the west face of the fort of Seringapatam, at the distance of about two miles. The position was admirably chosen. The right was on a high commanding ground, sloping gradually toward the Cauvery; the left resting on this river was doubly secured by it, and by an aqueduct fifteen yards wide and six feet deep, which, fed by a dam built across the river near Caniambaddy, at once served as a strong entrenchment, and furnished an unfailing supply of the finest water. In the rear were several deep ravines impracticable for the enemy's cavalry; in front a chain of advanced posts on high ground afforded equal security.

Tippoo's des-
pondency.


Tippoo, when he saw all his preparatory measures foiled by the advance of the besieging army along the south bank, is said to have sunk into absolute despondency. Calling together the whole of his principal officers he exclaimed, "We have arrived at our last stage; what is your determination?" They answered: "To die along with you." After a gloomy consultation, it was resolved, in the belief that General Harris would cross into the island by the southern fords, to cross at the ford of Arikera, take up a strong position in the line of his presumed route, and give battle with no alternative but death or

victory. The necessary movements were accordingly made, and Tippoo was posted with his whole army at Chendgal waiting the decisive moment for action, when to his surprise and mortification the British army, instead of deviating to the right to reach the fords, made a turn to the left in order to avoid the intermediate low grounds, and so passed on at the distance of three miles, while he was unable to take any steps to prevent them.

A.D. 1799.

The aqueduct already mentioned, after winding in front of the left of the British camp, continues in an easterly direction till within a mile of the fort, and then bends round to the south towards a woody eminence, called the

British position before Seringapatam.



Sultan Pettah Tope. Behind the aqueduct on the town side was a lofty bank, and in front were several ruined villages and rocky eminences, affording cover to the enemy's infantry and rocket-men, so near the camp that many of the rockets fell among the tents, and occasioned some apprehension for the safety of the park of artillery stores. It was therefore resolved to attack these posts after sunset on the 5th of April. The troops appointed for this purpose were the king's 12th regiment and two sepoy battalions under Colonel Shaw, and another division consisting of the king's 33d and the 2d Bengal regiment under Colonel Wellesley. The former division was to attack the forts at the aqueduct; the latter to make a diversion by scouring the Sultan Pettah Tope. Colonel Shaw partially succeeded, but Colonel Wellesley failed. Next day, however, the attack was renewed with success, and a connected line of strong posts was in consequence established, extending for nearly two miles from the village of Sultan Pettah to the river.

A. D. 1799.

Tippoo
again
attempts
negotiation.

This success appears to have produced a considerable impression on Tippoo, and induced him for the first time to open a communication with General Harris, who on the 9th of April received from him the following letter:—"The governor-general Lord Mornington Behauder sent me a letter, copy of which is inclosed; you will understand it. I have adhered firmly to treaties; what, then, is the meaning of the advance of the English armies and the occurrence of hostilities? Inform me. What need I say more?" The general's answer was equally laconic:—"Your letter, inclosing copies of the governor-general's letter has been received. For the advance of the English and allied armies, and for the occurrence of hostilities, I refer you to the several letters of the governor-general, which are sufficiently explanatory on the subject. What need, I say more?"

British rein-
forcements
from the
west.

On the 6th of April, General Floyd had set out for Periapatam with four regiments of cavalry and the greater part of the left wing of the army, for the purpose of strengthening General Stuart and enabling him to advance. The whole of the Mysorean cavalry and a large body of infantry commanded by



SEPOY OF TIPPPOO'S REGULAR INFANTRY.¹

Kummer-u-deen followed close on General Floyd's track, determined if possible to frustrate his intention. They continued accordingly to hover around him, both before the junction and after it, but no opportunity was given them of making the least impression, and on the 14th of April, both General Floyd and General Stuart arrived with their united forces in the camp before Seringapatam. On the following day General Stuart crossed to the north bank of the river, and took up a position so as to enfilade the face of the fort intended for attack, and the exterior trenches or field works by which the enemy endeavoured to impede the progress of the siege.

Plan of
attack.


The alternative of two plans of attack had been submitted by the chief engineer. The one was to assault at the south-west, and the other at the north-west angle. In the one case it would be made from the west, and in the other from the north bank of the river. The former was the direction in which it was anticipated by Tippoo, and he had accordingly employed many thousand workmen in making a new entrenchment on the west bank, and in opening new embrasures on various parts of the south face of the fort. He was again wrong

¹ The dress consisted of purple woollen stuff, with white diamonds on it; this was called the *tiger-jacket*. The accessories comprised a turban of red muslin, and cummerband of same material round the waist;

sandal slippers; black leather cross-belt; and a musket of French manufacture, having a leather covering to protect the cock from damp.—Gold's *Oriental Drawings*.

in his calculation, for the north-west angle had been adopted in preference, and he became himself convinced of it when he saw that the position taken by General Stuart, instead of being merely a feint as he at first supposed, was intended for permanent occupation. Opposite to this angle the bed of the river

A.D. 1799.

Plan of
attack on
Seringa-
patam.

SERINGAPATAM, South Works, during the Siege, 1799.—From the M'Kenzie Drawings, East India House.

was a bare rock, and the water so shallow as to offer no obstacle to the passage of troops. After the siege had regularly commenced, a very unexpected discovery was made. It had been understood that the grain in store would suffice for thirty days, but on measuring the bags of rice it was ascertained that there was not more than eighteen days' consumption for the fighting men of the army. "The cause of this alarming and unexpected deficiency," says Colonel Beatson, "has not been satisfactorily explained, but such was the actual pressure of our situation at the moment we were about to commence the siege."¹ "Happily," he continues, "from this alarm the commander-in-chief was soon afterwards effectually relieved, by a tender for the public service of twelve hundred bullock loads of rice. This supply, and some other private stock in camp, being secured and added to the public department, made the total quantity sufficient for the subsistence of the fighting men until the 20th of May; long before which time the convoy from the Baramahal was expected to arrive, and the siege of Seringapatam to be brought to a final issue." One would like to know by whom the above tender was made, and from what quarter the load of the twelve hundred bullocks was obtained. It looks as if it had found its way from the public stores, and returned to them by being purchased a second time. Colonel Beatson gives no further information on the subject, and Colonel Wilks disposes of it by saying, that "after a lapse of eighteen years this transaction still continues to be an unfit subject for historical disquisition."

Unexpected
and un-
accountable
deficiency
of supplies.

The siege continuing to make steady progress, Tippoo became more and more convinced of his inability to make a successful defence, and resolved once

¹ Colonel Beatson's *View of the Origin and Conduct of the War with Tippoo Sultan*, p. 100.

A.D. 1799.

Tippoo still
anxious to
negotiate.

more to try the effect of negotiation. Accordingly, on the 20th of April he sent the following undated letter to General Harris. "In the letter of Lord Mornington it is written, that the clearing up of matters at issue is proper, and that therefore you, having been empowered for the purpose, will appoint such persons as you judge proper for conducting a conference, and renewing the business of a treaty. You are, the well-wisher of both sircars. In this matter what is your pleasure? Inform me, that a conference may take place." General Harris returned an answer, inclosing the draft of a preliminary treaty, and stating that if its demands were not acquiesced in within twenty-four hours after receiving them, the allies reserved to themselves "the right of extending these demands for security, even to the possession of the fort of Seringapatam, till a definitive treaty can be arranged, and its stipulations carried into effect. The leading demands were, that Tippoo should cede one-half of his dominions to the allies, from the countries adjacent to their respective boundaries and agreeable to their selection, pay two crores of rupees (two millions sterling), and deliver four of his sons, and four of his principal officers as hostages. Tippoo raved at what he called the arrogance and tyranny of the demands, and disdained to return any reply. It was better, he said, to die like a soldier than to live a miserable dependant on the infidels in the list of their pensioned rajahs and nabobs.

Progress of
the siege.


On the 22d, a vigorous and well-conducted sortie from the garrison, against all the outposts and advanced works of the besiegers on the northern bank, was repulsed, after several hours' hard fighting, with a loss of about 700 men; on the 23d, the enlarged batteries of both northern and southern attacks silenced every gun opposed to them, and had so perfect an enfilade as to make the defence of the curtains all but impossible; and on the 26th and 27th, the enemy were dislodged from their last exterior entrenchment, distant only 380 yards from the fort, and consequently defended by its whole fire, as well as by exterior musketry and rockets. Tippoo, after this additional humbling, was able to pocket his disdain, and make a last attempt at negotiation. On the 28th he wrote as follows:—"I have the pleasure of your friendly letter, and understand its contents. The points in question are weighty, and without the intervention of ambassadors cannot be brought to a conclusion. I am therefore about to send two gentlemen to you, and have no doubt but a conference will take place. They will personally explain themselves to you." General Harris immediately replied, that he had made his demands in conformity to instructions from the governor-general, and could not without violating these instructions receive any ambassadors. As the terms had not been accepted the allies would be justified in making them more rigorous, but his acceptance would still be received, if given and properly authenticated before three o'clock P.M. of the following day.

Before this attempt at renewed negotiation, Tippoo had recourse to every

means which fear had suggested as likely to avert the impending fate. His attendance at the mosque was more frequent, and his devotions more earnest. He even entreated a fervent *amen* to his prayers from his attendants, and bribed the priests, not only of his own faith, but of Hindooism, which he had so cruelly persecuted, to intercede for his deliverance. The aid of astrology also was called in, and the professed adepts of every sect were consulted in regard to planetary influence, and unfavourable omens. Even with these, though their

A. D. 1799.

Tippoo's
fears, and
recourse to
astrologers.



GRAND MOSQUE, SERINGAPATAM, 1799.—From the M'Kenzie Drawings. East India House.

trade was chicanery, the time for delusion seemed to be past, and they spoke only of approaching calamities. After their worst predictions were confirmed by the refusal of General Harris to receive his ambassadors, Tippoo's rage subsided into a kind of stupor, and he could not be aroused to make exertions by which the evil day, if it could not be averted, might at least have been postponed. When the works of the besiegers clearly indicated that the salient angle at the north-west corner of the fort was the point where the breach for assault would be made, he declined, when urged by the most judicious of his officers, to cut off the whole angle by means of a retrenchment of easy execution. In personal inspection, now more than ever necessary, he became remiss, and chose rather not to see the extent of his danger than to contend against it.

The besiegers, who had concealed the true point of their attack till the latest moment possible, began on the 2d of May to make a breach of about sixty yards, immediately to the south of the bastion in the north-west angle. On the following day the breach was reported practicable, and the assault was fixed for the 4th. Before daybreak, 4376 men took their appointed stations in the trench under General (afterwards Sir David) Baird, who was to have the honour of leading them. He had volunteered for this service, and had earned a kind

The assault
headed by
Sir David
Baird.

A. D. 1799.

Assault on
Srīringa-
patam.

of right to be selected for it, by an imprisonment of nearly four years within this very fort, as one of the captives taken when Colonel Baillie's detachment was destroyed. The troops for the assault were arranged in two columns, the one



SIR DAVID BAIRD.—After Sir H. Raeburn.

under Colonel Sherbrooke and the other under Colonel Dunlop; and the plan was, that after issuing together from the trenches, they were, on surmounting the breach, to separate, wheeling respectively to the right and left, and proceed along the rampart, so as to be able, after carrying such works as might be expedient, to meet on its eastern face. The only object of placing the men so early in the trenches was to elude observation, for it had been determined not to assault till one o'clock, at which hour the garrison, taking their usual refreshment and repose, would be most off their guard. A powerful reserve was likewise stationed under the command of Colo-

nel Wellesley, in order to support the assault.

Its success.

At half-past one, the moment fixed for the assault, General Baird, who had shortly before sent round an intimation to the troops to be ready at an instant's warning, stepped out of the trench, and drawing his sword, called aloud, "Come, my brave fellows, follow me, and prove yourselves worthy the name of British soldiers." In an instant both columns rushed from the trenches, entered the bed of the river under cover of the batteries, and hastened toward the breach. In six minutes the forlorn hope, closely followed by the rest of the troops, had gained its summit and displayed the British colours; in a few minutes more the breach was crowded with men. As soon as a sufficient number were collected on the rampart, they wheeled off right and left, according to the original instructions. The assault operated upon the garrison like a surprise. So little was it expected that Tippoo, after replying, in answer to some warnings given him, that an assault by day was very improbable, was seated at his mid-day repast, when intelligence of its having actually commenced, first reached him. After a very feeble resistance, they abandoned their strongest positions, and thought only of saving themselves by flight. Not a few in their terror threw themselves from the rampart, and were dashed to pieces on the rocky bed of the river. The right column, which, from the number of formidable works known to lie across its path, had anticipated a desperate struggle,

in less than an hour had cleared their way along the rampart to the place of rendezvous on the eastern face of the fort. The left column made slower progress. The north-west bastion was soon gained, but all along the north rampart, the enemy—headed it is said by Tippoo in person, and posted behind traverses, which they occupied in succession—kept up a fire which killed or disabled most of the leading officers of the assailants, and repeatedly brought their front to a stand. Being reinforced by fresh troops, some of which cleared the traverses by opening a flanking fire upon them, they pushed on towards the north-east angle. Here the enemy, perceiving the approach of the right column, were thrown into the utmost confusion, and perished by thousands, either by the sword or in vain endeavours to escape.

A.D. 1799.

Capture of
Seringa-
patani.

As soon as the whole rampart was occupied, and the firing from it had ceased, General Baird deputed Major Allan to proceed with a flag of truce to the palace, and offer protection to Tippoo Sultan and all its inmates on condition of immediate surrender, at the same time threatening instant assault and death to every man within it in the event of further resistance. Major Allan having gained admission to the palace, was, after some delay, received by two of Tippoo's younger sons, who solemnly declared that their father was not within. General Baird, on receiving this information, was not disposed to credit it, and in the hopes of inducing them to tell where he was, threatened to search the inmost recesses of the palace. Meanwhile the princes were brought away under the strongest assurances of protection, and sent off to the camp to the commander-in-chief. General Baird, after placing a sufficient guard round the zenana to prevent Tippoo's escape, proceeded to make search for him in the other parts of the palace. The killedar in command, on being severely threatened, informed him that Tippoo had been wounded during the assault, and was lying in a gateway on the north face of the fort. He offered to point out the very spot. The information proved correct. Tippoo was indeed lying there, not merely wounded, but dead. His horse, which had been shot, and his palanquin, were first discovered. The gateway exhibited a horrid spectacle. Numbers had perished there from being trodden down or suffocated, and their dead bodies lay heaped in mass over each other. As the darkness had come on, it was necessary to examine them by torch-light. A personal attendant of the palanquin, who had escaped suffocation by creeping under it, on being informed of the object of the search, pointed out the body of his master. On being brought out, it was

Surrender of
Tippoo's
sons.


DRESS WORN BY TIPP
THE DAY OF HIS
DEATH.¹

¹ The coat is of rich crimson silk damask, lined with green silk, and ornamented with green tassels on the shoulders and sleeves, now much faded in colour.

The loops and tassels to fasten the coat are also green. The folds of the turban are of green velvet; the skull-cap and pendant flaps are of crimson silk exquisitely

A.D. 1799. immediately recognized by the killedar and several others, and conveyed in a palanquin to the palace, where the identification was completed by the unanimous testimony of the domestics. The body showed several wounds, but the one which must have almost instantaneously proved fatal, was a musket-shot, the ball of which had entered a little above the right ear, and lodged in the left cheek, near the mouth. It was said to have been given by a soldier whom he had endeavoured to cut down when seeking to deprive him of his richly orna-

Discovery of
Tippoo's
dead body.



TOMB OF HYDER ALI AND TIPPOO SULTAN, SERINGAPATAM.¹—From Hunter's Views in Mysore.

mented sword-belt. Tippoo's second son, who commanded the southern face, escaped during the assault, but surrendered on the following morning, and was sent back to the palace along with his two younger brothers. His conduct on viewing his father's corpse presented a striking contrast to theirs; he looked on with brutal apathy, while they gave affecting utterance to their grief. In the evening, the remains of Tippoo Sultan were deposited with those of his father in the superb mausoleum of the Lal Bang, situated at the eastern extremity of the island. The funeral was as splendid as Mahometan rites and European military honours could make it, and took place amid peals of thunder. The district is notorious for storms, but one so terrific as that which broke over the island at this time has seldom been witnessed.

Barbarous
character
of Tippoo.

It is impossible to feel any sympathy with Tippoo, or regret for the dynasty which closed with him. His father, who founded it, was possessed of natural talents of the highest order, but his successful career was less attributable to them than to perfidy, rapine, and bloodshed. Owing to the want of education,

embroidered, and lined with yellow silk wrought with silver. The nasal to protect the face is most beautifully inlaid with gold.

¹ A superb and magnificent mausoleum was built by Tippoo. "It is erected on a square base, elevated from the ground by a stone terrace, with ascents of numerous flights of steps; and is covered by a capa-

cious dome surmounted with a golden crescent. The walls are of white chunam, in imitation of stone; the upper part richly and laboriously wrought with a kind of fillagree work; and the whole encompassed by a veranda or colonnade, the pillars of which are of a composition resembling the finest black marble."

—Gold's *Oriental Drawings*.


his faculties had never been improved nor his manners refined, and he remained to the end of his life a clever but heartless barbarian. Tippoo, less talented than his father, surpassed him only in his vices, and was even notorious for some with which his father cannot be charged. To a cruel and vindictive temper he added a fierce and relentless bigotry, which was repeatedly displayed in the devastation of whole provinces and the extermination of their inhabitants merely because they resented his forcible conversions. In the eyes of Europeans the deepest stain on his memory is the inhuman treatment of his prisoners, the horrid dungeons in which he confined them, the heavy chains with which he loaded them, and the lingering or excruciating deaths by which he cut them off when he felt them to be cumbersome, or feared the revelations which they might make after he had been compelled to set them free. In this horrid butchery he had been

A.D. 1799.



JEWELLED PEACOCK, from Tippoo Sultan's Golden Throne.¹

Barbarous
character
of Tippoo.



FLAGS OF TIPPoo SULTAN, AND THE GOLDEN TIGER-HEAD FOOTSTOOL TO HIS THRONE.²

engaged only a short time before his capital was stormed, and the knowledge of the fact when first made known to the British soldiers had so exasperated them that they were with difficulty restrained from taking a fearful vengeance on all the members of his family and the inmates of his palace. This vengeance, which would only have punished one crime by committing another of equal atrocity, was happily prevented, but there is something like retributive justice in the fact that the assault which cost Tippoo his life and extinguished his dynasty, was headed by one who had experienced the horrors of a Seringapatam dungeon.

In the assault above 8000 of the enemy's troops were killed.

Value of
the capture
of Seringa-
patam.

The whole number engaged in the defence was 21,839, but of these above 8000

¹ This beautiful specimen of oriental jewellery was the ornament at the apex of the canopy to Tippoo's
VOL. II.

A.D. 1799.

Value of
the capture
of Seringa-
patam.Colonel Wel-
lesley com-
mandant.

were in the entrenchments on the island, and consequently little more than 13,000 within the fort. It thus appears that nearly two-thirds of the actual defenders must have fallen. The whole loss of the British force, during the siege and the assault, including exactly a whole month, from April 4th to May 4th, was only 1164. Of these 825 were European and 639 native troops. In the fort were found 373 guns, 60 mortars, and 11 howitzers, all of brass, and 466 guns and 12 mortars of iron, in all 929 pieces of ordnance, of which 287 were mounted on the fortifications, 424,000 round shot, 520,000 lbs. of gunpowder, and 99,000 muskets and carabines. The buildings of the fort included eleven large powder magazines, seventy-two expense magazines, eleven armouries for making and finishing small arms, two foundries for cannon, three buildings with machines for boring guns and muskets, four large arsenals, seventeen other storehouses containing accoutrements, swords, and other articles, and many granaries abundantly stored with provisions of every kind. The whole value in treasure and jewels amounted to £1,143,216. These details, copied from Colonel Beatson's work, give a better idea of the vast resources of the Mysore capital than could be obtained from any general description. General Baird resigned the charge of Seringapatam, on the morning after its capture, to Colonel Wellesley, who was immediately after appointed permanent commandant. It is unnecessary to say that no officer better qualified for the post could have been selected, but it may be suspected, without any great breach of charity, that when the appointment was made, his great merits did not weigh so much as his relationship to the governor-general. General Baird had certainly a prior claim, and was aggrieved when another was allowed to reap the fruits of a capture which had been effected under his immediate leadership. It has been maintained, however, that he did not desire, or at least professed not to desire, the appointment. On this fact, which has given rise to some discussion, the propriety or impropriety of Colonel Wellesley's appointment hinges. Once installed, the good effects of his management were soon apparent. By a vigorous exertion of authority, the disorder almost inevitable after a storm was speedily suppressed; the inhabitants, who had sought refuge in the neighbouring fields and villages, were induced by the restoration of confidence to

golden throne. The neck of the peacock is of emeralds, and the body of diamonds with three bands of rubies. The beak is a large emerald tipped with gold, and pendant from it are a ruby and two pearls; an emerald and pearl are the cresting to the head. The tail and wings are composed of rows of rubies, diamonds, and emeralds, and pendant from the former are small pearls.

² The tiger was the emblem of Tippoo's empire; and a golden tiger's head was the footstool to the splendid throne of which the jewelled peacock was the crowning ornament. The head, though very conventional in treatment, is strikingly oriental in character, but the legs and paws are modelled with great freedom. The eyes are of crystal, and the canine teeth are also of crystal; the markings on the head are in

burnished gold. The standards, grouped at the side of the tiger head, are of purple silk, having a central sun, consisting of alternate stripes of green and gold in a circle, surrounded by gold rays and stripes, known as "tiger stripes," of green bordered with gold at the corners. The standard in the centre is of green, with embroidery and fringe of gold. The spear-heads to all the flags are of gold, set with emeralds, diamonds, and rubies. The relics of Tippoo Sultan represented on pages 703 and 705, were taken at the capture of Seringapatam by Lord Harris, and with some other relics of the Mysore chief, are now preserved in the armoury, in the north corridor, Windsor Castle. They are engraved from sketches taken by permission of Her Majesty.

return, the bazaars were well supplied, and business ere long began to flow in its usual channels. Only three days after the capture, the main street of Seringapatam, says Beatson, exhibited the appearance of a fair, rather than that of a town just taken by assault. A.D. 1799.

After the fall of the capital, the submission of the whole country was easily effected. On the 14th of May, Futteh Hyder, Kummer-u-Deen, and Purneah, who had previously intimated their readiness to surrender, waited on General Harris, and were received by him with all the honours due to their rank. The whole army being under their command immediately followed their example, and peace and order were re-established in every part of Mysore. The conquest having been achieved, the first business of importance was to settle its future government on principles of equity and sound policy. To this task the governor-general immediately addressed himself. With the concurrence of Nizam Ali, who had left the arrangements entirely to the governor-general, General Harris, Colonel Wellesley, his brother the Hon. Henry Wellesley (afterwards Lord Cowley), Colonel W. Kirkpatrick, and Colonel Barry Close, were appointed by the governor-general "commissioners for the affairs of Mysore," with full powers, as the commission bears, "to negotiate and conclude, in my name, all such treaties, and to make and issue all such temporary and provisional regulations for the ordering and management of the civil and military government, and of the revenues of the said territories, as may be necessary for the immediate administration and settlement thereof." Captain Malcolm and Captain Monro were appointed secretaries to the commission, and the commissioners, before proceeding to act, were to take an oath, binding them "not to disclose any of the orders or instructions" transmitted to them by the governor-general, nor to "accept, directly or indirectly," any sum of money or other valuable thing, "by way of gift, present, or otherwise." The commissioners, "immediately on entering on their duties," were "to issue a proclamation notifying the restoration of tranquillity, and promising to all the inhabitants of the territories of the late Tippoo Sultan, security of person and of private property, encouraging them to resume their ordinary occupations under the protection of the allies," and containing "the strictest injunctions, under the most severe penalties to all persons within the said territories, to abstain from acts of violence, outrage, and plunder." In the secret instructions accompanying the commission, the governor-general announced an intention to restore "the representative of the ancient family of the Rajahs of Mysore, accompanied by a partition of territory between the allies, in which the interests of the Mahrattas should be conciliated," and desired the necessary measures for the removal of Tippoo's family to Vellore, which was to be their future residence. "The details," it is said, "of this painful but indispensable measure cannot be intrusted to any person more likely to combine every office of humanity with the prudential precautions required by the occasion, than Colonel Wellesley; and I therefore commit to his discretion,

Entire sub-
mission of
Mysore.

Commission-
ers ap-
pointed.

A.D. 1799. activity, and humanity, the whole arrangement." After the arrival of the family at Vellore, no "reasonable expense" was to be spared "to render their habitation suitable to their former rank and expectations," and "a liberal pecuniary allowance" was to be given, not exceeding at the utmost, in the aggregate, four lacs of pagodas (£160,000) a year.

Alleged
search of
the zenana
for treasure.

The 7th instruction is in the following terms:—"I have learned, with the utmost degree of surprise and concern, that the zenana in the palace of the sultan, was searched for treasure some time after the capture of the place: I could have wished, for the honour of the British name, that the apartments of the women had not been disturbed. In the heat and confusion of an assault such excesses are frequently unavoidable; but I shall for ever lament that this scene should have been acted long after the contest had subsided, and when the whole place had submitted to the superiority of our victorious arms. If any personal ornaments, or other articles of value, were taken from the women in that unfortunate moment, I trust that the commander-in-chief will make it his business to vindicate the humanity of the British character, by using the most zealous exertions to obtain a full restitution of the property in question." The outrage so justly censured had been committed, though the circumstances were not so bad as the governor-general imagined. In an answer written immediately after the receipt of the instruction, the commissioners say—"We feel great satisfaction in being able to assure your lordship that before the zenana was searched for treasure separate apartments were prepared for the ladies, and no precaution omitted to secure them from the possibility of being exposed to any inconvenience. No treasure was found in the zenana, nor was any article whatever conveyed from thence."

The parti-
tion treaty
of Mysore.

The above instructions were immediately followed by the transmission of the draft of a treaty, usually called the "Partition Treaty of Mysore," and entitled, "Treaty for strengthening the alliance and friendship subsisting between the English East India Company Behauder, his highness the Nabob Nizam ud Dowlah Asoph Jah Behauder, and the Peishwa Row Pundit Purdhan Behauder, and for effecting a settlement of the dominions of the late Tippoo Sultan." This treaty, to which the Company and the Nizam were the only parties, was concluded on the 22d of June, 1799, the Mysore commissioners acting as representatives of the governor-general, and Meer Allum as representative of the Nizam. It consisted of ten articles, and proceeds on the preamble that a war, rendered necessary by the unprovoked hostility of Tippoo, and his attempt "to evade the just demands of satisfaction and security," having terminated in "the reduction of the capital of Mysore, the fall of Tippoo Sultan, the utter extinction of his power, and the unconditional submission of his people," and the allies having "resolved to use the power which it hath pleased Almighty God to place in their hands, for the purpose of obtaining reasonable compensation for the expenses of the war, and of establishing perma-

nent security and genuine tranquillity for themselves and their subjects, as well as for all the powers contiguous to their respective dominions," had concluded a treaty "according to the under-mentioned articles, which, by the blessing of God, shall be binding on the heirs and successors of the contracting parties, as long as the sun and moon shall endure."

A.D. 1799.

The 1st article specified the territories which were to be ceded to the Company, and the 2d article those which were to be ceded to the Nizam. The estimated annual revenue of each, as fixed by the valuation adopted in the treaty of 1792, amounted to 537,170 canteria pagodas, equivalent, at the rate of three rupees to a pagoda, to £161,151. In addition to this common aggregate, the Company received to the value of £72,000 as the provision they undertook to pay for the families of Hyder and Tippoo; and the Nizam, in like manner, £21,000 for the personal jaghire granted within his share to Kummeru-Deen, who was to fix his future residence at Gurramconda. The Company's districts comprehended on the west the whole of Canara, extending along the coast from the vicinity of Goa southward to Cannanore, where it joined their territory of Malabar, and on the south-west, south, and east, the district of Wynaad, forming a southern continuation of the Rajah of Coorg's territory, nearly the whole of the Mysore territory south of the 12th degree of latitude, and two considerable tracts on the east, "together with the heads of all the passes leading from the territory of the late Tippoo Sultan to any part of the possessions of the English East India Company Behauder, of its allies or tributaries situated below the Ghauts on either coast, and all forts situated near to and commanding the said passes." The effect of these annexations was to give the Company continuous possession from sea to sea across the southern part of the peninsula, and completely to inclose the table-land of Mysore on all sides except the north. The Nizam's share lay on the north-east, and included the districts of Gooty, Gurramconda, and part of the district, but not the fort, of Chitteldroog. But the 3d article made an important addition to the acquisitions of the Company, by conveying to them, "in full right and sovereignty for ever," the fortress of Seringapatam, and the island on which it is situated.

Territorial
cessions to
the Com-
pany.

Article 4th was in the following terms:—"A separate government shall be established in Mysore; and for this purpose it is stipulated and agreed that Maharajah Mysore Kistna Rajah Oodraver Behauder, a descendant of the ancient Rajahs of Mysore, shall possess the territory hereinafter described, upon the conditions hereinafter mentioned." Cham Raj, the last pageant Rajah of Tanjore, having died of the small-pox, Tippoo deemed it unnecessary to continue the farce of nominating a successor. His son, who was now to be placed upon the musnud, was a child, according to Sir John Malcolm, only three, and according to Colonel Beatson, five years of age. His mother died a fortnight after his birth; but both his paternal grandmother, said to be ninety-six years of age, and his maternal grandfather were alive, as well as various other members

Restoration
of the old
Mysore dy-
nasty.

A. D. 1700.

Restoration
of the old
Mysore dy-
nasty.The governor-
general's
policy.

of his family. The Brahmin, Purneah, who had been the chief financial minister of Tippoo, had so readily given in his adhesion to the new arrangements, and was known to be possessed of so much ability, that he was appointed his dewan. When the Mysore commissioners had their first interview with the rajah's family, they found them in what Beatson calls "a condition of poverty and humiliation which excited the strongest compassion." Thus suddenly called from a hovel to a throne, it is easy to understand that they gladly promised compliance with every condition under which they were to hold their new dignity, and were full of "gratitude and joy." Previous to the interview the old ranee, the second wife of the rajah, who reigned at the time of Hyder's usurpation, and another lady, who was at once the maternal aunt of the new rajah and one of his father's widows, had addressed a joint letter to the commissioners in the following terms:—"Your having conferred on our child the government of Mysore, Nuggur, and Chitteldroog, with their dependencies, and appointed Purneah to be dewan, has afforded us the greatest happiness. Forty years have elapsed since our government ceased. Now you have favoured our boy with the government of this country, and nominated Purneah to be his dewan, we shall, while the sun and moon continue, commit no offence against your government. We shall at all times consider ourselves as under your protection and orders. Your having established us must for ever be fresh in the memory of our posterity from one generation to another. Our offspring can never forget an attachment to your government, on whose support we shall depend." The sentiments and feelings thus expressed furnish the key to the policy which the governor-general had adopted. In a letter to the directors he says—"The heir of Hyder Ali and Tippoo Sultan, animated by the implacable spirit and bold example of his parents, and accustomed to the commanding prospect of independent sovereignty, and to the splendour of military glory, might deliberately hazard the remnant of his hereditary possessions in pursuit of so proud an object as the recovery of that vast and powerful empire which for many years had rendered his ancestors the scourge of the Carnatic, and the terror of this quarter of India." On the other hand, "the heir of the Rajah of Mysore, if placed on the throne, must feel that his continuance in that station depends on the stability of the new settlement in all its parts; it must, therefore, be his interest to unite with cordiality and zeal in every effort necessary to its harmony, efficiency, and vigour. The effect of such an arrangement of the affairs of Mysore would not be limited to the mere destruction of the hostile power which menaced our safety; in the place of that power would be substituted one whose interest and resources might be absolutely identified with our own; and the kingdom of Mysore, so long the source of calamity or alarm to the Carnatic, might become a new barrier of our defence, and might supply fresh means of wealth and strength to the Company, their subjects, and allies."

After all the curtailments, the territories left to Mysore were larger than

they had been under the rajah's ancestors, and formed a compact continuous kingdom, yielding an estimated revenue of 1,374,076 canteria pagodas, equal to £412,222. The conditions under which the new rajah was to hold his territories were specified in what is called the "Subsidiary Treaty of Seringapatam," to which only the Company and the rajah were parties. It bound the rajah "to receive a military force for the defence and security of his highness's dominions," and to pay for it to the Company "the annual sum of seven lacs of star pagodas" (£280,000). In the event of war, the rajah was to contribute towards the discharge of the increased expense such a sum to the governor-general, "to bear a just and reasonable proportion to the actual net revenues of his said highness." To provide against any failure in the funds for payment, it was stipulated that whenever the governor-general should "have reason to apprehend such failure," he should have "full power and right either to introduce such ordinances and regulations as he shall deem expedient for the internal management and collection of the revenues, or for the better ordering of any other branch and department of the government of Mysore, or to assume and bring under the direct management of the servants of the said Company Behauder, such part or parts of the territorial possessions" of the rajah as shall appear to him "necessary to render the funds efficient and available either in peace or in war." In no case, however, was the rajah's "actual receipt of annual income, arising out of his territorial revenue," to be "less than the sum of one lac of star pagodas (£40,000), together with one fifth part of the net revenues of the whole of the territories ceded to him." The rajah was further taken bound "to abstain from any interference in the affairs of any state in alliance" with the Company, or "of any state whatever;" to hold no communication or correspondence with any foreign state without the previous knowledge and sanction of the Company; "not to suffer, even for a day, any European foreigners to remain within the territories now subjected to his authority, unless by consent of the Company;" and to leave the Company at liberty to garrison, in whatever manner they may judge proper, such fortresses within Mysore as might seem to them advisable. Finally, the rajah gave his promise "to pay at all times the utmost attention to such advice as the English government shall occasionally judge it necessary to offer to him, with a view to the economy of his finances, the better collection of his revenues, the administration of justice, the extension of commerce, the encouragement of trade, agriculture, and industry, or any other objects connected with his highness's interests, the happiness of his people, and the mutual welfare of both states." A glance at the above stipulations is sufficient to show that the rajah was made a sovereign only in name, and that the government of his territories was henceforth entirely vested in the Company. As Seringapatam had been appropriated by the Company, it was necessary to select a new residence for the rajah. Mysore, the ancient capital, was fixed upon; and, on the 30th of June, the ceremony of placing the

A.D. 1799.

Extent of
the restored
kingdom of
Mysore.Tenure by
which it
was to be
held.

A.D. 1799.

Restored
kingdom of
Mysore.

child on the musnud was performed by General Harris, in presence of the commissioners and a vast concourse of Hindoos, who rent the air with their acclamations, a royal salute from the fort of Seringapatam, and volleys of musketry from his majesty's 12th regiment. It is rather amusing to hear Beatson talking of the deportment of the young prince, a child of three or at most five years of age, as having been, during the ceremony, "highly proper." The investiture of Purneah as dewan was afterwards performed. Colonel Barry Close had previously obtained from the governor-general the appointment of resident at Mysore, an office for which he was considered peculiarly qualified by "extraordinary talents, proficiency in the native languages, and experience in the native manners and customs."

Proposed
cession to
the peishwa.

In the partition treaty of Mysore there was an article to which attention has not yet been paid. In addition to the territories which were appropriated to the rajah, and the shares obtained by the Company and the Nizam, a tract in the north-west, yielding an annual revenue of 263,957 canterias pagodas (£79,186), had been reserved. This tract, which was thus equal only to a half of each of the other shares, was contiguous to the Mahratta territory. The object of reserving it is explained in the 7th article, by which it was agreed that although the peishwa "has neither participated in the expense or danger of the late war, and therefore is not entitled to share any of the acquisitions made by the contracting parties (the Company and the Nizam), yet, for the maintenance of friendship and alliance," certain specified districts "shall be reserved, for the purpose of being eventually ceded to the said peishwa." This cession, however, was to be made only provided the peishwa "shall accede to the present treaty in its full extent, within one month from the day on which it shall be formally communicated to him by the contracting parties;" and provided, also, "he shall give satisfaction" to the Company and the Nizam "with regard to certain points now depending" between them, and "also with regard to such points as shall be represented to the said peishwa," on the part of the Company, by the governor-general, or the English resident at the court of Poonah. By article 8th it was stipulated that if the peishwa should refuse to accede to the treaty, or to give satisfaction on the points to which the 7th article referred, the districts reserved for eventual cession to him should rest jointly in the Company and the Nizam, who would either exchange them with the rajah for other districts of equal value, more contiguous to their respective territories, or otherwise arrange respecting them. A separate article, appended to the partition treaty, provided that, in the event of non-acceptance by the peishwa, the Nizam should have two-thirds and the Company the remaining third of the reserved districts.

The proposed cession to the peishwa was an act of great moderation, and even generosity. When the treaty was concluded with the Nizam in 1798, the governor-general offered to conclude one of a similar nature with the peishwa, who, after some negotiation, evaded the subject, and simply declared

that he would faithfully execute subsisting engagements. One of these was to take up arms against Tippoo in the event of his attacking any of the parties to the tripartite alliance of Lord Cornwallis; and accordingly, when Tippoo's proceedings with the French were declared to be equivalent to a declaration of war on his part, the peishwa promised to furnish a contingent to act with the allies. It was agreed that Purseram Bhow should head this contingent, and a British detachment, similar to that furnished in the former war, was held in readiness to join him. Nana Furnavese, who, after having been imprisoned and obliged to save himself by flight, had again become prime minister, was favourable to the British connection, and urged Bajee Row to fulfil his engagement; but the influence of Dowlut Row Scindia, who was hostile to that connection, prevailed, and the Mahratta contingent never took the field. At one time, indeed, it seemed more than probable that if it did take the field it would be not to oppose but to assist Tippoo, who had sent thirteen lacs of rupees to Poonah, and seemed on the eve of effecting a Mahratta alliance. The rapidity and success with which the war was carried on disconcerted this scheme, and the peishwa, to save appearances, affected the utmost joy when he heard of the capture of Seringapatam. Such was the state of matters when a considerable portion of Mysore, contiguous to the Mahratta territory, was conditionally offered to be annexed to it. After protracted discussion the conditions were declined, and the reserved territory was shared between the Company and the Nizam in the proportions which had been previously arranged.

A.D. 1789.

Conditional
cession to
the peishwa
declined by
him.

Shortly after the capture of Seringapatam, the district of Bednore, in the north-west of the Mysore territory, was disturbed by an adventurer of the name of Dhoondia Waugh. When in the service of the Patan or Afghan Nabob of Savanore, he had made incursions into Tippoo's dominions, till he was made prisoner and carried to Seringapatam. A forcible conversion made him a Mahometan, and he became one of Tippoo's soldiers. For some misconduct, or on some ground of suspicion, he had again been imprisoned, and was found in one of the dungeons when Seringapatam was stormed. The soldiers, knowing nothing of his character, set him at liberty. He fled immediately, and made a very ungrateful return to his deliverers. Being joined by some of Tippoo's disbanded cavalry, he took the direction of Bednore. There his numbers considerably increased, and several of the principal places of the district, owing to the treachery of the commandants, fell into his hands. He immediately laid the country under contribution, devastated the finest parts of it, and spread general consternation by numerous acts of rapine and murder. At length, on the 21st of July, Colonel Dalrymple, with a light corps of cavalry and native infantry, moved against him from Chitteldroog, and having overtaken a party of his banditti, nearly exterminated it, refusing quarter, for the purpose of making a severe example. Dhoondia proceeding westward, crossed the Toombudra, and was followed by Colonel Dalrymple, who on the 30th of

Ravages of
Dhoondia
Waugh.

A.D. 1799.

Repulse of
Dhoondia
Waugh.

July took Hurryhur, on the east bank of that river. Meanwhile Colonel Stevenson, advancing with a light corps from another direction, took Simoga by assault on the 8th of August. Both corps having now effected a junction, Colonel Stevenson, as senior officer, assumed the command. Dhoondia, who had encamped in a strong position near the fort of Shikarpoor, was driven with considerable loss across a small river in his rear, and after the fort had been taken by assault, was pursued so closely, that he sought refuge within the Mahratta frontier. He might have been overtaken and destroyed, had not Colonel Stevenson's instructions expressly prohibited him from giving umbrage to the Mahrattas, by entering their territory. Tranquillity was thus restored to Bednore, and as Dhoondia was shortly after attacked by Dhondoo Punt Gokla, a Mahratta chief, who deprived him of his elephants, camels, bullocks, and guns, it was hoped that he had been rendered incapable of future mischief. He was destined, however, as will afterwards be seen, to give new trouble.

CHAPTER VI.

Disputed succession in Tanjore—New settlement of this country—Proceedings in regard to Surat—
Deposition of the Nabob of Arcot—Proceedings in Oude—Subsidiary treaty with the Nizam—
Expedition to Egypt.



N arriving at Madras on his outward voyage, Lord Mornington, as has been mentioned, spent a short time in endeavouring to induce the Nabob of Arcot to remedy the defects of the arrangement made with his father by Lord Cornwallis in 1792, and in finally settling a disputed succession in Tanjore. He failed in the former object; the proceedings in regard to the latter will now be detailed.

Disputed
succession
in Tanjore.

Tuljajee, Rajah of Tanjore, died in 1786, leaving a half-brother, Ameer Sing, and an adopted son, Serfojee or Sarbojee, the latter under the guardianship of the celebrated missionary, Swartz. Both claimed the succession, and appealed to the Madras government. Ameer Sing denied his brother's right to cut him out of the succession by adopting a son, and moreover maintained that the adoption itself was, from the want of some essential requisites, null and void. For Serfojee, who was only a boy of about ten years of age, it was pleaded both that the adoption was valid and that Ameer Sing was illegitimate. To settle these points, several questions were submitted to learned pundits. Their answers were favourable to Ameer Sing, who was accordingly preferred. He was a man of bad character, and behaved in a way which made it doubtful if

he were of sound mind. Possibly all this might have been overlooked had he yielded to the demands of the Company instead of imitating the nabob, and refusing like him to enter into an agreement for the assignment of his revenues. Meanwhile, doubts arose as to the soundness of the opinion given by the pundits, and it was proposed as a kind of compromise, and a check on Ameer Sing's proceedings, that Serfojee should be declared his presumptive heir. This was strongly objected to by Mr. Swartz, who, in consequence of Ameer Sing's outrageous treatment of Serfojee and the late rajah's widows, had been permitted and assisted by the presidency to bring them to Madras. In a letter addressed to Sir Charles Oakley, the governor, on 27th January, 1793, he thus expressed his views:—"When I heard that the honourable board was resolved to proclaim Serfojee, the adopted son of the late Rajah of Tanjore, presumptive heir of the present rajah, and that he was to succeed him in case the present rajah should die without having a son born of his lawfully married wife (for that seems to be the meaning of the word presumptive heir), the following thoughts occurred to my mind, which I beg leave to disclose to your honour. I thought if Serfojee is proclaimed presumptive successor or heir to the throne of Tanjore, then he stands a poor, or perhaps no chance at all, of inheriting the country, for

A.D. 1793.

Disputed
succession
in Tanjore.

"His excellency the present rajah is but forty-three years old, and is now marrying one, or as some say two wives—he may therefore have a son. But if he does not have a son, he may take an infant, declaring him to be his own son, born of his wife; his hatred and jealousy of Serfojee makes this conjecture very probable. The same has been done at Tanjore by Aperoop, the lawful but barren wife of Serfojee Rajah. Or the present rajah may adopt another man's son. This is more than a conjecture; he has already declared it to be his intention, being resolved to adopt Nana Sahib's son. This Nana Sahib is the son of a concubine." In the subsequent part of the letter, Mr. Swartz argues that the present rajah, having no legal right to the throne, was not entitled to dispose of it in any way. "Can he give away that which is not his own? and shall an error once committed to the prejudice of the lawful heir be continued, so as to supersede the true and lawful heir for ever, or annihilate his right? It may be said that it would reflect on the decision formerly made in favour of the present rajah; but in my humble opinion that decision was conditional, supposing the justice of the opinions given by the pundits; but as their opinion is found to be ill grounded, the decision built upon it, one might think, would cease to be valid."

Swartz's ar-
gument for
Serfojee.

Lord Cornwallis acknowledged that Mr. Swartz's sentiments, in addition to other circumstances, had made him very doubtful of Ameer Sing's right, while he was entirely persuaded of his personal unworthiness. He considered it necessary, however, "to proceed with great circumspection and delicacy in impeaching a right that has been sanctioned by a solemn decision, passed in

A D. 1799.

Decision in
favour of
Serfojee as
heir to
Tanjore.

consequence of the answers that were made by fifteen pundits to the questions that were referred to them," and therefore only recommended that at present Serfojee should be proclaimed presumptive heir to the throne, and that in the meantime the question of right should again be opened up, by submitting the substance of the questions formerly considered by the Tanjore pundits to other pundits at Calcutta and Benares. Their opinion was contrary to that formerly given, and Sir John Shore having informed the directors that he concurred in it, they formally decided in Serfojee's favour. Still the final steps were not taken when Lord Mornington arrived. After an investigation at Madras, the first act of his administration in Bengal was to lodge a minute declaring his belief that Serfojee was the lawful heir, and his determination forthwith to place him on the musnud. This was only an act of justice, though it is needless to deny that policy, fully as much as justice, prompted to it. Ameer Sing had been twelve years in possession when he was deposed to make way for Serfojee, whose greatest recommendation to the governor-general and the Company undoubtedly was, that he was not in a condition to refuse any terms that might be dictated to him. Accordingly, by a treaty dated 25th October, 1799, he was taken bound to resign the whole administration, civil and military, into the hands of the Company, and rest satisfied with a nominal sovereignty, and a pension of a lac of star pagodas (£40,000), drawn from the revenues, together with one-fifth of the net sum drawn from the remainder.

The condi-
tions.

New ar-
rangement
respecting
Surat.

An arrangement similar to the above was shortly afterwards made in regard to Surat. In 1759, when this important town, in which the Company had long possessed a factory, was suffering by a state of anarchy, they were induced to attack the castle, and succeeded in gaining possession of it. The nabob, finding it impossible to oust them, entered into a treaty by which a double government was established, the Company undertaking the defence, while the nabob retained the civil administration. This arrangement was afterwards confirmed by the Mogul. Their rights thus derived from the same source were consequently equal, but British influence ultimately established a complete ascendancy, and it was perfectly understood that the nabob could neither be appointed nor be able to retain his office without the concurrence of the Company. The expense of maintaining the castle was not met by the revenue set apart for it, and various attempts were made to induce the nabob to increase it. The plan proposed by the Company, to diminish expense by improving the government, was to disband the nabob's undisciplined soldiery, and substitute three of their own battalions to be maintained at the nabob's expense. To this he manifested the greatest repugnance, objecting that his funds were not adequate, and that the proposal was a violation of the treaty of 1759. He had agreed, however, to make some important concessions, but the treaty was not concluded when he died in January, 1799. His only son, an infant, survived him only a few weeks, and the succession was claimed by his brother.

The Company, before consenting to recognize him, insisted on new stipulations in their favour, but the utmost that the claimant would agree to give was a lac of rupees annually, because the revenue, he averred, would not afford more. This sum was deemed insufficient, and the governor-general cut the matter short by simply ordering that the nabob should be displaced, and the government and revenues be transferred to the Company. The security and good government of Surat "can only be attained," he said, "by the Company taking the entire civil and military government of the city into their own hands." This looks very like "necessity, the tyrant's plea," and we question if his lordship improved the plea much by arguing that "the operation of the treaty of 1759 ceased on the demise of Mayen-ed-din" (the nabob with whom it was made), and "the power of the Mogul, having also become extinct, it follows that the Company, not being restricted with respect to the disposal of the office of nabob by any specific treaty, are at liberty to dispose of it as they think proper." They certainly had the power, but just as certainly they had not the right to do it, and there need not, therefore, be any hesitation in saying that the whole proceeding was characterized by tyranny and injustice. Governor Duncan of Bombay made his appearance at Surat with a treaty ready drawn, and the nabob had no choice but to sign it. By its terms he devolved the whole government on the Company, in return for a pension of a lac of rupees with a fifth of the net annual revenue secured to himself and his heirs.

A. D. 1799.

Arbitrary
nature of ar-
rangement
respecting
Surat.

The Nabob of Arcot's turn came next, but the arrangement forced upon him, though similar in kind, was rested on very different grounds. Among the papers found in the fort of Seringapatam, were documents which seemed to establish a secret correspondence between the nabobs Mahomed Ali and Omdut-ul-Omrah and Tippoo, for objects hostile to the interests of the Company. When Tippoo's two sons were carried off as hostages to Madras, they were accompanied by his two vakeels or ambassadors, Gholam Ali Khan and Ali Reza Khan, who, as may be supposed, made good use of their opportunities, and maintained a regular correspondence with their master. Their residence at Madras gave them opportunity of frequent intercourse with Mahomed Ali and his son, and the part of their correspondence detailing what passed during this intercourse constituted the main strength of the evidence on which a charge of treachery was brought against these nabobs. In addition to this correspondence only two other letters were produced, the one from a subsequent vakeel of Tippoo at Madras, and the other under a fictitious name, but supposed to be from Omdut-ul-Omrah. The most suspicious circumstance connected with this correspondence was the discovery of a cipher and a key to it. The key was found among Tippoo's secret records, and was written in the same hand as that in which the letters from the nabob to the government were written; at the foot of it was a note by Tippoo's head moonsha, stating it to be from Omdut-ul-Omrah. The fictitious names of the cipher had been used in the

The Nabob
of Arcot ac-
cused of
treachery.

A.D. 1799. correspondence, and the meaning of them as ascertained by the key gave evidence of the feelings which had dictated the correspondence. Thus the English were designated by the name of *teza wareeds* or *new comers*, the Nizam by that of *heech* or *nothing*, and the Mahrattas by that of *pooch* or *contemptible*.

Inconsistency of course adopted in regard to Nabob of Arcot.

The correspondence in itself was by no means decisive. Much of it was complimentary, and probably meant nothing more than figurative and high-flown oriental expressions are understood to do. Religion was talked of, and the duty of making common cause against the infidels, and hints were given to Tippoo as to the necessity of using caution in his intercourse with the French and the Mahrattas, of doing nothing rashly and biding his time. Nothing stronger than this was found, and it must be remembered that even this was not brought home to the nabobs, since the statements were not made directly by them, but only reported at second hand. On this subject it was justly observed by the Persian translator employed by the government:—"The accuracy of reports from agents, natives of India, to their principals, cannot under any circumstances be implicitly relied on; and in one of the reports of the vakeels, which contains the substance of a conference between themselves, the princes and the nabob, at which Colonel Doveton was present, a speech is ascribed to that gentleman which is evidently fabricated—a circumstance which tends to weaken the validity of all their reports; and if the evidence of the nabobs' conduct rested solely upon them, the proofs might be considered as extremely defective and problematical." Additional evidence therefore was necessary, and no means of obtaining it were omitted. A list of witnesses was produced, and Mr. Webbe, secretary to the Madras government, and Colonel Barry Close, resident in Mysore, were appointed commissioners to examine them. The most important were the two vakeels, who were still living, and being now pensioners of the Company could have no interest in concealing the truth, after they were assured that nothing which they said would criminate themselves, and had on the contrary an intelligible interest to assist in making out a case which they knew that their paymasters were anxious to establish. Ali Reza, who was residing at Vellore, was first examined, and in the opinion of the commissioners evinced "an earnest disposition to develop the truth." Gholam Ali, resident at Seringapatam, impressed them less favourably, and seemed even to feign dotage as a means of concealment. Both the vakeels testified that the complimentary expressions employed in their reports were, conformably to the custom of the country, much exaggerated, and gave other evidence which weakened rather than strengthened the proof of criminal intention in the nabobs. Several other witnesses were examined, but those of them who from their position were most competent so completely failed to establish any fact, that the commissioners "thought it unnecessary to record their evidence."

A.D. 1800.

Sufficiency
of the
charges
against Na-
bob of Ar-
cot ques-
tionable.

A singular specimen of the lamentable extent to which our judgments are biassed by our wishes, may be found in the fact, that the leading authorities of the Indian government, both abroad and in this country, were ready on this imperfect evidence to hold the charge of treasonable correspondence completely proved, and in consequence to blacken the memory of the deceased nabob, and take signal vengeance on his successor, who could hardly be said to live, as he was pining away under a mortal disease. With nothing but the documents before him, and before a single witness was examined, Lord Mornington had evidently made up his mind, and wrote as follows:—"A deliberate consideration of the evidence resulting from the whole of these documents has not only confirmed in the most unquestionable manner my suspicions of the existence of a secret correspondence between the personages already named, but satisfied my judgment, that its objects on the part of the Nabob Wallajah (Mahomed Ali) and Omdut-ul-Omrah, and especially of the latter, was of the most hostile tendency to the British interests. The proofs arising from the papers would certainly be sufficient to justify the British government in depriving that faithless and ungrateful prince of all means of rendering any part of the resources of the territories, which he holds under the protection of the Company, subservient to the further violation of his engagements and to the prosecution of his desperate purposes of treachery and ingratitude." Lord Clive, governor of Madras, after the witnesses had been examined, arrived at the same conclusion. "With this strong evidence of internal treachery, and of open opposition to our interests in the Carnatic, established by treaty, it is my deliberate opinion that a further adherence to the letter of the treaty of 1792, while the Nabob Omdut-ul-Omrah has been and now is perfidiously betraying the spirit and substance of the alliance between him and the Company, would be as inconsistent with the true principles of public faith, as it would be obviously incompatible with the preservation of our just rights and interests. On these grounds I have no hesitation in recommending to your lordship the immediate assumption of the civil and military government of the Carnatic, under such provisions as your lordship may be pleased to authorize for his highness the nabob, his highness's family, and the principal officers of his government."

Measures of
Lord Mor-
nington ap-
proved by
the home
authorities

The above letter of Lord Clive was written on the 23d of May, 1800, but a full year elapsed before the final steps were taken. The governor-general had intended to proceed to Madras as soon as the season would permit, and personally perform this great act of retributive justice. Circumstances, however, occurred which made this impossible, and he directed that Mr. Webbe should come to Calcutta, in order that he might obtain the fullest information from him before issuing his final arrangements. This delay gave Lord Mornington an opportunity of learning the views of the home authorities on the subject of the Mysore correspondence. The Board of Control agreed in his lordship's conclusions, and in the measures which he had declared his intention of adopting.

A.D. 1801.

Measures of
Lord Mor-
nington, in
regard to
Nabob of
Arcot, ap-
proved by
the home
authorities.


The secret committee of directors not only held the treachery of the correspondence proved, but stated that many other circumstances might in their opinion be urged to strengthen the doubts of the nabob's fidelity to the fundamental engagements with the Company, and referred particularly to the mode in which he had evacuated a fort in 1796, than which, they remarked, "a more decided instance of disaffection can scarcely be imagined." It would rather seem, however, that the directors only approved "of demanding some more certain pledges of the fidelity of Omdut-ul-Omrah than the Company then possessed." In fact, it is impossible not to see that the discovery of the Mysore correspondence was held to be most opportune, and that it was determined from the first to use it for the purpose of forcing an arrangement, which was felt to be extremely desirable, but to which it had been found impossible to obtain the nabob's assent. But for this the treachery said to have been discovered might easily have been overlooked. It was perfectly understood that Mahomed Ali and his sons had no real attachment to the Company, and submitted to the control exercised over them from necessity, and not from choice. They had repeatedly complained of being defrauded of what they called their sovereign rights, and there could not be a doubt that they would gladly have availed themselves of an opportunity of shaking off a galling yoke. Professor Wilson states the case very fairly, when he says in a note to *Mills' History* (vol. vi. p. 324):—"It may be admitted that upon the face of the correspondence little appeared to convict the nawabs of the Carnatic of actual treachery against the British government, yet there can be little difficulty in crediting that they entertained hostile sentiments towards it, or that they expressed those sentiments to Tippoo's vakeels. Although, then, the correspondence with Tippoo may not substantiate any conspiracy against the English power, it is impossible to question the inference that is reasonably drawn from it, an inference which scarcely required such testimony—that no reliance could be placed upon the fidelity or attachment of the nabobs of Arcot." Thus far Professor Wilson states the case with perfect accuracy, but we think he is egregiously in error when he adds—"Their political position, and their religious creed, rendered them irreconcilable foes, and with this conviction it would have been folly to have intrusted them longer with any degree of political power." Were this apology for the proceeding of the Company well founded, it would follow that they were entitled to overthrow and extinguish every native government in their vicinity, on the simple ground that political position, and difference of religion, made them irreconcilable foes. Then what is meant by saying that the Company had "intrusted" the nabobs with political power? When did the Company become the absolute sovereigns of the Carnatic, and when did the nabobs begin to hold it under them in trust? Is it not notorious that even in an European treaty the Nabob of the Carnatic had been formally recognized as a sovereign prince, and that the Company, besides entering into treaties with

him on that footing, had proclaimed themselves his vassals, by soliciting and accepting a jaghire from him? There was indeed much "folly" in the intercourse of the Company with the nabob, but as they had never intrusted him "with any degree of political power," there is no sense in speaking of the "folly" of prolonging the trust.

A D. 1801.

The arrangement ultimately made with regard to the Carnatic virtually acquitted the nabobs of the heaviest charges which had been brought against them. Had they been, as Lord Mornington asserted, prosecuting "desperate

Final arrangement in regard to the Carnatic



PALACE OF THE NABOB OF ARCOT, MADRAS.—FROM DANIELL'S VIEWS IN HINDOOSTAN.

purposes of treachery and ingratitude," or, as Lord Clive expressed it, "perfidiously betraying the spirit and substance of the alliance," absolute expulsion was the proper sentence, since the very idea of compounding with traitors was absurd. And yet what was the course which it was resolved to follow? To begin with negotiation, for the purpose of obtaining a complete resignation of the civil and military government of the Carnatic to the Company. Could the nabob's consent be obtained, no mention was to be made of his guilt, but on the contrary he was to be liberally pensioned, and treated as an old and faithful ally. It was only in the event of its being necessary to overcome opposition, that "the combination of fortunate circumstances" which had "revealed his correspondence" was to be turned to account, however painful it might be, "to expose the humiliating proofs of the ingratitude and treachery with which these infatuated princes had acted towards that power which had uniformly proved their guardian and protector." The ultimate result of the proceedings was to secure a valuable end by very unworthy means.

When the final instructions of Lord Mornington reached Madras, it was too late to negotiate with Omdut-ul-Omrah. He was on his deathbed, and expired on the 15th July, 1801. When his recovery became hopeless, the tranquillity

A.D. 1801.

Competing
claims for
the nabob-
ship of the
Carnatic.

of his last moments was disturbed by intrigues for the succession among the different members of the family, and Lord Clive deemed it necessary to take military occupation of his palace, for the purpose both of preserving order and preventing the dilapidation of treasure. Among the claimants to the succession Lord Mornington had selected two—the one Ali Hussein, the reputed son of Omdut-ul-Omrah, and the other Azeem-u-Dowlah, the acknowledged son of his younger brother Ameer-ul-Omrah. To the former, and, in the event of refusal, to the latter, the succession was to be offered, on the previous condition of holding only a nominal sovereignty with a liberal pension. Omdut-ul-Omrah by his will declared his son Ali Hussein, a youth of eighteen years of age, his heir, and appointed Mahomed Nejeeb Khan and Tookee Ali Khan his guardians. With these two, therefore, a few hours after the death, Mr. Webbe and Colonel Close were deputed as commissioners to hold a consultation. It was continued for several days without result, the guardians positively declining the terms. The commissioners refused to take a final answer from the guardians, and demanded an interview with Ali Hussein himself. After many objections it was granted, but when it took place he simply referred them to his guardians, plainly declaring that “his counsels and theirs could never be separated.” He was not to be parted with in this summary way, and the commissioners therefore intimated that Lord Clive desired a personal interview, and would for that purpose receive him in the tent of the Company’s officer commanding the troops, which had been stationed at the palace. When the guardians retired to provide the necessary equipage and accessories, Ali Hussein whispered that they had deceived him. During the interview with Lord Clive he made the same statement against the guardians without hesitation, and declared his disapprobation of the issue to which matters had been brought by them. The proposal was then repeated to him in the most distinct manner, and he declared his readiness to accept of it. It was supposed that the whole business was now on the eve of being satisfactorily arranged, and the greater, therefore, was the surprise of the commissioners when, during an interview on the following day while the guardians were present, Ali Hussein retracted everything he had said to Lord Clive. A second interview with his lordship in private failed to change his resolution. His whole family, he said, had been convened for the purpose of assisting his judgment; his resolution was final; he was prepared to meet every danger rather than subscribe to the conditions proposed. Further negotiation being useless, Lord Clive retired, after intimating to him that he had forfeited all claim to consideration, and must await the extreme measures which his conduct had rendered unavoidable.

It now only remained to bring forward the other candidate who had gained Lord Mornington’s preference. The first difficulty was to obtain access to him, as he was kept in rigorous confinement, and the least hint of his intended elevation would probably have cost him his life. This difficulty was unexpect-

edly removed by the guardians themselves. Becoming impatient of delay they had of their own accord placed Ali Hussein privately on the musnud, and were reported to be preparing to repeat the ceremony publicly on the following day. Lord Clive immediately took the necessary steps to prevent them, and by occupying the palace with the Company's troops, and removing all the late nabob's guards, obtained possession of Azeem-u-Dowlah's person. The sudden elevation from a prison to the musnud was too tempting to leave him any inclination to demur to the terms, and on the 25th of July, 1801, Azeem-u-Dowlah ascended the musnud with the title of nabob, and a pension of one-fifth of the annual revenues, while the Company gained the object for which they had long been striving, by becoming vested with the whole civil and military government of the Carnatic.

A.D. 1801.

Azeem-u-Dowlah made nabob.

Mention has been made of the intention of Lord Mornington to visit Madras, and make the settlement of the Carnatic in person. The main cause of his being obliged to abandon this intention was the state of affairs in Oude. By Lord Teignmouth's treaty, the Company were at liberty to increase the force serving in Oude, whenever it might be deemed necessary for the security of the contracting parties. The threatened invasion by Zeman Shah, and the disordered state of the government under the nabob's mutinous and ineffective military establishment, determined the governor-general to make a large increase of the Company's, and at the same time effect a corresponding reduction of the native troops. When the proposal was first made to the nabob, he acquiesced in its propriety, but on second thoughts, after finding how much it would lessen his consequence with his adherents, he withdrew his assent and began to throw every obstacle in the way.

State of affairs in Oude.

One of the methods which the nabob took to evade the reformation which he saw was about to be forced upon him, was to feign a desire to abdicate. Addressing Colonel Scott, the resident, at an interview, he said "that his mind was not disposed to the cares and fatigues of government; that as one of his sons would be raised to the musnud, his name would remain; and that he was possessed of money sufficient for his support, and the gratification of all his desires in a private station." At a second interview, he returned to the subject of his abdication, and stated as his motives, "the refractory and perverse disposition of the people at large," the "want of zeal and fidelity in the men immediately about his person," the "arrogance of some of the aumils," and "the open disobedience of others." The resident was not blind to the advantages which the Company might derive from the abdication, but deemed it prudent to expostulate with the nabob on the subject, showing him that the remedy of the evils was within his own power. "A strong and just administration would," he said, "insure the obedience of the bulk of his subjects," and attach them "to his person and government," and the "reform of the military establishment was the specific measure that would curb the arrogance of the aumils." If he

Pretended wish of the nabob to abdicate.

A.D. 1799.

Pretended
wish of the
Nabob of
Oude, to
abdicate.

would only "reject the advice of interested favourites, and be guided by the impartial and friendly council" of the governor-general, "the affairs of his government would be conducted with ease to himself, to the acquisition of a high reputation, and to the prosperity and happiness of his subjects." As he was about to resign, the nabob observed that it was unnecessary to enter on the subject of military reform. In this observation the resident acquiesced, and in consequence abstained from delivering a letter in which the governor-general had explained his views. There was afterwards reason to suspect that the delay which he thus gained was one of the main objects which the nabob aimed at when he announced his intention to abdicate. He made a grievous mistake when he thus attempted to trifle with Lord Mornington.

Proceedings
thereupon.

As soon as the proposal of abdication was announced to the governor-general, it was so much in accordance with his own wishes that he caused his military secretary, after only a week's delay, to communicate with the resident respecting it. "The proposition of the vizier," writes the secretary, "is pregnant with such benefit not only to the Company but to the inhabitants of Oude, that his lordship thinks it cannot be too much encouraged, and that there are no circumstances which shall be allowed to impede the accomplishment of the grand object which it leads to. This object his lordship considers to be the acquisition by the Company of the exclusive authority, civil and military, over the dominions of Oude." The formal abdication his lordship did not consider necessary to this end. On the contrary, he thought that it might cause embarrassment by raising a question of succession; and he therefore proposed a secret treaty, by which the nabob should vest the Company in the civil and military establishment of the country, and in which his sons should be "no further mentioned than may be necessary for the purpose of securing to them a suitable provision." In regard to the treasures and jewels left by the late nabob, the governor-general, on Sadat Ali's agreeing to the above arrangement, would have "little difficulty in allowing his excellency to appropriate" them, under deduction of arrears of subsidy and of any other debts due to the Company.

Proposed
treaty.

A treaty embodying the above stipulations was forwarded to the resident, and on being submitted to the nabob was perused by him with great apparent calmness. He put some questions as to the authority which was to remain with his successor, and on being told that the plan did not provide for a successor, asked "whether a family, which had been established for a number of years, was to abandon the sovereignty of its hereditary dominions." The resident could only refer to the ample provision made for the comfort and independence of that family. The impression left upon him is thus described:—"From this conversation I can hardly venture to draw any conclusion, and shall therefore only observe, that though his excellency is perfectly master of concealing his passions, yet if he had entertained an immoveable repugnance to the basis of

A.D. 1790.

The Nabob
of Oude
retracts.

the treaty, he could scarcely have disguised it under smiles and an unaltered countenance." Whether the professed desire to abdicate had been mere pretence, or the intimation that, if he should abdicate he must not expect to take with him the whole of his accumulated wealth, had induced him to abandon an intention once really entertained, it is certain that he soon began to retract. A few days after the above interview the resident was waited upon by the nabob, whose views appeared to have undergone a considerable change. After some preliminary remarks, wrote the resident, "his excellency proceeded to declare, that the proposition offered by your lordship was so repugnant to his feelings—departed so widely, in a most essential point, from the principle on which he wished to relinquish the government, and would, were he to accept it, bring upon him such indelible disgrace and odium, that he could never voluntarily subscribe to it. The sovereignty of these dominions had been in the family near a hundred years, and the transfer of it to the Company, under the stipulations proposed by your lordship, would in fact be a sale of it, for money and jewels; that every sentiment of respect for the name of his ancestors, and every consideration for his posterity, combined to preclude him from assenting to so great a sacrifice for the attainment of his personal ease and advantage." His ultimate proposition was that he should appoint his successor; when this was objected to, he concluded with saying, that "he was ready to abandon his design of retirement, and to retain the charge of the government." On being reminded that the military reform would still be necessary, the nabob observed "that the reform of his military establishment upon the principles proposed by your lordship would annihilate his authority in his own dominions."

Determina-
tion of the
governor-
general.

Lord Mornington, suspecting that "his excellency's principal, if not sole view in the late transaction, has been to ward off the reform of his military establishment," declared himself "extremely disgusted at the duplicity and insincerity of his conduct," and determined to lose no time in enforcing his own plan of military reform. By the treaty concluded by Lord Teignmouth, the whole defence of Oude was undertaken by the Company. The amount payable by the nabob as subsidy was, under ordinary circumstances, fixed at seventy-six lacs, but if it should at any time become necessary to increase the Company's troops beyond 13,000 men, the subsidy was to be proportionably increased. The necessity of an increase was, apparently by the letter, and unquestionably by the spirit of the treaty, left to the decision of the Company, and on this ground the governor-general held that they were entitled, without consulting the nabob, to burden him with the permanent payment of troops to any extent which they might choose to consider necessary. In the present instance, the number which the governor-general resolved to send fixed an additional burden of £500,000 sterling on the revenue of Oude, and made the whole sum permanently payable as subsidy amount to one crore and twenty-six lacs, or rather more than a

A. D. 1800.

Determina-
tion of the
governor-
general re-
specting
Oude.

million and a quarter pounds sterling (£1,260,000). Orders were accordingly given to move the troops forthwith to such points within Oude as might seem advisable, giving due notice to the nabob of the augmentation, and "calling upon his excellency to adopt the requisite measures for the regular payment of the additional force." On being informed by the resident that the troops were on their march, the nabob "entreated that no actual steps might be taken for their actual march into his dominions," till he had an opportunity of submitting to his consideration a paper which he was then engaged in drawing up, and some propositions which he had to offer. The resident told him that "it was totally impossible to delay the march of the troops, but that as it would require a day or two to arrange a place for their distribution; if his excellency would in that space come forward in an unreserved manner with any specific propositions," he (the resident) would judge what weight to allow them, and how far they would authorize him to suspend the progress of the corps. The nabob having observed that he had not consented to the augmentation, and been told that the governor-general considered himself the proper judge of its necessity, made the following reply:—"If the measure is to be carried into execution, whether with or without my approbation, there was no occasion for consulting me."

The nabob's
remon-
strance.

On the 14th of January, 1800, ten days after the above interview, the nabob put into the hands of the resident a paper in which he reminded him that the proposed plan had never received his approbation or acquiescence, and objected to it on various grounds, such as the thousands of people whom it would deprive of their subsistence, and the serious commotion which the disbanding of the native troops would in all probability produce in the capital. He concluded, however, with saying, that from dread of his lordship's displeasure, and with the sole view of pleasing him, he was compelled to assent to the introduction of the plan. On the 18th of January, the resident transmitted to the governor-general another paper or memorial which the nabob had delivered to him on the 11th, and in which the whole question was argued with considerable ability. Referring to the 2d article of the treaty, he remarks:—"On my accession to the musnud, the force designed for the defence of those dominions was increased beyond what it had been on any former period; whilst on my part I agreed to defray the expense of the said augmentation. But in no part of the said article is it written or hinted, that after the lapse of a number of years, a further permanent augmentation should take place." On the 7th article he remarks, that after the conclusion of the treaty "no further augmentation is to be made, excepting in cases of necessity; and that the increase is to be proportioned to the emergency, and endure but as long as the necessity exists. An augmentation of troops without existing necessity, and making me answerable for the expense attending the increase, is inconsistent with the treaty, and seems inexpedient." Quoting a part of the 17th article, which stipulated that

"the nabob shall possess full authority over his household affairs, his hereditary dominions, his troops, and his subjects," he asks, "Where is my authority over my household affairs, over my hereditary dominions, over my troops, and over my subjects," should the management of the army be taken from under my direction?

A.D. 1801.

Some of the above arguments were not easily answered, and the governor-general found means of dispensing with the necessity of it. His letter, to which the paper purported to be an answer, was attested by the governor-general's seal and signature. The reply ought, according to established usage, to have been executed with equal solemnity. The paper was therefore returned to the resident with instructions to replace it in the hands of the nabob, and at the same time inform him, that "the mode adopted in the present instance by his excellency, of replying to a public letter from the governor-general, attested by his lordship's seal and signature, and written on a subject of the most momentary (momentous?) concern to the mutual interests of the Company and of his excellency, besides indicating a levity totally unsuitable to the occasion, is highly deficient in the respect due from his excellency to the first British authority in India." It was added, that "if in formally answering his lordship's letter, his excellency should think proper to impeach the honour and justice of the British government in similar terms to those employed in the paper delivered to you on the 11th, the governor-general will then consider how such unfounded calumnies and gross misrepresentations both of facts and arguments deserve to be noticed."

Lord Mornington treats the nabob's remonstrance as informal and insulting.

It cannot be necessary to continue the detail of this altercation. The nabob, after interposing some impediments to the execution of the governor-general's plan, was intimidated by a letter, in which he was charged with pursuing a course "nearly equivalent to positive hostility," and told that "perseverance in so dangerous a course" would leave "no other alternative than that of considering all amicable engagements" between him and the Company "to be dissolved." Thus menaced, he saw the necessity of giving way, and by the end of February, 1800, paid the money demanded on account of the additional troops. When the nabob subsequently complained of the difficulty he found in making these payments, the governor-general, in a letter dated 22d January, 1801, and addressed to the resident, rejoined:—"If the alarming crisis be now approaching in which his excellency can no longer fulfil his engagements to the Company, this calamity must be imputed principally to his neglect of my repeated advice and earnest representations. The augmented charges might have been amply provided for, if his excellency had vigorously and cordially co-operated with me in the salutary and economical measure of disbanding his own undisciplined troops. It is now become the duty of the British government to interpose effectually for the protection of his interests, as well as those of the Company, which are menaced with common and speedy destruction, by the rapid decline

The nabob intimidated.

A. D. 1801.

The Nabob
of Oude.

of the general resources of his excellency's dominions." He concluded with declaring, that "no effectual security can be provided against the ruin of the province of Oude, until the exclusive management of the civil and military government of that country shall be transferred to the Company, under suitable provisions for the maintenance of his excellency and his family. No other remedy can effect any considerable improvement in the resources of the state, or can ultimately secure its external safety and internal peace."

Two courses
submitted
to him by
the gover-
nor-general.

Entertaining these views, the governor-general could not consistently make any proposal which did not embody them, and yet, as if conscious that an attempt to carry them out by violent methods would expose him to a charge of tyranny and injustice, he modified his measures so far as to give him the choice of two propositions. The one was to cede his whole dominions to the Company, reserving to himself and his successors only a nominal sovereignty; the other was to cede only as much of his dominions as would yield a revenue equal to the whole of the augmented subsidy of which he had been compelled to bear the burden. The whole revenue of Oude at this time fell short of two millions and a half sterling, and as the subsidy considerably exceeded one million, the only alternative left to the nabob was to allow himself to be deposed, or to allow the Company to seize and appropriate one-half of his dominions, in consideration of their undertaking to defend the other half, and control him in the management of it. This was in substance the option submitted to the nabob. Can we wonder that he complained bitterly, or deny that he complained justly of harsh and iniquitous treatment?

His reply to
Lord Mor-
nington's
proposition.

The nabob had no hesitation in rejecting the first proposition. "As it is impossible for me with my own hands to exclude myself from my patrimonial dominions (for what advantage should I derive from so doing?)—this therefore is a measure which I will never adopt." To the second proposition he manifested the greatest repugnance, and urged an objection which was never answered. By Lord Teignmouth's treaty, the Company were entitled on failure of payment of the subsidy to take such steps as might seem necessary to obtain it. Of course when there was no failure they had no right to interfere. The nabob accordingly argued thus:—"Since I have not in any way delayed or neglected to discharge the kists for the expenses of the troops, but have paid them with punctuality, where is the occasion for requiring any territorial resource?—I expect to derive the most substantial profits from bringing into a flourishing condition this country, which has so long been in a state of waste and ruin. By a separation of territory, my hopes of these substantial profits would be entirely cut off, and a great loss would accrue. How then can I assent to any territorial cession?" Instead of contradicting the statement that the kists had been punctually paid, or attempting to answer the argument founded upon it, the governor-general satisfied himself with such declamation as the following:—"I now declare to your excellency, in the most explicit

terms, that I consider it to be my positive duty to resort to any extremity rather than suffer the further progress of that ruin, to which the interests of your excellency and the honourable Company are exposed, by the continued operation of the evils and abuses actually existing in the civil and military administration of the province of Oude." To the resident he wrote:—"Any further reference to me from Oude is unnecessary. I therefore empower you to act under the instructions contained in this letter, without waiting for additional orders. If, therefore, his excellency should persist in rejecting both propositions, you will inform him that any further remonstrance to me on this subject will be unavailing; that you are directed to insist upon the immediate cession of the territory proposed to be transferred to the Company; and that in the event of his excellency's refusal to issue the necessary orders for that purpose, you are authorized to direct the British troops to march for the purpose of establishing the authority of the British government within those districts." To this, the *ultima ratio* to which the governor-general was always too ready to resort when dealing with native powers, the nabob could make no reply, and after some stipulations which he proposed had been disdainfully rejected, he declared that no other alternative was allowed him than that of "passive obedience" to whatever measures might be resolved on; "the utmost which could be expected from him was passive submission to those measures;" his lordship's power could dispose of "the whole of his territorial possessions, and of his treasures;" "he neither had the inclination nor the strength to resist it; but he could not yield a voluntary consent to propositions injurious to his reputation." Such were the circumstances under which the Nabob of Oude was compelled to conclude a treaty, which extorted from him one-half of his territories, and left him, in regard to the other half, nothing more than a nominal sovereignty.

A.D. 1801.

Peremptory orders of the governor-general.

Before the arrangements were concluded, Lord Mornington deemed it necessary to despatch his brother, the Honourable Henry Wellesley (afterwards Lord Cowley), on a mission to Lucknow, in the hope that his diplomatic talents, combined with his near relationship to the governor-general, might enable him to smooth down any difficulties which still stood in the way. Mr. Wellesley arrived on the 3d of September, 1801, and on the 5th placed in the hands of the nabob a memorial explanatory of the objects of his mission. The alternative of the two propositions was again tendered to him, and he was invited to a renewed discussion of the merits. He consented, but soon gave a peremptory rejection of the first proposition, on the ground that it would bring "an everlasting stigma on his name, by depriving a whole family of such a kingdom." Mr. Wellesley and the resident endeavoured to reason him out of this belief, by telling him "that his excellency reasoned upon the first proposition as if the execution of it deprived him of the possession of the musnud, whereas the true extent and meaning of it, and indeed the primary object, was to establish him-

Mission of the governor-general's brother to Lucknow.

A.D. 1801.

Mission of
the gover-
nor-gene-
ral's brother
to Lucknow.

self and posterity more firmly and securely on the musnud, with all the state, dignity, and influence." Can anything be more ludicrous and insulting? The proposition was that he should cede all his territories in perpetuity to the Company, and bind himself never to reside in them, and the effect of it, he is told, will be to establish him and his posterity more firmly and securely in the possession of all the state, dignity, and affluence of his exalted station. Had



THE PUNJ MAHALLA GATE, LUCKNOW.—From Daniell's Oriental Scenery.

the nabob been simple enough to believe this representation and to act upon it, would it have been possible to deny that he had been swindled out of his dominions?

The nabob
submits.

While the nabob positively rejected the one proposition and delayed his passive assent to the other, the governor-general lost patience, and caused intimation to be made to him that, in the event of further delay, he would not even have the privilege of choosing. The British government would choose for him by selecting the proposition to which he was known to be most repugnant. The nabob, now reduced to extremity, only begged to be allowed to depart on a pilgrimage, and appoint his son to act for him during his absence. He no longer withheld his consent, but he wished not to be present at the execution. He gives his reason:—"I should consider it a disgrace, and it would be highly unpleasant to me to show my face to my people here." The indulgence thus asked was conceded, and the treaty was signed on the 10th of November, 1801. The possession of one-half of the territories of Oude thus passed to the Company by a stroke of the pen, and the possession of the other half was so imperfectly guaranteed to the nabob that the Company could be at no loss at any future time for a plausible pretext for seizing it. It is not unworthy of notice that the cession made to the Company included nearly the whole of the territories which the nabob's father, Sujah-u-Dowlah, had acquired, partly from the Com-

pany and partly by their aid, at the cost of about a million sterling. By a singular reverse of circumstances the Company were able, after having pocketed the price, to seize the territories, and thus obtain possession both of price and subject. Mr. Hastings sold the provinces of Corah and Allahabad, and hired out British troops to make an iniquitous conquest with the avowed object of improving the frontiers of Oude, and interposing it as a barrier for the protection of the Company, and Lord Mornington had now taken possession of all the territories thus acquired with the avowed object of interposing the Company as a barrier for the protection of Oude. There is too much ground to believe that in both cases the avowed was very different from the real object, and both honour and justice were sacrificed to policy. At the same time, how much soever the means employed must be reprobated, it is impossible to deny that a very great boon was conferred on the inhabitants of the ceded countries when they passed from the government of Sadat Ali to that of the Company. Immediately after ratifying the treaty the governor-general provided for the settlement of the new territory by establishing a board of commissioners, composed of three civil servants of the Company, presided over by Mr. Henry Wellesley as lieutenant-governor.

A.D. 1801.

Harsh terms
imposed
upon the
Nabob of
Oude.

Before the conclusion of the treaty the governor-general had set out on a tour to the north, and was at Benares when the treaty was sent to him for ratification. In a previous part of the journey a letter arrived from Mr. Wellesley, intimating that the nabob had some thoughts of imitating the example of his predecessor, and supplying the deficiencies of his revenue by plundering the begum his grandmother. As Mr. Hastings had sanctioned a similar proceeding, and drawn large sums by means of it, the Nabob of Oude, who had himself no scruples on the subject, imagined that the present governor-general would be equally unscrupulous, and proposed that, in the event of the territorial cession being carried out, he should be permitted in this way to compensate himself. The begum, who had a suspicion of the treatment which her grandson was preparing for her, endeavoured to avert it by not only soliciting the protection of the British government, but offering to constitute the Company her heir. The legality of such a proceeding was more than doubtful; but the governor-general, while admitting as a general rule "the justice and policy of preventing the transfer of individual property by gift or testament to a foreign state," held that there were peculiarities in the position of the begum which might justify the Company in accepting the legacy. Any doubt which he might have had on the subject was removed by the above proposal of the nabob, to which his lordship, instead of imitating the unworthy example which Mr. Hastings had set him, ordered his secretary to return the following indignant answer:—"The inclination manifested by his excellency the vizier in the form of a conditional assent to Lieutenant-colonel Scott's proposal for a territorial cession, to degrade and despoil the most distinguished characters of his

A disgraceful
proposal by
the nabob
indignantly
rejected by
the governor-general.

A.D. 1801. family and his court—a design, though under some degree of disguise, particularly directed to the begum—and his insidious and disgraceful attempt to obtain the sanction of the British name to such unwarrantable acts of proscription, have given additional weight in his lordship's mind to the arguments above detailed, and have determined his lordship not only to acquiesce in the begum's proposal to its full extent, if it should be revived on her part, but to encourage her highness to renew her proposition at the earliest period of time, and by every justifiable means."

Arbitrary
treatment
of the
Nabob of
Furruck-
abad.

Mr. Wellesley, in the course of his duties as lieutenant-governor of the ceded districts, had his attention called to the position of the Nabob of Furruckabad, who was a tributary of Oude, and had now, in consequence of the territorial cession, become a tributary of the Company. His territory, forming part of the fertile tract of the Doab, extended for about 150 miles along the right or western bank of the Ganges, and yielded a revenue of above ten lacs (£100,000). While subject to Oude the nabob had been under the special protection of the Company, and he naturally expected that when his allegiance was entirely transferred to it his position would be improved. The succession had devolved upon him in consequence of the murder of his father by his eldest son. He was then too young to undertake the government, and a regent had been appointed; but the young nabob was now approaching majority, and, as he had always had a dislike to the regent, he was in hopes of being permitted to take the administration into his own hands. Mr. Wellesley, as lieutenant-governor, had fixed his residence at Bareilly. Hither the nabob and the regent repaired with a view to a new arrangement.* The regent arrived first, and took the opportunity of an interview to give the nabob a very bad character. This would not have told much against him; but, unfortunately for him, the governor-general had adopted a policy which he was determined to follow whenever he found it not absolutely impracticable. This was to pension the native ruler, as he had done in Tanjore and attempted to do in Oude, and assume the whole civil and military government in name of the Company. When this plan was submitted to the nabob, he requested that it should be put in writing, and after perusing it gave utterance to his feelings in the following terms:—"When I was in hopes that I should be put in possession of the country and property, this proposition is made to me. I am totally at a loss what to do. If I deliver over the country to the English government, all my relations and my neighbours, and all the nobility of Hindoostan will say that I have been found so unfit by the English government that they did not think it proper to intrust me with the management of such a country, and I shall never escape for many generations from the sneers of the people. If, on the contrary, I say anything in disobedience to your orders, it will be against all rules of submission and propriety." In this dilemma he proposed that the English government should make one of its own servants superintendent of revenue, with power to send

his agents into the villages and act along with the Furruckabad collectors. A.D. 1801.
 By this means, he said, "your wishes may be accomplished, and my honour and name preserved throughout Hindoostan." Mr. Wellesley, acting under the instructions of the governor-general, turned a deaf ear to these remonstrances, and the nabob was compelled to submit to all the disgrace he had so earnestly deprecated, and cede his territories in perpetuity to the Company in return for a pension. Before the settlement of the territorial cessions in Oude was completed, it was necessary to have recourse to arms in order to reduce a refractory zemindar of the name of Bagwunt Sing, who maintained an army of 20,000 men. He had two strongholds, Bidgehur and Sasanee, both of which stood

Arbitrary
treatment
of the
Nabob of
Furruck-
abad.



HILL-FORT OF BIDGEHUR.—From Daniell's Oriental Annual, 1834.

sieges and made a good defence; Sasanee, in particular, situated on the route from Agra to Alighur, repulsed a premature assault, and was not evacuated by its garrison till the siege was undertaken by the commander-in-chief in person and the approaches had been regularly advanced to the distance of 200 yards. In March, 1802, the settlement having been completed, the board of commissioners for Oude was dissolved, and Mr. Wellesley shortly after sailed for Europe.

The governor-general, amid the numerous subjects which occupied his attention in India, looked beyond its limits, and engaged in various measures which, while they were intended to give additional security to the Indian government, had a direct bearing on European politics. The earliest of these measures was the mission of Captain Malcolm to the court of Persia towards the end of 1799. The object was to enter into political and commercial treaties with the shah, by which the general interests of Great Britain might be promoted, and, at the same time, encourage him to make a diversion in Cabool, which would give Zeman Shah sufficient occupation at home, and oblige him to abandon his schemes of conquest in India. This mission, from the ability

Mission to
Persia and
Cabool.

A. D. 1801.

Contem-
plated ex-
pedition
against the
Mauritius.Expedition
to Egypt
under Gene-
ral Baird.

with which it was conducted, and the interesting account which Sir John Malcolm has given of it, acquired a considerable degree of celebrity; but, from various causes, the brilliant results at one time anticipated from it were not realized. The next foreign measure of importance projected by the governor-general was an expedition against the Mauritius. The French privateers which found an asylum there had, since the commencement of the war, been most destructive to British commerce, and nothing promised to be more efficacious in suppressing their depredations than the capture of their place of rendezvous. With this view an armament was fitted out under the command of Colonel Wellesley in the end of 1800, and arrived in the harbour of Trincomalee, in Ceylon, to wait for Admiral Rainier, commanding the British squadron in the Indian Ocean. An extraordinary crotchet on the part of the admiral frustrated the expedition. The governor-general, he thought, had no right to engage in it without the express command of his majesty, signified in the usual official form to the Indian government and to the commanders of his majesty's sea and land forces. On this ground he refused to co-operate, and before his scruples could be overcome the troops designed for the expedition were required for a different service. This was an expedition from Bombay to Egypt, to co-operate with the British forces which were engaged in frustrating the views of the French in that country. When the governor-general was obliged to abandon his designs on the Mauritius, he was meditating an attack on Batavia, when instructions from England turned attention to Egypt. The governor-general had in some measure anticipated these instructions by causing a body of 1600 native infantry to be held in readiness at Bombay for foreign service. These, having been joined by the troops from Trincomalee, sailed from Bombay under General Baird, and reached Jedda, on the east coast of the Red Sea, on the 18th of May, 1801. Here they were joined by a body of troops from the Cape. The united force, now amounting to 7000 men, of whom 2000 were sepoys, proceeded northwards to Cosseir, which was reached on the 8th June. Intelligence had previously been received of the victory gained over the French by Sir Ralph Abercromby, though at the expense of his own valuable life. Hostilities, however, were still raging, and General Baird commenced his march across the desert. It was accomplished with much difficulty, but without any serious loss; and the whole army, after having been carried down the Nile in boats, assembled in the Isle of Rhonda on the 27th of August. It expected still to be in time to assist in the capture of Alexandria; but, on arriving at Rosetta, received intelligence that Menon, who, on Bonaparte's departure, assumed the chief command, had capitulated. Hostilities in Egypt consequently ceased, and shortly afterwards the peace of Amiens was proclaimed. The Indian army had thus no opportunity of gaining any laurels in the field; but the expedition itself, and the march across the desert, no mean achievements, are well entitled to an honourable place in Indian history.

A.D. 1802.

Misunder-
standing
between the
directors
and the
governor-
general.

On the 1st of January, 1802, the governor-general addressed a letter to the directors, intimating his intention to resign at the close of the year. His reasons were not given, but there could be no doubt that he was mainly influenced by a want of confidence, if not actual hostility, evinced towards him by the directors themselves in various proceedings. The earlier acts of his administration, and more especially the conquest of Mysore, had been universally applauded. The crown had hastened to do him honour by conferring on him the title of Marquis Wellesley, and the court of directors had passed a resolution, afterwards unanimously confirmed by the court of proprietors, bearing testimony to his eminent services, and rewarding them with an annuity of £5000. In proportion, however, as the views of his lordship's administration seemed to enlarge, and the acquisition of new territories was followed by its necessary consequence, increased expenditure, dissatisfaction began to be felt, and even to be expressed by overt acts. Several of his appointments to office were animadverted upon and rescinded. The appointment of his brother, Mr. Henry Wellesley, to be one of the Mysore commissioners, was objected to as inconsistent with the act of parliament, which specially reserved all such offices to covenanted servants of the Company; the emoluments allowed to his other brother, Colonel Wellesley, as governor of Mysore, were cut down as extravagant, and a peremptory order to reduce the army of the Deccan, not only implied a censure upon him for having unduly increased it, but seemed to him so dangerous that he ventured, on his own responsibility, to suspend the execution of it. He was, moreover, thwarted in a magnificent project on which his heart was set. This was the erection of a college at Fort William for the improved education of the civil service. In a minute recorded 10th July, 1800, he gave a very full and able exposition of his views on this subject. "The civil servants of the East India Company," he said, "can no longer be considered as the agents of a commercial concern. They are in fact the ministers and officers of a powerful sovereign; they must now be viewed in that capacity, with reference not to their nominal, but to their real occupations. They are required to discharge the functions of magistrates, judges, ambassadors, and governors of provinces, in all the complicated and extensive relations of those sacred trusts and exalted stations, and under peculiar circumstances which greatly enhance the solemnity of every public obligation and aggravate the difficulty of every public charge. Their duties are those of statesmen in every other part of the world, with no other characteristic differences than the obstacles opposed by an unfavourable climate, by a foreign language, and by the peculiar usages and laws of India, and by the manners of its inhabitants." From these acknowledged facts the governor-general inferred that "whatever course and system of study may be deemed requisite in England to secure an abundant and pure source for the sufficient supply of the public service, the peculiar nature of our establishments in the East, so far from admitting any

A. D. 1802.

Misunder-
standing
between the
directors
and the
governor-
general.

relaxation of those wise and salutary rules and restraints, demands that they should be enforced with a degree of additional vigilance and care proportioned to the aggravated difficulties of civil service, and to the numerous hazards surrounding the entrance to public life in India." These were the important objects aimed at by the college, and so eager was the governor-general for a commencement, that he actually established it without waiting for the sanction of the home authorities. This was unfortunate, as it was an usurpation of authority which could not plead any immediate necessity, and furnished the directors with grounds of objection additional to those which were furnished by some parts of the constitution of the college itself. The consequence was, that the college had scarcely commenced operations when it was abolished, and a very humble substitute for it was provided by the establishment of an institution at each of the three presidencies, for instruction in the native languages.

Main causes
of it.

It is doubtful if the directors would have come so directly into collision with the governor-general, had they not been goaded on by what was called the "shipping interest," which then formed the most powerful body connected with the East India House, and had been mortally offended by some steps in advance which the governor-general had taken on the subject of free trade. On the renewal of the charter in 1793, the Company were taken bound to reserve at least 3000 tons of their shipping annually for the use of private merchants engaged in the India trade. For exports from Great Britain the amount of tonnage was at the time sufficient, had it been allotted fairly, under proper regulations, and at a reasonable rate. In India the case was very different. The 3000 tons were far from supplying what was wanted for export to Europe, and the consequence was, that a large export trade had sprung up, and was carried on almost entirely by foreign shipping belonging to the different maritime states of the European continent. This trade, affording the British residents in India a convenient means of transmitting their fortunes, was mainly supported by their capital, and thus, owing to injudicious restrictions, a trade by which Britain might have greatly profited, was thrown entirely into the hands of foreigners. The evil was so manifest that in May, 1798, the directors empowered the Bengal government to take up ships on account of the Company, and re-let them to the Calcutta merchants for shipments to London. The governor-general, finding that under this plan the merchants complained loudly both of expense and delay, innovated upon it so far as to allow them to make their own arrangements for the extent and rate of freight, and the despatch of the vessels. As these ships were India built, the ship-builders in London raised an outcry in which they were joined by the "shipping interest" at the India House. Ministers, strongly backed by the other mercantile interests of England, cordially supported the innovation, and a serious quarrel ensued between the directors and the Board of Control. The governor-

BLACKIE AND SON

GLASGOW:
35, FREDERICK STREET.

LONDON

EDINBURGH:
3, SOUTH COLLEGE STREET.

LONDON: 11, WARWICK SQUARE, E.C.

Publishing in Parts, super royal 8vo, 2s each

A COMPREHENSIVE HISTORY OF INDIA,

CIVIL, MILITARY, and SOCIAL, from the first landing of the English, to the suppression of the Sepoy Revolt, including an Outline of the Early History of Hindoostan. By HERAY BEVERIDGE, Esq., Advocate. Illustrated by above Five Hundred Engravings on Wood and Steel. It will extend to 28 Parts.

"The accuracy and finish of the maps and engravings, the beauty of the paper and type, and the great care with which manifestly all the records of our Indian conquests have been studied, render this a most valuable addition to the history of our colonial empire."—*Atlas Staff.*

"It is written in a clear and good style; is well printed and gets up the engravings in wood and steel are extremely well executed; and there are maps and other appliances to assist in perfectly apprehending the text."—*Critic.*

"Written with great care, . . . and profusely embellished."—*Liverpool Staff.*

Publishing in Parts, super royal 8vo, 2s each.

A COMPREHENSIVE HISTORY OF ENGLAND,

CIVIL and MILITARY, RELIGIOUS, INTELLECTUAL, and SOCIAL from the Earliest Period to the Present Time. By CHARLES MACFARLANE and the Rev THOMAS THOMSON. Edited by the Rev THOMAS THOMSON. With numerous Annotations from the Writings of recent distinguished Historians. Illustrated by above One Thousand Engravings on Wood and Steel. It will extend to about 84 Parts.

"If the work is continued as it has been commenced, it will indeed be a valuable record of the social state of the country."—*Scott's Chronicle.*

We can unhesitatingly declare that this History is without a rival for concu-

ry of statement, comprehensiveness of matter, soundness of philosophy, elevation of religious and moral sentiments, and elegance of diction. This ought emphatically to be entitled the Family History of England."—*Norwich Herald.*

New and revised edition, in Parts, 2s, and Divisions, 10s each

THE POPULAR ENCYCLOPEDIA;

OR, CONVERSATIONS LEXICON.

Being a General Dictionary of Arts, Sciences, Literature, Biography, History, and Politics with Preliminary Dissertations by distinguished Writers.

The POPULAR ENCYCLOPEDIA has been before the public for many years past, and has met with a large measure of acceptance. The alterations and corrections made for the present edition render the Work a satisfactory exponent of the state of knowledge in the present day. The articles on Botany, Chemistry, and Geology have been wholly re-written, and the scientific articles generally have been carefully revised; and those on Geography, Topography, History, Theology, and Biography have been subjected to a rigid examination.

An entirely new Supplement has been written, containing additional biographies, notices of localities newly discovered, or that have risen recently into importance—of substances and processes new in science and the arts—of the great events of the world during the last twenty years—and other subjects of general interest.

The Illustrations of the POPULAR ENCYCLOPEDIA have been augmented fully a half, and extend to One Hundred and Fifty-four Pages of Steel Engravings, and Fourteen Coloured Maps, besides many Engravings on Wood. The whole Work, including Supplement, will be completed in 32 Parts, price 2s each, or in 14 Divisions, 10s each.

In 32 Parts, 2s 6d each, or 2 large Vols, 2250 pages, super-royal 8vo, cloth, £3, 15s

MORTON'S CYCLOPEDIA OF AGRICULTURE, PRACTICAL AND SCIENTIFIC:

In which the Theory, the Arts, and the Business of Farming, in all their departments, are thoroughly and practically treated. By upwards of Fifty of the most eminent Farmers, Land Agents, and Scientific Men of the Day. Edited by JOHN C. MORTON. With above 1800 Illustrative Figures on Wood and Steel.

The object of this Work is to present to the Agricultural reader the whole of the truth immediately connected with his profession, as far as it is known to the man most familiar with the sciences it involves, the methods it employs, and the risks it incurs. Illustrations on Wood and Steel, of Farm Buildings, Inclosures, Plants cultivated and uncultivated, Agricultural Machines, Implements, and Operations, &c., are given, wherever they can be useful.

The Maps complete in 32 Parts, imperial 4to, 2s. 6d. each.

THE IMPERIAL ATLAS OF MODERN GEOGRAPHY;

An Extensive Series of Maps, embracing the most recent Discoveries, and the latest Political Divisions of Territory in all parts of the World. Compiled from the most reliable sources, under the supervision of W. G. BLACKIE, Ph.D., F.R.G.S.

Impartial and accurate information, largeness of scale, and clearness of execution, measuring when closed 18 inches by 11 inches. The Maps are printed on paper measuring 32 inches by 15, and carefully coloured. The Series extends to seventy-eight such Sheets, comprising above One Hundred different Maps.

A GENERAL INDEX, embracing all the names on the Maps in the ATLAS, extending to considerably above 100,000 in number, is in course of publication, and will be completed in 5 Parts, 2s. 6d. each.

In Parts, imperial 8vo, 2s. 6d. each.

THE IMPERIAL GAZETTEER.

A GENERAL DICTIONARY OF GEOGRAPHY,

PHYSICAL, POLITICAL, STATISTICAL, and DESCRIPTIVE; including comprehensive Accounts of the Countries, Cities, Principal Towns, Villages, Seas, Lakes, Rivers, Islands, Mountains, Valleys, &c., in the World. Edited by W. G. BLACKIE, Ph.D., F.R.G.S. Illustrated by nearly SEVEN HUNDRED AND FIFTY ENGRAVINGS, printed in the text, comprising Views, Costumes, Maps, Plans, &c. Two large Volumes, 2670 pages, imperial 8vo, cloth, 24. 6s.

"This excellent book of reference. . . . All the articles we have examined, whether long or short, exhibit a greater degree of correctness in

minute detail than we should have thought practicable in so comprehensive a work."—*Athenaeum*.

In Parts, imperial 8vo, 2s. 6d. each.

THE IMPERIAL DICTIONARY,

ENGLISH, TECHNOLOGICAL, AND SCIENTIFIC;

Adapted to the Present State of Literature, Science, and Art, comprising all Words purely English, and the principal Technical and Scientific Terms, together with their Etymologies, and their Pronunciations, according to the best Authorities. Edited by J. OGILVIE, LL.D. Illustrated by upwards of Two Thousand Engravings on Wood. In two large Volumes, 2386 pages, imperial 8vo, cloth, 24; or including the Supplement, 24. 17s. 6d.

"The most comprehensive work of the kind we possess."—*Athenaeum*.

"Dr. Ogilvie has not only produced the best English Dictionary that exists,

but, so far as the actual state of knowledge permitted, has made some approach towards perfection."—*British Quarterly Review*.

Complete in 7 Parts, 2s. 6d. each; or in cloth, 20s.

A SUPPLEMENT TO THE IMPERIAL DICTIONARY,

Containing an Extensive Collection of Words, Terms, and Phrases, in the various departments of Literature, Science, and Art; together with numerous Obsolete, Obsolescent, and Scottish Words, found in Chaucer, Spenser, Shakspeare, and Scott, not included in previous English Dictionaries. By JOHN OGILVIE, LL.D. Illustrated by nearly 400 Engravings on Wood.

The number of additional words, including additional significations to words already given, amount to nearly Twenty Thousand.

In 32 Parts, imperial 4to, 2s. 6d. each.

THE IMPERIAL FAMILY BIBLE,

Containing the OLD and NEW TESTAMENTS, according to the most correct Copies of the Authorized Version. With many Thousand Critical, Explanatory, and Practical Notes; also, References, Readings, Chronological Tables, and Indexes. Illustrated by a Superb Series of Engravings.

The Engraved Illustrations, 74 in number, consist of a Series of Historical Subjects, selected with much care and research from the Works of the Old Masters, and from those of the existing Schools of Painting on the Continent

and in Britain, and a Series of Views of important Bible Localities, from authentic drawings; the whole engraved in the most finished manner.

In 32 Parts, imperial 8vo, 1s. each; or 2 Vols., cloth extra, 38s.

THE HISTORY OF THE BIBLE,

From the Beginning of the World to the Establishment of Christianity; and a connection of Profane with Sacred History. By the Rev. THOMAS STACKHOUSE, M.A. With copious additions from recent Commentators, Critics, and Eastern Travellers; and Complete Indexes. Also, an Appendix on the Illustrations of Scripture derived from the Egyptian and Assyrian Monuments, &c.

Illustrated by Fifty highly-finished Engravings.

GLASGOW, EDINBURGH, AND LONDON.

In 46 Parts, medium 8vo, 1s. each; or in Divisions, cloth gilt, 6s. 8d. each.

BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF EMINENT SCOTSMEN.

Originally Edited by ROBERT CHAMBERS. In Four Volumes. New Edition. With a Supplemental Volume, containing the Biographies to the Present Time. By the Rev. THOMAS THOMPSON. With 85 Portraits, and 5 Engraved Titles.

In 25 Parts, super-royal 8vo, 1s. each.

THE WORKS OF ROBERT BURNS.

Complete Illustrated Edition. Literary and Pictorial. With WILSON'S Essay "On the Genius and Character of Burns;" DR. CURRIE'S Memoir of the Poet; and 50 Landscape and Portrait Illustrations. Or with Eight Supplementary Parts, containing 32 Engravings, making in all 82 Illustrations. 2 Vols., cloth extra, £1, 16s.

In 21 Parts, super-royal 4to, 2s. each.

ITALY:

CLASSICAL, HISTORICAL, AND PICTURESQUE.

Illustrated in a Series of Views, engraved in the most finished manner, from Drawings by Stanfield, R.A.; Roberts, R.A.; Harding, Prout, Lettich, Brockedon, Barnard, &c., &c. With Descriptions of the Scenes, and an Essay on Italy and the Italians, by CAMILLO MAPEI, D.D.

"We do not know a more delightful drawing-room book than this work on Italy, which comprises upwards of sixty exquisite illustrations of the noblest and most interesting scenery in the world, with corresponding descriptions to record

the natural features, and the poetical and historical associations of each spot."—*Inverness Courier*.

ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF THE WALDENSES.

In 16½ Parts, 1s. each; or 2 Vols. 8vo, cloth, 18s.

THE ISRAEL OF THE ALPS.

A Complete History of the Vaudois of Piedmont and their Colonies. Prepared in great part from unpublished Documents. By ALEXIS MURON, D.D. Illustrated by a Series of Steel Engravings, comprising Scenery in the Valleys, Maps, and Historical Illustrations, prepared by or under the superintendence of the Author, M. MURON.

This Work contains the most complete and connected view of the history of the Vaudois. It is the fruit of long and laborious research, and throws new light

upon many of the known facts, events, and periods of the Waldensian people in their earnest and protracted struggle for the preservation of the true faith.

In 39 Parts, 1s. each; Divisions, cloth elegant, 6s. each; or 4 Vols., cloth, £2, 4s.

D'AUBIGNE'S HISTORY OF THE REFORMATION.

Translated by D. D. SCOTT, and H. WHITE, B.A. The Translation carefully revised by Dr. D'AUBIGNE. Large type, numerous Notes, not in any other edition, and Forty Illustrations, beautifully Engraved on Steel. The Emerald Edition, small 8vo, in 17 Nos., Price 6d. each.

In 20 Parts, 1s. each; or 2 Vols., cloth, £1, 1s.

A HISTORY OF THE PAPACY,

POLITICAL AND ECCLESIASTICAL, in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries. By LEOPOLD RANKE. With Notes by the Translator, and an Introductory Essay by J. H. MERLE D'AUBIGNE, D.D. Illustrated by Twenty highly-finished Portraits.

In 12 Parts, super-royal 8vo, 2s. 6d. each; or 1 Vol., cloth extra, £1, 11s. 6d.

THE GARDENER'S ASSISTANT.

PRACTICAL AND SCIENTIFIC. A Guide to the Formation and Management of the Kitchen, Fruit, and Flower Garden, and the Cultivation of Conservatory, Green-houses, and Hot-house Plants. By ROBERT THOMPSON, Superintendent of the Horticultural Society's Garden, Chiswick. Illustrated by twelve beautifully-coloured Engravings, each representing two or more choice Flowers or Fruits, and nearly Three Hundred Engravings on Wood.

BELLIE AND SON'S PUBLICATIONS:

In 25 Parts, 2s. each; or 2 Vols. super-royal 8vo, cloth, £2, 14s.

THE WORKS OF JOHN BUNYAN,
PRACTICAL, ALLEGORICAL, AND MISCELLANEOUS;

First Complete Edition. Carefully collated and printed from the Author's own Editions. With EDITORIAL PREFACES, NOTES, and a MEMOIR OF BUNYAN AND HIS TIMES. By GEORGE OFFOR. Numerous Illustrative Engravings.

SEPARATE ISSUES.

- I. THE EXPERIMENTAL, DOCTRINAL, AND PRACTICAL WORKS. Illustrations. In 32 Parts, 1s. each.
II. THE ALLEGORICAL, FIGURATIVE, AND SYMBOLICAL WORKS. Numerous Illustrations. In 18 Parts, 1s. each.

LADIES OF THE REFORMATION.

MEMOIRS OF DISTINGUISHED FEMALE CHARACTERS,

Belonging to the Period of the Reformation in the Sixteenth Century. By the Rev. JAMES ANDERSON, Author of *Ladies of the Covenant*, &c. Nearly Two Hundred Illustrations, from Drawings by J. Godwin, G. Thomas, J. W. Archer, E. K. Johnson, &c.

FIRST SERIES.—ENGLAND, SCOTLAND, and THE NETHERLANDS. Small 4to, cloth, antique, 10s. 6d.

SECOND SERIES.—GERMANY, FRANCE, SWITZERLAND, ITALY, and SPAIN. Small 4to, cloth, antique, 10s. 6d.

Cloth, antique, 7s. 6d.; or 14 Nos., 6d. each.

LADIES OF THE COVENANT;

Being Memoirs of Distinguished Scottish Female Characters, embracing the period of the Covenant and Persecution. By the Rev. JAMES ANDERSON, Author of *The Martyrs of the Bass*, &c. Numerous Engravings.

Complete in 30 Nos., 6d. each; or 2 Vols., cloth, gilt, 17s.

THE SHEEPFOLD AND THE COMMON;
OR, WITHIN AND WITHOUT.

Being Tales and Sketches Illustrating the Power of Evangelical Religion, and the Pernicious Tendency of the Heresies and Errors of the Day.

Illustrated by a Series of Thirty-two Page Engravings.

This Work is a new and much-improved Edition of the *Evangelical Rambler*, a title under which above One Hundred Thousand copies of it were sold. The

highest testimony was borne to its excellence when first put forth, and its re-appearance, in a revised and amended form, has met with great approval.

Complete in 20 Parts, imperial 8vo, 1s. each.

THE LIFE OF JESUS CHRIST,

With the Lives of the Apostles and Evangelists. By the Rev. JOHN FLEETWOOD, D.D. Also, the Lives of the most Eminent Fathers and Martyrs, and the History of Primitive Christianity, by WILLIAM CAVE, D.D. With an Essay on the Evidences of Christianity, and numerous Notes not to be found in any other Edition. To which is subjoined, A Concise History of the Christian Church, by the Rev. THOMAS SIMS, M.A. Illustrated by Forty beautiful Engravings.

Complete in 20 Parts, super-royal 8vo, 1s. each; or 1 Vol., cloth, 21s.

THE CHRISTIAN CYCLOPEDIA;

OR, REPERTORY OF

BIBLICAL AND THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE

By the Rev. JAMES GARDNER, M.D., A.M. With numerous Illustrations.

This Work is designed to be a popular compendium of what has hitherto been written on all those subjects which are either involved in, or allied to Christianity. It embraces in its plan the general features both of a Biblical and Theo-

logical Dictionary, and a comprehensive digest of the Literature and Biography connected with Christianity. It must be regarded as a Work of high value to the readers and students of the Scriptures.

GLASGOW, EDINBURGH, AND LONDON.

BIBLES AND COMMENTARIES.

THE IMPERIAL FAMILY BIBLE.

See page 2.

THE COMPREHENSIVE FAMILY

BIBLE; with Notes and Practical Reflections; also, References, Readings, Chronological and other Tables. By DAVID DAVISON, LL.D. With numerous Historical and Landscape Illustrations and Maps. In 36 Parts, super-royal 4to, 2s. each.

COOKE'S BROWN'S SELF-INTER-

PRETING BIBLE. With Introduction, Marginal References, and Copious Notes, Explanatory and Practical. By the Rev. HENRY COOKE, D.D., Belfast. Illustrated with Historical Designs, and a Series of Views. In 44 Parts, royal 4to, 1s. each.

HAWEIS' EVANGELICAL EXPO-

SITOR; a Commentary on the Holy Bible, with Introduction, Marginal References and Readings, and a Complete Index and Concise Dictionary, by the Rev. JOHN HAWEIS. With Maps, Plans, and other Engravings. 65 Parts, 1s. each.

THE TWOFOLD CONCORDANCE

to the Words and Subjects of the Holy Bible; including a Concise Dictionary, a Chronological Arrangement of the Sacred Narrative, and other Tables, designed to facilitate the Consultation and Study of the Sacred Scriptures. In 18 Nos., 6d. each.

The FIRST PART of this Work consists of a careful collation of Oruden's Concordance, but retaining all that is really valuable. The SECOND PART comprises a Complete Index and Concise Dictionary of the Bible, by the Rev. JOHN BARR.

THE BOOK OF ECCLESIASTES:

ITS MEANING AND ITS LESSONS. By the Rev. ROBERT BUCHANAN, D.D. Square 8vo, cloth, 7s. 6d.

STANDARD RELIGIOUS WORKS.

BAXTER'S SELECT PRACTICAL

WORKS. Including his Treatises on Conversion, The Divine Life, Dying Thoughts, and Saints' Everlasting Rest, and a Memoir of the Author. In 48 Nos., super-royal 8vo, 6d. each.

BAXTER'S SAINTS' EVERLAST-

ING REST: The Divine Life, and Dying Thoughts; also, a Call to the Unconverted, and Now or Never. 21 Nos., super-royal 8vo, 6d. each; cloth, 11s. 6d.

FAMILY WORSHIP: A Series of

Prayers, with Doctrinal and Practical Remarks on Passages of Sacred Scripture, for every Morning and Evening throughout the Year, by One Hundred and Eighty Clergymen of the Scottish Church. With Twenty-one highly-finished Engravings. 20 Parts, super-royal 8vo, 1s. each; cloth, £1, 1s.

M'GAVIN'S PROTESTANT: A

Series of Essays on the Christianity of the New Testament, and the Papal Superstition. New Edition. Medium 8vo, cloth, 14s.; or in 26 Nos., 6d. each.

DWIGHT'S SYSTEM of THEO-

LOGY; or, Complete Body of Divinity. In a Series of Sermons. In 20 Parts, 1s. each.

THEOPNEUSTIA; The Bible, its

Divine Origin and Entire Inspiration, deduced from Internal Evidence, and the Testimonies of Nature, History, and Science. By L. GAUSMAN, D.D., Geneva. Cloth, 3s.

PSALMS of DAVID: Scottish Met-

rical Version. To bind with Family Bibles, various sizes. Imperial 4to, 2s. 6d.; super-royal 4to, 2s.; royal 4to, 2s.; demy 4to, 2s.; 18mo, 6d.

ILLUSTRATED POCKET BIBLE;

Containing nearly 9000 Critical and Explanatory Notes, and 80,000 References and Readings; also, THIRTY-SEVEN beautiful Engravings. In 24 Nos., 6d. each.

BROWN'S DICTIONARY of the

BIBLE. Corrected and Improved. Illustrated by several hundred Engravings. 20 Parts, 1s. each; cloth, £1, 1s.

THE BOOK of COMMON PRAYER.

Notes compiled from the Writings of the most eminent Commentators. Illustrated by 29 beautiful Engravings, including eight Designs for the Offices, by H. G. SHELTON. The Rubrics printed in Red. 16 Nos., 6d. each; and in mor., flexible, 15s.

BARNES' NOTES ON THE NEW

TESTAMENT. Illustrated and Annotated Edition. With 38 Steel Plates, 22 Maps and Plans, and 28 Engravings on Wood—in all, twenty separate Plates, from the most authentic sources, illustrating the principal Scripture Scenes, and Sites of Celebrated Cities, Towns, &c. The whole complete in 33 Parts, 1s. each; or in 5 double vols., 6s. each, and 1 at 4s. 6d.

BARNES' QUESTIONS ON THE

NEW TESTAMENT. For Bible Classes and Sunday Schools. In 1 Vol. (MATTHEW to HEBREWS), cloth, 3s. 6d.; or 6 Parts, 6d. each.

BARNES' NOTES ON THE OLD

TESTAMENT. Books of JOB, ISAIAH, and DANIEL. With additional Prefaces and Notes, also Appendixes, Engravings on Steel, and above 150 Illustrations on Wood; most of them to be found in no other Edition. In 19 Parts, 1s. each; or JOB, 1 Vol., cloth, 6s.; ISAIAH, 2 Vols., 7s.; DANIEL, 1 Vol., 6s. 6d.

CONTEMPLATIONS on the HIS-

TORICAL PASSAGES of the OLD and NEW TESTAMENT. By the Right Rev. JOSEPH HALL, D.D. Numerous Plates. In 15 Parts, 1s. each.

PROFESSION AND PRACTICE;

Or, Thoughts on the Low State of Vital Religion among Professing Christians. By G. M'CULLOCH. Cloth, 1s. 6d.

An EXPOSITION of the CONFES-

SION of FAITH of the WESTMINSTER ASSEMBLY of DIVINES. By ROBERT SHAW, D.D., Whitburn. Eighth Edition. Cloth, 3s. 6d.

SCOTS WORTHIES; their LIVES

and TESTIMONIES. With a Supplement, containing MEMOIRS of THE LADIES of the COVENANT. Upwards of One Hundred Illustrations. In 22 Parts, super-royal 8vo, 1s. each.

THE CHRISTIAN'S DAILY COM-

PANION: A Series of Meditations and Short Practical Comments on the most Important Doctrines and Precepts of the Holy Scriptures, arranged for Daily Reading throughout the year. With Twenty-one highly-finished Engravings. 20 Parts, super-royal 8vo, 1s. each; cloth, £1, 1s.

WATSON'S BODY of PRACTICAL

DIVINITY, in a Series of Sermons on the Shorter Catechism of the Westminster Assembly, with Select Sermons on various Subjects. The whole Revised and Corrected, with numerous Notes. In 29 Nos., super-royal 8vo, 6d. each.

WILLISON'S PRACTICAL WORKS.

With an Essay on his Life and Times. By the Rev. Dr. HENRY WILLISON. 20 Parts, super-royal 8vo, 1s. each.

HISTORY, BIOGRAPHY, &c.

**MEMOIRS of NAPOLEON BONA-
PAPTE.** By K. de BOURGNEUIL. Numerous Historical and
Portrait Illustrations. 25 Parts, 1s. each; or 2 vols., £1, 6s.

CABINET HISTORY of ENGLAND,
Civil, Military, and Ecological, from the Landing of Julius
Cæsar till the year 1816. 12 vols., bound in cloth, £1, 6s.

**SMITH'S CANADA: PAST, PRESENT,
and FUTURE.** Being an Historical, Geographical, Geological,
and Statistical Account of Canada West. Maps, and other
illustrations. 2 Vols., royal 8vo, cloth, 20s.

**AIKMAN'S HISTORY of SCOT-
LAND,** from the Earliest Period to the present Time. New
Edition. With NINETY ILLUSTRATIONS, comprising Portraits,
Views, and Historical Designs. In 68 Parts, 1s. each.

THE ISRAEL of the ALPS. A Com-
plete History of the Vaudois of Piedmont and their Colonies.
Prepared in great part from unpublished Documents. By
ALEXIS MONROE, D.D. Illustrated by a Series of Steel Engrav-
ings. In 164 Parts, 1s. each; or 2 Vols. 8vo, cloth, 15s.

**THE WORKS of FLAVIUS JOSE-
PHUS.** With Maps and other Illustrations. Demy 8vo, 224
Parts, 1s. each; or 4 Vols., cloth, 24s.

See also Works on pages 1, 2, and 4 of this List.

**NOTES of a CLERICAL TUR-
key,** spent chiefly in the HOLY LAND. By the Rev. ROBERT
BUCCHANAN, D.D. Illustrated by an Accurate Map of the whole
country, and by various enlarged Sketch Maps, illustrative of
individual localities and of particular excursions. Cloth, 7s. 6d.

THE TEN YEARS' CONFLICT.
Being the History of the Disruption of the Church of Scotland.
By the Rev. ROBERT BUCCHANAN, D.D. Illustrated with Por-
traits on Steel and Designs on Wood. 25 Nos.; 6d. each; or 2
Vols. cloth, 15s. The Library Edition, elegantly printed in large
type, 2 vols. demy 8vo, cloth, £1, 1s.

ROLLIN'S ANCIENT HISTORY.
With Extensive Notes, Geographical, Topographical, Historical,
and Critical, and a Life of the Author. By JAMES BELL. Num-
erous Illustrations. In 24 Parts, medium 8vo, 15s. each.

**ROLLIN'S ARTS and SCIENCES of
the ANCIENTS.** With Notes by JAMES BELL (forming a third
Volume to Ancient History). In 10 Parts, 1s. each.

**BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY of
EMINENT SCOTSMEN.** In Four Volumes. New Edition.
With a Supplemental Volume, continuing the Biographies to the
Present Time. By the Rev. THOS. THOMSON. With 86 Portraits,
and 5 Engraved Titles. In 46 Parts, medium 8vo, 1s. each;
or Divisions, cloth gilt, 6s. 6d. each.

WORKS ON AGRICULTURE.

CYCLOPEDIA of AGRICULTURE.
Practical and Scientific. By upwards of Fifty of the most
Eminent Farmers, Land-Agents, and Scientific Men of the day.
Edited by JOHN C. MONROE. With above 1800 Illustrative
Figures on Wood and Steel. In 28 Parts, 2s. 6d. each; or 2 large
Vols., super-royal 8vo, cloth, £3, 15s.

NEW FARMER'S ALMANAC.
Edited by JOHN C. MONROE, Editor of the *Agricultural Gazette*,
Cyclopedia of Agriculture, &c. Published yearly. Price 1s.

**OUR FARM CROPS; Being a popu-
lar Scientific Description of the Cultivation, Chemistry, Dis-
eases, and Remedies, &c. of our different Crops, worked up to
the high Farming of the present day.** By JOHN WILSON,
F.R.S.E., Professor of Agriculture in the University of Edin-
burgh, Member of Council of the Royal Agricultural Society of
England, &c., &c. Illustrated with Engravings on Wood. To be
completed in Twelve Parts, 1s. each, each Part complete in itself.

"This Work is probably the most remarkable, and the most useful for the
Agriculturist, that has appeared for a long time."—*Glasgow Official Gazette*.

THE GARDENER'S ASSISTANT.
Practical and Scientific. A Guide to the Formation and Manage-
ment of the Kitchen, Fruit, and Flower Garden, and the Cul-
tivation and Management of Conservatory, Green-house, and Hot-
house Plants. With a Copious Calendar of Gardening Operations.
By ROBERT TROTTER, Horticultural Society's Garden, Chiswick.
Illustrated by numerous Engravings and carefully Coloured
Plates. In 12 Parts, 2s. 6d. each, or cloth, £1, 11s. 6d.

Besides the subjects above indicated, the Work contains Chapters on the Phy-
siology of Plants, the Nature and Improvement of Soils, the various kinds of
Manures and their Uses, and the Tools, Instruments, &c. employed in Gardening;
together with descriptions of the best varieties of Vegetables, Fruits, and
Flowers. Profusely illustrated with Engravings printed in the Text.

THE PRACTICAL MEASURER;
Or, Tradesman and Wood-Merchant's Assistant. By ALEXANDER
FERGUSON. New Edition, greatly enlarged. In 12 Nos., 6d. each;
bound, 6s. 6d.

FARM INSECTS. Being the Natural
History and Economy of the Insects injurious to the Field Crops
in Great Britain and Ireland, and also those which infest Barns
and Granaries, with suggestions for their destruction. By JOHN
CURTIS, F.L.S., &c., &c. Illustrated with many hundred Figures,
Plain and Coloured. In 8 Parts, super-royal 8vo, 2s. 6d. each,
plain plates, and 3s. 6d. coloured plates; or cloth, £1, 10s.

FARMER'S GUIDE. A Treatise on
the Diseases of Horses and Black Cattle, with Instructions for
the Management of Breeding Mares and Cows. By JAMES WEBB,
Veterinary Surgeon. Seventh Edition. Foolscap 8vo, cloth,
3s. 6d.

CONSTRUCTION of COTTAGES.
By G. SMITH, Architect, Edinburgh. Illustrated by Working
Plans, accompanied by Specifications, Details, and Estimates.
Cloth, 4s.

AGRICULTURIST'S CALCULATOR.
A Series of Forty-five Tables for Land-Measuring, Draining,
Manuring, Planting, Weight of Hay and Cattle by Measure-
ment, Building, &c. 17 Nos., foolscap 8vo, 6d. each; bound, 9s.

AGRICULTURIST'S ASSISTANT:
A Note-Book of Principles, Rules, and Tables, adapted to the
use of all engaged in Agriculture, or the Management of Landed
Property. By JOHN EWEART, Land-Surveyor and Agricultural
Engineer. Plates and Cuts. Foolscap 8vo, cloth, 3s. 6d.

**LAND - MEASURER'S READY-
RECKONER:** Being Tables for ascertaining at sight the Con-
tents of any Field or Piece of Land. Third edition. Bound in
roan, 2s.

HOW to CHOOSE a Good MILK COW.
By J. H. MARSH, with a Supplement on the Dairy Cattle of
Britain. Illustrated with Engravings. Cloth, 3s.

Re-issue, with Coloured Plates. In 30 Parts, royal 8vo, 1s. each.

A HISTORY OF THE EARTH AND ANIMATED NATURE.

By OLIVER GOLDSMITH. With numerous Notes from the pen of the most distinguished British and Foreign Naturalists.

The Plates contain 2400 illustrative figures, of which 230 are carefully coloured.

In 22 Parts, royal 8vo, 1s. each.

A HISTORY OF THE VEGETABLE KINGDOM.

Embracing the Physiology, Classification, and the Culture of Plants; with their various uses to Man and the Lower Animals, and their application in the Arts, Manufactures, and Domestic Economy. Illustrated by Seven Hundred Figures on Wood and Steel, of which One Hundred are beautifully coloured.

WORKS ON MACHINERY, CARPENTRY, &c.

ENGINEER and MACHINIST'S

DRAWING-BOOK: A Complete Course of Instruction for the Practical Engineer; comprising Linear Drawing, Projections, Eccentric Curves, the various forms of Gearing, Reciprocating Machinery, Sketching and Drawing from the Machine, Projection of Shadows, Tinting and Colouring, and Perspective, on the basis of the works of M. Le Blanc and M.M. Ariensz. Illustrated by numerous Engravings on Wood and Steel. In 16 Parts, imperial 4to, 2s. each; or 1 Vol. half-morocco, £2, 2s.

ENGINEER and MACHINIST'S

ASSISTANT: Being a Series of Plans, Sections, and Elevations of Steam Engines, Water Wheels, Spinning Machines, Mills for Grinding, Tools, &c., taken from Machines of approved Construction; with detailed Descriptions and Practical Essays on various departments of Machinery. New and Improved Edition. In 28 Parts, imperial 4to, 2s. 6d. each; or 2 Vols. half-morocco, £4, 4s.

RAILWAY MACHINERY. A Treatise

on the Mechanical Engineering of Railways; embracing the Principles and Construction of Rolling and Fixed Plant, in all departments. Illustrated by a Series of Plates on a large scale, and by numerous Engravings on Wood. By D. KINNEAR CLARK, Engineer. In 30 Parts, imperial 4to, 2s. 6d. each; 3 Vols. half-morocco, £4, 16s.

RAILWAY LOCOMOTIVES. Their

Progress, Mechanical Construction, and Performance, with the recent Practice in England and America. Illustrated by an extensive Series of Plates, and numerous Engravings on Wood. By D. KINNEAR CLARK, Engineer. To be completed in 26 Parts, imperial 4to, 2s. 6d. each; 3 Vols., half-morocco, £4.

This Work will comprise the Locomotive Section of the Author's Work on *Railway Machinery*; with successive additions illustrating the practice of English Locomotive Engineers of the present day, and presenting the most recent attainments in American practice. It will also include the consideration of a variety of questions bearing upon the improvement and economical working of the Locomotive.

RECENT PRACTICE in the LOCOMOTIVE ENGINE

(being a Supplement to *Railway Machinery*): Comprising the most recent Improvements in English Practice, and Illustrations of the Locomotive Practice of the United States of America. By D. KINNEAR CLARK, Engineer. Complete in 10 Parts, imperial 4to, 2s. 6d. each; half-morocco, 35s.

This Work contains a supply of the new portion of *Railway Locomotives*, announced above. It is published separately for the benefit of those who already possess the Author's Work on *Railway Machinery*.

RURAL ARCHITECTURE. A

Series of Designs for Ornamental Cottages and Villas. Exemplified in Plans, Elevations, Sections, and Details. With Practical Descriptions. By JOHN WATSON, Architect. In 21 Parts, imperial 4to, 2s. each; 1 Vol. half-morocco, £2, 10s.

CARPENTER and JOINER'S

ASSISTANT: A Complete Course of Practical Instruction in Geometry, Geometrical Lines, Drawing, Projection, and Perspective; also the Selection, Preparation, and Strength of Materials, and the Mechanical Principles of Framing, with their Application to Carpentry and Joinery. Illustrated by numerous Engravings on Steel and Wood, comprising examples of some of the most important Timber Constructions executed in Great Britain, on the Continent of Europe, and in the United States of America. To be completed in about 22 Parts, super-royal 4to, 2s. each.

The object of this publication is to supply, in a compendious form, a complete and practical Course of Instruction in the Principles of Carpentry and Joinery, with a Selection of Examples of Works actually executed. It will include the most important features of the great works of Emy, Kraft, and others, which, from their cost and foreign languages, are inaccessible to the great majority of workmen.

CABINET-MAKER'S ASSISTANT.

A Series of Original Designs for Modern Furniture, with Descriptions and details of Construction. Complete in 33 Parts, imperial 4to, 2s. 6d. each; half-bound morocco, £3, 3s.

MECHANIC'S CALCULATOR;

Comprehending Principles, Rules, and Tables, in the various Departments of Mathematics and Mechanics. Nineteenth Edition. Cloth, 5s. 6d.

MECHANIC'S DICTIONARY. A

Note-Book of Technical Terms, Rules, and Tables, useful in the Mechanical Arts. With Engravings of Machinery, and nearly 200 Diagrams on Wood. Thirteenth Edition. Cloth, 5s.

The CALCULATOR and DICTIONARY are published in 27 Nos., 6d. each.

MURPHY'S ART of WEAVING.

Illustrated by nearly 250 Figures, with Warp, Weft, and Yarn Tables, for the use of Manufacturers. Third Edition, 8vo, cloth, 16s.

REID'S CLOCK and WATCH-

MAKING, Theoretical and Practical. Illustrated with Twenty Folding Plates, and Vignette Title. In 18 Parts, royal 8vo, 2s. 6d.; or 1 Vol., cloth, 21s.

ORNAMENTAL DESIGN: A Series

of examples of Egyptian, Grecian, Roman, Italian, Gothic, Moorish, French, Flemish, and Elizabethan Ornaments, suitable for Art-workmen and Decorators. With an Essay on Ornamental Art, as applicable to Trade and Manufacture. By JAS. BALLANTYNE, Author of a *Treatise on Egyptian Glass*, &c., &c. Forty Plates, imperial 4to, cloth, 21, 2s.

BLAGIE AND SON'S PUBLICATIONS:

POETRY AND LIGHT LITERATURE.

THE WORKS OF ROBERT BURNS. Complete Illustrated Edition, Literary and Pictorial. With Winson's Essay "On the Genius and Character of Burns," and Dr. CURRIE's Memoir of the Poet, and 50 Landscape and Portrait Illustrations. 25 Parts, super-royal 8vo, 1s. each.
Or with Eight SUPPLEMENTARY PARTS, containing 82 Engravings; making in all 82 Illustrations. 2 Vols., cloth extra, 21, 16s.

LAND OF BURNS; A Series of Landscapes Illustrative of the Writings of the Scottish Poet, from Paintings by D. O. HILL, R.S.A. Also, Portraits of the Poet, his Friends, &c. With Descriptions and Biographies, by ROBERT CHAMBERLAIN and Essay by Professor WINSON. 2 Vols., 4to, cloth, gilt edges, 22, 2s.

BOOK OF SCOTTISH SONG. A Collection of the Best and Most Approved Songs of Scotland, with Critical and Historical Notices, and an Essay on Scottish Song. Engraved Frontispiece and Title. 16 Nos., 6d. each; cloth, gilt edges, 9s.

BOOK OF SCOTTISH BALLADS. A Comprehensive Collection of the Ballads of Scotland, with Illustrative Notes, and Engraved Frontispiece and Title. 15 Nos., 6d. each; cloth, gilt edges, 9s.

NICOLL'S POEMS and LYRICS, chiefly in the Scottish Dialect. With a Memoir of the Author. New Edition. Small 8vo, cloth, gilt, 2s. 6d.

HOGG.—The WORKS of the ETTRICK SHEPHERD, with Illustrations by D. O. HILL, R.S.A.—The Poetical Works, complete in 5 Vols., cloth, 17s. 6d.; the Prose Works, complete in 6 Vols., 21, 1s. Both Series are also published for sale in separate Vols., at 8s. 6d. each.

CASQUET OF LITERARY GEMS; Containing upwards of 700 Extracts in Poetry and Prose. From nearly 300 Distinguished Authors. Illustrated by Twenty-five Engravings. In 24 Parts, 1s. each.

REPUBLIC OF LETTERS. A Selection in Poetry and Prose, from the Works of the most Eminent Writers, with many Original Pieces. Twenty-five beautiful Illustrations. 4 Vols., cloth extra, gilt edges, 21, or in 16 Parts, 1s. each.

GOLDSMITH'S MISCELLANEOUS WORKS. With an Essay on his Life and Writings. Thirty-seven Engravings on Wood, from Designs by W. Harvey and W. B. Scott. 2 Vols., foolscap 8vo, cloth, 10s.

SANDFORD'S ESSAY on the RISE and PROGRESS OF LITERATURE. Foolscap 8vo, cloth, 2s. 6d.

LAING'S WAYSIDE FLOWERS: Being Poems and Songs. Introduction by Rev. GEO. GILFILLAN. Third Edition. Cloth, gilt, 2s.

MISCELLANEOUS.

CYCLOPEDIA of DOMESTIC MEDICINE and SURGERY. By THOS. ANDREW, M.D. Illustrated with Engravings on Wood and Steel. 17 Parts, royal 8vo, 1s. each; cloth, 18s.

BARR'S SCRIPTURE STUDENT'S ASSISTANT. A Complete Index and Concise Dictionary to the Bible. New Edition, enlarged, with Pronunciation of Proper Names, Chronological Arrangement of the Scriptures, &c. Post-8vo, cloth, 3s.

BARR'S CATECHETICAL INSTRUCTIONS for YOUNG COMMUNICANTS. With an Address to Young Persons not yet Communicants. 41st Edition, 18mo, sewed, 4d.

BARR'S CATECHETICAL INSTRUCTIONS on INFANT BAPTISM. With an Address to Young Parents. 15th Edition, 18mo, sewed, 4d.

COMMERCIAL HAND-BOOK: A Complete Ready-Reckoner, and Compendium of Tables and Information for the Trader, Merchant, and Commercial Traveller. 310 pp. 48mo, bound in roan, 1s.

COMSTOCK'S NATURAL PHILOSOPHY: Edited and largely augmented by R. D. HOBLYN, M.A. Oxon. A Manual of Natural Philosophy; in which are popularly explained the Principles of Heat, Mechanics, Hydrostatics, Hydraulics, Pneumatics, the Steam Engine, Acoustics, Optics, Astronomy, Electricity, Magnetism, &c.; with Questions for Examination on each Chapter, and an Appendix of Problems. Illustrated by nearly Three Hundred Engravings on Wood. Foolscap 8vo, cloth, 5s.

HARTLEY'S ORATORICAL CLASS-BOOK. With the Principles of Elocution Simplified and Illustrated by suitable examples. Fifteenth Edition, improved. Foolscap 8vo; bound, 2s. 6d.

CHORISTER'S TEXT-BOOK; Containing nearly Two Hundred Psalm and Hymn Tunes, Chants, Anthems, &c., arranged for from Two to Five Voices, with Organ or Piano-forte Accompaniments; preceded by a Comprehensive Grammar of Music. By W. J. P. KIDD. Super-royal 8vo, stiff paper, 5s.; cloth, gilt, 8s.

HAND PLACE-BOOK of the UNITED KINGDOM; Containing References of daily use to upwards of 15,000 Localities in Great Britain and Ireland, and General Statistical Tables. Bound, 2s.

FERGUSON'S INTEREST TABLES, At Fourteen different Rates, from a Quarter to Six and a Half per Cent.; also, Tables of Commission and Brokerage. New Edition, enlarged. Bound, 6s.

LAWRIE'S SYSTEM of MERCANTILE ARITHMETIC; With the Nature, Use, and Negotiation of Bills of Exchange. Fifth Edition. In 2 Parts, bound in roan, with Key, 8s.; or Parts I. and II., in cloth, 1s. each; the Key separately, 1s.

MOFFAT: Its WALKS and WELLS. With Incidental Notices of its Botany and Geology. By WILLIAM KEDDIE; and Report on, and Chemical Analysis of, its Mineral Wells, by J. MACADAM, F.R.S.S.A. Foolscap 8vo, 1s.

TYTLER'S ELEMENTS of GENERAL HISTORY, Ancient and Modern. With considerable additions to the Author's Text, numerous Notes, and a Continuation to the reign of Queen Victoria. Edited by the Rev. BRANDON TURNER, M.A. Sixth Edition. Cloth, 5s. 6d.; also in Divisions. Div. I., price 2s. 6d.; Div. II., price 3s. 6d.

M'CRIE'S SKETCHES of SCOTTISH CHURCH HISTORY: Embracing the Period from the Reformation to the Revolution. 2 Vols., demy 12mo, cloth, 4s.

ROBERTSON'S HISTORY of the JEWS, From the Babylonian Captivity to the Destruction of Jerusalem. Cloth, 1s. 6d.

ROBERTSON'S CHART of SCRIPTURE CHRONOLOGY, from the Creation to the Destruction of Jerusalem. In stiff covers, 4d.

STAFFA and IONA DESCRIBED and ILLUSTRATED; With Notices of the Principal Objects on the route from Port Canna to Oban, and in the Sound of Mull. Many Engravings. Limp cloth, 2s.

